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1. SUMMARY: These curve-lined appeals have also been 
straight-lined with the petition for certiorari in Macon v. 
Joiner, et al., No. 82-1974 (Summer List 9, Sheet 1). They 
present the question whether the~inimum wage and overtime 
provisions of the FLSA may constitutionally be applied to the 
employees of av;ublicly owned and operated mass transit system. 
wth. . ~~~~ ~.R. ,~ ~~~~ w ~ ~~~~- ~~}~ 
·~ ~ ~ ~~I>.S\'J ~ ~ ~~ ··~~ ~ ~ 
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2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Until May 1959, public 
transportation in San Antonio was provided by a private transit 
company. At that time, the City of San Antonio created a city-
owned transit system and purchased the private company. In March 
1978, appellee SAMTA, a regional transit authority created 
pursuant to Texas law to serve the San Antonio Metropolitan Area, 
acquired the facilities and equipment of the city-owned nonrail 
system and commenced operations. 
In September 1979, the DOL's Wage and Hour Administration 
rendered an opinion that appellee's operations were not 
constitutionally immune from the application of the FLSA. 
Appellee then filed this action for a declaratory judgment that 
it was exempt from the FLSA and moved for summary judgment. The 
Secretary of Labor counterclaimed for enforcement of the FLSA's 
overtime and record-keeping provisions, appt Garcia intervened in 
support of the Secretary, and appellee APTA intervened in support 
of SAMTA. The~ found that local, publicly operated mass ________. 
~
transit systems constitute integral operations in an area of 
traditional governmental functions, and entered judgment for 
~~~pellee. This Court vacated the DC's judgment and remanded for 
~- further consideration in light of United Transp. Union v. Long 
VVV ~ Island R.R., 455 u.s. 678 (1982). 
On remand, the DC found "nothing in LIRR that compels a 
change in its previous conclusions ..•• " Although the DC 
recognized that "[t]he historical record is not one of 
predominately [sic] public ownership and operation of transit 
services," it concluded that the "record of state regulatory 
\ 
activity indicates that mass transit has traditionally been a 
state perogative [sic] and responsibility, not a federal 
concern." The DC recognized that, under LIRR, lOth Amendment 
immunity is precluded where it would "erode federal authority 
over previously private functions recently converted to public 
ownership," but held that granting immunity to publicly owned and 
operated mass transit systems would not have that effect. The 
FLSA, unlike the Railway Labor Act, is not "a current 
manifestation of a traditional federal concern" since private 
transit operators were not subjected to the Act's minimum wage 
provisions until 1961 and public employers remained entirely 
exempt until 1966. The recent vintage of the amendments 
subjecting public transit employers to the FLSA, the DC 
concluded, precluded a finding that a long-standing federal 
regulatory scheme would be eroded by a grant of immunity. The DC 
then considered the NLRA, the UMTA, and other federal statutes, 
and concluded that "[n]o .•• federal authority exists to be 
eroded in the area of transit." 
The DC's analysis ended with an examination of other factors 
indicating that a function is a state prerogative. It was unable 
satisfactorily to distinguish mass transit from fire and police 
protection and other public services classified as traditional 
state functions in National League of Cities. The DC expressly 
rejected the CA3's holding in Kramer v. New Castle Area Transit 
Auth., 677 F.2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 103 s. Ct. 786 
(1983), that the critical role played by federal grant funds in 
stimulating the conversion of transit systems to public ownership 
differentiates the emerging public role in transit operation from 
traditional state functions. Public transportation, moreover, 
benefits the whole community, is provided at a heavily subsidized 
price, cannot realistically be provided on a for-profit basis, 
and is primarily provided by government. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appt Garcia: The DC's holding is contrary 
to decisions of three CAs that have unanimously decided, in light 
of LIRR, that the FLSA's minimum wage and maximum hours 
provisions may constitutionally be applied to publicly owned 
transit companies. See Dove v. Chattanoga Area Reg. Transp. 
Auth., 701 F.2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council of 
Augusta, Ga., 699 F.2d 1060 (CAll 1983), petn. for cert. pending 
sub nom. Macon v. Joiner, No. 1974; Kramer, supra. The only 
question is whether the DC's aberrant decision should be 
summarily reversed. Appt relies heavily on the CA3's decision in 
Kramer to argue that nonrail mass transit systems are not among 
the functions traditionally performed by state and local 
governments, that such systems have long been subject to federal 
regulation, and that the traditionally private systems have 
become predominantly public due to federal aid. 
~ 
Appt Donovan: The SG argues that the DC's decision 
~~~onflicts with National League of Cities, LIRR, and decisions in 
~hree circuits. Provision of mass transit services is 
distinguishable in critical respects from "core state functions" 
like public education, safety, health, etc.: 
(1) Mass transit is not a traditional local governmental 
function. The DC erred in treating mass transit as an integral 
-5-
component of a state's transportation system, and its conclusi6n 
that historic state regulation of local transit service suffices 
to render mass transit a traditional state prerogative cannot be 
reconciled with National League of Cities since state regulation 
of private enterprise is not equivalent to state operation of 
transit services. 
(2) The recent conversion of transit systems to public 
ownership is not a local phenomenon, but is the result of 
"cooperative federalism." The shift was spurred by federal 
legislation and money; as a result, the claim that operation of 
mass transit by states and localities has become essential to the 
states' separate and independent existence is untenable. The 
reasons offered by the DC for discounting the relevance of 
federal funding are unpersuasive. 
(3) Employment relations in the private transit industry had 
long been subject to federal regulation when local governments 
began to acquire transit systems in the 1960s. In contrast to 
the situation in National League of Cities, where the federal 
government's intrusion affected settled patterns of state 
administration, the municipality here entered a federally 
regulated industry and thus subjected itself to the existing 
regulation. Although Congress did not extend full protection to 
transit employees until 1974, it has long had the power to do so; 
if states' acquisition of private transit operations extends 
intergovernmental immunity thereto, federal authority is 
necessarily eroded. 
-6-
Appellee SAMTA: (1) Mass transit satisfies the test for 
immunity articulated in LIRR. The crucial attributes on which 
the LIRR Court relied do not exist in the case of local transit: 
(a) Local mass transit is not part of a national transportation 
network. The characterization of public transit as an exercise 
in "cooperative federalism" is irrelevant since many activities 
exempted under National League of Cities have been described by 
Congress in the same terms. (b) Local mass transit has not been 
subject to long-standing and comprehensive federal regulation. 
There exists no scheme of federal regulation designed to provide 
uniformity among transit systems, and the NLRA--a law of general 
application applying to almost every private employer--cannot be 
equated with the comprehensive federal statutes specifically 
regulating railroads. Because most transit employees have been 
fully protected by the FLSA only since 1976, it is impossible to 
characterize federal regulation as long-standing or 
comprehensive. (c) States and localities have historically 
regulated local mass transit. (d) State and local governments 
are the principal providers of mass transit, and the states 
clearly regard metropolitan transit authorities as essential 
governmental functions. (e) Appellee has never acceded to FLSA 
coverage. 
(2) Transit systems are analogous to hospitals: public 
involvement in hospitals is not as well established as in the 
transit field; federal funding played a significant role in the 
development of hospitals; and hospitals have long been subject to 
the very same statutes cited by appts as regulating transit. 
-7-
(3) Federal funding of transit is irrelevant, and appts' 
argument to the contrary is foreclosed by Jackson Transit Auth. 
v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1285, 457 u.s. 15 (1982). 
Since Congress "did not intend [UMTA] to create a body of federal 
law applicable to labor relations between local governmental 
entities and transit workers," id. at 27, the receipt of UMTA 
funds cannot abrogate the lOth Amendment rights of those 
governmental entities. 
(4) Appellee's final argument, presented to but not 
addressed by the DC, is that the FLSA's severability clause does 
not authorize the application of the Act, which has been held 
unconstitutional as applied to most of the class of public 
employees it was intended to cover, to the remainder of the 
class. Application of the FLSA to publicly owned local mass 
transit is impermissible absent an amendment to the Act. 
Appellee APTA: The motion to affirm offers no substantial 
additional arguments other than the claim that the trend toward 
public ownership of local mass transit was well established 




The jurisdictional statements clearly 
present a substantial federal question, and the lower court's 
decision squarely conflicts with the decisions of three CAs, one 
I 
of which is also before the Court at this time. As the 
contentions make clear, summary disposition does not seem 
appropriate. LIRR may well prove dispositive, but the 
possibility that the cases can be meaningfully distinguished is 
sufficient to warrant plenary consideration. 
' "'. ;· 
-~-
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend noting probable 
jurisdiction. Macon v. Joiner, which presents the same issue, 
should be considered with, or held for, these appeals. 
There are two motions to affirm and an amicus brief urging a 
plenary hearing and affirmance. 
August 25, 1983 Werder Opin in juris. stmts. 
'.' 
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2. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend noting probable 
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jurisdiction. Macon v. Joiner, No. 82-1974, which presents the 
same issue, should be considered with, or held for, these 
appeals. 
There are two motions to affirm and an amicus brief urging a 
plenary hearing and affirmance. 
August 25, 1983 Werder Opin in juris. stmt. 
. '. 
September 26, 1983 Conference 
~mmer List 21, Sheet 1 
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GARCIA {SAMTA employee) 
v. 
SAN ANTONIO MTA, et al. 
No. 82-1951 
DONOVAN {Sec. of Labor) 
v. 









1. SUMMARY: Appellant in No. 82-1913 has filed a reply 
brief. It points out that appellees have basically ignored the 
conflicting decisions of the CA3, CA6, and CAll. Where appellees 
have addressed these decisions, their attacks are meritless. The 
-2-
conflicting decisions properly relied on the fact that federal 
funding had initiated the move toward public ownership of transit 
systems. Congress does not forfeit its authority under the 
Commerce Clause by making generous grants under the Spending 
Power. 
2. RECOMMENDATION: I continue to recommend noting probable 
ju~ion. 
August 31, 1983 Werder 
Court ................... . l'•oted on .................. , 1d: -: ;- • 
Argued .............. . .... , 19 .. . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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Copies to the Conference 
~u.prtm.t ~curl .of lJtt lhtittb ~talt.s' 
'Jia.-Jrington, ~. ~· 21T~'l~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
No. 82-1913 
No. 82-1951 
June 11, 1984 
Garcia v. San Antonio MTA 
Donovan v. San Antonio MTA 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Needless to say, Harry's circulation today 
supporting a reversal of the judgment below and offering a 
significant change in our approach to the Tenth Amendment 
question is unexpected. Because our summer recess is right 
around the corner, I, for one, would prefer that the case be 
reargued rather than reassigned. 
Sincerely, 
CHAMI!!IERS Of' 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
..t'JtFtmt QI.mri &tf tJrt ~tb ,jtatts 
._-aslthtghnt. ~. <q. 2ll~'l~ 
June 11, 1984 
Re: Nos. 82-1913 & 82-1951 Garcia v. San Antonio Met. 
Transit Authority 
Dear Harry: 
I, too, favor reargument in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackrnun 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMI!I!:RS 01'" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.§tqn"tmt atourt of tltt ]tniit~ .§taU• 
Jfufringhtn. ~. <ij. 20p'l~ 
June 11, 1984 
Re: 82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 
Dear Harry: 
I have your draft op1n1on in this case in which you 
suggest the possibility for (1) reassignment; (2) carry 
over for reargument. 
At this stage - almost mid-June - a 30 page opinion 
coming out contrary to the Conference vote on a very 
important issue places those who may dissent in a 
difficult position. 
I think we should set the case over for reargument 
and so move. 
Regards, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:%lt}lrtlnt <4ourt nf Up• 'Jlini:tt~ ~taftg 
~agJritt.gtlllt. lB. <4. 20gt){.~ 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
June 11, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1913, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 
No. 82-1951, Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. 
You will recall that the conference vote in these cases was 
5-4 to affirm, with my own vote shaky on the affirming side. I 
assume that it is because of this that the Chief Justice as-
signed the cases to me, on his frequently stated reference to 
the "least persuaded." 
I have spent a lot of time on these cases. I have finally 
decided to come down on the side of reversal. I have been able 
to find no principled way in which to affirm. It seems to me 
that our customary reliance on the ~historical" and the "tradi-
tional" is misplaced and that something more fundamental is 
required to eliminate the widespread confusion in the area. The . 
enclosed draft of a proposed opinion reflects my views. 
I realize that this means (1) that the cases should be 
reassigned and (2) that some of you may feel the cases should go 





•aprmu CJi.nui ~tf tJrt ~h •tatt• 
·-Jrinfbt~ ~.crt. 20~, 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
,June 1.2, 1984 
Re: 82-1.913 - Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority 
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio 




Your motion to reargue this case prompts me to 
suggest that perhaps it would be useful to have a 
conference discussion of the standard that should be 
applied to such motions. I think our recent 
discussion of the standards to be applied to a 
dismissal of a writ as having been improvidently 
granted when there are four iustices who want to 
decide the case on the merits was constructive and 
that we mjght profit by focusing our attention on the 
reargument situation in an orderly way. 
It occurs to me that there are four alternative 
grounds for reargument: 
(1) If five justices are unable to 
agree on the proper disposition of a case ~A/~. J . ~ 
before the end of June, reargument is -~~/ 
certainly appropriate. That was the 
justification for the reargument in ~ 
Pennhurst and Sony last year. I suppose 
there is some possibility that that problem 
may justify a reargument in Segura and in 
Palmer v. Hudson, although I gather that 
you remain optimistic about your ability to 
circulate in the near future a proposed 
Court opinion on which five people can 
agree. 
(2) If the circulation of the 
majority op1n1on comes so late that there 
is not adequate time in which to prepare a 
- 2 -
dissent, a reargument may be justified. I 
would suppose, however, that we could hold 
up adjournment for two or three days in 
order to avoin setting a case over. Two 
examples of this problem come to mind: Last 
~erm I did not circulate my proposed 
majority opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra 
Club, 82-242, until June 6; Bill Rehnquist 
circuJated his dissent on June 20 and on 
the following day you changed your vote. 
Bill then circulated his draft opinion for 
the Court on June 27 and thereafter I 
converted my majority into a dissent. 
There was a similar sequence of events 
jn Buffalo Forge in the 1975 Term. I 
circulated my proposed majority on June 18, 
1976, Byron circulated his dissent on June 
21, and on June 25, you switched your vote 
making it necessary for Byron to prepare a 
majority which he was able to do on June 
28, and I then circulated my dissent. 
In the case under discussion now, I 
find it difficult to believe that the four 
Justices who have supported the motion to 
reargue no not have the capacity to prepare 
a dissent in the time which remains this 
month. The various status reports that 
have been circulated have led me to believe 
that all four offices were quite current in 
their work. 
(3) The third possible basis for 
reargument might be that a Member of the 
Court is not certain as to his vote. It 
would not seem to me, however, that this 
would justify reargument unless the vote 
became critical to the disposition. 
(4) Another possibility, of course, is 
the thought that the membership in the 
Court might change over the summer and 
thereby produce a different outcome. In my 
. ~:,. . 
- 3 -
view, this would not be a proper ground for 
reargument. 
Accordingly, unless someone advances a persuasive 
reason for reargument that has not yet been 
identjfied, I plan to vote against your motion. 
Respectfully, ., 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Dear Harry: 
June 12, 1984 
82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio 
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio 
In view of the approaching end of the Term (one 
hopes), I prefer the reargument suggestion. 
Justice Blackmun 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
"~1)~~.~:. 
"fC 














.§upunu <IJomf .ttf Ur~ ~ttlt ~hdt.tr 
:JI'aglfinghtn. ~. <IJ. 20~'!~ 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 12, 1984 
Re: 82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authorit¥ 
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonto 
Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Dear Harry: 




Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~upuntt <!fcurt cf tlrt ~b ~taftg 
'masJrin:gicn. ~. <!f. 2llc?'l~ j 
June 12, 1984 
Re: Nos. 82-1913 & 1951-Garcia v. San Antonio 
Met. Transit Authority, etc. 
Dear Harry: 





cc: The Conference 
.. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
i\ltpfnttt QI&tlttt of tltt ~tb i\ta:Ue' 
Jla,e'£rington. ~. OJ. 20c?-'~ 
June 13, 1984 
Re: 82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority 
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority 
Dear Harry, 
As would be indicated by my vote in previous cases 
such as Maryland v. Wirtz and National League of 
Cities, I am much taken with your opinion and could 
join it if the case is not to be reargued. If there is 
to be a reargument, however, I would prefer not voting 
on the merits at this time. As for the reargument, I 
shall await the discussion but would be inclined to 
' follow your lead. 
Sincerely, 
. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
,jlqfrtut.t <lfoud of l4t ~ittb .ttalt,G' 




July 3, 1984 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Re: 82-1913) 
82-1951) 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority ~ 
IX>novan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority 
Dear lewis, 
'lbe following is a possible fonn of order on the reargurrent of 
this case: 
"This case is restored to the calendar for reargurrent. 
In addition to the questions presented in the petition for 
writ of certiorari and previously briefed and argued, the 
parties are requested to address and brief the following 
question: 
Whether I9r not t:h2 fraiJEWQrk of analysis of 
Tenth Anendrrent questions as set forth in 1--------. 
National league of Cities v .• Usery, 426 U.S. 
833 (1976), smuld be reconsidered'?" 
Justice P~ll 
Sincerely, 
tke. ct rf r' oa ch. .fD 
.f3v1k iVI 
. t 1-e.c.. S-e frl.,c, 
/ 11~ vi~J 
.1 r~,~ ct e:;v~.r h-~ rt:t I ,.. 
fl...o.. ~t-ll·ow nu J!. 
i l (l,\. •f'b Vl(l fVb ~ I "' OY~ 17} 
41 ft If (J '> ~;.,: dl.-t / ~ ., J -('u a._ {e. V'~ 
hrie·fi; -/luGl,,.-1 
~r: .,~ A c;;.r • 
A.f{ 
jen 07/03/84 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Joe 
Re: 82-1913 & 82-1951 Garcia v. SAMTA 
I 0 H.. ~~~ ~~~J 
I suggest as a ques~on for~e~~nt the following: 
Pr~l--~~~ 
Whether National Ceague o { Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 
1\ 
833 (1976), should be reconsidered. 
This is the plain import of HAB's opinion. On page 18, it 
rejects "as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice" the 
rule that state immunity be based on whether a governmental func-
tion is integral or traditional. It would hold instead that the 
substantive limitations on congressional regulation of the States 
under the Commerce Clause "demand no more than that the statute 
at issue be a nondiscriminatory one." P. 26. The only part of 
the opinion that suggests otherwise is the conclusion, which 
states that the Court "reaffirm [s] the fundamental premise of 
National League of Cities that Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause must accommodate the special role of the States in 
the federal system." P. 30. But plainly the opinion "reconsid-
ers" National League. Even if the parties read the above ques-
tion to allow them to argue that the States had no special role 
in the federal system, that would not be bad. 
Other possibilities: 
1. Whether National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 
(1976), should be overruled. ~~~~ 
2. Whether the soeer ine 1\ of National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), should be rejected. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.ittpTnttt <!Jltttrl of tlrt J'nit~ jtalt$' 
JkwJrin:ghtn, ~. <!J. 2Ubi~~ 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
July 3, 1984 
Re: 82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Authority 
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Authority 
Dear Lewis, 
The proposed order on reargument is all 
right with me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.J U STICE HARRY A . B L A CK MU N 
.h.puuu ~ttttrl ttf tlft ~ttit.dt ~hUts 
-~Jrittgtott. ~ . ~· 2!T,;t'1~ 
July 3, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1913, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority 
No. 82-1951, Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority 
Dear Lewis: 
Because I voted against reargument of these cases, I have no 
standing to suggest changes in the proposed form of order. I 
venture to say, however, that if the question is to be presented, 
National League of Cities just might end up being overruled. • In 
the opinion I prepared this Term, and as to which some took 
umbrage, it was not overruled. 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
ss 
July 3, 1984 
82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio ~1etro. Transit AuthoritY 
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. ~ransit Authority 
MEMORANDU~ TO THE CONFERENCE: 
~.t. .... ·, 
Sandra and I suggest the following form of order: 
"This case is restored to the calendar 
for reargument. In addition to the questions 
pr~sented in the petition for writ of certio-
rari and previously briefed and argued, the 
parties are requested to brief and argue the 
following question: 
"Whether or not the principles of the 
Tenth Amendment as set forth in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 
(1976), should be reconsidered?" 




July 3, J9S4 
82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority 
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority 
Dear Harry: 
Sandra and I thought, in view of your op1n1on 
critical of National League of Cities, that it was desirable 
to focus the attention of the parties broadly on the princi-
ples followed by the Court in that case. 
I am sure I speak also for Sandra in saying that 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
,jnvrttttt <4l!Ufi ttf f!rt ~tlt ,jtldts 
jlrasltingbm, ~. <4- 2llbl>1~ 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
ss 
July 3, 1984 
RECEIVEQ I 
cHAI1BC.RS 0. \liE 
CHIEF !lSi\ ~. 
"84 JUN 33 P 2 :48 
82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority 
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
~·. 
Sandra and I suggest the following form of order: 
"This case is restored to the calendar 
for reargument. In addition to the questions 
presented in the petition for writ of certio-
rari and previously briefed and argued, the 
parties are requested to brief and argue the 
following question: 
"Whether or not the principles of the 
Tenth Amendment as set forth in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 
(1976), should be reconsidered?" 
L.F. P., Jr. 
jen 03/07/84 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Nos. 82-1913 & 82-1951 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Joseph Neuhaus March 7, 1984 
Question Presented 
Does application of the minimum wage and overtime provisions 
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to a city-owned bus sy~tem -
violate the Tenth Amendment? 
Facts & Decision Below 
In 1979, the Secretary of Labor amended his regulations to 
include local mass transit systems in the category of government 
activities to which he would seek to apply the FLSA. The San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (SAMTA) filed a complaint 
seeking a declaratory judgment that its operations are exempt 
from the FLSA under the doctrine of National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976). The Secretary counterclaimed to en-
force the act, and a SAMTA employee (Garcia) intervened seeking 
backpay: a trade association joined on SAMTA's side. 
The DC (WD Tex, Shannon, J.) initially held that applying the 
FLSA to SAMTA was unconstitutional under National League. On 
appeal, this Court remanded for reconsideration in light of Unit-
-----~ 
ed Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 u.s. 678 
(1982} (LIRR}. The DC reaffirmed its original holding. The 
court held that the history of state involvement in "regional 
transportation systems" (i.e., roads and highways}, and of state 
regulation of local mass transit, showed that mass transit was af;..c::::._ 
There was no 
history of federal regulation that would be eroded by recognizing 
Tenth Amendment immunity. In addition, mass transit was not dis-
tinguishable from other government functions--such as hospitals 
and schools--that were explicitly mentioned in National League as 
protected from FLSA regulation. Finally, the court applied a 
test for determining immunized government functions that was de-
veloped by CA6 in Amersbach v. City of Cleveland,598 F.2d 1033, 




1. "Traditional governmental functions." The DC and the 
parties all agree that the ~nly que StiO';)n this case i-s whether -
the mass transit system here satisfies the 't~ ird par1 ' of the test 
for Tenth Amendment immunity set out i~odel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-288 (1981), i.e., whether 
the States' compliance with the FLSA will "directly impair their (.;,_e 
ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional )~ 
governmental functions'" (quoting National League). The Court in~ 
National League defined such "traditional governmental functions" ~/­
primarily by example: it listed (in dictum)~e prevention, po-
~lice protection~anitatio~public heal~ parks and recreation, 
~chools, and ~ospitals. 426 u.s., at 851, 855. The Court called 
these functions "typical" of those performed by state and local 
governments, adding, "Indeed, it is functions such as these which 
governments are created to provide, services such as these which 
the States have traditionally afforded their citizens." Id., at 
851. v 
The Court in LIRR elaborated on this rather sparse defini-
tion. It held that operation of a commuter railroad was not a ---traditional governmental function. The Court relied in part on 
intimations in National League itself, but also determined that LJIJf.( 
operation of passenger railroads traditionally was a function of 
~-------------------- ~-------------------------
private industry, not local governments. 455 u.s., at 685-686. 
-----·---
(Only two of 17 commuter railroads in the United States were 
owned by a public entity.) The Court went on, however, to dis-
avow reliance on "a static historical view" of functions immune 
·, 
from federal regulation. !d., at 686. It restated the test as 
"whether the federal regulation affects basic state prerogatives 
in such a way as would be likely to hamper the state government's 
ability to fulfill its role in the Unionand endanger its 
'separate and independent existence."' !d., at 686-687 (emphasis 
added). 
Leaving to one side the question of tradition or history, it 
seems to me that the operation of mass transit systems today falls 
into the kind of basic state prerogative,. that were listed in Na--------------..__......._.., _......__ - - . 
tional League. All pf those things listed are functions that the 
State regards as essential and that, for a variety of reasons, 
the market cannot profitably provide at rates that the State is 
willing to tolerate. The State does not profit from providing ef!',6~ 
these services, but offers them on a free or subsidized basis~ 
Similarly, it appears that mass transit became a public function 
precisely because the market could no longer provide the service 
-------~ • ~ twa= ,..........._ .... ... .... :--.. 
(presumably as a result of the flight of the middle class from 
the cities and the growing role of the automobile in middle class ~ 
life). Its operation is 
provide @ of oe rating 
heavily subsidized: currently, fares~ 
revenue. Moreover, the provision of ~ 
mass transit service has become over the last 25 years overwhelm- ~J-rc 
err t1 t.ftrJ10 ingly the business of the public. Over 9~ of mass transit pas-~ 
~ngers travel on publicly-owned systems (although it remains 
~true that slightly less than half of the systems in the country 
are privately held) .1 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages • 
. . { . 
, . 
, .. 
The central question in this case is whether two other facts 
..........._.., --- r;::: '-" -- ......... ---....-
about mass transit remove that function from the realm of immu-~ 
nized activities:~· the public role in mass transit is~ ~. 
"traditional," but arose only in the last 25 years: 2~,~J7....--L 
States' acquisition of mass transit systems was made possible 
-~---- ~--- -··-- ·----
massive federal grants. 
4 
by~ 
2. The role of "tradition." There is no question that the 
Court in National League repeatedly emphasized that it was those 
functions that States traditionally have afforded their citizens 
that were immunized. And the Court in LIRR relied first on "the 
historical reality that the operation of railroads is not among 
lThis paragraph essentially tracks the test for "integral" 
or "basic" or "traditional" state functions derived by CA6 in 
Amersbach. Although the test makes no reference to tradition or 
history, considered infra, pp. 5-6, it otherwise appears 
successfully to synthesize the functions listed in National 
League and the considerations set out in that case and in LIRR. 
See Legal Foundation Amicus Br. 
2The DC relied on the history of state and local 
involvement in local transportation generally, and the history of 
state and city regulation of privately-owned mass transit, to 
find that operation of mass transit was a "traditional" 
governmental function. Reliance on the first certainly was 
misplaced. Under the first view, anything vaguely related to 
local transportation--such as car sales, or operation of a 
junkyard (cf. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 u.s. 794 
(1976))--would be immunized if taken over by the government. The 
second view has more merit, because it shows the kind of state 
interest that is important. But regulation alone does not 
indicate that the operation of the activity itself is a central 
state function. Just because the State regulates land use and 
strip mining, cf. Hodel, does not mean that strip mining is an 
essential public service critical to the role of the States in 
our federal system. If the strip mining industry collapsed in 
Virginia and was taken over by the State, that alone would not 
make it an essential public function, despite a long history of 
state regulation. A history of state regulation is not 
irrelevant, but it does not prove very much. 
•· 
' 
the functions traditionally performed by state and local govern-
ments." 455 u.s., at 686 (emphasis in original). But, as noted, 
~ 
LIRR also explicitly rejected reliance on "a static historical --- -------------- -------
view of state functions." Ibid. S"~ The Chief Justice wrote for a ,..___.....,-? 
unanimous Court that the role of 
functions is merely as a signal of 
tal to the role of States in our 
~
"tradition" in defining state ~ 
those activities that are v~
society, that is, those t  
constitute "basic state prerogatives." Id., at 686-687, It 
would seem that a like role can be played by the pervasiveness of 
a public activity--a nearly universal pattern of state ownership 
and provision of a service, even if recently arisen, likewise 
suggests that the activity is a basic or integral governmental 
function. Otherwise, as society evolves and new functions are 
taken up by government, the new functions could automatically be 
subjected to federal control. It is unlikely that they would 
ever thereafter become immunized, since one of the factors to 
look to is whether the federal government has sought to regulate 
the activity (see infra, p. 9). Eventually, as new functions 
replaced 6r dwarfed the traditional activities of States, Nation-
al League would qe rendered a dead letter. 
Given the lack of a tradition of state operation of mass 
transit systems, it is likely that modern state participation 
h b 
. .~.-t I( 
s ould e espec1ally pervasive to show that mass transit is a 
basic state prerogative. Whether mass transit meets that test is 
not obvious, for it is evident that a substantia].. number of 
small, private transit systems continue to exist. Nevertheless, 
• 
the fact that these make up a very small part of the market, 
.. 
which is now overwhelmingly public, and that the move to public-
ownership appears to be a continuing trend, suggests that mass 
transit now is a "traditional" governmental function, like 
schools, hospitals, and the like. ~ 
3. UMTA gra,nts. The appellants emphasize the fact that th==.~ 
federal government has played a large role in the transfer o( .- .. -
mass transit systems from public to private ownership. This fac-
tor seems to me relevant in two ways: § , it casts doubt on 
whether the collapse of the private transit market would have led 
to any public transit systems--i.e., whether mass transit is an 
essential governmental activity;~, it makes the choice of 
the State to run these systems, as opposed to the federal govern-
ment, seem to be a matter not of constitutional significance--
i.e., it casts doubt on whether this function, if it is "tradi-
tionally" governmen~ l, is also "traditionally" linked to the 
State. - The first point is not persuasive. The very passage of the 
UMTA shows that the elimination of mass transit was viewed as a 
' calamity of the greatest moment. All governments involved were 
willing to spend huge sums to ensure that mass transit was con-
tinued. 
The second point is more difficult. The argument is that the 
fact that States, rather than the federal government, ending up 
owning and running the mass transit systems is of little impor-
~~~ 
tance because the feds after all were paying fo 7 , them. Cf. Kra-
mer v. New Castle . Area Transit Auth., 677 F.2d 308, 310, n. 1 
(CA3 1982) (making approximately this argument). Put slightly 
differently, the federal government allowed the States to take on 
this function, so it hardly can be said to impair their basic or 
traditional role for the federal government to nullify state con-
trol over that function. 
~ere are three answers. e our background knowledge of 
American society tells us that local mass transit is a T~ 
quin te ssent ia lly non federa 1 function. It is practically incon-
----------~--~------------------------
ceivable that the federal government would run intracity buses 
and the like; the source of the funding does not change the es-
- ---·- -·--·-·--· 
sential nature of the function. Thus, no party here has suggest-__________ __________., 
ed that the choice of this form of operation in the UMTA grants 
was the result of politics or some compromise among interest 
groups. It apparently was assumed that the States would be the 
ones responsible for running the systems, just as they are re-
sponsible for running police departments, schools, and hospitals. 
All of these receive substantial federal grants but all were 
thought to be plainly immunized in National League. ~, it 
would be a peculiarly static sort of federalism that tied whether 
a function is immunized or not to whether it became a state func-
tion with federal or state monies. This is similar to the argu-
ment above with regard to "tradition." Not only would the devel-
opment of the National League doctrine be tied to the somewhat 
tvvrtli~J: 
quirky ~eae£al4S~a~~ arrangements of the past, but I suspect very 
little would be left to the doctrine over time. We can expect 
that an increasing amount that States do will involve substantial 
federal funding. If enough States adopt the function, or the 
function has been per formed by the State for enough years, that 
activity safely may be considered a "basic state prerogative." 
Third, it should not be forgotten that the States and cities that 
purchased their transit systems contributed large sums as well. 
In fact, the system in San Antonio apparently was purchased with-
out any federal funds whatsoever. 
This does not mean that Congress has no control over the pro-
grams it funds. Even if the program were one touching a "basic 
state prerogative," Congress might be able to require adherence 
to the requirements of the FSLA as a matter of its Spending Pow-
er, rather than its Commerce Power. (It is clear that Congress 
has not yet hinged receipt of federal transp6rtation grants on 
~------------~~--~'-----~------------~-----------
compliance~ with the FSLA--the UMTA specifically grants States 
-------------.----------
broad latitude in making arrangements to continue the collective 
bargaining rights of their previously private employees.) The 
extent to which the Tenth Amendment limits the Spending Power was 
explicitly left open in National League. Nevertheless, i _t _ would 
appear that Congress' power is at its greatest when it seeks to 
regulate a subject so closely tied to the funds it is providing 
as here. 
The appellants make several other arguments against affirm-
ing. These can be disposed of briefly. 
4. Erosion of federal authority. The appellants argue that 
immunizing public transit operations would, as in LIRR, allow the 
States to "erode Jederal authority in areas traditionally subject 
to federal statu tory regulation." 455 U.S., at 6 87. There is 
nothing to this argument in my view. Private transit operations 
are not subject to anything like the comprehensive and specific 
regulatory scheme at issue in LIRR. Here, the FLSA did not even 
apply to private transit workers until relatively recently (1966 
as to some workers, and 1974 as to others). The only significant 
federal law that long has applied to private transit and that can 
be avoided by becoming publicly owned is the NLRA. But the same 
is true of virtually all formerly private functions, since the 
NLRA applies to nearly all private commerce and contains a blan-
ket exemption for state employees. 
5. Balance of federal & state interests. In addition to the 
three-part test set out in Hodel, the cases indicate that there 
may be situations in which "the nature of the federal interest 
advanced may be such that it justifies State submission." Hodel, 
452 u.s., at 288, n. 29; accord wyoming; LIRR; see also National 
League, 426 u.s., at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The SG ar-
gues that the federal interest here is of such a nature because 
it is intimately connected to interstate commerce--many transit . 
systems cross state boundaries--and because coverage of public 
transit employees is necessary to prevent unfair competition with 
the private sector. SG Br. at 4 6. /~ 
The link to interstate commerce seems tenuous: the matter is 
essentially a local concern, even if the locality crosses state 
boundaries. Moreover, such interstate systems probably are gov-
erned by Interstate Compacts, which provide Congress with a more 
precise means of control over them. See u.s. Const., Art. I, 
§10. Finally, this case involves no such interstate system. 
The need to prevent unfair competition is also unpersuasive. 
There is nothing special about this particular goal of commerce 
... 
regulation. It would be present whenever there is both a public 
and private sector funded by user fees, as when schools or hospi-
tals are regula ted. Thus, this claim would strip immunity from 
much that a State does. Moreover, it seems fantastical to speak 
of unfair competition with the private sector when the market is 
overwhelmingly public and the public s]to~j, s heavily subsi-
dized. 
5. Absence of demonstrated effect c n structuring of serv-
ices. One point that has bothered me about affirming the DC here 
is that appellees have not pointed convincingly to any direct 
effect applying the FSLA will have on States other than increas-
ing costs. The Court in National League showed in some detail 
how the overtime provisions of the act would interfere with com-
monly accepted ways of delivering police and fire protection. 
. ' 
See 4 2 6 U • S • , at 8 50 • Similarly, the Court in EEOC v. Wyoming, 
103 s.ct. 1054, 1061, n. 11 (1983), suggested in a slightly dif-
ferent context that an effect on "underlying sovereign choices" 
was of greater concern than interference with "a generalized in-
terest in efficient management." The holding of the Court there, 
moreover, plainly required some threshold of increased burden on 
the State before a federal law would be seen to "directly impair" 
a state function. In this case, while there is some mention of 
the problem of split shifts for bus workers, see APTA Br. at 21, 
there is no suggestion that the act would interfere to any sig-
nificant degree with such sovereign choices. 
There are two answers. First, National League and Wyoming 
both emphasized that such actual proof of effect was not neces-
sary as long as one could forsee a "direct and obvious effect 
on the ability of the States to allocate their resources." 103 
~ 
S.Ct., at 1063. Such an effect presumably can be expected in the 
extra costs that overtime wage requirements will certainly bring 
about. Second, it is noteworthy that Congress included in the 
FLSA an exemption for transit workers. The existence of this 
exemption--which was not entirely removed until 1974, and at that 
time was carefully phased out--suggests that applying the act to 
transit workers will have a significant impact on the States. 
1. Recommendation. Affirm. 
•, 
March 12, 1984 
GARCIA GINA-POW 
82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia and Donovan v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority 
MEMO TO FILE 
Joe's bench memo is thorough and well-reasoned. I 
dictate this only to identify - without elaboration 
points that seem to indicate, persuasively, that we should 
affirm. This is my tentative view after a preliminary 
reading of the briefs and Joe's memorandum. 
The Question 
Does the San Antonio mass transit system satisfy the 
third part of the Tenth Amendment immunity specified in 
Hodel: Whether compelling compliance with FLSA will 
"directly impair [San Antonio's] ability to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental .._____ 
functions", quoting National League. 
Discussion 
National League's examples of "traditional 
governmental functions" included - without limitation -
fire prevention, police protection, santitation, public 
health, parks and recreation, schools, and hospitals. 
These were said to be "typical" of services that 
"traditionally [have been] afforded their citizens." 
Over the past quarter century, the operation of mass 
transit systens has become a basic state [city J 
responsibility. The free market could not operate this 
-~- .__..--. ._ 
essential public service profitably. Mass transit has 
become a public function as evidenced by the fact that 94% 9 jL% 
of its passengers nation-wide travel on publicly owned 
systems. Only 45% of the operating revenue of the -
publicly owned systems come from fares. In short, they 
are heavily subsidized by government. 
Arguments to the Contrary 
It is argued that two other aspects of mass transit 
distinguish it from National League type functions. 
First, mass transit is not a traditional function. But 
Long Island Railroad explicitly rejected reliance on a 
"static historical view of state functions". Public 
-~
functions, as the history of this country in the past half 
century emphasizes, are not static. Governments at all 
levels increasingly have played larger roles in meeting 
public needs not within the capability of private 
enterprise. 
A second argument is that government grants '--------------
distinguish this case from National Cities, and the need 
for such grants emphasizes that mass transits are not a 
traditional function. 
There are several answers: (i) Despite federal 
~~ 
funding, Amass transit is distinctly a non-federal 
function; ( i i) A state function does not cease to be such _... 
depending on whether substantial federal funding is 
provided; and (iii) The concededly "traditional" state and 
local functions such as schools, health, police, provision 
and maintenance of highways now all receive federal 
funding in varying ways and amounts. 
Absence of Evidence of Adverse Effect 
In National League, the Court opinion noted that 
applying FSLA would interfere with accepted ways of 
delivering police and fire protection. In this case, no 
comparable showing was made. But both National League and 
Wyoming emphasize that actual proof of adverse effect was 
not necessary. A state should be free to allocate its own ------resources, and this includes the right to determine wages 
and hours - and work schedules - of its employees. 
LFP, JR. 
82-1913 GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO 
82-1951 DONOVAN v. SAN ANTONIO Argued 3/19/84 
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THE CHIEF" JUSTICE 
~np:rtllU Qiourt .n tift ~a ,jtatts 
._aslfinghtn. ~- Of. 20p,.~ 
March 31, 1984 
Re: Nos. 82-1913, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
82-1951, Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 




TO: Ms. Penny Hazelton DATE: Nov. 13, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F.. Powell, Jr. 
First, my thanks for the very real help you have 
given my Chambers in connection with our interest in feder-
alism and the adoption of the Tenth Amendment. 
If you should be available for further research, I 
am interested in another aspect of the legislative history: 
The National Labor Relations Act, 29 USC §152(2): and Labor-
Manaqement Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 USC §8402(e)J 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 USC S652(5) 1 and 
the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, 29 USC 
SS1003(b) (1), 1002(32): the Federal Power Act, 16 USC 
S824(f). 
In each of these statutes - as well as several 
others - Congress exempted the states and their subdivi-
sions. I am interested in knowing why Congress exempts 
states from certain of its major regulatory statutes but not 
from others. For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act, as 
a result of amendments since its enactment, is now fully 
applicable to the states and their subdivisons. Perhaps the 
legislative history of one or more of the statutes mentioned 
above sheds some light on this question. 
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Wtb:tarl! 
.:§u.p:r.e:me <!Jttmt ttf tJre ~nit.tlt .;§tatts 
'JWfasfringtttn.lfl. <If. 2ll.;tJ!.~ 
TO: Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
FROM: Penny A. Hazeltonc~ 
Assistant Librarian for Research Services 
DATE: November 16, 1984 
RE: States and Federal Regulatory Agencies 
Thank you for the kind words expressed in your November 
13, 1984 memo. However, I confess that Sara Sonet found the 
materials you received on the Tenth Amendment question. I 
have conveyed your gratitude to her. I am glad the Library 
could be of service. 
I am working on your interesting question about the 
states and federal regulatory agencies. I will have something 
before the end of the day today (Friday) . 
PAH/dp 
December 19, 19A4 
82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia v . San Antonio Metropolitan 
'f'ransit, et al 
Dear Bi1 J : 
My dissent in this .r::ase was circulated this afternoon. 
I have tried to def~nd ycur fine opinion in National LPague 
of Cities. flavil"g constdered your reAsoninq more carefullv, 
I have even a higher opinion of what you wrote in Leaque of 
Cities than formerly . 
If you have anv inclination to write separately, I 
would of course welcome it. 
I am sendtnq copi.eC3 of thi.9 notr! to the Chief and 
Sandra . Suggestions from any of you wi.ll be carefully con-
sider("d. 
Justice Rehnquist 





JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.iu.prtntt ~ourt af tqt ~ittb .italt.G' 
'Jlulfhtgtan, ~. ~· 2.tT~'l~ 
December 20, 1984 
No. 82-1913 
No. 82-1951 
Garcia v. San Antonio MTA 
Donovan v. San Antonio MTA 
Dear Harry, 
/ 
I realize a great deal has 
your opinion and in Lewis' dissent. 
add a few words of my own and I will 
for long. 
been said already in 
Nevertheless, I plan to 
try not to hold you up 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
,jupumt <!fllltri of t4t ~b .ibdtg 
._uJringhtu. ~. Of. 21lbi~~ 
December 20, 1984 
Re: 82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority 
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority 
Dear Lewis: 
I join your dissent. 
Regards, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
PPS: I may have some thoughts later, but I'd like to get 
the ball rolling. 
December 26 , 1984 
PERSONAL 
82-l<H3 Garci.a v . San l\ntonio \1etr.opolltan 
Dear San~ri): 
Upon my return to the Court todav I was qlad to find 
your letter to Harry indicatinq that you wi1.1 write in this 
case . 
You may recalJ that I expressed tl-te hope that you would 
write . After all, you and I ~re the only members of thP 
Court who have had extended exoPrience in state and local 
government . Your experience, of course, was of a more im-
portant character ~s mine was ltmjted to servi~q on Boards 
and Commissions . 
I hope that also you will ioin my opinion . If there 
are chanqes that vou would like for me to make , I probably 
would he qlad to accept your views . 
Sincerely , 









JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
,j~rtmt Qj:111td cf tqt 11tnittb ,jtab.$' 
Jhurftingtcn, !t <!J:. 211,?~~ 
January 24, 1985 
Re: 82-1913) Garcia v. San Antonio MTA 
) 
82-1951) Donovan v. San Antonio MTA 
Dear Lewis, 
I will be circulating my dissent in this 
case shortly. I would like to join your e~ellent 
dissent also, but, frankly, I do not feel~omrorcable 
with the citations to City of Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health on page 3 and in footnote 3 of 
your dissent. If you would not object to deleting 
those references, I would welcome the opportunity to 
join your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
CHAMBER S OF 
,itqtrttttt Qillltd o-f t4t 'Jni.ttb .itatt,&' 
'Jl~lfington. ~. QJ. 2ll'biJ!t~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
January 30, 1985 
82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority 
82-1951 Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
February 11, 1985 
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WJB 6/11/84 - does not want to reargue 
Joined by JPS 6/12/84 
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SOC wants to reargue 6/11/84 
LFP voted to reargue 
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1st draft 12/19/84 
2nd draft 2/11/85 
Joined by CJ 12/19/84 
SDO 1/30/85 
SOC dissenting 
1st draft 1/25/85 
2nd draft 1/30/85 
3rd draft 2/12/85 
Joined by LFP 2/11/85 
LFP will dissent 10/23/84 
SOC awaits dissents and may write separate 10/23/84 
SOC will dissent 12/20/84 
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CHAMIS£RS OF" 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
October 5, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1913- Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority 
82-1951 -Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority 
Dear Bill, 
Since it is "your ox" that is being "gored," will 
you take on a dissent? 
If, for any reason you'd prefer not, let me know. 
cc: Justice Powell 
Justice O'Connor 
October 8, 1984 
83-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio 
83-1951 Donovan v. Ran Antonio 
near Ch~ef: 
Bill and I have talked and ~e agrees r s~ouJ~ 
write the dissent if agreeahle to you an~ Sandra. 
I '"i 11, of course, try to rJemonstrate that the 
"goring" was not of Sill's "ox", ~ut of the ConEtitution. 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: Justice Rehnquist 
Justice O'Connor 
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 




Garcia v. San Antonio 
Donovan v. San Antonio 
It is certainly agreeable with me if you 
take on the dissent in this case. As I indicated at 
Conference, I may want to add a few thoughts of my 
own on the subject. 
Justice Powell 





TO: Annmarie DATE: October 18, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-1913 Garcia 
I have now had an opportunity to read your first 
draft of a dissent in this case. I appreciate your 
undertaking this in advance of our seeing the Court 
opinion. Necessarily, we have assumed that HAB will 
adhere essentially to the reasoning of the draft he 
circulated last Term. There certainly will be changes, 
perhaps substantial ones.l 
I now record random thoughts in this memorandum 
both for you and me as reminders to myself. I identify 
possible points to be made in our opinion. I state them 
in no particular order, and suggest no particular 
priority. In the end, some may merit including in a draft 
and others perhaps not. 
1. we should be careful not to undercut WHR' s 
opinion in National League of Cities. I recognize, 
1 I am dictating this without having reread 




Annmar ie, that I am retreating somewhat from the view 
previously expressed that we should speak in terms of 
redefining the basic standard. Lets find some more 
felicitous way of acomplishing this. As the standard has 
been reiterated repeatedly (Hodel, Long Island R., and 
FERC), we should not join HAB now in condemning it. The 
standard is a sound generalization, but in applying it a 
court must address and weigh the federal and state 
interests that are at issue. Your draft does this. 
2. we will, of course, emphasize that the 
Court's opinion rejects long accepted principles of 
federalism. There is an excellent quote in Younger v. 
Harris, 401 u.s. 37 (I believe at 44-45) that we should 
use - with other authorities - to demonstrate the ongoing 
vitality of federalism. See Pennhurst last Term. 
3. In explaining 
standard under the balancing 
quote from Long Island R.R. 
the application of the 
approach, we can use the 
at page 686-as to the 
application of the standard, and the fact that it is not a 
static one. 
4. It may be helpful to demonstrate by examples 
that the test is not static. 
this but for a different 
HAB's opinion last Term did 
reason. For decades the 
.Jo 
providing of public schools was not a traditional state 
function in the sense that it had ancient roots. Indeed, 
we could argue that local transportation - purely in terms 
of tradition - fits more neatly into the standard than 
other functions such as schools, public health, garbage 
collection, etc. Transportation depends on roads and 
streets. State and local governments always have provided 
these essentials of "transit": i. e., to facilitate the 
movement of people so essential to any form of civilized 
life. Roads and streets are still state and local 
services. They have been improved, and the means of 
transportation have changed from horse-drawn carriages to 
streetcars, buses and now subways. To be sure, most of 
these early methods of moving people about were privately 
operated, but this could be left in private hands only so 
long as they were economically viable. The function was 
providing an essential public service, and one long 
regulated only by the states. 
Annemar ie, I don't want to carry the foregoing 
too far or to overemphasize it. It may be worth only a 
footnote, but I'd like your thinking as to its merit. 
5. The AFL-CIO's brief argues, as its first 
point, that the providing of all "goods and services" may 
'*· 
be subjected to federal regulation regardless of whether 
the goods and services are viewed as traditional or not. 
HAB' s opinion goes beyond this and would hold that the 
only limit on the Commerce Cause is the "structure" of the 
federal system. 
6. You have commented on federal funding simply 
in a sentence. After we see HAB's new opinion, it should 
be pointed out - perhaps in a footnote - that federal 
funding has now become pervasive - and perhaps necessarily 
so in view of the extent to which state and local revenues 
have been drained 
excise taxes. If 
off primarily by federal 
"funding" determined the 
federal constitutional authority the states 
abolished. 







This memorandum implies no criticism of your 
draft. I think the essence of your draft is sound and 
well written. No doubt the draft will have to be 




lfp/ss 10/22/84 AN SALLY-POW 
82-1913 Garcia 
Comments on HAB's Opinion of Last Term: 
Since 1913 Texas has authorized localities to 
regulate "carriage for hire". Since 1915 San Antonio has 
provided for franchising, insurance, safety requirements 
and other regulations of passenger vehicles operated for 
hire. P. 2, 3. 
Not until 1961 did Congress extend the FLSA to 
employees of private mass transit systems. P. 4. 
In 1966, for the first time, the Act was 
extended to state and local government employees. The 
application of the Act to public schools and hospitals was 
sustained in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 u.s 183 (1968), but 
Wirtz overruled in National League of Cities. P. 4, 5. 
Not until 1974 was the Act made fully applicable - even 
with respect to overtime limitations - to mass transit 
employees. P. 5. This history makes clear that Congress 
was half-a-century behind Texas in regulating any aspect 
of local transit systems. 
The DC in this case relied heavily on this 





HAB recognized the distinction between the 
authority of Congress to regulate private activity and its 
authority to impose federal regulation of a state 
governmental entity. HAB makes the point - perhaps with 
some reason - that if mass transit is exempt it must be 
because it is owned and operated by the city rather than 
because the operations are "local". P. 8. 
HAB devotes almost a full page of "string cites" 
he says illustrates the difficulty of determining what is 
a "traditional governmental function". P. 9, 10. 
Annmarie can distinguish a good many of these cases. 
Perhaps the centerpiece of HAB' s argument last 
Term was the "difficulty" in "identifying an organizing 
principle" that places cases on one side of the line or 
the other. He says that "this Court has made little 
headway in defining the scope of governmental functions 
protected under National League of Cities". P. 10. 
On the same page that HAB finds no "organizing 
principle", he speaks of the Court's difficulty in Long 
Island in developing a "workable standard for traditional 
governmental functions". 
HAB does recognize that many "constitutional 
standards involve 'undoubted gray areas'", citing Fry v. 
3. 
United States, 421 u.s. 542, 558, and that we decide on a 
"case-by- case" basis the applicability of the particular 
constitutional provision. P. 11. 
As Annmarie has noted, HAB devotes several pages 
to the argument that the Court's difficulty "in the field 
of tax immunity" is illustrative of the problem involved 
in the application of the League of Cities standard. 
Annmarie meets this argument very well. We may think it 
desirable to expand her response after we see Harry's new 
opinion. 
HAB states that in Long Island we "rejected the 
possibility of making immunity [from federal regulation) 
turn on a purely historical standard of 'tradition'"· P. 
15. He then goes on to say that the defect in the 
historical approach is that: 
It prevents courts from accommodating changes in 
the historic function of states, changes that 
have resulted in a number of once private 
functions like education being assumed by the 
states and their subdivisions." [see also 
footnote 9) P. 15. 
HAB concludes that "reliance on history as an 
organizing principle results in line drawing of the most 
arbitrary sort". P. 15. 
Then, HAB rejects "non-historical standards" as 
being "just as unworkable as a historical standard". P. 
16. 
HAB finds "a more fundamental problem" in 
applying the League of Cities standard - the same problem 
"that explains why the Court was never able to develop a 
basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the 
inter-governmental tax immunity cases. P • 16 , 1 7 • Th is 
fundamental problem is that: 
"Neither the governmental/proprietary 
distinction nor any other that purports to 
separate important governmental functions from 
other ones can be faithful to the role of 
federalism in a democratic society". P. 17 
But HAB's explanation of his theory of 
unfaithfulness to the role of federalism is not easy to 
follow. Indeed, he devotes less than a page to an opaque 
explanation of this "more fundamental problem" before he 
comes to his conclusion on p. 18: 
"We therefore reject, as unsound in principle 
and unworkable in practice, a rule of state 
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a 
judicial appraisal of whether a particular 
governmental function is 'integral' or 
'traditional'". P. 18 
5. 
After finding a "more fundamental problem" for 
rejecting the League of Cities standard (p. 16), HAB moves 
forward a few pages to another "more fundamental reason" 
for this rejection, namely: "the sovereignty of the 
states is limited by the Constittuion itself". P. 19, 20. 
It is recognized that the states "retain a 
significant measure of sovereign authority" (citing my 
dissent in Wyoming) , but HAB says they do so "only to the 
extent that the Constitution has not divested them of 
their original powers and transferred those powers to the 
federal government". P. 20. 
He goes on to say the Court has "no license to 
employ free standing conceptions of state sovereignty when 
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause". P. 21. In other words, the Commerce Clause 
permits the federal government to eliminate all state 
sovereignty except where explicity granted the states. 
This view simply reads the Tenth Amendment out of the 
Constitution. 
Having disposed of the Tenth Amendment, HAB then 
moves to his novel thesis that the Framers perceived that 
state sovereignty would be protected by "the structure of 
the federal government itself". P. 22. He finds that the 
states are protected from "overreaching by Congress" 
because the states were "vested with indirect influence 
over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by 
their control of electoral qualifications and their role 
in presidential elections", and 
direct influence in the Senate". 
they were 
1 P. 22. 
"given more 
As illustrative of how protective the federal 
government is the states, HAB cites the lavishness with 
which federal funds are made available to the states -
including the funding of "such services as police and fire 
protection, education, public health and hospitals, parks 
and recreation, and sanitation". P. 23, 24. This 
lavishness is more accurately explained by the political 
benefit seen by members of Congress in making money 
available to their home districts or states. 
HAB cites a number of statutes that expressly 
exempt states and their subdivisions, including NLRA, 
OSHA, the Sherman Act and several others. P. 24. HAB 
cites these as evidence of generosity. Under his view 
Congress any time could make all of these statutes 
applicable to the states just as it has done with FLSA. 
7. 
HAB says "the fundamental limitation [another 
example of something being 'fundamental') that the 
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to 
protect the states as states is one of process rather than 
one of result." P. 25. 
Finally, HAB identifies the "only substantive 
restraint" on federal authority is "a requirement that 
Congress not attempt to single out the states for special 
burdens or otherwise discriminate against them". P. 25. 
HAB cites no case authority for this expansive view of the 
Constitution. It will be interesting to see whether he 
retains this extreme view when he writes for the Court. 
He does cite M'Cullough v. Maryland, as resting in part on 
concerns about discrimination. 
* * * 
My rereading of HAB 's opinion again shocks me. 
He rejects, in effect, the existence of any state 
sovereignty protected by the Constitution except where 
explicitly stated. He construes the Commerce Clause as 
preempting the Tenth Amendment even though several states 
would not have ratified the Constitution without the 




perhaps Penny - to give us the record evidence of why the 
lOth Amendment was added.] 
As I now read HAB's opinion, it goes beyond the 
AFL-CIO brief's view that "all goods and servies" provided 
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CHAMBERS OF' 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
October 23, 1984 
Re: Nos. 82-1913 and 82-1951 - Garcia v. San 
Antonio Metropolitan Transit AuthoritY 
Dear Harry: 




Copies to the Conference 
... ~ 
, . . 
'' 
CHAMI!IE:RS Of" 
.SUJfrtmt Qfltlttf of flrt ~b ithdte 
'Baeftinghtn. ~. (!f. 21l.;i>l-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
•'' . 
October 23, 1984 
Re: No. 82-1913 and 1951-Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit and Donovan v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS Of' 
~U.Vttmt alontlgf tqt Jnittb .jtalt.s' 
JlU'Itingtttn. Jl. <If. 2lJc?.lt,;l 
.JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
•• 
October 23, 1984 
No. 82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority 
No. 82-1951 Donovan, Secretary of Lal:x:>r v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Dear Harry, 
I will await the dissent and may have sc:::nething to 
say in separate dissent as well. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
October 25, 1984 
No. 82-1913) Garcia 
) v. San Antonio 
) Metropolitan 
) Transit Authority 
) 
) Donovan v. San 
) Antonio 
) Metropolitan 
No. 82-1951) Transit Authority 
Dear Harry, 




Copies to the Conference 
~/ 
October 23, 1984 
82-1913 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Dear Harry: 





cc: The Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
i\Jqtrtntt Qf&tlttf &tf tfrt ~.tb ilta.ttg 
Jlulfington, ~. <If. 20~~, 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
October 29, 1984 
82-1913 - Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority 
82-1951 - Donovan v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
-
October 30, 1984 
GAR GINA-POW 
To: Annmarie 
From: LFP, JR. 
Re: 82-1913 and 82-1951 - Garcia v. San Antonio 
Over the weekend I read HAB's opinion of October 
23 with some care. I did not have with me at home his 
opinion of last June. As I recall, a large part the 
present opinion is simply incorporated, but there are 
significant additions. You mentioned the omission of his 
"discrimination" point. 
In any event, perhaps as a memory refresher for 
myself, I note points that we may consider - some quite 
general and others specific. 
1. A major curiosity of his opinion is that it 
proports to support "federalism". For example, he states 
that League of Cities is "inconsistent with principles of 
federalism" p. 2. Again, no "distinction" that 
"proports to separate our important governmental functions 
can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic 
society." p. 17. 
Federalism - if it means anything - refers to the 
duel federal and state system of our country. It 
, .. , 
'·' 
2. 
necessarily recognizes that the state's have a major role 
that cannot be voided by the federal government. HAB 
concedes that "some sovereign authority is retained" by 
the state (p. 19), but never identifies it. P. 20. At 
another point, HAB states that the "states unquestionably 
do 'retain a significant measure of state authority'" 
(quoting my dissent in Wyoming). P. 20. But he limits 
that in the next few sentences of his opinion 
[Annmarie: It is important for us to 
address what federalism means. Some of the 
decisions of this Court will be quite helpful. 
[Secondary authority also should be examined.] 
2. HAB concedes that a "case by case" approach might 
"develop a workable standard". P. 11. But the first 18 
pages of his opinion are devoted to rejecting the 
"traditional function" standard of National Cities. He 
then concludes that no other standard is workable. There 
is no mention of a "balancing" analysis that is so 
familiar in constitional cases. 
[Did not HAB mention balancing his 
concurring opinion in League of Cities? Do you 
know of any decisions of this Court that apply a 
balancing analysis in a Commerce Clause case? 
We might ask Lynda or the Library for help on 
this.] 
3. 
3. You have a good answer to HAB's reliance on the 
"governmental/proprietary" function distinction in 
taxation. Were the earlier cases ever expressly overruled 
or merely reinterpreted? 
4. In n. 10, p. 15, HAB refers to the "state 
interest in being free from federal regulations" a 
meaningless genuflecting as he subordinates the state 
interest to the Commerce Clause. 
5. After rejecting "traditional functions" as a 
standard, HAB considers and rejects "history": "non-
historial": "uniquely govermental function": and 
"necessary governmental services", (P. 15-16). But again 
HAB does not mention "balancing" or weighing the 
respective interests of governments in the federal system. 
6. Harry has again identified two "more fundamental 
problems" with League of Cities. The first is that no 
standard can be found that is "faithful to the role of 
federalism". P. 16-17. On page 17, after this statement, 
the opinion curiously seems to wonder off and talk about 
the opportunity of states to "experiment", and about a 
non-elected federal judiciary not being competent to 
interfere with action of "elected legislative 
representatives". P. 16, 17. 




Annmarie, we may take a jab at HAB for this 
sort of talk. He is not concerned about the 
competency of an unelected federal judiciary to 
read the Tenth Amendment out of the 
Constitution. Nor is it self-evident how 
conveying virtually unlimited power on the 
federal government enhances the ability of the 
various states to "experiment". HAB's "logic" 
simply eludes me. 
4. 
7. Repeating the argument he made last Term, HAB 
finds, as a second "more fundamental reason" for holding 
that Congress has power to regulate wages and hours of all 
state and local employees is that "state sovereignty is 
limited by the Constitution itself". P. 19. 
After conceding that "some sovereign authority is 
retained", he does not identify it except the provision of 
the Constitution that protects "state territorial 
integrity". P. 21. 
8. The opinion relies on a quote from Justice Field. 
P. 20. The quotation, though quite general, supports the 
purpose and substant of the Tenth Amendment. Justice 
Field, dissenting in B&O Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 u.s. 
368, 401, said that the Constitution "recognizes and 
perserves the autonomy and independence of the states .•• ", 
and that federal "supervision over either the legislative 
or judicial action of the states is in no case permissible 
6. 
Rather than supporting HAB's argument that the 
structure protects the states, the rationale and decision 
of the Court in this case make perfectly clear that the 
"protection" that exists at present is a matter of 
"grace", that can be withdrawn at any time. Federalism 
must mean more than this. Can there be a genuine federal 
system if the state components of the system have 
authority only as a matter of grace by the federal 
component? 
11. Of course, HAB 's argument is we can trust the 
Congress - and perhaps to a less extent the President -
not to denigrate the role of the states because the people 
of all of the states elect the legislative branch and the 
head of the executive branch. As we have discussed, HAB 
cites no authority for this and we know of none with the 
possible exception of some secondary writing. HAB's 
opinion reflects a unrealistic - if not singularly naive -
view of how the political system works in our country 
today. 
In the early years of our country, Congress met only 
briefly in the course of a year. Its members were drawn, 
in large part, from citizens of some prominence in various 




' .. { 
.,, .. 
7. 
home districts or states. Now, Congress is composed of 
professional politicians who - I believe - are restricted 
by law against holding private employment. They are a 
branch of the national government. They have no state 
responsibilities. Moreover, as we have discussed, the 
relatively new phenomena in national politics is the 
"special intersts group". For years there have been some 
of these: e.g., veterans groups (but I was never willing 
to join), and organized labor. Today, the range of groups 
and PACs that lobby regularly is legion. 
12. A major flaw in HAB • s "structure" reasoning is 
that his reliance on "democracy" focuses only on the 
federal government itself. His opinion overlooks the fact 
that the most effective democracy is at the lcoal level 
where the people are close to the local problems, and know 
and have access to the people who are elected to city 
councils and county board of supervisors. The people at 
these levels also have family members who are in the 
various services performed by the local goverments. The 
state legislatures, none of which meet the year around, 
are drawn from the various professions and employments 
within the state. A state legislature therefore is far 
more responsive to the state electrate than the Congress 
8. 
is to any particular state interest. There must be a good 
deal of writing - perhaps in some of our cases - to the 
effect that the public participation in democratic 
processes is greater, better informed, and more 
influential at the state and local levels than in the 
Congress or the federal bureaucy. 
13. If HAB mentions the Tenth Amendment, it escapro 
my reading of his opinion. I hope that Penny has provided 
us with some history of the adoption of the Tenth 
Amendment and its purpose. This Court also must have 




except as to matters by the Constitution specifically 
authorized or delegated to the United States." There is 
nothing in the Commerce Clause that "specifically" 
authorizes Congress to regulate the wages and hours of 
state employees. The Commerce Clause is no more specific 
than the Tenth Amendment in the language used. 
9. In purporting to illustrate the "effectiveness of 
political power" (P. 23, 24), HAB emphasizes federal 
grants to state and local services such as police, fire, 
schools, santitation, etc. In commenting on this, we 
could note that by virtue of the "spending power" Congress 
has exercised substantial control over state and local 
affairs, but I know of no decision that holds or implies 
that the mere granting of federal funds without a 
positive reservation of regulating authority - establishes 
a Commerce Clause right to control the activities that 
benefit from the grants. 
relevant. 
See Pennhurst I that may be 
10. HAB cites a number of federal statutes that have 
not been extended to cover state employees or activities: 
NLRB, LMRA, OSHA, ERISA, the Sherman Act, the Federal 
Power Act. - P. 24. 
~~~ 
~ ~ lfp/ss 09/07/84 
•• ~ j 
82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia v. San Antonio Transit 
Donovan, Secretary of Labor v. San Antonio Transit 
As of the date of this memo, the following 
briefs have been filed in addition to those we had before 
us last Term: Principally two briefs supporting reversal, 
one by the SG and the other by Larry Gold {and others) on 
behalf of Garcia. At least three briefs have been filed 
supporting affirmance, two that are rather persuasive: 
brief on behalf of National League of Cities and various - -
other state organizations {League of Cities brief), and 
one - curiously enough - by the Colorado Public Employees 
Retirement Association. I have not seen a supplemental 
brief on behalf of San Antonio Transit Authority. 
The additional question that we asked to be 
reargued was: 
"Whether or not 
Amendment as set 
Cities v. Usery, 
reconsidered?" 
Arguments for Reversal 
the principles of the lOth 
for th in ::.:.Na=t~i ~o==n.=::a.=l___;L=7-e=-a=-g""::u~e--:o:...::f=-
426 U.S. 833, should be 
The SG has filed a curious brief. He says that 
"some clarification of the test for intergovernmental 
2. 
immunity established in National League of Cities is 
desirable • but the key principle articulated in that ,, 
case is sound and enduring constitutional doctrine. 
Exactly what "clarification" the SG thinks is appropriate 
is not entirely clear. Whatever it is, he would have us 
reverse the DC. Throughout his brief, the SG "carries 
water on both shoulders", arguing that federalism and the 
lOth Amendment are vi tal and that League of Cities is 
basically sound. Nevertheless, League of Cities should be 
clarified in accordance with the SG's proposed test as 
follows: 
" . the test must be whet h_er at the time the 
federal goverment first entered the field with 
regula t ory-reg is lation, the states had generally 
established themselves with fi"ied patterns of 
organization as p rovide(_? _ p f the particular 
s.ervj.ce. Absent .... such a long-sta'na 1ng tradi tion 
of state activity in a field, federal regulation 
simply cannot be said impermissibly to trench 
upon state prerogatives." 
In applying this test, the SG makes the familiar 
argument: transit service is not "an established 
municipal service of long standing". It was a private 
enterprise until only about 20 years ago, and was feasible 
only because of "massive financial assistance" from the 
federal government. When the Fair Labor Standards Act was 
3. 
amended in 1966 by the addition of language that would 
include employees of public transit companies, no one 
would have suggested that the Act as amended was 
unconstitutional. Thus, the SG says that appellee's 
"argument depends entirely upon recognition of a rule of 
creeping unconstitutionality, i.e., that political and 
economic developments subsequent to enactment" resulted in 
unconstitutionality. Br., p. 27, 28. 
* * * 
My Comments on SG''s Brief 
The argument of "creeping unconstitutionality" 
is a clever debating point. It is consistent with the 
SG's proposed "test" which would focus on which government 
"first entered the field with regulatory legislation - the 
state or federal government". Thus, the SG prefers a rule 
that would establish constitutionality by "who gets there 
first". On their face, neither of these formulations 




As the amicus brief of National League of Cities 
rather persuasively, the legitimate powers of a 
are not static. They were not frozen when the 
Constitution was adopted: 
-. 
"Just as state powers are not a closed 
catalogue, so too they are not static. Rather, 
they grow and change over time, as necessitated 
by new economic technological and demographic 
facts. Thus, over time, states and local 
governments have often begun to provide new 
services needed by citizens; such services have 
included public schools, hospitals, fire 
departments, sanitation facilities, airports 
and, as in this case, mass transit." 
4. 
Counsel quotes from a publication by Woodrow 
Wilson to the effect that: "The question of the relation 
of the states to federal government cannot • be 
settled by the opinion of any one generation. It is a 
question of growth, and every successive state of our 
political and economic development gives it a new aspect, 
makes it a new question •.• " P. 13. 
The relevant provisions of the Constitution have 
not changed since its adoption and the first ten 
amendments were added in 1790. Yet, as of that date, 
neither the federal nor state governments provided any 
substantial number of the services that are now 
commonplace: schools, hospitals, clinics, garbage 
collection, public sewerage, street lights, airports, etc. 
Under the SG' s argument whichever one of these services 








determined which government constitutionally could 
regulate it. 
Apart from other problems, the SG's test would 
result in different constitutional rules in different 
states. It may well be that some cities owned and 
operated their own mass transit before the FLSA purported 
to cover municipal employees. l' 1,·-lf!Y1-~~ i 12.10 
(.s-~ -5~' ~) 
Brief on Behalf of Garcia (Larry Gold) 
This brief reflects the position of organized 
labor. It is straightforward and drastic. It makes two 
arguments: first, that National League of Cities should 
be overruled. Second, even if it were correct in holding 
that state sovereignty places a limit on the Commerce 
Clause power, that limit 
(i) "the provision of 
is inapplicable for 
good~ and services 
t\ 
two reasons 
is not an 
essential part of state sovereignty", and (ii) "federal 
regulation of political subdivisions of a state does not 
infringe state sovereignty". 
One can make a reasoned argument for overruling 
League of Cities depending upon one's basic perception of 
our federal form of government. The other arguments made 
in this brief are so extreme that I cannot believe a 
majority of this Court would accept them. 
s 
If "good and 
A 
6. 
services" are not a part of state sovereignty, the federal 
government could preempt virtually all state laws and 
regulations - including police and fire services, medical 
services, etc. 
* * * 
Arguments of the Amici Briefs Urging Affirmance 
I have noted above National League of Cities' 
rebuttal of the SG's arguments. Its brief argues 
affirmatively that applying the principles of federalism 
to harmonize the roles of federal and state governments 
must be a "balancing" process. The brief notes that 
Justice Blackmun, in his League of Cities concurring 
.. df 11bl. h op1n1on, argue or a a anc1ng approac • The brief also 
says that Justice O'Connor made a similar argument in FERC 
v • Miss iss i pp i , 4 56 U • S . 7 4 2 • This brief, as well as 
others favoring affirmance, rely on Younger v. Harris 
which states that federalism means: 
~ 
"a system in which there is sensitivity <It' the 
legitimate interests of both State and National 
Goverments, and in which the National 
Government, anxious though it may be to 
vindicate and protect federal rights and federal 
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways 
that will not unduly interfere with the 
legitimate activities of the States. It should 
never be forgotten that this slogan, 'Our 
Federalism,' born of the early struggling days 
of our Union of States, occupies a highly 
important place in our Nation's history and its 
future." p. 7,8. 
7. 
The brief also relies on Fry v. United States, 
421 u.s. 542, 547, n. 7 - a case that I should review. 
The amicus brief filed on behalf of Colorado 
Public Employees Retirement Association, makes an argument 
that has considerable appeal. It urges reaff irmance of 
the "fundamental principles of the lOth Amendment 
articulated in National League of Cities". The decision 
~ 
in that case is "sensitive to balance of interests that 
1\ 
must be struck between the sovereign in our federal 
system. It then states: 
"When stripped of tis broad constitutional 
overtones, National League of Cities holds only 
that Congress may not exercise its Commerce 
power to legislate the " compensation paid~ to 
employees of states ana their politlcal 
~ s~s1ons. Congressionar-Tntrusion into the 
I'- _.... amount or revenues that a state may allocate to 
f~ '-~ its employees is a direct assault upon a state's 
~- ability to maintain its 'separate and 
4 
, independent existence. ' Indeed, a state onlx_ 
~ may act through its employees. The instanc~ 
A - ~ case accordingly should not be used as a vehicle 
1 ,A~~ ~ _J.- for reconsidering ei"ther the Constitutional 
~~ ~ foundations of National League of Cities or the 
Ov  test that has been developed for assessing 
_j_~f J,o claims of state immunity from federal Commer~ 
Clause legislation. Regardless of the ul tim'"te 
~ limits of Tenth Amendment immunity, this case 






formulated in National League of Cities and EEOC 
v. Wyoming that the qom[>ensation paid to state 
employees, including public transit workers, may 
not be prescribed by Congress." p. 4. 
8. 
The foregoing makes a lot of sense, primarily 
because it would be easy to apply. It would actually 
extend National League of Cities since the greater part of 
a state budget - both for the state government and its 
subdivisions is devoted to employment of people to 
provide the goods and services that the public now 
demands. This probably would be viewed as a broadening 
rather than a limiting of National League of Cities. 
The brief also makes a good point in the 
following language: 
"If there is to be consistent application of 
constitutional doctrine, congress I Commerce 
Clause powers cannot be dependent upon judicial 
resolution of the thorny fiistorical question of 
whether some or ~ all states were the first 
pi.QViders of a particular function or service. 
In this case, the proision of transit services, 
or more narrowly, the payment of compensation to 
public transit eymployees, is the sort of 
integral state function that should not be 
regulated by Congress." p. 5. 
* * * 
Miscallaneous Points 
9. 
The SG argues that courts should be reluctant to 
make judgments such as National League of Cities. The 
question as to which of the sovereigns should perform 
services to the public should be left to the "national 
political process". See pp. 13, 16 of the SG's brief. 
I would inquire whether it would not be more 
democratic to leave this question, if it is to be left to 
the political process, to that process as it operates in 
the respective states. The state governments are far 
closer to the people, and more familiar with their needs, 
than the government in Washington. Moreover, they are 
less likely to be dominated by the special interest groups 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
Justice Powell September 22, 1984 
From: Annmarie 
Nos. 82-1913 and 82-1951 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et al 
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
et al 
Background 
JUSTICE BLACKMON'S proposed majority opinion makes three 
general claims: ~, that National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833 (1976) correctly held that the federal commerce 
power is limited by the role of the states in the federal system: 
~ that t~ standard which has evolved for determi~ing these 
limits, i.e., whether the exercise of federal power reaches 




inconsistent with the principles of federalism on which National 
League of Cities rests;~- that the states' role in the 'U1Ii'L -
 , ...... 
federal system is amply protected by the
1
f egislative process and ~ 
-----~ ~ -----=;,___---..__::.__ __ 
thus that the only substantive protection necessary is that 
--------~-----------------------------federal legislation not discriminate against states. I think 
there are a number of problems with these claims that should be ---------, 
addressed in dissent. 
Discussion 
I have organized this discussion into two major sections. In 
Part I, I discuss problems with JUSTICE BLACKMON's proposed 
alternative to the test of state immunity from Commerce Clause --enactments. In Part II, I address his criticisms of the test 
that the Court has developed in National League of Cities and its 
progeny. 
r. 
A. Procedural Protection for States as States 
Although JUSTICE BLACKMON states that he accepts the holding 
of National League of Cities that the role of the states in the 
federal system limits the federal commerce clause power, he 
. h . . 1):-f . explicitly eschews any attempt to def1ne t ose l1m1ts. ~ Follow1ng 
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent in National League of Cities, JUSTICE --------------- ~ 
BLACKMON argues that the limitations the constitution imposes on 
the exercise of the commerce power with respect to the states 
inhere in the structure of the federal government. Draft at 23. 
~--------------------------------
Thus, he concludes that the "fundamental limitation that the 
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect 
, 
3. 
the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of 
result." Id. at 25. 
JUSTICE BLACKMON is surely correct that the Framers intended 
the structure of the federal government to protect the interests 
of the states. Nevertheless, I think it is a long step from that 
proposition to the view that the fundamental protection of state 
sovereignty under the constitution is one of process and not of 
substance. JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion, like JUSTICE BRENNAN's 
dissent, does not explain why the states' roles in 
the President and members of Congress protects the 
states from federal overreaching under the Commerce 
While senators may be elected from the various states, 
once in office they are members of the federal government. Under 
JUSTICE BLACKMON's approach, these federal officials are the 
'; z=- ---
judges of the limits of their own power. It is not intuitively . -~ 
clear how the constitutional provisions providing for state input 
in the electoral process guarantee that particular exercises of 
the Commerce Clause power do not infringe on residual state 
sovereignty. JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion does not explain his 
reasoning on this point. 
Moreover, as far as I can tell, the Court has never abdicated 
responsibility for assessing the constitutionality of challenged 
action solely beca! se affected parties theoretically are able to ----look out for their own interests. As JUSTICE REHNQUIST noted in 
National League of Cities, a much stronger argument about 
structural protections could have been made in Buckley v. Valeo, 






than can be made with respect to limitations on the Commerce 
Clause. In these cases, the President signed legislation which 
limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and 
thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that the law 
violated the Constitution." Nevertheless, the Court held the 
laws unconstitutional because they entrenched on presidential 
authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN's opinion does not address this point: nor does it cite 
any authority for its contrary view. 
B. Nondiscrimination as a Substantive Standard 11~, 
JUSTICE BLACKMON's opinion recognizes only one substantive~~ 
restraint on the exercise of the Commerce Clause power, that is ~ 
... ~ 
"that Congress not attempt to single out the States for special ~ ~ 
burdens or otherwise discriminate against them." The opinion ~ 
argues that this restraint finds its justification "in~
procedural nature of th[e] basic limitation" and is "tailored to ~ . 
~-~ .. 1.ooC. 
compensate for failings in the national political process rather 
~c.~ 
than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy. I II 
~....c.le 
Draft at 25. I believe that this argument is basically 
incoherent and illuminates the fundamental tension in JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN's opinion as a whole. 
In the first place, the nondiscrimination standard is 
inconsistent with the basic premise of state sovereignty as a 
limitation on the commerce power. JUSTICE BLACKMUN' s opinion 




proposed by JUSTICE BLACKMUN requires only that Congress treat 
___,. 
the states exactly as it treats private parties. Far from 
"reflecting" the states special role in the federal system, this 
standard seems to me to be incompatible with its existence. 
In the second place, adoption of JUSTICE BLACKMUN' s 
Jl. d. . . . d d,,d h h non lSCr1m1nat1on stan ar oes not mean t at t e federal courts 
will be free from having to define integral governmental 
functions or some equivalent realm of protected state functions. 
The opinion notes in a footnote that ~t "every statute that does 
single out the States for special obligations is unconstitutional 
~--------~~----------;_ __ ___ 
ipso facto." Draft at 27 n.20. It is does not say, however, how 
the Court is to decide which discriminatory statutes are 
constitutional and which are not. Given that the Court's purpose 
in any such inquiry would be exactly the same as it is now under 
National League of Cities and its progeny (i.e., whether the 
Commerce Clause is limited with respect to certain state 
activities), I think the Court is likely to end up engaging in 
precisely the same kind of analysis that JUSTICE BLACKMUN finds 
objectionable. Thus, the one substantive limitation that the -
opinion finds necessary leads the Court to precisely the place 
..... --- -JUSTICE BLACKMUN found objectionable in the first place. 
--------------------------~-------~'-----_.------~------~--~~----# 
II. 
A. The Unworkability of "Traditional Governmental Functions" 
Section II of JUSTICE BLACKMUN's opinion argues that the test 
of state immunity under National League of Cities is unworkable. 
He focuses particularly on the third part of the test as 
., 
explained in Hodel 
u.s. 264 (1981), that state compliance with the federal 
obligation must "directly impair [the State's] ability 'to 
structure integral operations in areas of traditional 
governmental functions.'" 452 u.s. at 287-88 (quoting National 
League of Cities). To make this argument, JUSTICE BLACKMON cites 
a long string of cases involving the question of state immunity 
under National League of Cities. In his view there is no 
"organizing principle" distinguishing the cases that have found 
state immunity from those which have not. In addition, JUSTICE 
BLACKMON relies heavily on the Court's e~pe~~nce in "the related 
field of state immunity from federal taxation." He argues that _ __ ____......___ _____ --~--
the Court abandoned the governmental/proprietary distinction in 
this field both because the Court was unable to "give principled 
content" to the distinction and because it was unworkable. 
It is, of course, difficult to define / ~raditional - "' governmental functions. But it seems to me that the opinion's 
recitation of a "laundry list" of functions thought to be 
protected or unprotected by courts interpreting National League 
/I \~ 
of Cities is somewhat disingenous. In each of the cited cases, 
the courts considered the issue on the specific facts before it: 
they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular things 
inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did 
not. Taken out of context, it is not surprising that JUSTICE 
BLACKMON could find no "organizing principle" among the various 
fun~ 
4 ?U 1-' ~--r:,. 
V.be ~ ~'. 1--f ·-' 
~-~. ~  ~ L.7J 
Moreover, I do not think the case law cited by JUSTICE /~ 
BLACKMUN demonstrates his claim that the treatment of this issue J....lA,<.-
~~ 
in the courts shows that the standard is unworkable. His opinion 
cites five decisions by the courts of appeals finding "protected 
- -- ----
functions under National League of Cities." Two of these cases, 
Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (CA6 1979) and 
Molina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority, 680 F.2d 841 
(CAl 1982) , involve the scope of coverage of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, the same statute at issue in National League of 
Cities. In two others, United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (CA9 
1978) and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 
(CA6 1981), the courts discussed whether particular activities 
were integral governmental functions, but the question of 
immunity under National League of Cities was not properly before 
the courts. 1 The fifth case, Gold Cross Ambulance v. City of 
1 In Best, an individual pleaded guilty to drunk driving on a 
federal enclave. A United States magistrate sentenced him to a 
jail term and a fine, and ordered that his sentence be suspended 
pursuant to a California statute. Best moved to correct his 
sentence on the ground that the magistrate had no power to 
suspend his license. The DC denied the motion, and CA9 reversed 
and remanded. Although CA9 spoke of the issuance of drivers' 
licenses as an integral governmental function citing National 
League of Cities, the issue in the case was not state immunity 
from federal activity under the commerce power. Rather, the 
question presented was whether a federal court could order a 
state agency to suspend a state created privilege, in a case 
where the state was not even represented in the relevant 
proceedings. Thus, while this case involved federalism concerns, 
they were not those implicated by the holding of National League 
of Cities. 
Similarly, in Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, the 
question was whether a city ordinance, which prohibited the 
establishment of alternative waste disposal sites and required 
that all "acceptable" garbage be deposited at a new recycling 
Footnote continued on next page. 
-~ 
8. 
Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982) held in the 
alternative that federal antitrust laws could not prevent the 
city and state from regulating ambulance services, citing 
National League of Cities. On appeal, however, the case was 
affirmed not on the National League of Cities ground, but under 
the state action exemption to the antitrust laws. 705 F.2d 1005 
(CA8 1983), cert pending, No. 83-183. 
Thus, I think it is a bit misleading to argue that these 
cases have no "organizing principle." Two of them are not 
properly analyzed under National League of Cities principles in 
the first place, one did not reach the National League of Cities 
question at the CA level, and the other two came to precisely the 
same conclusion about the Fair Labor Standards Act as National 
League of Cities did. 
Similarly, I do not think the eight cases which JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN cites as examples of those where no state immunity has 
been found show that the courts have found it impossible to 
discern traditional governmental functions. Two of the cases 
simply do not involve the question whether certain activity is a 
traditional governmental function. Williams v. Eastside Mental 
Health Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 
plant, violated the Constitution or federal law. CA6 noted that 
waste disposal was a "customary area of local concern long 
reserved to state and local governments." 654 F.2d at 1196 
(citing National League of Cities). The case, however, did not 
involve the authority of Congress to legislate against a claim of 
state immunity, but rather the inverse question, whether state 
law interferred with interstate commerce. 
9. 
976 (1982), turned on whether the application of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to employees of a halfway house would reach the 
State as State. The CA held that it would not, since the halfway 
house was not a state institution with state employees. In 
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 
434 u.s. 902 (1977), CA2 rejected New York City's claim that the 
DC's order that it enforce a plan under the Clean Air Act 
violated National League of Cities on the ground that the plan in 
question was developed by the State and City. Although the other 
cases cited by JUSTICE BLACKMUN address the problem of 
identifying traditional governmental functions, when viewed on 
their facts, I do not think they show that the test is 
"unworkable." 
lf/1-/S 5 
I think the opinion is on strong ground, however, in citing 
~ ---
the Court's d iff icul ties in the analogous tax immunity field. 
But although the Court has abandoned the 
"governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New 
r-t....<-~ 
York v. United States, 326 u.s. 572 (1946), it has not taken the 
""\ 
drastic approach of defining the states' tax immunity solely in 
n ,, 
procedural terms. For example, in Massachusetts v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978), JUSTICE BRENNAN wrote for the Court 
..,.----, 
that the states could have no constitutional objection to federal 
taxes that satisfied a three prong test: (1) that the tax not 
discriminate against the states; (2) that the tax be based on a 
fair approximation of use; ( 3) that the tax be structured to 
produce revenues not in excess of the total cost to the federal 







Court has abandoned the governmental/ proprietary distinction, it 
nevertheless subjects revenue measures to some substantive 
restraints • ......____ 
---------------------------------------------
B. Traditional Governmental Functions and Federalism 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s opinion also maintains that efforts to 
define traditional governmental functions are "unsound in 
principle" because no distinction "that purports to separate 
important governmental functions from other ones can be faithful 
to the role of federalism in a democratic society." The opinion 
argues that the states must be free "to engage in any activity 
that their citizens choose for the common weal," and that any 
rule of state immunity which relies on distinguishing 
"traditional," "integral," or "necessary" state functions 
"invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decision about 
which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 
This is a clever attempt to turn National League of Cities 
against itself. It seems to me, however, that this argument can 
fare no better than JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s argument for structural 
protection of the states and the use of a nondiscrimination 
standard. To the extent that the structure of the federal 
government cannot be shown to provide adequate protection for the 
states, then the federal judiciary, whose clear province it is 
"to say what the law is," must review legislation to determine if 
Congress has overstepped its authority with respect to the 
states. Judicial review in this context needs no different 
justification from that which it always h~s. In addition, given 
that JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s concession that not all legislation which 
11. 
discriminates against the states is necessarily unconstitutional, 
the federal judiciary is likely to play the same role under his 
approach as it does under the National League of Cities approach. 
Conclusion 
Despite JUSTICE BLACKMUN's assertions to the contrary, 
neither his structural approach to the protection of state 
sovreignity, nor his substantive nondiscrimination standard, is 
rooted uniquely in the value of federalism. In addition, neither 
of them prot cts the states as states. To this extent, the 
opinion is inconsistent with the central premise of National 
League of Cities, a premise which the opinion purports to 
embrace. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN is, of course, correct that National League 
of Cities is difficult to apply. I think he is wrong, however, 
to argue that the basic approach of the case is unsound. Neither 
the cases decided under National League of Cities, nor the 
Court's experience in the tax immunity field, suggest that a case 
by case approach to a substantive definition of state immunity 
from Commerce Clause enactments is unworkable. 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: Sept. 29, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-1913 and 82-1951 San Antonio Transit Authority Case 
The brief amicus filed on behalf of 25 states, 
and apparently written by the Attorney General of 
Massachusetts, is particularly interesting. It strongly 
supports reaffirmance of the basic principle (federalism} 
of National League of Cities, and urges us to affirm the 
DC's decision. But the brief argues for a different 
analytical approach. It rejects analysis based upon 
whether the function at issue is "traditional", and is 
particularly critical of the "rigid and myopic historical 
approach" urged by the SG - an approach that looks to 
whether the municipal function was a traditional one at 
the time the FLSA was adopted. 
The states' brief argues for a "balancing test" 
one that would require a court exercising judicial 
review to weigh the strength of the federal interest in 
regulating the states as states against the seriousness of 
the intrusion on state sovereignty". The specific 




.. in light of the functions served by the states in the 
constitutional scheme 11 • P. 42. 
One factor to be assessed is 11 the proximity of 
the federal action to the core concerns of the Commerce 
Clause ... The Founding Fathers wished to assure 11 an 
integrated national economy.. that can exist only in the 
absence of state-imposed barriers. The impact of the 
state activity on interstate commerce must be assessed to 
determine whether the state must submit to federal 
regulation. This 11 does not focus on whether the state is 
engaged in commercial activity, but instead inquires into 
the degree which that activity affects the core concerns 
of the Commerce Clause 11 • The question, therefore, is not 
whether the regulation of wages and hours of transit 
workers is within the scope of the Commerce Clause . 
rather, the relevant inquiry is an assessment of degree 
i.e. how much of a burder on interstate commerce is 
created by exempting publicly employed transit workers 
from the FLSA? 11 P. 42-45. 
The states' brief goes on to say that: 
11 0nce the strength of the federal interest and 
the impact of the state activity have been 
ascertained, they may be balanced against the 
injury to state sovereignty posed the federal 
regulation ... 
~· \ ... ' 
Finally, as I understand the brief by the 
states, there must be recognition that the Constitution 
established "a frame of government within which democratic 
choice is guaranteed. For this reason, injury to state 
sovereignty should not be assessed in terms of the 
substantive merit of a particular state policy, but rather 
in terms of the effect upon self government." P. 51- 52. 
The brief concludes, not surprisingly, that the 
"balance tips" against the extension of FLSA to public 
mass transit. These transit systems relate to "local 
rather than national concerns". Moreover, they have never 
been regulated by the federal government, but have 
remained subject to "local political decision-making 
processes" and regulation. P. 61, 62. 
Finally, the point is made that the "assured 
provision of public transportation is an essential feature 
of the daily lives of many people - commuters, school 
children, the elderly, etc." The point also is made that 
the "intrusion of the national government into this local 
political process [and local service] not only limits the 
range of choice, but demonstrates to state and local 
citizens that the local government is not theirs". P. 64. 
, . 
. ~ .:.,p;· • .... 
} r 
Brief of American Public Transit Association (Bill 
Coleman) 
This wordy supplemental brief on behalf of this 
party (one of the appellees) argues that the "principles" 
of League of Cities are sound and should be reaffirmed. 
It is emphasized that four subsequent cases (Hodel, Long 
Island Railroad, FERC v. Mississippi (opinion by 
Blackmun), and EEOC v. Wyoming) have reaffirmed League of 
Cities and its "principles". P. 7-15. 
I should have said that on p. 2 of this brief, 
the two "constraints on Congress 1 exercise of Commerce 
Clause power in direct regulation of the states and their 
political subdivisions, are "the principles of federalism" 
and the Tenth Amendment. 
Commencing at p. 32 of the brief, it is said 
that "the three part test in Hodel, and applied in 
subsequent cases, is a fully workable doctrine that 
insures thorough consideration of all legitimate state and 
constitutional interests. The result of such judicial 
scrutiny is in effect a balancing of the importance of 
each sovereign 1 s interests - a balancing for which the 
Court 1 s tests and precedents provide objective and 
understandable criteria". P. 33. 
I note that this "balancing test" is similar to 
that which is the centerpiece in the brief on behalf of 25 
states that I discuss above. 
Reply Briefs on -ehalf of Appellants 
The SG's reply brief is weak and adds little to 
the SG's original flawed effort. Indeed, for me the 
arguments by the SG' s off ice in this case are about the 
weakest I have ever seen emerge from that quality group of 
lawyers. For my comments on the SG's brief, see my memo 
of September 7. 
The reply brief of appellant Garcia is 
scholarly, well written - and will be well argued by Larry 
Gold - but it reiterates the extreme position advanced in 
prior briefs. Following elaborate quotations from The 
Federalist (that could be matched easily with quotations 
emphasizing federalism), the brief presents an absolutist 
view of the Commerce Clause: it is supreme over state law 
whether exercised with respect to private persons or 
directly as a regulation or restriction on the action of 
state and local governments. Under this view, all local 
"goods and services" would be subject to federal 
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"The fact that, as to any given good or service, 
some entities [private corporations] that are 
not sovereign provide the service while some 
entities [cities] that are sovereign do not, 
demonstrates that such activity 1s not an 
essential attribute of state sovereignty". 
This observation undercuts the SG' s argument, 
and it also identifies the logical weakness of reliance 
upon whether a service is "traditional", "essential" or 
"core". 
These observations implicitly suggest the merit 
of the "balancing test" urged by the brief on behalf of 25 
states. 
The Garcia brief, as an alternative to its 
"basic position", agrees with the "Secretary of Labor (the 
SG) that if the states are to retain the current form of 
commerce power immunity, the immunity should be confined 
to the functions the states have historically performed " 
P. 14. 
* * * 
In light of my examination of these and other 
briefs, and in view of problems identified in the analysis 
of League of Cities, I am inclined to agree generally with 
a balancing test in which a reviewing court would weigh 
, . 
the factors identified in the states' brief. I will want 
to discuss with Annmar ie who has thought about the case 
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· GARCIA40 SALLY-POW 
Note: This a rough redraft of Part IV, the purpose being 
to make somewhat clearer the broad scope of the Court's 
decision. 
* * * 
The question presented in this case is the 
applicability of the FLSA to the wages and hours of 
employees of a city-owned transit system. The effect of 
the Court's decision and holding is far broader. In 
National League of Cities, the power to regulate the wages 
and hours of employees of fire and police departments was 
at issue. The overruling of that decision and the broad 
sweep of today's opinion apparently authorize federal 
control by virtue of the Commerce Clause over tne terms 
and conditions of employment of all state and local 
employees. The Court thus rejects the distinction, for 
2. 
purposes of federal regulation, between public and private 
employers engaged in commerce that had been .carefully 
~awn in League of Cities. This conclusion reflects a 
misunderstanding if not indeed a rejection of the history 
of our country and the intention of the Framers of the 
Cbnsti tution. 1 
Here I return to the test approved in National 
~ague of Cities, and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. 
Co., and FERC v. Mississippi: whether the service or 
activity at issue is one that "the states and their 
political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their 
1 see the opinion of the Court in National 
League of Cities that makes clear that the very essence of 
a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the 
activities of the states as states by means of the 
commerce power. See also in this connection the Court's 
opinion in ~ supra, at 547, n. 7. 
• 1,•, 
3. 
citizens". National League of Cities, supra, at 855. The 
application of this test requires a balancing approach. 
See, ante, at As Justice Blackmun observed in 
concurring in National League of Cities: 
"[I]t seems to me that [the Court's opinion] 
adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw 
federal power in areas such as environmental 
proctection, where the federal interest is 
demonstrably greater and where the state 
facility compliance with imposed federal 
standards would be essential." Id., at 856. 
There is no holding in this case that the 
"federal interest is demonstrably greater" than the 
clearly traditional state interest in controlling the 
employment terms and conditions of its own employees. No 
such holding could have been made, as the state interest 
is compelling. The financial impact on a state and its 
localities of displacing their control over wages, hours, 
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations of 
4. 
their employees could have a serious - and sometimes 
unanticipated - effect on state and local budgeting and 
taxes. 2 Moreover, as was said in National League of 
Cities, federal control "displaces state policies 
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery 
of those governmental services that citizens require". 
Id., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal rather than 
private operation of an intra-city mass transit system is 
reltively new in the life of our country. It nevertheless 
is a classic example of the type of service traditionally 
provided by local government. It is indistinguishable in 
2 rn his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, 
Justice Douglas - joined by Justice Stewart - observed 
that the Court's extention of the FLSA could "disrupt the 
fiscal policy of the states and threaten their autonomy in 
the regulation of health and education". !d., ·at 302. 
5. 
principle from the traditional services of providing and 
maintaining streets, public lighting, traffic control, 
water, and sewerage systems. 3 It is precisely services of 
this kind "with which citizens are more 'familiar[) and 
minutely conversant.'" The Federalist, No. 46, at 316. 
State and local elected and appointed officials, in their 
respective communities, ofcourse must be intimately 
familiar with these services. Nor are such officials 
unaware that their constituents as well as the press are 
responsive both to the adequacy, fairness and cost of 
these services. It is this kind of state and local 
control and accountability that the Framers understood 
3 In Long Island R. Co. theunanimous Court 
recognized the truism that the "traditionally governmental 
functions" test is not a static concept as our history 
shows. (citation} 
6. 
would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal 
system that the Constitution explicitly requires. See 
National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
Although the Court's opinion purports to 
recognize that the states retain some sovereign power, it 
does not identify even a single aspect of state authority 
that would remain where the Commerce Clause is invoked to 
justify federal regulation. 4 In Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, 
overruled by National League of Cities and today 
reaffirmed, in a comparatively narrow opinion the Court's 
4The Court's one effort to reassure the 
states was to identify major statutes that not yet have 
been made applicable to state governments as distinguished 
from the private sector: {Annmar ie, list the statutes 
with the reference to HAB's opinion). The Court does not 
suggest that this restraint will continue after its 
decision is understood, or that special interest groups 
will not accept the now open invitation to urge Congress 
to extend these and other statutes to apply to states and 
their local subdivisions. 
7. 
sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, 
institutions and schools. Justice Douglas, in dissent, 
wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the Commerce 
Clause could enable "the National Government [to] devour 
the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment". Id., at 
205. 
lfp/ss 12/10/84 Rider X (Garcia) 
GARX SALLY-POW 
As contrasted with democracy at state and local 
levels, one must compare this with the way the federal 
government works realistically. Legislation is d~afted 
primarily by the staffs of the congressional committees. 
In view of the hundreds of bills introduced at each 
session of Congress and the complexity of many of them, it 
understandably is impossible for even the most 
conscientious legislators - other than those who serve on 
theresponsible committeees - to be truly familiar with 
many statutes that are enacted. But this is only the 
beginning of the process. The federal departments and 
agencies usually are authorized to write the regulations 





statutes. Again these are drafted largely by staff 
personnel. And the administration and enforcement of 
federal laws and regulations necessarily are in the hands 
of staff and civil service employees. 
In recognizing that this is the way the system 
works, I imply no criticism of these employees or of the 
senior officials who are in charge. For the most part, 
they are conscientious and faithful to their duties. But 
this is not the question. Rather, if one believes in 
democracy it is clear that the immense federal bureaucracy 
know less about the services traditionally rendered by 
states and localities, and are less responsive, than the 
state legislatures, city councils and board of supervisors 
of the 50 states. With all respect, therefore, I think it 
fair to say that the Court is simply out of touch with the 
'I 
3. 
reality of how our system operates in holding that the 
"structure of the federal government" itself "ensure[s) 
the role of the states in the federal system". Ante, at 
22.* 
*The Court also observes that the standard approved in 
National League of Cities "disserves the principles of 
democratic self government". The Court looks myopically 
only to persons elected to positons in the federal 
government in Washington. It disregards entirely the far 
more effective role of democratic self government at the 
state and local levels. 
* * * 
Note to Annmarie: What do you think of 
something like the above to be added to my redraft of Part 
IV at some appropraite point? Feel free to redraft this 
entirely. The point can be made in more elegant language 




Note: This a rough redraft of Part I rpose being 
to make somewhat clearer the broad scope of the Court's 
decision. 
* * * 
The question presented in this case is the 
applicability of the FLSA to the wages and hours of 
employees of a city-owned transit system. The effect of 
the Court's decision and holding is far broader. In 
National League of Cities, the power to regulate the wages 
and hours of employees of fire and police departments was 
at issue. The overruling of that decision and the broad 
sweep of today's opinion apparently authorize federal 
control by virtue of the Commerce Clause over the terms 
and conditions of employment of all state and local 
employees. The Court thus rejects the distinction, for 
2. 
purposes of federal regulation, between public and private 
employers engaged in commerce that had been carefully 
drawn in League of Cities. This conclusion reflects a 
misunderstanding if not indeed a rejection of the history 
of our country and the intention of the Framers of the 
Constitution. 1 
Here I return to the test approved in National 
League of Cities, and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. 
Co., and FERC v. Mississippi: whether the service or 
activity at issue is one that "the states and their 
political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their 
1see the opinion of the Court in National 
League of Cities that makes clear that the very essence of 
a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the 
activities of the states as states by means of the 
commerce power.\) See also in this connection the Court's 





citizens". National League of Cities, supra, at 855. The 
application of this test requires a balancing approach. 
~ t-v< "'1--t:.../"- !-< ... ? .,.t./~·' - ~ /1.., ~ ~" 1 /,.1/~ 
---· 1\ ~ Justice Blackmun_,p~b&er u~d- .... in .P_,~ See, ante, at 
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"[I]t seems to me that [the Court's opinion] 
adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw 
federal power in areas such as environmental 
proctection, where the federal interest is 
demonstrably greater and where the state 
fucility compliance with imposed federal 
standards would be essential." Id., at 856. 
There is no holding in this case that the 
"federal interest is demonstrably greater" than the 
cJ.Qarly traditional state interest in controlling the 
v~-.~; 
employment terms and conditions of its own employees. No 
such holding could have been made, as the state interest 
~ compelling. The financial impact on a state and its 
localities of displacing their control over wages, hours, 
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations of 
·" 
4. 
their employees could have a serious - and ~s 
unanticipated - effect on state and local budgeting and 
taxes. 2 Moreover, as was said in National League of 
Cities, federal control "displaces state policies 
regarding the manner in which they will structure delivery 
of those governmental services that citizens require". 
Id. , at 84 7. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal rather than 
private operation of an intra-city mass transit system is 
reltively new in the life of our country. It nevertheless 
is a classic example of the type of service traditionally 
provided by local government. It is indistinguishable in 
2 In his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, 
Justice Douglas - joined by Justice Stewart - observed 
that the Court's extention of the FLSA could "disrupt the 
fiscal policy of the states and threaten their autonomy in 
the regulation of health and education". !d., at 302. 
5. 
principle from the traditional services of providing and 
maintaining streets, public lighting, traffic control, 
water, and sewerage systems. 3 It is precisely services of 
this kind "with which citizens are more 'familiar[) and 
~nutely conversant.'" The Federalist, No. 46, at 316. 
State and local elected and appointed officials, in their 
respective communities, o~ourse must be intimately 
c_ ... L~k~~4~ 
familiar with these services. Nor are such offi~ ials ~ 
1\ 
. 4/P C aJ4u 
unaware that their constituents as well as the press; are 
responsive both to the adequacy, fairness and cost of 
these services. It is this kind of state and local 
control and accountability that the Framers understood 
3 In Long Island 
recognized the truism that 
functions" test is not a 
shows. (citation) 
R. Co. theunanimous Court 
the "traditionally governmental 
static concept as our history 
would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal 
system that the Constitution explicitly requires. See 
t<Btional League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. r ~ y 
Although the Court's opinion purports to 
recognize that the states retain some sovereign power, it 
does not identify even a single aspect of state authority 
that would remain where the Commerce Clause is invoked to 
justify federal regulation. 4 In Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, 
overruled by National League of Cities and today 
reaffirmed, in a comparatively narrow opinion the Court's 
4The Court's one effort to reassure the 
states was to identify major statutes that not yet have 
been made applicable to state governments as distinguished 
from the private sector: (Annmarie, list the statutes 
with the reference to HAB's opinion). The Court does not 
suggest that this restraint will continue after its 
decision is understood ... or t:Ra< special interest groups 
r----W--.-1.,.-,;-l """' ae-4! accept the now open in i tation to urge Congress 
to extend these and other statut s to apply tol sta~es and 
their local subdivisions. ~ 
•' 
7. 
sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, 
institutions and schools. Justice Douglas, in dissent, 
wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the Commerce 
Clause could enable "the National Government [to] devour 
the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 





lfp/ss 12/10/84 Rider A, p. (Garcia) 
GARZ SALLY-POW 
Annmarie: What do you think of adding at some place a -
footnote 
like this: ~~~ 
';)_ g_J ---r 
In criticizing National League of Cities, the 
Court states that it would "invite[s] an unelected federal 
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it 
\\ 
favors and which ones its dislikes ~ Then curiously1 
enoag+r.., the Cour t;t ~ cites Justice Brandeis' famous 
Observation in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 u.s. 
262, 311 (1932) to the effect that under the "traditional" 
~~at-~~~~ 
governmental function analysis "the states cannot serve as 
~ 
laboratories for social and economic experiment". Ante, 
at 17. Apparently the Court is saying that where "an 
2. 
unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether 
a particular function is one for the federal or state 
governments)~ the states no longer may engage in 
"social and economic experiment". Ante, at 17. It is not 
easy to understand this argument. 1-Me-ee ,_. i t! s ---re1rult 
_,. 1/L/ . ~ 
u~ t he Court's ruling that these decisions are to be 
1\ 
~ "'\ 
made by the federal government alone . will leave the states 
A 
with little or no opportunity to serve as the 
"laboratories" perceived by Justice Brandeis. 
' ~;., 
lfp/ss 12/10/84 Rider A, p. (Garcia) 
GARZ SALLY-POW 
Annmarie: What do you think of adding at some place a 
footnote like this: 
In criticizing National League of Cities, the 
Court states that it would "invite[s] an unelected federal 
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it 
favors and which ones its dislikes. Then curiously 
enough, the Court's opinion cites Justice Brandeis' famous 
cbservation in New State Ice Co. ,v. Liebmann, 285 u.s. 
262, 311 (1932) to the effect that under the "traditional" 
governmental function analysis "the states cannot serve as 
laboratories for social and economic experiment". Ante, 
at 17. Apparently the Court is saying that where "an 
.. 2 • 
unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether 
a particular function is one for the federal or state 
governments that the states no longer may engage in 
"social and economic experiment". Ante, at 17. It is not 
easy to understand this argument. Indeed, its result 
under the Court's ruling that these decisions are to be 
made by the federal government alone will leave the states 
with little or no opportunity to serve as the 
"laboratories" perceived by Justice Brandeis. 
lfp/ss 12/10/84 Rider z, p. (Garcia) 
GARZl SALLY-POW 
Note to Annmarie: We have talked about my dissenting 
opinion in Wyoming. I continue to think - subject to 
discussion with you - that a footnote might be added 
referring to the view of the Commerce Clause at the time 
the Constitution was adopted and citing my opinion. Here 
is a draft: 
The emasculation of the powers of the states 
that can result from today's decision is predicated on the 
Commerce Clause as a power "delegated to the United 
States" by the Tenth Amendment. All that the Constitution 
says affirmatively is that "Congress shall have power 
• to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the 
2. 
several states and with the Indian tribes." Art. I, §8. 
It is of interest that Section 8 identifies a score of 
powers, with authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the 
credit of the United States, pay its debts, provide for 
the common defense, and for the general welfare listed 
~fore the brief reference to "Commerce" is made. It is 
clear from the debates leading up to the adoption of the 
Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was that 
which the states themselves were powerless to regulate. 
Indeedthe language of the clause itself focuses on 
activities that only a national government could regulate: 
cnrnrnerce with foreign nations, Indian tribes and "among" 
the several states. 
To be sure, this Court has construed the 
Commerce Clause - and extended its reach - to accommoda~ 
~:. 
3. 
unanticipated changes over the past two centuries, 
commencing with transportation and communication. As 
these changes have occurred, this Court has been the 
arbiter to decide whether the federal government has 
extended its authority to activities beyond the capability 
of a single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal 
interests that outweighed the authority and interests of 
the states. For a discussion of the place and 
understanding of the Commerce Clause, see EEOC v. Wyoming, 
____ u.s. ____ , at p. ____ - ____ (1983} (Powell, J., 
dissenting}. 
lfp/ss 12/17/84 Rider A, p. 21 (Garcia) 
GAR21 SALLY-POW 
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of 
supervisors, and state and local commissions, boards and 
agencies. It is at these state and local levels - not in 
Washington as the Court so mistakenly thinks - that 
"democratic self government" is best exemplified. 
' .; ~ .. 
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lfp/ss 12/05/84 Rider A, p. 17 (Garcia) 
RIDER17 SALLY-POW 
Annmarie: 
Note 7 makes some excellent points, but perhaps 
it could be reframed along the following lines: 
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that 
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the 
constitutional structure might impose on federal action 
affecting the states under the Commerce Clause". Ante, at 
27. The opinion then hastens to say that "in the factual 
setting of [some identified] cases the internal safeguards 
cl the political process have performed as intended." !d. 
But the Court identifies no standards as to when and under 
what circumstances the "political process" may have failed 
2. 
and naffirmative limitsn are to be imposed. Presumably, 
such limits are to be determined by the Judicial Branch 
even if it is nunelectedn. But today's opinion has 
rejected the balancing standard approved in the several 
cases it has overruled, and now suggests no other standard 
that would enable a court to determine that there has been 
a malfunction of the npolitical processn. The Court's 
unwillingness or inability to specify the naffirmative 
limitsn on federal power that it mentions, are when and 
how these limits are to be determined, may well be 
explained by the transparent fact that any such attempted 
would be subject to precisely the same objections it 
relies on today to overrule National League of Cities. 
·~·· 
;~ . 
lfp/ss 12/05/84 Rider B, p. 7 (Garcia) 
RIDERB7 SALLY-POW 
The "structure" relied upon, as today's decision 
itself reflects, is not the authority of the Judicial Branch 
unquestioned since Marbury v. Madison to determine the 
allocations of powers within the federal system. Rather, 
~e "structure" said to "ensure the role of the states in 
the federal system is their function in "the selection of 
both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the federal 
government". Id., at 27. To ensure no doubt about its 
intention, the Court renounces its decision in National 
League of Cities because it "inevitably invites an 
uneelected federal judicial to make decisions about which 
state policies its favors and which ones it dislikes". 
Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which the states 
may exercise their authority now is to be determined from 
time to time by political decisions of the Congress and the 
2. 
President, decisions the Court said should not be subject to 
judicial review. !d. I note in passing, it does not seem 
to have occurred to the Court that it - and uneelected 
majority of five Justices - today rejects almost 200 years 
of the understanding of the constitutional status of 
federalism. In doing so, there is only the barest mention 
of the Tenth Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum from any 
Court cited in support of the view that the role of the 
states in the federal system properly depends upon the grace 
of elected federal officials rather than the Constitution 
itself. 
The foregoing, a rough draft, might with some 
editing be a substitute from the part marked B at the bottom 
of page 7 to the pointed marked End at the top of page 9. 
This may not be an improvement, but I would like to see how 
it looks. 
lfp/ss 12/05/84 Comment as to pp. 15 and 16 (Garcia) 
COMMENT SALLY-POW 
Note to Annmarie: 
Subpart B (p. 16) commences with the statement 
that the Court holds that the "fundamental limitation that 
the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause 
to protect the states as states is one of process rather 
than on of result". 
HAB's opinion does say this. But is this a 
different protection of the states from HAB's reliance on 
the "structure" of the Constitution that vests the 
electoral power in the states. It seems to me that 
without some elaborate explanation of why the two 
"protections" are consistent, it may be better simply to 
2. 
omit from the beginning of the paragraph on p. 15 to the 
point marked end near the bottom of page 16. 
In others words, Subpart B could begin with the 
~ntence that commences: "Today's opinion does not 
explain . • " . . 
lfp/ss 12/05/84 Rider A, p. 7 (Garcia) 
RIDER7 SALLY-POW 
Note: Perhaps on page a footnote along the following 
lines - after some improvement to insure preciseness of 
language - might be appropriate: 
The Court's decision reverses the purpose and 
meaning of the Tenth Amendment. Rather than guaranteeing 
that all powers not expressly granted to the federal 
government are reserved to the states, today's decision in 
effect says that all powers not express guaranteed to the 
states (e.g., electoral rights and guaranteed borders), 
are vested in the federal government. At least this is 
true with respect to the Commerce Clause - a provision 
expanded to encompass an undreamed of array of activities. 
2. 
Until today, the restraint against the ultimate 
encroachment upon state authority under that clause had 
been the power of judicial review - a power the Court also 




lfp/ss 12/06/84 Rider A, p. 29 (Garcia) 
GARCIA29 SALLY-POW 
In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of 
activities engaged in by state and local governments that 
affect the daily lives of people. These are services that 
people have the ability to understand and evaluate as well 
as the right, in a democracy, to participate and 
oversee. 10 We recognized that "it is functions such as 
these which governments are created to provide .,"and 
that the states and local governments are better able to 
perform than the national government. 
lfp/ss 12/06/84 Rider A, p. 40 (Garcia) 
GARCIA40 SALLY-POW 
Note: 
This a rough redraft of Part IV, the purpose 
being to make somewhat clearer the broad scope of the 
Court's decision. 
The question presented in this case is the 
applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the wages 
and hours of employees of a city-owned bus system. The 
effect of the Court's decision and holding is far broader. 
In National League of Cities, the power to regulate the 
wages and hours of employees of fire and police 
departments was at issue. the overruling of that decision 
and the broad sweep of today•s opinion apparently 
authorizes federal control by virtue of the Commerce 
J' ..... 
ir'."J ,f 




Clause over the terms and conditions of employment of all 
state and local employees. It no longer is questioned 
that the provisions of the Act apply to private employers 
engaged in commerce. Obliterating the distinction between 
the authority of the federal government over state conduct 
and private conduct reflects a misunderstanding if not 
indeed a rejection of the history of our country and the 
intention of the Framers of the Constitution. 1 
No state action with respect to employment is 
subject to federal control. Here I return to the view 
expressly recognized in National League of Cities, Hodel, 
1see the opinion of the Court in National 
League of Cities that makes clear that the very essence of 
a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the 
activities of the states as states by means of the 
commerce power. See also in this connection the Court's 
opinion in~ supra, at 547, n. 7. 
Long Island R. Co., and FERC v. Mississippi: that the 
service or activity at issue is one that "the states and 
their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded 
their citizens". National League of Cities, supra, at 
855. The application of this test requires a balancing 
approach. As Justice Blackmun observed in agreeing that 
fue "result" in National League of Cities: 
"[I]t seems to me that [the Court's opinion] 
adopts a balancing approach, and does not outlaw 
federal power in areas such as environmental 
proctection, where the federal interest is 
demonstrably greater and where the state 
facility compliance with imposed federal 
standards would be essential." Id., at 856. 
There is no holding in this case that the 
"federal interest is demonstrably greater" than the 
clearly traditional state interest in controlling the 
terms and conditions of its own employees. Indeed, it 
3. 
fairly can be said that the state interest is compelling. 
4. 
The financial impact on a state or its localities of 
displacing their control over wages, ours, overtime 
regulations, pensions, labor relations and the like, can 
have a serious - and sometimes unanticipated - effect on 
state and local budgeting and taxes. Moreover, as was 
said in National League of Cities, federal control 
"displaces state policies regarding the manner in which 
they will structure delivery of those governmental 
services tht citizens require". !d., at 847. While it is 
true that municipal operation of an intra-city mass 
transit system is reltively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of local 
self government. Providing this modern means for citizens 
to go to and from their work and for inner-urban 
transportation for all of the familiar purposes, is 
' . 
5. 
indistinguishable in principle from the acknowledged 
traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage 
systems. It is precisely services of this kind "with 
which citizens are more 'familiar[] and minutely 
conversant.'" The Federalist, No. 46, at 316. State and 
local elected officials, in their respective communities, 
also are intimately familiar with these governmental 
activities, and they are not unaware that their 
constituents and the press are responsive both to the 
adequacy, fairness and cost of these services. It is this 
kind of state and local control and accountability that 
the Framers understood would insure the vitality and 
preservation of the federal system that the Constitution 
6. 
explicitly requires. See National League of Cities, 
supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Althought he Court's opinion purports to 
recognize that the states retain some sovereign power, it 
has failed to identify even a single aspect of state 
authority that would remain after the Commerce Clause is 
. 2 
invoked to support federal regulation. 
In Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, overruled by 
National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, in a 
2The Court's one effort to reassure the 
states was to i .dentify major statutes that not yet have 
been made applicable to state governments as distinguished 
from the private sector: {Annmarie, list the statutes 
with the reference to HAB's opinion). The Court does not 
suggest that this restraint will continue after its 
decision is understood, or that special interest groups 
will not accept the now open invitation to urge Congress 
to extend these and other statutes to states and their 
local subdivisions. 
7. 
comparatively narrow opinion the Court's sustained an 
extension of the FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions 
and schools. Justice Douglas, in a dissent joined by 
Justice Stewart, made the relevant point that this 
extension of that Act could "disrupt the fiscal policy of 
the states and threaten their automony in the regulation 
of health and educaton". !d., at 203. Indeed, Justice 
Douglas wrote presciently that this reading of the 
Commerce Clause could enable "the National Government [to] 
devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment". Id., at 
205. 
, . 
lfp/ss 12/07/84 Rider A, p. 17 (Garcia) 
RIDER17 SALLY-POW 
Annmarie: Note 7 is excellent. In an effort to make it 
somewhat stronger, I have reframed it along the following 
lines. Feel free to edit, or I could go back to your 
draft. 
* * * 
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that 
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the 
constitutional structure might impose on federal action 
affecting the states under the Commerce Clause". Ante, at 
27. The opinion then states that "in the factual setting 
of [some identified] cases the internal safeguards of the 
political process have performed as intended." Id. But 




what circumstances the "political process" may have failed 
and "affirmative limits" are to be imposed. Presuma6ly, 
such limits are to be determined by the Judicial Branch 
even if it is "unelected". But today's opinion has 
rejected the balancing standard approved in the several 
cases it has overruled, and suggests no other standard 
that would enable a court to determine when there has been 
a malfunction of the "political process". The Court's 
unwillingness or inability to specify the "affirmative 
limits" on federal power that it vaguely mentions, or when 
and how these limits are to be determined, may well be 
explained by the transparent fact that any such attempted 
would be subject to precisely the same objections it 
relies on today to overrule National League of Cities. 
' ' 
lfp/ss 12/07/84 Rider A, p. 9 (Garcia) 
GAR9 SALLY-POW 
In the opinion that follows, I will address in Part II its 
criticism of the rationale of National League of Cities 
and the standard it applied. Part III will review briefly 
the understanding at the time of the ratification of the 
Constitution and the extent to which this Court, until 
today, has recognized that we have a federal system in 
which the states retain a signficant measure of 
sovereignty. Part IV will consider the applicability of 
the FLSA to the indisputable local service provided by an 
urban transit system. 
,. ·~ 
' . 
lfp/ss 12/07/84 Rider A, p. 7-8 (Garcia) 
RIDERB7 SALLY-POW 
The "structure" said to "ensure the role of the 
states in the federal system is their function in "the 
selection of both the Executive and Legislative Branches 
of the federal government". Id., at 27. To leave no 
doubt about its intention, the Court renounces its 
decision in National League of Cities because it 
"inevitably invites an uneelected federal judicial to make 
decisions about which state policies its favors and which 
ones it dislikes". Ante, at 17. In other words, the 
extent to which the states may exercise their authority, 
where Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause, 
now is to be determined from time to time by political 
decisions made in Washington, decisions the Court says 
2. 
will not be subject to judicial review. !d. I note in 
passing, it does not seem to have occurred to the Court 
that it - and uneelected majority of five Justices - today 
rejects almost 200 years of the understanding of the 
constitutional status of federalism. In doing so, there 
is only the barest mention of the Tenth Amendment. Nor is 
so much as a dictum from any court cited in support of the 
view that the role and authority of the states in the 
federal system depend upon the grace of elected federal 




·"' ~ ...... 
~~· ~ 
lfp/ss 12/07/84 Rider A, p. 18, 19 (Garcia) 
GAR18 SALLY-POW 
Note to Annmarie: Again, I admire your note 9 with the 
excellent cites to secondary authority. Your quote from 
Kaden is on target. What would you think of adding, 
following that quote or perhaps at some other place, a 
more specific reference to the innumerable special groups 
with powerful lobbies that also make generous campaign 
contributions to selected members of Congress. These 
groups now have a far greater influence on the voting of 
many members of Congress than unorganized individual 
opinions in their districts or states. Indeed, the 
average individual often feels incompetent to understand 
the complex legislation that may, when it is applied, 
2. 
diminish the opportunity for democracy to work at the 
local level. 
aml 11/9/84 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
Outline for a Second Draft of the Dissent 
Introduction 
This section is basically your rider on stare decisis. 
I. Federalism 
The ~ attempts to rationalize its result by claiming 
that any attempt to define traditional governmental functions is 
inconsistent with federalism. But--
(1) HAB's opinion is inconsistent with any usual 
understanding of federalism & indeed never describes what the 
majority thinks federalism entails. 
(2) Majority plays lip service to state sovereignty, but 
mentions the Tenth Amendment only once. 
(3) Federalism is a dual system of government; states play a 
major role. The Federalist outlines the founders' view of the 
importance of the states, as do cases of this Court. A detailed 
discussion of federalism goes here. 
(4) Majority's unprecedented view means that Congress is 
free to usurp state power whenever and however it can agree to do 
so; this view realizes the worst fears of the opponents of the 
Constitution. It ignores the fact that the Constitution would not 
have been ratified without the promise of the Tenth Amendment. 
. 
•• < . 
- 2 -
II. Majority's Approach 
The majority opinion argues that no standard for defining 
traditional governmental functions can be "faithful to 
federalism," because any such standard (somehow) interferes with 
the freedom of states to experiment. More fundamentally, HAB 
contends that "state sovereignty is limited by the Constitution 
itself." 
~ ~ "'Ud ~~-----.-. ~ 
(1) As for faithfulness to federalism, i~ ie h~rg tc •Qe ~ow---~ 
giving Congress unlimitedL ~rev~w&Ql~ authority to treat States 
just as it does any private individual or entity is faithful to 
,.b~~~~ 
the role of the States in our federal system; it rs-~iSo-u  
~~Q ~~o~~s  tt!~~~t?to ~
"\ ..1'L.t,.. 2.71']] .... ,· th.,.v+. ~ a P\c.. d~ -:-r experiment4 s~nce Cong~ ean~ow i~~~S~Q~~-~~~-~-L-~-~~~-~-~H~~~~~~~- -  
~ e;v-W-
cqnstitut:i,.enal-oheek "!rom ~he courts-.. 
(2) Re: HAB's claim that the traditional government function 
standard "invites an unelected fed. judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 
Of course it isn't the Court's job to judge the wisdom of 
particular policies. But the majority provides no basis for its 
assertion that the courts "inevitably" must do so when ruling in 
this area. The Tenth Amendment provides a substantive check on 
what Congress may do with respect to the States. 
(3) Re: the argument that the fundamental limitation on 
Congress' power under the Commerce Cl. is one of process. The 
Court expressly rejected this argument in National League of 
Cities, and for good reasons: the view is illogical and 
inconsistent with fundamental constitutional principles. 
'. ' 
- 3 -
(a) The majority offers no explanation of how the 
electoral role of the States guarantees that Congress will not 
exceed its authority. Congress is part of the federal 
government. 
(b) The fact that the States are politically 
successful in obtaining funds and exemptions from some federal 
laws does not show that political processes are the proper means 
of enforcing constitutional limitations. Moreover, what 
exemptions Congress gives today it can take away tomorrow. 
Surely the States are entitled to more protection than whatever 
the curr~nt political situation allows. 
(c) The majority effectively makes federal officials 
the judges of their own power. This is inimical to the 
fundamental pricniples of constitutional government. It is the 
settled province of the courts "to say what the law is." 
Judicial review needs no different justification in the context 
of the Commerce Clause from that which it always has. 
(d) The Court has never before abdicated responsibility 
for deciding constitutional questions on the ground that the 
affected parties can take care of themselves. JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
responded to the "inherent structural protections" argument in 
National League of Cities; the majority does not address his 
argument at all. 
(e) For all the majority's talk about "democracy," it 
does not acknowledge that the State governments are also 
democratic institutions, and in many ways provide more, and more 
effective, opportunities for citizen participation. Contrast the 
- 4 -
"audience" of the Congress with that of State legislatures and 
local governments. 
III. Defining Traditional Governmental Functions 
(1) HAB says that the test of traditional governmental 
functions has proved unworkable. The cases he cites do not 
support that claim. 
(2) HAB says that the Court's experience in the tax field 
shows that it is impossible to devise a satisfactory test of 
traditional functions. But in the tax area, the Court has not 
retreated to the position here adopted by the majority. 
Discussion of tax cases goes here. 
(3) HAB does not even discuss the possibility of a balancing 
test, which is, after all, what his concurrence in National 
League of Cities adopted. This is unfortunate, because a 
rearticulation of the factors which the Court's decisions have 
balanced (implicitly, at least) helps to clarify the test and 
shows that the "unworkability" problem is a red-herring. 
In deciding whether an enactment under the Commerce 
Clause violates the States' sovereignity, we should balance how 
closely the challenged action implicates the core concerns of the 
Commerce Clause, i.e., the promotion of a national economy and 
free trade among the States, against the impact on the States if 
forced to comply with particular federal policies. 
(4) Applying the balancing test as described above, it is 




lfp/ss 11/13/84 GARM SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: November 13, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Garcia 
I comment on the outline of our opinion. It is 
thorough and identifies the principal points very well. 
On further reflection, I am not sure that it is 
best to put the federalism argument as Part I. It 
certainly will be the most important part of our opinion. 
Yet, it seems more logical to follow generally the order 
of discussion in HAB's opinion. After the introductory 
portions (that I have dictated as Part I and want you to 
feel free to revise and edit), we would have a Part II 
that responds to HAB's rejection of League of Cities. Our 
2. 
purpose is to demonstrate that the Court reads it far too 
narrowly, either to justify its attack on federalism or 
simply because of a misconception of the League of Cities' 
basic approach. 
The "traditional governmental functions" test 
cannot fairly be read as narrowly as the Court does today. 
The test actually contemplates a balancing or weighing of 
the respective interests of the two components of our 
federal system - the states and the federal government. 
HAB himself viewed the League of Cities test in precisely 
this light in his concurring opinion in that case. Our 
dissent could identify the weaknesses in HAB's denigration 
of League of Cities, and conclude this part of our dissent 
with a summary exposition of the proper balancing test. 
3. 
It is important, Annmarie, to keep this portion 
of our dissent reasonably concise, ignorning or relegating 
to summary footnotes some of our possible criticisms. For 
example, I would dispose of HAB's tax case analogies in a 
brief footnote. 
The second major part of the dissent, Part III, 
of course, would be the discussion of federalism - the 
most distinctive feature of our dual system of government. 
Again, there will be a temptation perhaps to overwrite as 
there is a great deal that can be said. So long as it is 
written well, this will not concern me. The Court opinion 





lfp/ss 11/13/84 GARl SALLY-POW 
82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision overrules 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), a 
case in which we held that Congress~~
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and 
local governments. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the 
history of this Court in which prior decisions have been 
reconsidered and overruled. I can recall, however, no 
case in which the principle of stare decisis was ingored 
. .u h . f h v as flagrantly as we now w1 tness. T e reason1ng o t e 
Court in National League of Cities, and the principle 
applied there, have been repeatedly reiterated over the 
past eight years .~ational League of Cities itself has 
been cited and quoted, since its decision in 1974, in 
opinions joined by every member of the present Court. 
2. 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass 1 n, 452 u.s. 
264, 287-293 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long 
Island R. Co., 455 u.s. 678, 684-686 (1982); and Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 
764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in Long Island 
R. Co., a unanimous Court reaffirmed the principles of 
National League of Cities but found them inapplicable to 
the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in interstate 
commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities 
test applicable to this case is the third one 
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which 
examines whether 1 the states 1 compliance with 
the federal law would directly impair their 
ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions. 1 " 
Id., at 684. 
The Court in that case recognized that the test "may at 
times be a difficult one", id., but its application was 
considered in that unanimous decision as settled 
constitutional doctrine. 
Justice Blackmun, the author of today 1 s reversal 
of National League of Cities, wrote the opinion of the 
Court in FERC v. Mississippi, supra, decided June 1, 1982. 
It is of interest that the four Justices who join Justice 
Blackmun today were the four who joined his opinion in its 
3. 
entirety in FERC v. Mississippi. In that case, the Court 
then said: 
"In National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, 
for example, the Court made clear that the 
State's regulation of its relationship with its 
employees is an 'undoubted att'r ibute of state v 
sovereignty.' Id., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553 
(1957) , which upheld a federal labor regulation 
as applied to state railroad employees, 426 
u.s., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities 
acknowledged that not all aspects of a State's 
sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." !d., n. 28, p. 764. 
The footnote in FERC quoted above did say that even where 
the requirements of the National League of Cities standard 
are met, "there are situations in which the nature of the 
federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies 
state submission". The joint federal/state system of 
regulation in FERC was such a "situation", but there was 
no hint in Justice Blackmun's opinion that National League 
of Cities - or its basic standard that he reiterated - was 
subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
It is true that the doctrine of stare decisis 
does not apply with the same force in a constitutional 
case as it does where the meaning of the Constitution is 
not at issue [Annmarie, cite authority]. This distinction 
usually has been recognized where a new Justice comes to 
4. 
the Court, bound by his oath faithfully to construe the 
Constitution, and views a constitutional issue differently 
from one or more predecessors. In the present case, 
however, the five Justices who compose the majority today 
participated in National League of Cities and the cases 
reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial decision, and 
with it respect for the authority of this Court, are not 
served by the abrupt overruling of precedents we witness 
in this case. [Annmarie, perhaps you can find some 
authority for supporting stare decisis and its importance 
that could be included in a footnote]. 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in 
weakening the application of stare decisis, this is likely 
to be less important than what the Court has done to the 
Constitution itself. The unique feature of the United 
States is its federal system guaranteed by the 
Constitution and implicit in the name of our country 
itself. Despite some genuflecting in language to the 
concept of federalism, today's decision can be viewed as 
2Justice O'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart 
in September 1981, and participated in Long Island RR. and 
FERC. 
5. 
reading the Tenth Amendment out of the Constitution. The 
holding is that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
"contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause" to determe the wage rates and hours 
of employment of all state and local employees. Ante, at 
27. In rejecting the traditional view of our federal 
system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority 
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' 
Article I powers, the princip~ means chosen by 
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in 
the federal system lies in the structure of the 
federal government government." Ante, at 21, 22 
(emphasis added) • 
The "structure" relied upon is the fact that the 
states have "a role in the selection of both the Executive 
and Legislative Branches of the federal government". Id. 
No mention is made of the Tenth Amendment, no other 
"means" are identified as "ensur[ing]" the role of the 
states, and no authority is cited for the~~at the 
"'( 
role of states in the federal system is not rooted in the 
Constitution itself. Rather, the extent to which the 
~~ 
states may exercise their authority A is to be determined 
from time to time by political decisions of the Congress 
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of the Court's 
~ 
of Cities ~-1 
it "inevitably invites an unelect d federal judiciary to 
make decisions about which state it favors and 
which ones it dislikes". Ante, at -It does not seem 
to accur to the Court that it - elected" majority of 
five Justices today rejects 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional st tus of federalism. 
~ ~~"-o 
I will return later to 
-1. 
ederalism. First, 
following the Court's order of discuss on, I 
· d;a.-~~ b.-1 ~ ~~ot1"JJCC~~v 
~A r;eaceRs €er QHQUWA"J I..;eague of Cities .,~ 
sons not previously a vanced in the several 
rationale of that case. 
* * * 
Annmarie: Take a careful look at the foregoing 
language and you might have Lynda also look at it. I 
don't want to seem strident or to overstate the Court's 
decision. On the other hand, I think it important at the 
outset to make explicitly clear the far reaching effect of 
the Court's decision - a decision without precedent. 
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lfp/ss 11/13/84 GARM SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: November 13, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Garcia 
I comment on the outline of our opinion. It is 
thorough and identifies the principal points very well. 
On further reflection, I am not sure that it is 
best to put the federalism argument as Part I. It 
certainly will be the most important part of our opinion. 
Yet, it seems more logical to follow generally the order 
of discussion in HAB's opinion. After the introductory 
portions (that I have dictated as Part I and want you to 
feel free to revise and edit), we would have a Part II 
that responds to HAB's rejection of League of Cities. Our 
2. 
purpose is to demonstrate that the Court reads it far too 
narrowly, either to justify its attack on federalism or 
simply because of a misconception of the League of Cities' 
basic approach. 
The "traditional governmental functions" test 
cannot fairly be read as narrowly as the Court does today. 
The test actually contemplates a balancing or weighing of 
the respective interests of the two components of our 
federal system - the states and the federal government. 
HAB himself viewed the League of Cities test in precisely 
this light in his concurring opinion in that case. Our 
dissent could identify the weaknesses in HAB's denigration 
of League of Cities, and conclude this part of our dissent 
with a summary exposition of the proper balancing test. 
3. 
It is important, Annmarie, to keep this portion 
of our dissent reasonably concise, ignorning or relegating 
to summary footnotes some of our possible criticisms. For 
example, I would dispose of HAB's tax case analogies in a 
brief footnote. 
The second major part of the dissent, Part III, 
of course, would be the discussion of federalism - the 
most distinctive feature of our dual system of government. 
Again, there will be a temptation perhaps to overwrite as 
there is a great deal that can be said. So long as it is 
written well, this will not concern me. The Court opinion 
is 29 pages, and we are free to equal it. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
~' .. , .. 
) 
lfp/ss 11/14/84 GARl SALLY-POW 
82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision overrules 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), a 
case in which we held that Congress could lacked authority 
torequirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state 
and local governments. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the 
history of this Court in which prior decisions have been 
reconsidered and overruled. I can recall, however, no 
case in which the principle of stare decisis was ingored 
as flagrantly as we now witness. 1 The reasoning of the 
Court in National League of Cities, and the principle 
applied there, have been repeatedly reiterated over the 
past eight years. National League of Cities itself has 
been cited and quoted, since its decision in 1974, in 
1National League of Cities following some 
changes in the composition of the Court, had overruled 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 ( 1968) • Unlike National 
League of Cities, Wirtz had not been repeatedly accepted 
by subsequent decisions. (Annmarie: check this). 
2. 
opinions joined by every member of the present Court. 
Hodel v. Virginia Sur face Mining & Reel. Ass' n, 452 u.S. 
264, 287-293 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long 
Island R. Co., 455 u.s. 678, 684-686 (1982); and Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 
764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in Long Island 
R. Co., a unanimous Court reaffirmed the principles of 
National League of Cities but found them inapplicable to 
the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in interstate 
commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities 
test applicable to this case is the third one 
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which 
examines whether 'the states' compliance with 
the federal law would directly impair their 
ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions. '" 
Id., at 684. 
The Court in that case recognized that the test "may at 
times be a difficult one", id., but its application was 
considered in that unanimous decision as settled 
constitutional doctrine. 
Justice Blackmun, the author of today's reversal 
of National League of Cities, wrote the opinion of the 
Court in FERC v. Mississippi, supra, decided June 1, 1982. 
It is of interest that the four Justices who join Justice 
.. • 
3. 
Blackmun today were the four who joined his opinion in its 
entirety in FERC v. Mississippi. In that case, the Court 
then said: 
"In National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, 
for example, the Court made clear that the 
State's regulation of its relationship with its 
employees is an 'undoubted attribute of state 
sovereignty.' !d., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553 
{1957}, which upheld a federal labor regulation 
as applied to state railroad employees, 426 
u.s., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities 
acknowledged that not all aspects of a State's 
sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." Id., n. 28, p. 764. 
The footnote in FERC quoted above did say that even where 
the requirements of the National League of Cities standard 
are met, "there are situations in which the nature of the 
federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies 
state submission". The joint federal/state system of 
regulation in FERC was such a "situation", but there was 
no hint in Justice Blackmun's opinion that National League 
of Cities - or its basic standard that he reiterated - was 
subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
It is true that the doctrine of stare decisis 
does not apply with the same force in a constitutional 
case as it does where the meaning of the Constitution is 
not at issue [Annmarie, cite authority]. This distinction 
,, 
4. 
usually has been recognized where a new Justice comes to 
the Court, bound by his oath faithfully to construe the 
Constitution, and views a constitutional issue differently 
from one or more predecessors. In the present case, 
however, the five Justices who compose the majority today 
participated in National League of Cities and the cases 
reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial decision, and 
with it respect for the authority of this Court, are not 
served by the abrupt overruling of precedents we witness 
in this case. [Annmarie, perhaps you can find some 
authority for supporting stare decisis and its importance 
that could be included in a footnote]. 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in 
weakening the application of stare decisis, this is likely 
to be less important than what the Court has done to the 
Constitution itself. The unique feature of the United 
States is its federal system guaranteed by the 
Constitution and implicit in the name of our country 
itself. Despite some genuflecting in language to the 
2Justice O'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart 
in September 1981, and participated in Long Island RR. and 
FERC. 
5. 
concept of federalism, today's decision can be viewed as 
reading the Tenth Amendment out of the Constitution. The 
holding is that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
"contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause" to determe the wage rates and hours 
of employment of all state and local employees. Ante, at 
27. In rejecting the traditional view of our federal 
system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority 
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' 
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by 
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in 
the federal system lies in the structure of the 
federal government government." Ante, at 21, 22 
(emphasis added). ----
The "structure" relied upon is the fact that the 
states have "a role in the selection of both the Executive 
and Legislative Branches of the federal government". Id. 
No mention is made · of the Tenth Amendment, no other 
"means" are identified as "ensur [ing]" the role of the 
states, and no authority is cited for the holding that the 
role of states in the federal system is not rooted in the 
Constitution itself. Rather, the extent to which the 
states may exercise their authority now is to be 
determined from time to time by political decisions of the 
6. 
Congress and the President decisions the Court says will 
not be subject to judicial review. Id. Indeed, not the 
least remarkable aspect of the Court's opinion is its 
critic ism of National League of Cities because it 
"inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make 
decisions about which state policies it favors and which 
ones it dislikes". Ante, at 17. It does not seem to 
accur to the Court that it - an "unelected" majority of 
five Justices today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. 
I will return later to what the Court does to 
federalism. First, following the Court's order of 
discussion, I will address its critic ism of the general 
standard of League of Cities. 
* * * 
Annmarie: Take a careful look at the foregoing 
language and you might have Lynda also look at it. I 
don't want to seem strident or to overstate the Court's 
decision. On the other hand, I think it important at the 
outset to make explicitly clear the far reaching effect of 
the Court's decision- a decision without precedent. Feel 






After a paragraph along the foregoing lines 
(written ~gantly by you), the dissent could then 
J\ 
4. 
move - as your outline proposes - to address the doctrine 
of federalism. This could follow after an opening 
sentence or two to the effect that although the Court's 
opinion repeatedly pays lip service to state sovereignty, 
it nowhere defines it or cites the case that have 
repeatedly emphasized its basic part of the structure of 
our government. Nor does the opinion of the Court 
identify what is left of a separate constitutional role of 
the states • 
. As a general observation, Annmarie, your outline 
of 11/9 is comprehensive. Indeed, it may - if followed 
too literally - obscure what we gree should be the central 




unprecedented and far reaching because it authorizes a 
fundamental change in the federal system prescribed by the 
Constitution and intended by the Framers. 
I therefore think we should devote a minimum of 
space to some of the marginal issues and arguments: e.g., 
HAB's reliance on the tax analogy, the fact that many of 
his citations do not support his conclusions, and the 
like. 
* * * 
Your suggested outline, after the introductory 
portions, would have three main parts: 
II. Majority's approach. 
In this you would address HAB's attack on the 
"traditional governmental functions" analysis. 
6. 
III. Defining Traditional Governmental 
Functions. 
Here you would make the important argument that 
the "traditional ~overnmental functions" test - as stated 
in League of Cities - is misconceived by the Court's 
opinion as HAB himself viewed it, in joining League of 
Cities, the test actually contemplates a balancing or 
weighing of the respective interests of the two components 
of our federal system - the states and the federal 
government. 
An alternative outline or structure for our 
dissent could involve only two major parts after the 
introductory portions. We could start, as HAB does with 




Court reads it far too narrowly, either to justify its 
attack on federalism ~~al f or simply because o~ ~ 
miconception of the League of Cities basis approach. HAB 
recognizes this himself in his concurring opinion. 
Part II then would contain our federalism 
argument. After all, this should be the heart of our 
opinion and possibly it would be more effective to address 
Harry's highly vulnerable federalsim arguments after a 
Part I in which we show that the proper understanding of 
the traditional governmental functions language used in 
prior decisions is viewed far too narrowly by the Court's 
opinion. 
This alternative outline of our dissent would 
follow more closely HAB's Court opinion. This would not 
weigh heavily with me if a different outline seemed more 
8. 
logical. If Lynda is familiar enough with the came, I 
would be interested in your joint thinking as to how to 
organize our dissent. We have all of the material and 
some wonderfully strong arguments. The structure of the 
opinion, however, is important and also it is essential 
not to make it unduly long. 
lfp/ss 09/29/84 SAN SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: Sept. 29, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-1913 and 82-1951 San Antonio Transit Authority Case 
The brief amicus filed on behalf of 25 states, 
and apparently written by the Attorney General of 
Massachusetts, is particularly interesting. It strongly 
supports reaffirmance of the basic principle (federalism) 
of National League of Cities, and urges us to affirm the 
DC's decision. But the brief argues for a different 
analytical approach. It rejects analysis based upon 
whether the function at issue is "traditional", and is 
particularly critical of the "rigid and myopic historical 
approach" urged by the SG - an approach that looks to 
whether the municipal function was a traditional one at 
the time the FLSA was adopted. 
The states' brief argues for a "balancing test" 
one that would require a court exercising judicial 
review to weigh the strength of the federal interest in 
regulating the states as states against the seriousness of 
the intrusion on state sovereignty". The specific 





.. , . ' 
2. 
"in light of the functions served by the states in the 
constitutional scheme". P. 42. 
One factor to be assessed is "the proximity of 
the federal action to the core concerns of the Commerce 
Clause". The Founding Fathers wished to assure "an 
integrated national economy" that can exist only in the 
absence of state-imposed barriers. The impact of the 
state activity on interstate commerce must be assessed to 
determine whether the state must submit to federal 
regulation. This "does not focus on whether the state is 
engaged in commercial activity, but instead inquires into 
the degree which that activity affects the core concerns 
of the Commerce Clause". The question, therefore, is not 
whether the regulation of wages and hours of transit 
workers is within the scope of the Commerce Clause • 
rather, the relevant inquiry is an assessment of degree 
i.e. how much of a burder on interstate commerce is 
created by exempting publicly employed transit workers 
from the FLSA?" P. 42-45. 
The states' brief goes on to say that: 
"Once the strength of the federal interest and 
the impact of the state activity have been 
ascertained, they may be balanced against the 
injury to state sovereignty posed the federal 
regulation." 
3. 
Finally, as I understand the brief by the 
states, there must be recognition that the Constitution 
established "a frame of government within which democratic 
choice is guaranteed. For 
sovereignty should not be 
this reason, injury to state 
assessed in terms of the 
substantive merit of a particular state policy, but rather 
in terms of the effect upon self government." P. 51- 52. 
The brief concludes, not surprisingly, that the 
"balance tips" against the extension of FLSA to public 
mass transit. These transit systems relate to "local 
rather than national concerns". Moreover, they have never 
been regulated by the federal government, but have 
remained subject to "local political decision-making 
processes" and regulation. P. 61, 62. 
Finally, the point is made that the "assured 
provision of public transportation is an essential feature 
of the daily lives of many people - commuters, school 
children, the elderly, etc." The point also is made that 
the "intrusion of the national government into this local 
political process [and local service] not only limits the 
range of choice, but demonstrates to state and local 
citizens that the local government is not theirs". P. 64. 
4. 
Brief of American Public Transit Association 
Coleman) 
(Bill 
This wordy supplemental brief on behalf of this 
party (one of the appellees) argues that the "principles" 
of League of Cities are sound and should be reaffirmed. 
It is emphasized that four subsequent cases (Hodel, Long 
Island Railroad, FERC v. Mississippi (opinion by 
Blackmun), and EEOC v. Wyoming) have reaffirmed League of 
Cities and its "principles". P. 7-15. 
I should have said that on p. 2 of this brief, 
the two "constraints on Congress' exercise of Commerce 
Clause power in direct regulation of the states and their 
political subdivisions, are "the principles of federalism" 
and the Tenth Amendment. 
Commencing at p. 32 of the brief, it is said 
that "the three part test in Hodel, and applied in 
subsequent cases, is a fully workable doctrine that 
insures thorough consideration of all legitimate state and 
constitutional interests. The result of such judicial 
scrutiny is in effect a balancing of the 
each sovereign's interests - a balancing 
Court's tests and precedents provide 
understandable criteria". P. 33. 
importance of 




I note that this "balancing test" is similar to 
that which is the centerpiece in the brief on behalf of 25 
states that I discuss above. 
Reply Briefs on Behalf of Appellants 
The SG 1 s reply brief is weak and adds little to 
the SG 1 s original flawed effort. Indeed, for me the 
arguments by the SG 1 s off ice in this case are about the 
weakest I have ever seen emerge from that quality group of 
lawyers. For my comments on the SG 1 s brief, see my memo 
of September 7. 
The reply brief of appellant Garcia is 
scholarly, well written - and will be well argued by Larry 
Gold - but it reiterates the extreme position advanced in 
prior briefs. Following elaborate quotations from The 
Federalist (that could be matched easily with quotations 
emphasizing federalism), the brief presents an absolutist 
view of the Commerce Clause: it is supreme over state law 
whether exercised with respect to private persons or 
directly as a regulation or restriction on the action of 
state and local governments. Under this view, all local 
"goods and services" would be subject to federal 
regulation. 
observation: 
The brief supports this view by the facile 
"The fact that, as to any given good or service, 
some entities [private corporations] that are 
not sovereign provide the service while some 
entities [cities] that are sovereign do not, 
demonstrates that such -aC:tivity is not an 
essential attribute of state sovereignty". 
6. 
This observation undercuts the SG' s argument, 
and it also identifies the logical weakness of reliance 
upon whether a service is "traditional", "essential" or 
"core". 
These observations implicitly suggest the merit 
of the "balancing test" urged by the brief on behalf of 25 
states. 
The Garcia brief, as an alternative to its 
"basic position", agrees with the "Secretary of Labor (the 
SG) that if the states are to retain the current form of 
commerce power immunity, the immunity should be confined 
to the functions the states have historically performed " 
P. 14. 
* * * 
In light of my examination of these and other 
briefs, and in view of problems identified in the analysis 
of League of Cities, I am inclined to agree generally with 






the factors identified in the states' brief. I will want 
to discuss with Annrnarie who has thought about the case 




. ,~trt~;.~ .: i'r:·.t:' ... . 
lfp/ss 10/18/84 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: October 18, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
82-1913 Garcia 
I have now had an opportunity to read your first 
draft of a dissent in this case. I appreciate your 
undertaking this in advance of our seeing the Court 
opinion. Necessarily, we have assumed that HAB will 
adhere essentially to the reasoning of the draft he 
circulated last Term. There certainly will be changes, 
perhaps substantial ones. 1 
I now record random thoughts in this memorandum 
both for you and me as reminders to myself. I identify 
possible points to be made in our opinion. I state them 
in no particular order, and suggest no particular 
priority. In the end, some may merit including in a draft 
and others perhaps not. 
1. We should be careful not to undercut WHR • s 
opinion in National League of Cities. I recognize, 
1 I am dictating this without having reread 
HAB's draft of last Term • 
2. 
Annmarie, that I am retreating somewhat from the view 
previously expressed that we should speak in terms of 
redefining the basic standard. Lets find some more 
felicitous way of acomplishing this. As the standard has 
been reiterated repeatedly (Hodel, Long Island R., and 
FERC), we should not join HAB now in condemning it. The 
standard is a sound generalization, but in applying it a 
court must address and weigh the federal and state 
interests that are at issue. Your draft does this. 
2. We will, of course, emphasize that the 
Court's opinion rejects long accepted principles of 
federalism. There is an excellent quote in Younger v. 
Harris, 401 u.s. 37 (I believe at 44-45) that we should 
use - with other authorities - to demonstrate the ongoing 
vitality of federalism. See Pennhurst last Term. 
3. In explaining the application of the 
standard under the balancing approach, we can use the 
quote from Long Island R.R. at page 686-as to the 
application of the standard, and the fact that it is not a 
static one. 
4. It may be helpful to demonstrate by examples 
that the test is not static. HAB's opinion last Term did 




providing of public schools was not a traditional state 
function in the sense that it had ancient roots. Indeed, 
we could argue that local transportation - purely in terms 
of tradition - fits more neatly into the standard than 
other functions such as schools, public health, garbage 
collection, etc. Transportation depends on roads and 
streets. State and local governments always have provided 
these essentials of "transit": i. e., to facilitate the 
movement of people so essential to any form of civilized 
life. Roads and streets are still state and local 
services. They have been improved, and the means of 
transportation have changed from horse-drawn carriages to 
streetcars, buses and now subways. To be sure, most of 
these early methods of moving people about were privately 
operated, but this could be left in private hands only so 
long as they were economically viable. The function was 
providing an essential public service, and one long 
regulated only by the states. 
Annemar ie, I don't want to carry the foregoing 
too far or to overemphasize it. It may be worth only a 
footnote, but I'd like your thinking as to its merit. 
5. The AFL-CIO's brief argues, as its first 
point, that the providing of all "goods and services" may 
4. 
be subjected to federal regulation regardless of whether 
the goods and services are viewed as traditional or not. 
HAB' s opinion goes beyond this and would hold that the 
only limit on the Commerce Cause is the "structure" of the 
federal system. 
6. You have commented on federal funding simply 
in a sentence. After we see HAB's new opinion, it should 
be pointed out - perhaps in a footnote - that federal 
funding has now become pervasive - and perhaps necessarily 
so in view of the extent to which state and local revenues 
have been drained off primarily by federal income and 
excise taxes. If "funding" determined the 
federal constitutional authority the states 
abolished. 





This memorandum implies no criticism of your 
draft. I think the essence of your draft is sound and 
well written. No doubt the draft will have to be 
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lfp/ss 10/22/84 AN SALLY-POW 
82-1913 Garcia 
Comments on HAB's Opinion of Last Term: 
Since 1913 Texas has authorized localities to 
regulate "carriage for hire". Since 1915 San Antonio has 
provided for franchising, insurance, safety requirements 
and other regulations of passenger vehicles operated for 
hire. P. 2, 3. 
Not until 1961 did Congress extend the FLSA to 
employees of private mass transit systems. P. 4. 
In 1966, for the first time, the Act was 
extended to state and local government employees. The 
application of the Act to public schools and hospitals was 
sustained in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S 183 ( 1968) , but 
Wirtz overruled in National League of Cities. P. 4, 5. 
Not until 1974 was the Act made fully applicable - even 
with respect to overtime limitations - to mass transit 
employees. P. 5. This history makes clear that Congress 
was half-a-century behind Texas in regulating any aspect 
of local transit systems. 
The DC in this case relied heavily on this 
history of local regulation. P. 7. 
' 2. 
HAB recognized the distinction between the 
authority of Congress to regulate private activity and its 
authority to impose federal regulation of a state 
governmental entity. HAB makes the point - perhaps with 
some reason - that if mass transit is exempt it must be 
because it is owned and operated by the city rather than 
because the operations are "local". P. 8. 
HAB devotes almost a full page of "string cites" 
he says illustrates the difficulty of determining what is 
a "traditional governmental function". P. 9, 10. 
Annmarie can distinguish a good many of these cases. 
Perhaps the centerpiece of HAB' s argument last 
Term was the "difficulty" in "identifying an organizing 
principle" that places cases on one side of the line or 
the other. He says that "this Court has made little 
headway in defining the scope of governmental functions 
protected under National League of Cities". P. 10. 
On the same page that HAB finds no "organizing 
principle", he speaks of the Court's difficulty in Long 
Island in developing a "workable standard for traditional 
governmental functions". 
HAB does recognize that many "constitutional 
standards involve 'undoubted gray areas'", citing Fry v • 
. ' 
' 3. 
United States, 421 u.s. 542, 558, and that we decide on a 
"case-by- case" basis the applicability of the particular 
constitutional provision. P. 11. 
As Annmarie has noted, HAB devotes several pages 
to the argument that the Court's difficulty "in the field 
of tax immunity" is illustrative of the problem involved 
in the application of the League of Cities standard. 
Annmarie meets this argument very well. We may think it 
desirable to expand her response after we see Harry's new 
opinion. 
HAB states that in Long Island we "rejected the 
possibility of making immunity [from federal regulation] 
turn on a purely historical standard of 'tradition'"· P. 
15. He then goes on to say that the defect in the 
historical approach is that: 
It prevents courts from accommodating changes in 
the historic function of states, changes that 
have resulted in a number of once private 
functions like education being assumed by the 
states and their subdivisions." [see also 
footnote 9] P. 15. 
HAB concludes that "reliance on history as an 
organizing principle results in line drawing of the most 





•'·" .. · ,.,. 
4. 
Then, HAB rejects "non-historical standards" as 
being "just as unworkable as a historical standard". P. 
16. 
HAB finds "a more fundamental problem" in 
applying the League of Cities standard - the same problem 
"that explains why the Court was never able to develop a 
basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the 
inter-governmental tax immunity cases. P. 16 , 1 7 • This 
fundamental problem is that: 
"Neither the governmental/proprietary 
distinction nor any other that purports to 
separate important governmental functions from 
other ones can be faithful to the role of 
federalism in a democratic society". P. 17 
But HAB's explanation of his theory of 
unfaithfulness to the role of federalism is not easy to 
follow. Indeed, he devotes less than a page to an opaque 
explanation of this "more fundamental problem" before he 
comes to his conclusion on p. 18: 
"We therefore reject, as unsound in principle 
and unworkable in practice, a rule of state 
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a 
judicial appraisal of whether a particular 
governmental function is 'integral' or 
'traditional'"· P. 18 
' 5. 
After finding a "more fundamental problem" for 
rejecting the League of Cities standard (p. 16), HAB moves 
forward a few pages to another "more fundamental reason" 
for this rejection, namely: "the sovereignty of the 
states is limited by the Constittuion itself". P. 19, 20. 
It is recognized that the states "retain a 
significant measure of sovereign authority" (citing my 
dissent in Wyoming) , but HAB says they do so "only to the 
extent that the Constitution has not divested them of 
their original powers and transferred those powers to the 
federal government". P. 20. 
He goes on to say the Court has "no license to 
employ free standing conceptions of state sovereignty when 
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause". P. 21. In other words, the Commerce Clause 
permits the federal government to eliminate all state 
sovereignty except where explicity granted the states. 
This view simply reads the Tenth Amendment out of the 
Constitution. 
Having disposed of the Tenth Amendment, HAB then 
moves to his novel thesis that the Framers perceived that 
state sovereignty would be protected by "the structure of 




states are protected from "overreaching by Congress" 
because the states were "vested with indirect influence 
over the House of Representatives and the Presidency by 
their control of electoral qualifications and their role 
in presidential elections", and they were "given more 
direct influence in the Senate". 1 P. 22. 
As illustrative of how protective the federal 
government is the states, HAB cites the lavishness with 
which federal funds are made available to the states -
including the funding of "such services as police and fire 
protection, education, public health and hospitals, parks 
and recreation, and sanitation". P. 23, 24. This 
lavishness is more accurately explained by the political 
benefit seen by members of Congress in making money 
available to their home districts or states. 
HAB cites a number of statutes that expressly 
exempt states and their subdivisions, including NLRA, 
OSHA, the Sherman Act and several others. P. 24. HAB 
1 r note that HAB cites articles by Professor 
Wechsler and Professor Choper as supporting his views. 




cites these as evidence of generosity. Under his view 
Congress any time could make all of these statutes 
applicable to the states just as it has done with FLSA. 
HAB says "the fundamental limitation [another 
example of something being 'fundamental'] that the 
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to 
protect the states as states is one of process rather than 
one of result." P. 25. 
Finally, HAB identifies the "only substantive 
restraint" on federal authority is "a requirement that 
Congress not attempt to single out the states for special 
burdens or otherwise discriminate against them". P. 25. 
HAB cites no case authority for this expansive view of the 
Constitution. It will be interesting to see whether he 
retains this extreme view when he writes for the Court. 
He does cite M'Cullough v. Maryland, as resting in part on 
concerns about discrimination. 
* * * 
My rereading of HAB' s opinion again shocks me. 
He rejects, in effect, the existence of any state 
sovereignty protected by the Constitution except where 
explicitly stated. He construes the Commerce Clause as 
preempting the Tenth Amendment even though several states 
.~. 
' 8. 
would not have ratified the Constitution without the 
adoption of that Amendment. [Annmarie: Ask the library -
perhaps Penny - to give us the record evidence of why the 
lOth Amendment was added.] 
As I now read HAB's opinion, it goes beyond the 
AFL-CIO brief's view that "all goods and servies" provided 
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October 30, 1984 
GAR GINA-POW 
To: Annmarie 
From: LFP, JR. 
Re: 82-1913 and 82-1951 - Garcia v. San Antonio 
Over the weekend I read HAB's opinion of October 
23 with some care. I did not have with me at home his 
opinion of last June. As I recall, a large part the 
present opinion is simply incorporated, but there are 
significant additions. You mentioned the omission of his 
"discrimination" point. 
In any event, perhaps as a memory refresher for 
myself, I note points that we may consider - some quite 
general and others specific. 
1. A major curiosity of his opinion is that it 
proports to support "federalism". For example, he states 
that League of Cities is "inconsistent with principles of 
federalism" p. 2. Again, no "distinction" that 
"proports to separate our important governmental functions 
can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic 
society." p. 17. 
Federalism - if it means anything - refers to the 
du~ federal and state system of our country. It 
2. 
necessarily recognizes that the state's have a major role 
that cannot be voided by the federal government. HAB 
concedes that "some sovereign authority is retained" by 
the state (p. 19), but never identifies it. P. 20. At 
another point, HAB states that the "states unquestionably 
do 'retain a significant measure of state authority'" 
(quoting my dissent in Wyoming) . P. 20. But he limits 
that in the next few sentences of his opinion 
[Annmarie: It is important for us to 
address what federalism means. Some of the 
decisions of this Court will be quite helpful. 
[Secondary authority also should be examined.] 
2. HAB concedes that a "case by case" approach might 
"develop a workable standard". P. 11. But the first 18 
pages of his opinion are devoted to rejecting the 
"traditional function" standard of National Cities. He 
then concludes that no other standard is workable. There 
is no mention of a "balancing" analysis that is so 
familiar in constitional cases. 
L.M-
[Did not HAB mention balancing .1\ his 
concurring opinion in League of Cities? Do you 
know of any decisions of this Court that apply a 
balancing analysis in a Commerce Clause case? 
We might ask Lynda or the Library for help on 
this.] 
3. 
3. You have a good answer to HAB's reliance on the 
"governmental/proprietary" function distinction in 
taxation. Were the earlier cases ever expressly overruled 
or merely reinterpreted? 
4. In n. 10, p. 15, HAB refers to the "state 
interest in being free from federal regulations" a 
meaningless genuflecting as he subordinates the state 
interest to the Commerce Clause. 
5. After rejecting "traditional functions" as a 
standard, HAB considers and rejects "history"; "non-
historial"; "uniquely govermental function"; and 
"necessary governmental services", (P. 15-16). But again 
HAB does not mention "balancing" or weighing the 
respective interests of governments in the federal system. 
6. Harry has again identified two "more fundamental 
problems" with League of Cities. The first is that no 
standard can be found that is "faithful to the role of 
federalism". P. 16-17. On page 17, after this statement, 
the opinion curiously seems to wonder off and talk about 
the opportunity of states to "experiment .. , and about a 
non-elected federal judiciary not being competent to 
interfere with action of "elected legislative 
representatives". P. 16, 17. 




Annmarie, we may take a jab at HAB for this 
sort of talk. He is not concerned about the 
competency of an unelected federal judiciary to 
read the Tenth Amendment out of the 
Constitution. Nor is it self-evident how 
conveying virtually unlimited power on the 
federal government enhances the ability of the 
various states to "experiment". HAB's "logic" 
simply eludes me. 
4. 
7. Repeating the argument he made last Term, HAB 
finds, as a second "more fundamental reason" for holding 
that Congress has power to regulate wages and hours of all 
state and local employees is that "state sovereignty is 
limited by the Constitution itself". P. 19. 
After conceding that "some sovereign authority is 
retained", he does not identify it except the provision of 
the Constitution that protects "state territorial 
integrity". P. 21. 
8. The opinion relies on a quote from Justice Field. 
P. 20. The quotation, though quite general, supports the 
G< 
purpose and subs tan~ of the Tenth Amendment. Justice 
Field, dissenting in B&O Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 u.s. 
368, 401, said that the Constitution "recognizes and 
perserves the autonomy and independence of the states ... ", 
and that federal "supervision over either the legislative 
or judicial action of the states is in no case permissible 
5. 
except as to matters by the Constitution specifically 
authorized or delegated to the United States." There is 
nothing in the Commerce Clause that "specifically" 
authorizes Congress to regulate the wages and hours of 
state employees. The Commerce Clause is no more specific 
than the Tenth Amendment in the language used. 
9. In purporting to illustrate the "effectiveness of 
political power" (P. 23, 24), HAB emphasizes federal 
grants to state and local services such as police, fire, 
schools, santitation, etc. In commenting on this, we 
could note that by virtue of the "spending power" Congress 
has exercised substantial control over state and local 
affairs, but I know of no decision that holds or implies 
that the mere granting of federal funds without a 
positive reservation of regulating authority - establishes 
a Commerce Clause right to control the activities that 
benefit from the grants. 
relevant. 
See Pennhurst I that may be 
10. HAB cites a number of federal statutes that have 
not been extended to cover state employees or activities: 
NLRB, LMRA, OSHA, ERISA, the Sherman Act, the Federal 
Power Act. - P. 24. 
6. 
Rather than supporting HAB's argument that the 
structure protects the states, the rationale and decision 
of the Court in this case make perfectly clear that the 
"protection" that exists at present is a matter of 
"grace", that can be withdrawn at any time. Federalism 
must mean more than this. Can there be a genuine federal 
system if the state components of the system have 
authority only as a matter of grace by the federal 
component? 
11. Of course, HAB' s argument is we can trust the 
Congress - and perhaps to a less extent the President -
not to denigrate the role of the states because the people 
of all of the states elect the legislative branch and the 
head of the executive branch. As we have discus sed, HAB 
cites no authority for this and we know of none with the 
possible exception of some secondary writing. HAB's 
opinion reflects a unrealistic - if not singularly naive -
view of how the political system works in our country 
today. 
In the early years of our country, Congress met only 
briefly in the course of a year. Its members were drawn, 
in large part, from citizens of some prominence in various 
careers - citizens who spent most of each year in their 
7. 
home districts or states. Now, Congress is composed of 
professional politicians who - I believe - are restricted 
by law against holding private employment. They are a 
branch of the national government. They have no state 
responsibilities. Moreover, as we have discussed, the 
relatively new phenomena in national politics is the 
"special intersts group". For years there have been some 
of these: e.g., veterans groups (but I was never willing 
to join), and organized labor. Today, the range of groups 
and PACs that lobby regularly is legion. 
12. A major flaw in HAB' s "structure" reasoning is 
that his reliance on "democracy" focuses only on the 
federal government itself. His opinion overlooks the fact 
that the most effective democracy is at the lcoal level 
where the people are close to the local problems, and know 
and have access to the people who are elected to city 
councils and county board of supervisors. The people at 
these levels also have family members who are in the 
various services performed by the local goverments. The 
state legislatures, none of which meet the year around, 
are drawn from the various professions and employments 
within the state. A state legislature therefore is far 
more responsive to the state electrate than the Congress 
'. 
8. 
is to any particular state interest. There must be a good 
deal of writing - perhaps in some of our cases - to the 
effect that the public participation in democratic 
processes is greater, better informed, and more 
influential at the state and local levels than in the 
Congress or the federal bureaucy. 
13. If HAB mentions the Tenth Amendment, it escaped 
my reading of his opinion. I hope that Penny has provided 
us with some history of the adoption of the Tenth 
Amendment and its purpose. This Court also must have 
written about it a number of times. 
LFP, Jr. 
,, 
The case of Garcia vs. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, de-
cided by the Supreme Court Tuesday, 
rated front-page headlines for good 
reason. First-and taxpayers be-
ware-it restores sweeping powers 
that Congress had before 1976 to im-
pose costs on state and local govern-
ments. Second, the justices split 
sharply over whether courts must con-
stantly define the separate preroga-
tives of federal and state govern-
ments. The court majority, in effect, 
washed its hands of this constitutional 
responsibility and told the politicians 
to fight it out. 
· Garcia is a sharp and untoward re-
v.ersal of court policy. In 1976, in Na-
tional League of Cities vS. Usery, the _ 
court ruled that even the wide-ranging 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution 
does not empower Congress to impose 
minimum-wage and overtime require-
ments on state governments perform-
ing certain of their "traditional" func-
tions. Since then, the courts have been 
applying this principle to other cases. 
In the process they have complained 
about the difficulty of figuring out 
what constitutes a "traditional" local 
government function and what does 
riot. Garcia solved these difficulties by 
overruling Usery completely. 
Justice Harry Blackmun, writing 
for the five-man liberal majority, ex-
plained why it was necessary and safe 
to give up trying to hem in the federal 
government. First, he noted, the 
courts have found no coherent way to 
separate the local functions they want 
to defend against federal intrusion 
from those they do not. They are not 
likely to find the magic principle in 
the future, either, he thought. 
More important, he argued, mak-
ing fixed lists of federal functions vs. 
local functions is no way to run a 
changing democracy. Our founders 
recognized this, for they chose to pro- · 
teet the states not by putting the vari-
ous levels of government into rigid 
boxes but by giving the states power 
within the national government it-
self-organizing the Senate on state 
lines, for instance, or making the 
states the basic units for choosing a 
president. 
This argument is a wonderfully 
clever way to shift the federalism de-
bate away from arguments about con-
stitutionally allotted government func-
tions to vagutf and sweeping pro-
nouncements about the nature of the 
whole American process. Justice 
.Lewis Powell, writing for the minor-
ity, was unimpressed with his col-
Jeag}le 's intellectual feat. 
Justice Powell · first maintained 
that ·the particular decisions required 
of the courts by the Us~ry ruling were 
·no more difficult than the balancing 
acts they had to perform in countless 
other policy areas. More central, he 
thought it scandalous to maintain ca-
valierly that the rights of the states in 
the American regime will be pro-
tected automatically. It is dangerous, 
he asserted, to say that the all-impor-
tant principle of governments close to 
the people does not require the protec-
tion of explicit Jaws and rules and 
court opinions. 
When you finish reading this wor-
ried criticism of the majority opinion, 
it is hard to escape the thought that 
Justice Blackmun's cheery descrip-
tion of a self-regulating federalism is 
more than a trifle glib. It is particu-
larly so at a time of so much public 
concern over the enormous accretion 
of power in Congress, with public es-
teem for that body at such a low 
ebb. 
It is indeed true that Usery was 
difficult to put into practice. After a 
long period of centralization, many 
ideas about what naturally constituted 
a local or state function had been 
eroded or altogether lost. Liberal jus-
tices had made the Commerce Clause 
an eight-lane highway for federal law-
makers seeking new areas of regula-
tion and controL But the difficulty 
represented scant cause for abdica-
tion. 
In · fact, the Blackmun decision is 
not really abdication, but a distinct 
and affirmative award of power to the 
federal government. It ignores, along 
with all the other arguments for de-
centralized power, the truth that com-
petition among the states in the deliv-
ery of wanted public services at low 
rates to the taxpayers is a vital con-
trol over government excess. Con-
gress faces far Jess restraint and is 
correspondingly more guilty of such 
excess. We hope Justice William 
Rehnquist is correct in saying that it 
is only a matter of tim·e before the 
Blackmun decision is itself reversed. 
New York Times, February 2~, 
.. . ~ . 
HIGH ·coURT RULING 
I SOURCE" OF DISMAY . 
[ TO LOGAL-OFFIG.IALS 
THEY S~£ LOSS OF POWERS 
Governors and Mayors Expect 
Crowding by Congress in 
Areas Other Than Pay 
By .JOHN HERBERS 
11pec1a1 til n. New Yen n-
WASHINGTON, Feb. 20 - A furor 
,8nlptecl today among governors, 
mayors and other local otfidals over 
the Supreme Court ruling that 13 mil-
.11011 state and local government em-
ployees are IUbject to Federal wage 
and bour standards. 
Some IIUd 7\lellday'a 5-to-4 dedslon 
;-would ra11e coaa and increase bureau-· 
. crattc red tape. But beyond that, there 
was a C008eDSUI that tbe ruling struck 
at the heart of efforts by state and local 
. pvernmeats to win broader authority 
· throulh the courts to operate their 
J jurildictions with lesa Interference 
. from Wasbiqton. · 
. "I always viewed the Supreme Court 
In the role of referee, ltanding 011 tbe 
field 1n a lt:J1ped ahirt, mediating the 
contest between the state and Federal 
aovemmeuts," laid Gov. Bruce Bab-
bitt of Arizona, a Democrat who Is a · 
leading advocate of restoration of state 
-powers. " .What this dedaion does is 
1 haw the referee leavtna the field and 
1 beedtq for the lhower." . ! 
'Aara err Totality' Worrlell Him . 
· Coatlnued From ~ap Al· and others who laid the leaillatlon wu 
needed to atve public employeet!i the 
clitionall h ld same protections as the private 1ector, have tra Y e authority. which Is covered under the Fair Labor 
They also noted that the decision ran Standards Act and the Federal Gov· · 
coun~er to President R-.an•s philoao- emment. , ' 
phy. The Administration, which. bad · · 
opposed the broad •cope of th decl However, the decision was unusual in e • that the court, in ruling . that public 
sion, bas held that- the ~tea should be transit workers had to be brought 
given more authority in various areas under Federal standards, al8o over-
in return for having their Federal tunds ruled its own ·decision of 1976 holdlng 
reduced. Mr. Reaaan's 1986 budpt that the ConStitution did not permft 
callB for deep cuts in aid to states, dties Congress to "directly replace the 
and other local kovernments 'and the states' freedom to structure integral 
governors said they were now '1n a poel- operations in areas,of U,ditt~ JOV· 
tion of possibly having to give up both emment fw\ctions. . 
the funds and authority .. ' Blackmun Seel State Strenatb 
· The moat Immediate effect of the · 
decision, according to state an.d local Associate Justice Hap-y .A. Black- 1 
otfidala, was that it would cost their mun, writing the ~lnion, laid efforts 
governments many millions of dollars by Federal courts to Impose Umita on · 
in overtime pay for pollee officers, tire- ~e power of COngress ~er the lOth 
fiahtera, transit workers and others Amendment bad proven ~practlca- , 
who work split or unusual lhifts and ble and doctrinally barren and the 
that the paperwork involved would add states ~re now in a position to defend 
a burden. . · themselves , agai~U!! Congress 1n the 
Paying the minimum wage as re- "political process. 
qulred under Federal ltandarda was s. Kenneth Howard, executiVe direc-
not considered a factor because an but tor of the Advisory Commtasion on In-
the very smallest . Jurl8dictlons have tergovemmental ~elations, a nonpartl-
wage standards that equal or exceed san research organltation created by 
the Federal minimum, $3.35'&11 hour. Congress, said he did not understand 
I,tandy Arndt, spokesman for the Na- how the Court came to that conclusion 
1 tional 1.eaaUe of Cities, aatd an adell- when the commission for some months 1 
tional factOr was that the aovemments has been conductin& a study on why the 
involved were now in the middle of the states and their subordinate govern-
fiscal year, with budpts already de- mentshdaolittlepowerlnCongress. 
dded, "and now they are faced with "Where Is the political restraint?" he 
deciding what they are going to do it said. "We don't see it tilat way." 
they don't have enouah money to pay Mr Howard said one of the prellmi· 
policemen and firemen." naey>.findlngs of the 'study was that with 
Impact on Pay b Murky political parties weakene<1 in recent 
it was unclear, however, what the years Congress had·become an assem-
tlscal Impact would be. Congress, in bly of independent operators little in-
eaactini the 1874 legialation bringing nuenced by party otfidals or elected · 
state and local employes under Fed8nil officials in respective states. "We see 
·standards, wrote in 110me provisions pre-emptive legislation by. Congress u 
for unusual shifts 10 ail :tQ,jreBtraln tbe a real threat to a balan~ Federal sys-
costs. Much of the ~t)faetior would de- tem," he said. . · 
pend on how the LabOr, Department~ Richard B. Geltman, general counsel · 
dded to enforce the regulations.,'~ -~ of.theNationalGovemors' Aasodati~, 
The Supreme Court's decision ~u said: "This decision can only lead to a 
welcomed by labor unions, wotk~~-Fter exercise of Federal authority 
He laid be was particularly con- , and unitary, centralized aovemment." 
cemed about "the aura of totallty" of States and local governments, he said, 
the dec:lstoo wblcb leaws tbe ,..,__. shorn of the constitutional protection 
' -- afforded the Federal legislative and 
aDd the states COiltestina 011 politiCal judicial t>ranChes, are to be treated as · 
fttber than CODStitutional pounds. f . 
Governor Babbitt . aDd other aover· i th~y were just "a few more 8pecial 
nora u1d tb&t ~uae the Court bad ~~eh:~.f!OUPB coming to Washington 
"taken a w..Ik" there was fear that < 
Coopela would be _~ to1 pre-empt ·Matthews. Coffey, executive of tbe 
state power In areas far beyond waae. National . Association 9f Counties 
aDd J1our ltaDdards, in educ:atioo, maintalning that "the Court bas tateri 
crime control, coDaumer protection a Walk," said the burden wu now on 
and otber fuoctiOiliiWbere the ltates state and local governments to assume 
a 1'more dillJent watchcloa role" to 
. make sure Congress no Ionaer paue8 
legislation that asserted "a broad gen. 
eral prindple" and then lett It up to tbe 
cow:ts to dedde what harm it m1&ht clo 
to the state &Jldl~ ~ent,s. 
new -xorK '.l'~mes, February 20, 1985 
,. ~t ..... w.tao Ia for despite the lOth Amendment, because 
, .mel toea~ em~, ille <lcNrt . runntng a railroad was not a "tradition-
JUSTICES ENHANCE ·.:· =~:.:::m;$. ==~~c=j=~ 
FED,E. R'AL POWER·S; ==:·~=u:;~~:; =t~f!w~ Federal qe dis-. . Constitutioll live~ the states special A Severely Frayed DoetrlDe 
OVER THE STATES. =:::~dJ::!!';!~;!!:a: m~::W~~itC:a=::: interfere til state affairs. .. the National League of Cities doctrine 
Rel)'lna on PoUtleal ProCea . . ::;re:T=ln:~~o: 
UPSET O'WN '76 PRECED,ENT With .. rare exceptions," ,Aaoc;iate thel97tldecision,thatSanAntonlowas . Justice· HatTY A •. ,B\ackmun"wrote for immune from being required to pay its 
the majority today. the constitution mass transit workers accol'dinR to Fed-
imposes no such limit.. Rather, he era! wage and hour BCales. Soth the ! 
I 't' f U S St d d · · said t,be states are protectecl ag'ainst transit workers and the Federal Gov-mpOSI IOn 0 ~ . an ar ~ Fed~ral mtrusiCIDII into their saver-· ernment appealed to the Supreme 
T · W It r p - on1 · the---. that ..._, · Court, arguing that mass transit was for ranslt or"'ers ay .. eignty , y to ""'&"..,.. " .....,~can not a traditional state function and that 
_, use tbe "political process ' to protect the lOth Amendment analysis should 
Sets New Framework :· themset~. · , not apply. 
It is "~ s~re of the Federal The Court argued ·· the case last 
Government itself" that protects the March and, after failing to reach a 
· states, Ju8tice Blackm~ continued, decision by the end df the term, ordered 
By LINDA GREENHOUSE and not any "judicially created Umita- a new argument for last October with 
Spec:laJtoTbeNew .Y~.nmes • • tioos 011 Federal JXJWI!Ir/' He said ef- an added issue: "whether or not the 
WASHINGTON, Feb. 19- Taking fortS by tbe Supreme\~uri and the principles of the lOth Amendment as 
the rare step ' of ovemlling one of its · 1 -~· .... e to •.t..pose Other limits on setforf:binNational LeagueofCitiesv. / ower""""'"" .... Usery should be reconsidered" 
own recent precedents, the Supreme . the power of 'Congress bad · proven It was clear then that the .:esmt to-
Court today signiflcantly .enban~ the "both impracticable ~ doctrinal'y day was a posslbnitf, although few peo-
power of the Federal Government to, barren." Citing ~ p~ of state . pie expected the sweeping terms with · 
regulate state activititlS that bad been which the Court reached the result. So-
considered immune from Federal con- delegatiOilS in Congiess and the states' licitor General Rex E. Lee, arguing for 
1 trol: • role in the ~ CoUep, Justice . the Federal Government, bad urged 
. The decision, one of the Court's most Blaclanun laid: "The political process the Court to upbold National League of 
important ruli~ on the subject ~Of . lDsures that laws .that unduly burden 
the states will not be promulgated." 
Excerpts from opf,Uons, page Al2. Justice Blackmun appeared to be Im-
plying that once the states have lost a 
I
, federalism, created a new framework battle in Congress, the judiciary should 
for analyzing the constitutional bal- interfere only with ~me reluc-
1
, ance ~tween Federal and state au. tance, if at all. · 
In a bitter dissenting oPinion, AsSoci-
thority. ate Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr. ac:.. j The Court ruled, 5 to 4, that Federal cused the majority of abandoning the 
minimum wage and hour standards Court's age-old principle of judiclalr&-
l cover -employees of pUblicly owned view and of establ.isbing in its place the 
\ mass transit systems. In immediate doctrine lbat Federal political offi~ 
practical-terms, the decision lslik~ "are the sole judges of the Omits of 
l~d to higher wages for transit - their own power." · 
ers. While nearly aU these employees · "The states' rote in our system of 
: receive more than the minimum wage, Government ts a matter of constltu-
11 they typically work split shifts, with tional law, not of legislative grace," 
long breaks between the morning and Justice Powell said. 
' evening rosh hours and would receive · The decision, Garda v. ,San .Antonio 
I :-~ft ..... overti ' """ . Metropolitan Transit A~ty, No. tz-u""~ me a-Y· . . 11113, was the latest episode bi an an-Effect on Other State Employees usual' chapter of constitutional history. 
i - · . . al Two otber dlsseoters, Associate Jus-
, By extensiOn, the dectsion so re- tices William H. Relmquist and Sandra 
I stores most other state employees to . Day O'Cormor, each suggested in tbe1r 
protected status under the Fai~ Labor own dissenting opinions that the chap-
Standards Act. The 1976 decision, ter may not be closed, and that today's 
which the Court ovemlled today, held decision itself may soon be a target for 
that the Constitution did not permit overniling. 
Congress to extend wage and hour · Chief Justice Warren E. Burger a1ao 
coverage to state employees ~use to · dissented. Justice Blackmun's ma- · 
do so would "directly displace the 
states' freedom to stnicture integral 
operations in areas of traditional gov-
en,unental fyn_Etions." , 
l. 
/f" 
jority opinion was Joined by As80daRte CitieS as a "fundamental constitutiOnal ~­
lustfces William J. Brennan, Byron · Insight." Be said today that be was 'I" 
White, 'I'burgood Marshall and John "surprised and grieving" over the~ · t: 
Paul Stevens. · come. 
Blaclmuin'a Plvotal Role Reactioa to·RuJlD& 
The key role was that of Justice The National League of Cities ~ued .. r 
Blackmun. ' He had been a reluctant a statement saying the Court bad 
member of the 5-to-4 majority in the "clearly upset ·any semblance of bal· •1 
1978 -declsion, which was written by ance between the interests of ;Federal 
t Justice Rehnquist. That declsioo, Na- policy and our once-proud traditions of 
ltional League of Citiesv.-Usery, stnack local self-government." 
i·down Congress's extension of the Fair Gerald w. McEntee, president of the 
Labor Standards Act to stat~ employ- American Federation of State, County 1: .• 
ees by resurrecting one of the most ob- and Municipal Employees, said the ~ ... 
scure provisions of the Bill of Rights, decision ended a period of "second- n • 
the lOth Amendment. class citizenship" for employees of ·n 
The lOth Amendment provides }hat state and local government. ,c 
powers not granted by the Constitution Justice Blackinun's 28-page opinion v 
to the Federal Government "are re- did not discuss the lOth Amendment. ·.~: 
served to the states." The NatlonM Rather, he discussed the extent to o1 
League of Cities decision found _in tha~ which the National League of Cities ap- 10 
amendment an affirmative check on proach had proved "unsound in princl-
the 'ability ,of Congress to exercise its pie and unworkable in practice." nJ -. 
power over interstate . commerce in "We have no license to employ free. r.> 
ways that affected the "states as standing conceptioos of state saver- nf · 
'states/' It was the first time in 40 yean : eignty when measuring Congressional l) 
Umt the Court bad tnvalidated an ac.- authority under · the Commerce n 
tion taken by Congress under the Com· ·Clause," . Justice Blackmun said. et-· 
merce Clause power, and the decision ."State sovereign interests are more · at 
appeared to herald a major shift in the properly protected by procedural safe- Je 
Federal-state balance of power. guards inherent in the structure of the 'l" 
That ~mise did not materialize, Federal system than by judicially id -
however, as the Court seemed to pull createdlimttattonsonF~power." ·rr 
back from the full implications of the I . 19 
1976 decision. In 1972, for example, the -- J) 
~ Court ruled that employees of the state- REMEMBER THE NEEDIESTI -
[
owned Long Island Ran Road had a -
federally guaranteed right to strike, i{ 
. ~ 
apec~aJ to n. New vcn ,_ 
WASHINGTON; Feb. 19-Following are excerpts from opiniona by the Su-
preme Court today on the constitutional relationship between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the states. Associate Justice Harry A. Blackmun wrote the opin-
ion, which was joined by Associate Justices William J. Brennan Jr., Byron R. 
White, Thu~ood Marshall and John Paul Stevens. Aaaociate Justice Lewis F. 
Powell Jr. filed a dfsaent joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger andAssocl-
ate Justices William H. Rehnquist and Sandra Day O'CoMOr, who both alto 
filed aeparate dissents. 
... 
F~om the Opinion I • 
' 
By Justice Blackmun 
We revisit lri these cases an tssue 
raised in National League of Cities v. 
Usery (1976). In that litigation, this 
Court, by a sharply divided vote, 
ruled that the Commerce Clause does 
not empower Congress to enforce the 
minimum-wage and overtime provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(F.L.S.A.) against the states "in 
areas of traditional governmental 
functions." 
Although National League of Cities 
supplied some examples of "tradi-
tional governmental functions," It did 
not offer a aeneral explanation of how 
a "traditional" function is to be dis-
tinguished from a "nontraditonal" 
one. Since then, Federal and state 
courts have struggled with the task 
thus imposed, of Identifying a tradi-
tional function for purposes of state 
immunity wtder the Commerce 
Clause. 
In the present cases, a Federal Dis-
trict Court concluded that municipal 
ownership and operation of a mass-
transit system is a traditlonalaovern-
mental function and thus ," wtder Na-
tional Leasue of Cities, is exempt 
from the obligations imposed by the 
F.L.S.A. Faced with tbe identical 
question, three Federal Courts of Ap. 
• peals and one state appellate court 
have reched the opposite conclusion. 
Lack of Consllteney Seen 
Our examination of thil "function" 
standard now persuades us that the 
attempt to draw the bowtdarles of 
state regulatory immunity in terms 
of "traditional governmental func-
tion" Is not only wtworkable but Is in-
consistent with established principles 
of federalism and, indeed, with those 
very federalism principles on which 
National League of Cities purported 
to rest. That case, accordingly, Is 
overruled. . . 
The prerequisites for aovemmental 
Immunity under National League of 
Cities were summarized by this Court 
in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
(1981). Under that summary, four 
conditions must be satisfied. First, it 
Is said that the Federal statute at 
Issue must regulate ·"the states as 
states." Second, the statute must 
"address matters that are indusputa-
bly 'attributes of state sovereignty.' " 
lbird, state compliance with the Fed-
eral obligation must "directly Impair 
[the states'] ability 'to sttucture inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional 
governmental functions.' " Finally, 
the relation of state and Federal in-
terests must not be such that "tl\e na-
ture of the Federal ·interest justifies 
state submission." 
The controversy has focused on the 
third, that the challenged Federal 
statute trench on "traditional govern-
mental functions." Just bow trouble-
some thE! task has been is revealed by 
the results in other Federal cases. 
Court Makes Uttle Headway 
Thus far, this Court Itself has made 
little headway in defining the scope of 
the functions deemed protected wtder 
National League of Cities. 
We believe, however, that there is a 
more fundamental problem at work 
here. Neither the governmental/pro-
prietary distinction nor any other that 
purports to separate out Important 
governmental functions can be faith-
ful to the role of federalism in a demo-
cratic society. The essence of. our 
Federal system is that within the 
realm of authority left open to them 
under the Constitution, the states 
must be equally free to engaae in any 
activity that their clttzehs choose for 
the common weal, no matter how 
unorthodox or wtnecessary anyone 
else, including the judiciary, deems 
state involvement to be. 
Any rule of state Immunity that 
.looks to the "traditional," "integral," 
or "necessary" nature of aovernmen-
. tal functions inevitably invites an 
wtelected Federal judiciary to make 
decisions about which state policies it 
favors and which It dislikes. 
We therefore now reject, as un-
SOWld in prin. tclple and unworkable in 
practice, a _ rule of state Immunity 
from Federal regulation that turns on 
a judicial appraisal of whether a 
particular governmental function Is 
"integral" or "traditional." If there 
are to be limits on Fedeial Govern-
ment power to interfere with state 
functions, as wtdoubtedly tllere are, 
we must look elsewhere to find them. 
Special Position of Statel 
The central theme of National · 
League . of Cities was that the states 
occupy a special position in our con-
stitutional system and that the scope 
of Congress' authority under the 
Commerce Clause must refiect that 
position. Of course, the Commerce 
SUpreme Court lli8torical Society 
Associate Justice Harry A. Blaclt-
mwt, wbo WJ'Ole Court's opinion. 
Clause by its specific language does 
not provide any special limitation oi1 
Congress' actions with respect to the 
~tates. It Is equally true, however, 
. that the text of the Constitution pro-
vides the beginning rather than the 
final answer to every inquiry into 
questions of federalism. In order to 
be faithful to the underlying Federal 
premises of the Constitution, courts 
must look for the "postulates which 
limit and control." 
We doubt that courts ultimately can 
identify principled constitutional 
limitations on the scope of Congress' 
Commerce Clause powers merely by 
relying on a priori definitions of state 
sovereignty. In part, this is because 
of the elusiveness of objective criteria 
for "fundamental" elements of state 
sovereignty. 
There is, however, a · more funda-
mental reason: the sovereignty of the 
States Is limited by the Constitution 
ItSelf. A variety of sovereign powers, 
. for example, are withdrawn from the 
states by Article I Section 10. Section 
8 of the same Article works an equally 
sharp contraction of state sover-
eignty by authorizing Congress to ex-
• erclse a wide range of legislative 
powers and (in conjwtctlon with the 
. Supremacy Clause of Article VI) to 
displace contrary state legislation. 
By providing for final review of ,. 
questions of Federal law in this 
Court, Article III curtails the aover-
eign power of the'states' judiciaries to 
make authoritative determinations of 
law. Finally, the developed applica-
tion, through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, of the greater part of the Bill of 
Rights to the states limits the sover-
eign authority that states otherwise 
would possess to leatslati with re-
spect to their citizens and to conduct 
their own affairs. 
The states unquestionably do retain · tiOns and their role in Presidential 
a significant measure of sovereign elections. They were atven more di· 
authority. They do so, however, only rect influence in the -senate, where 
to the exent that the Constitution bas each state received equal repreaenta-
not divested them of their orlaJ,nal : tton and each senator was to be H-
powera and transferred those powers lected by the legislature of hla state. 
to tbe Federal Government. In short, the Jl'ramera Chose to rely 
When we look for the atates' "resld· 
uary and Inviolable aov~tgnty," 
(Tbe Federalist No. 39 J. Madison) In 
the shape of the constitutional 
scheme rather than In predetermined 
notions of sovereign power, a differ-
ent measure of state sovereignty 
. emerges. Apart from the Umltatlon 
. on Federal authority Inherent In the 
delegated nature of congress• Article 
• I powers, the principal means chosen 
by the Framers to Insure the role of 
the states lie& tn the structure of the 
Federal Government itself. 
It is no novelty to observe that the 
composition of the Federal Govern-
• ment was designed In large part to 
protect the states from overreaching 
by Congress. The Framers thus gave 
the states a role In the selection both 
of tbe executive and the legislative 
branches of the Federal Government. 
The states were vested with Indirect 
influence oVer the House of R.epre. 
sentatlves and tbe Presidency by 
their control of electoral qualtftca-
on a Federal system In which apeclal 
restraints on Federal power over the 
states inhered prtnctpally in the 
workings of the national Government 
Itself, rather than In discrete ltmlta· 
tions on the objects of Federal author-
ity. 
The effectiveness of the Federal 
political process in preserving the 
states' Interests Ia apparent In the 
course of Federal legislation. 
We are - convinced that the funda-
mental limitation that the constitu· 
tional scheme imposes on the Com-
merce Clause to protect the "states 
as states" is one of process i'ather 
than one of result. Any substantive re-
straint on the exercise of Commerce 
Clause powers must find its justiflca. 
tion In the procedural nature of thla 
baste limitation, and It must be tai-
lored to compensate for possible fail· 
tngs in the national political process 
rather than to dictate a "sacred prov- · 
lnce of state autonomy." • 
National League of Cities v. Usery 
is overruled. 
From Dissents 
By Justice Powell 
\ 
Because I belleve this decision sub- that it, an unelected majority of five 
stantially alters the Federal system Justices, today rejects almost 200 
embodied in the Constitution, I dis- ·years of the understanding of the con-
stitutional atatus of Federallsrrl. 
I 
sent. 
The stabillty of judicial decision, Defect' ln .Opinion Ia Seen 
the result of its holdlna,l.e., that Feel· 
eral polltical offici.... lnvoldn& the 
Commerce Clause, are the sole 
Judges of the Umlta of their own 
power. This result is 1nconalltent with 
the fundamental principle~ of our 
constitutional sy.tem. At least Iince 
Marbury v. Madlson lt baa been the 
settled province of the Federal Judtci- · 
ary "to aay what the law ll" with re-
spect to the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress. In reJecttna the role of the 
Judiciary In Protectlna the atates 
from Federal overreachlna, the 
Court's opinion offers no explanation 
for Ignoring the teachlna of the most 
famous case In our blstory. 
The question presented in thla case 
Is whether the extension of the 
. F.L.S.A. to the wages and hours of 
. employees of a city-owned tranalt 
system unconstitutionally lmptnaes 
on fundamental state soveretanty. 
The Court's sw= holdlna does 
far more than atrJ:lp uswer this ~ 
question In the neptive. Today's 
opinion apparently authorizes Fed· 
eral control, under the auspices of the 
Commerce Clause, over the terms 
and conditions of employment of all 
state and local . emplOyeel. The 
Court's action reflects a Hrloul mil-
understanding, lf not an outrlaht re-
jection, of the. history of our country 
and the Intention of the Framers of 
the Constitutioo. 
By Justice Rehnquiat 
I Join both Jutlce Powell'• and Jus-
.tice O'Connor'• thouahtful dluenta. I' 
do not think It Incumbent 011 tboH of 
us In dissent to apell out further the 
tine points of a principle that wlll, I 
am confident, ln time qaln com-
mand the support of a majority of .this 
Court. s 
By Justice O'Connor and with It respect for the authority of Today•s opinion does not explain 
this Court, are not served by the · how the states' role tn the electoral The Court today surveys the battle 
prectpltious overruling of multiple process guarantees tAAt particular scene of federalism aDd sounds a re-
precedents that we witness In this exercises of the Commerce Clause treat. Uke Justice Powell, I would 
case. A unique feature of the United power Will not tnfrlnge on residual . prefer to bold the tleld aad, at the 
States is tbe Federal system of gov- state sovereignty. Members of Con- very least, render a Uttle aid to the 
emment guaranteed by the Constitu· gress are elected from the various wo\Dlded. • · 
tion and implicit In the very name of states, but In office they are members In my view, federallam cannot be 
our country· Despite some genuflect· of the Federal Government. reduced to the weak "euence" dll-
lngln Court's opinion to the concept of The Court apparently thinks that · tilled by the majortty today. ·\ · 
federalism, today'a decision effec- the states' success of obtaining Fed· Due to the ·emerpoce of an lnt6-
tively reduces the Tenth Amendment eral fwKls for various projects and srated and lndultrlallzed oatlooal 
to meaningless rhetoric when Con- exemptions · from the obligations of ·economy, thla Court 1~ been reo! , gress acts pursuant to the Commerce some Federal statutes is tndlcative of quired to examine ,.ua review a 
Clause. the "effectiveness of the Federal breathtaking expanaloo of the powers 
To leave no doubt about its lnten- political process In preserving the . of Congress. IndotnaaotheCourtcor-
tion, the Court renounces Its decision states' Interests." But such polltical rectly perceived that the Framers of 
In National League of Cities because success is not relevant to the question our Constitution Intended Coqrels to 
it "Inevitably Invites an unelected whether the polltical processes are have sufficient power to addrela na-
1 
Federal Judiciary to make decisions the proper means of enforcing consftl· tional problems. They also envlaioned 
about which state policies Its favors tutional limitations. The fact that a republlc whose vitality was allured 
and which ones It dislikes." In other Congress generally does not trans- by tbe diffusion of power DOt oaly 
words, the extent to which the states gress constitutional limits on Its among the branchel M the Fecleral 
l 
may exercise their authority, when power to reach state activities does Government, but also between the 
Congress purports to act under the not make, Judicial review any less Federal Government and the atates. 
' 
Commnerce Clause, henceforth is to necessary to rectify tbe cases In In tbe 18th century theee intentions 
be determined from time to time by which it does so. . did not conflict because tecbnology 
. political decisions made by members The states' role • In our system of had not yet converted every local 
of tbe Federal government, decisions government is a matter of constltu· problem Into a national ooe. ·A con-
the Court says wUl not be subject to tional law, not of legislative grace. fllct bas now erne~. and the Court 
judicial review. I note that it does not More troubling than the logical in- today retreats rather than recoDcile 
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Overtime-Pay Ruling Burdens 
State and Local Governments 
By JOANN s. LUBLIN 
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
T 
HE FULL BLOW of the Supreme Court's Garcia decision 
last February has just begun to hit state and local govern-
ments where it hurts-in their pocketbooks. Generally, the 
ruling-which affects about half the nation's 14 million state 
and local workers-bars the popular practice of granting compensa-
tory time off for overtime work. 
Instead, governments are required to pay overtime wages and 
revamp their payroll systems. They say it will initially cost them $3 
billion or more, although everyone won't suffer ~~~~~~~~~ the same. The Labor Department starts enforc-
ing the ruling on Oct. 15; police and firefighter 
groups seeking back pay already have sued 
about 15 communities. ;;;;:==7 ~ 
For state and local governments, the high ~  
court's mandate "probably is the single biggest liii::!·~-~~ 
burden they will be facing this year and maybe IJ
1\IIJ1)11 Ill 
next year," says Gregg Jackson, research di- IJJ[IIIIIIIIIIIIII[[J 
rector of the International City Management 
Association. At Senate Labor Committee hearings this Thursday, 
three governors, along with a host of other distressed municipal and 
state officials, undoubtedly will warn of layoffs, reduced services 
and higher taxes. 
F OUR BILLS have been introduced in Congress to overturn portions of the decision by amending the federal minimum-wage and overtime-pay law. The chances for quick congres-sional action look slim, however, partly because the court's 
action hurts certain states and localities more than others. A hard-
est-hit list would include: California, Florida and smaller, less-union-
ized communities, largely in the South and the West. Big Northeast 
cities may be affected relatively less. 
The impact is likely to be felt most among firefighters, who 
consume a big chunk of local budgets. Firefighting also is expensive 
for states with extensive fire-prone areas, such as California and 
Florida. While the regular workweek for a majority of U.S. fire-
fighters lasts 56 hours, Labor Department guidelines will require 
state and local governments to give firefighters premium overtime 
pay if they work more than 53 hours. One reason that heavily union-
ized big cities will be less affected is that many already have shorter 
workweeks than the national norm. 
In addition, some states and localities previously chose to com-
ply with the federal Fair Labor Standards Act or have local statutes 
that closely follow it. Among them: Maryland, Michigan and Massa-
chusetts. "They don't see much need to get on the bandwagon" 
clamoring for a congressional remedy, says James Valin, a top La-
bor Department official. 
I 
T ISN'T SURPRISING, then, that five of 21 cosponsors for one 
House bill modifying the Garcia decision all hail from Califor-
nia-as does Sen. Pete Wilson, the author of a Senate measure. 
The decision could cost the state and its local governments 
more than $350 million. 
By contrast, the Garcia ruling's economic effect on Massachu-
setts "is going to be nominal," says Michael Sloman, an assistant 
attorney general. "That entered in our thinking" when state leaders 
-~ ...... ........ t..o....~. .._...._.,._ ... . . ··~ _.__ . . .. .._ ____ .._ ··- "' ~ ... • --
percent of surveyed women 
"hn1nru.>·r" said they had bought a new 
the past month. Their reasons: 
Had a coupon 











For More Hikers 
Only the Air 
Remains Free 
By DAVID SHRIBMAN 
Staff Reporter of TnE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
Turnstiles where New Hampshire's 
Winneweta Falls Trail crosses the Ellis 
River? A tollbooth on the switchbacks 
along the Daniel Webster Trail on the 
northeast slope of Mount Madison? 
Not yet. But the hikers who are climb-
ing into the Presidential and Franconia 
Ranges this summer are talking about 
more than the waterfall along the Ammon-
oosuc Ravine Trail and the steepness of 
the Six Husbands Trail. They are also talk-
ing about user fees. 
The term, once confined to the back 
rooms of Capitol Hill, is increasingly being 
heard in the back country of the White 
Mountains. And though nobody is ready to 
set up turnstiles or tollbooths, the notion is 
creating a stir along the 350 miles of trails 
within 50 miles of Pinkham Notch. 
Many hikers, like Donna Polhamus of 
Somerville, Mass., say that "there's some-
thing unappealing" about paying a fee to 
walk the trails. But in the past dozen 
years, New Hampshire officials, wilder-
ness groups and others have mounted oper-
ations to rescue about 100 hikers from re-
mote peaks and ravines-and there is 
growing sentiment that the cost of such op-
erations and the maintenance of public 
trails and shelters ought to be underwrit-
ten by hikers themselves. 
Hiker Obligations 
"You get services just by taking a hike 
in the woods," says Stephen Rice, director 
of north country operations for the Appala-
chian Mountain Club, a major wilderness 
group ~hat maintains eight huts and 17 
Wjs r.JF:;t;;J. 7/~/.fs-"S: 
A Messa e From Garcia 
This week a Senate subcommittee 
wm begin hearings on the application 
ot the Fair Labor Standards Act to 
stitl:e and local governments, a subject 
that usually glazes the eyes of all but 
tne most devoted. This year, though, 
it iS not just a matter of a million dol-
lar~ here, a million there. Real money 
is ~t stake. And state and local politi-
cal leaders actually may be coming 
forward to say so. 
Early this year the Supreme Court, 
in 1he Garcia decision, extended the 
reach of the FLSA to cover state and 
local government activities that were 
once exempt. Among other changes, 
local employees will not be permitted 
to work overtime and take compensa-
tory time off later on. From now on 
the workers will have to be paid for 
tMir overtime at time-and-a-half 
ra es. Local government trainees, 
from firefighting recruits to youth em-
ployment program workers, will also 
fall uilder the time-and-a-half rule. 
The price tag will vary by locality 
and region. Big cities in the Northeast 
will suffer least, since their labor 
practices are already the most expen-
sive and most favorable to public-em-
ployee unions. But even these cities 
will pay more than their spokesmen 
currently admit. And for the country 
as a whole, the Garcia decision may 
cost about $3 billion. 
Lest you think this figure is a right-
wing scare tactic, be advised that it 
does not include the cost of renegotiat-
ing contracts, administering the 
changes or going to court in disputes 
over retroactive pay. Nothing in the 
current Reagan budget will even ap-
proach this decision in added burden 
tct local governments. 
As the Journal's Joann S. Lublin 
pointed out in a story yesterday, even 
\~ IJcal government workers are not ec-
static about the Garcia decision. The 
rule requiring time-and-a-half for 
overtime will often mean no overtime 
at all, and hence less total wages than 
in the bad old days. Senior citizens 
who now do government jobs at rela-
tively low wages in order to stay be-
low their Social Security ceilings may 
well find the jobs eliminated. Para-
medics who work in town and volun-
teer their after-hours services in their 
rural home communities will not be 
able to do so anymore. Though the 
public-employee unions have an insti-
tutional interest in uniform national 
labor standards, labor organizations 
are divided on this issue. 
Until very recently, local govern-
ments were urging the Reagan admin-
istration to press for corrective legis-
lation but somehow not yelling quite 
loud enough for their voices to reach 
the general media or the Democrats 
in the House of Representatives. With 
state and local support slow in com-
ing, the administration faced its own 
dilemma: Should it step forward and 
take the political heat alone, or should 
it let the costs run up and start to en-
trench themselves until the localities 
got up the gumption to join vigorously 
in the debate? 
In the past few days there have 
been signs of more action. The hear-
ings will give us the first public indi-
cation of how all the calculations have 
come out. If a thundering silence 
emerges from the hearing room, do 
not assume that the Garcia problem is 
trivial; what you hear will simply be 
local leaders whose ties to an old ide-
ology make them afraid to acknowl-
edge the depth of the trouble. And if 
you hear a bit of healthy yelling, you 
will know that economic realities are 
at last forcing some necessary recon· 




A E. Dick Howard 
Editor's Note: Last year when Professor Howard delivered the 
Richard Russell Lectures at the University of Georgia, he posed the 
thesis that the Supreme Court has an important role to play in 
deciding federalism issues. Since those lectures, the Supreme Court 
has handed down its decision in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority. In that decision, a five-man 
majority (there were four dissenters) ruled that where Federal actions 
are attacked on the grounds that they invade rights reser~~ed to the 
states under the Tenth Amendment, the states must look, for all 
practical purposes, to Congress not the courts for protection. In so 
ruling, the Court 011erruled one of its own modern decisions, its 
1976 decision in National League of Cities v. Usery. The Garcia 
decision is certainly the most important federalism decision in years 
and it is being widely debated. 
wo centuries ago, the framers who met at 
Philadelphia labored to produce a Con-
stitution crafted to the needs of a free people 
living in a republic of extended territory. Drawing 
on the lessons of history, they sought to give the 
central government sufficient authority to deal with 
such national concerns as commerce among the 
states, while dispersing power in such a way as 
to protect individual liberty and local self-govern-
ment-two of the ends for which the war of 
independence had been waged. 
Federalism is a linchpin of that constitutional 
order. The text of the Constitution-which refers 
to the states at least fifty times-makes clear how 
central the concept of federalism was to the 
founders' thinking. Indeed, it was a concern about 
the potential power of the new federal government 
that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 
In the nineteenth century, that perceptive 
French traveler, Tocqueville, lavished praise on 
American federalism in his Democracy in America. 
On the link between self-government and liberty, 
he commented, "A nation may establish a free 
government, but without municipal institutions it 
cannot have the spirit of liberty." 
As Americans prepare to celebrate the Con-
stitution's bicentennial, the Supreme Court appears 
to have forgotten both the framers' intent and the 
teachings of the nation's history. In February the 
Court decided Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority. Five justices joined in a majority 
opinion concluding, in effect, that if the states 
want protection within the constitutional system 
7 
they must look to Congress, not the courts. The 
principal means, Justice Blackmun wrote, by which 
the role of the states in the federal system is to be 
ensured "lies in the structure of the Federal 
Government itself." 
The states and localities, to be sure, will survive 
the impact of Garcia's immediate holding, which 
involves the application of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act to a municipally owned mass-transit system. 
The holding is bound to be both burdensome and 
expensive, but most local governments will find 
ways to adjust. 
Far more is at stake, however, than bus drivers' 
pay. Garcia raises fundamental questions about the 
role of the Supreme Court as the balance wheel of 
the federal system. History, principle, and an 
understanding of the political process argue strongly 
that the federal judiciary should undertake the very 
function Garcia abdicates. For those who care about 
the health of American constitutionalism, Garcia 
should be an unsettling decision. 
Although the ultimate reach of Garcia is 
unclear, the decision adopts a variation on a theme 
asking the Court to hold its hand when a litigant 
claims that a federal action is beyond the authority 
of the Federal Government in that the action 
encroaches upon some protected right of the states. 
Final resolution of such claims, this thesis runs, 
should be left to the political branches of the 
government. 
Such a position reads an important part of the 
founders' assumptions out of the constitutional 
order. One may debate-though the point has long 
since been academic-whether the founders in-
tended the Supreme Court to have the power of 
judicial review. But assuming the legitimacy of that 
doctrine, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
the founders assumed that limiting national power 
in order to protect the states would be a judicial 
function. 
James Madison, in Federalist No. 39, was 
explicit: "there must be a tribunal empowered to 
decide controversies relating to the boundaries 
between the two jurisdictions." The nature of the 
ratification contest--especially the Federalist's need 
to reply to anti-Federalist charges-supports this 
conclusion: the proponents of the Constitution saw 
federalism as among the institutional arrangements 
to be protected in the constitutional system. 
The principle of the rule of law adds force to 
what this history teaches. Anglo-American con-
stitutionalism asserts that no branch of government 
should be the ultimate judge of its own powers. The 
principle that one cannot be a judge in one's own 
I 
J ( -.....'· I ' ' 
cause is of centuries' standing. This principle is 
stated by Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham's Case 
(1610) and, · in our own time, has been reinforced 
by United States v. Nixon (197 4). The principle is 
especially important in a system which, in addition 
to being federal, looks to checks and balances and 
the separation of powers to restrain arbitrary 
government. 
Moreover, Garcia disregards the ways in which 
the nation's political process actually works. 
Essential to any argument that the Court should 
abstain from adjudicating limits on national power 
vis-a-vis the states is the notion that the states have 
ample protection in the processes of politics. 
This assumption has two dimensions. One is 
institutional-that the states have a major part in 
structuring the national government. The other is 
political-that the ways in which the process 
actually works (such as in the political parties and 
in Congress) focus on the states. In fact, neither 
branch of the argument reflects current realities. 
There was a time when the states had con-
siderable influence over the shape of federal 
politics. Under the original Constitution, U.S. 
senators were elected by state legislatures. 1he 
Constitution did not set federal standards for 
congressional elections; the states controlled the 
franchise. And it was up to the state legislatures as 
to how to draw the boundaries of congressional 
districts. 
All this has changed. The Seventeenth Amend-
ment (adopted in 1913) brought direct election of 
senators. Judicial decisions (such as that striking 
down the poll tax) and acts of Congress (notably 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965) have federalized 
much of the law respecting the franchise. The 1965 
statute, for example, requires preclearance (by the 
Attorney General or the District Court for the 
District of Columbia) of voting changes in areas 
covered by the act. State power to apportion con-
gressional seats has been circumscribed by decisions 
such as the Supreme Court's 1964 opinion in 
Wesberry v. Sanders, requiring that congressional 
districts be based on population. 
Accompanying these institutional changes 
comes a palpable decline in the "political" 
safeguards. Political parties, especially at the state 
level, no longer are the force they once were. 
Increased use of primaries and the impact of 
"reforms" have encouraged the growth of alternative 
institutions. Most striking has been the rise of 
PACs, which now number in the thousands. 
The "nationalization" of campaign finance 





constituents. Special interest politics tends to 
replace consensus politics. Moreover, the explosive 
growth of the Federal Government in modern times 
has brought the emergence of the "iron triangle" 
-the convergence of bureaucrats, interested 
legislators (often powerful committee chairmen), 
and lobbyists to determine the shape of federal" 
programs. 
In defense of having the Court abdicate Tenth 
Amendment questions, as it did in Garcia, one 
sometimes hears the argument that the Court 
cannot resolve empirical questions. Thus, it is 
argued, to "balance" competing state and federal 
interests requires the Court to undertake a mode of 
enquiry that more properly belongs to legislators. 
Yet in other areas of constitutional litigation the 
Court resolves empirical questions as a matter of 
course. Every case involving claims that a state act 
burdens commerce requires the resolution of 
economic and other such data, but the Court does 
not shirk this task. 
Another objection to the Court's having a role 
in Tenth Amendment cases is that the justices 
cannot draw workable distinctions, such as deciding 
what is and what is not a "traditional governmental 
function" (the distinction that provided state 
protection against federal intrusion before Garcia). 
Such line-drawing is, of course, difficult. But its 
being difficult does not mean that it should not be 
undertaken, any more than the difficulty of de-
ciding what constitutes "speech" or "religion"-the 
thorniest of problems-are grounds for not deciding 
First Amendment cases. 
Whatever the tangles confronting the Court, 
there are even graver reasons to question Congress' 
competence or willingness to make considered judg-
ments on constitutional questions-especially when 
the question is that of the limits of Congress' own 
power: The judicial process may have its flaws, but 
it aspires to a degree of rationality, including 
analytical reasoning, that one does not associate 
with the legislative process. The limits of time, the 
pressures of lobbyists, the temptations of 
expediency, undue reliance on staff, and other 
distractions often have more to do with the final 
shape of legislation than any thinking about 
constitutional issues. Martin Shapiro makes the 
point well: "The nature of the legislative process, 
combined with the nature of constitutional issues, 
makes it virtually impossible for Congress to make 
independent, unified, or responsible judgments on 
the constitutionality of its own statutes." 
Still another argument for the Court's leaving 
the states and localities to the tender mercies of 
Congress is that the Court needs to husband its 
scarce political capital. This argument raises the 
spectre of a return to "dual federalism"-the ancien 
regime, before 193 7, when the Supreme Court often 
derailed federal, social and economic legislation in 
the name of states' rights. 
Such a risk is chimerical. For the Court to play 
a role in protecting the states as states under the 
Tenth Amendment, as the majority set out to do in 
the Court's 1976 decision in National League of 
Cities v. Usery (overruled in Garcia), raises no . 
question about Congress' power over the private 
sector. 
Garcia betrays a glaring disregard of a 
basic truth about American constitu-
tionalism: that institutional rights are a 
form of Individual rights. 
As to keeping the Court out of unnecessary 
controversies, most of the debate over "judicial 
activism" in recent decades has involved such issues 
as school prayer, criminal justice, and abortion. It is 
individual rights decisions that, by and large, stir 
passions. One doubts that the partisans of Garcia 
would be content to see individual rights matters, 
because they may be controversial, left likewise to 
the political process. 
Garcia betrays a glaring disregard of a basic truth 
about American constitutionalism: that institutional 
rights are a form of individual rights. Even such 
basic guarantees as those in the Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment do not secure absolute 
personal rights. They protect against governmental 
(that is, institutional) actions, not against 
infringements by private parties. Thus, securing 
individual rights requires assurances as to the 
Constitution's institutional safeguards. 
The individual American-as the heir to those 
who brought the Constitution into being and agreed 
to its adoption-has a fundamental entitlement to 
living under the form of government spelled out in 
the Constitution. The separation of powers is not 
to be abandoned simply because it may be in-
convenient. Likewise, one of the predicates of the 
constitutional order is that the Supreme Court 
adhere to the values of federalism as manifestly 
implicit in the Constitution. 
Federalism may be an elusive idea, but it is no 
mere abstraction. And, while it was essential to the 
adoption of the original Constitution, it is more 
than simply a political compromise adopted to get 
9 
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the Constitution underway. Federalism is linked 
with individual liberty and with the health of the 
body politic. 
By participating in government at the local 
level, the citizen is educated in the value of civic 
participation. A robust federalism encourages state 
and local governments as schools for citizenship. 
Moreover, federalism both reflects and encourages 
pluralism, allowing individual idiosyncracies to 
flourish. · One often hears Justice Brandeis quoted on 
the states' serving as "laboratories" for social and 
economic experiments. The states are more than 
mere laboratories; to the extent they encourage 
pluralism the states are handmaidens of the open 
society. 
Ultimately, the case for federalism rests on the 
right of choice-the essence of political freedom. 
States and local governments have, of course, often 
trampled this very right, as when they have denied 
the vote because of race. The remedies for such 
abuses lie in vigorous judicial enforcement of 
constitutional guarantees and in Congress' power to 
protect civil rights. But the need to guard against 
trespasses by states or localities on individual 
liberties does not undermine the conclusion that 
federalism as such can operate as part of the very 
matrix of protection for individual liberties. 
In refusing to enforce the Tenth Amendment.:_ 
to play the role they regularly undertake in respect 
to other provisions of the Bill of Rights-the Garcia 
majority leaves an important constitutional sentry 
post unmanned. What recourse have those who 
care about the health of federalism? 
Early and outright reversal of Garcia 
should not lightly be predicted, even 
assuming new justices are appointed to 
the Court. Reversals typically come only 
after a precedent has been robbed of 
vitality. 
There are other opportunities for courts to 
vindicate the underlying values. Federal statutes 
may be interpreted in light of their impact on state 
and local governments. For example, the Court's 
1981 Pennhurst decision lays down the salutary rule 
that federal grant conditions, to be binding on state 
and local governments, must be clearly identified as 
such when grant funds are accepted. Notions of 
comity can come into play when reviewing lower 
courts' use of their equity pOwers to reform state 
institutions (such as prisons) or when deciding how 








far a federal coun may go in intervening in state 
coun proceedings (as in the Coun's 1971 decision 
in Y~ "· Hams). 
Ultimately, one may hope for the undermining 
or demise of Garcia. The majority decision stops 
shon of saying that under no circumstances could 
the constitutional structure impose affirmative ·limits 
on federal actions affecting the states. A more 
favorable fact situation than that in Garcia, one · 
entailing a more serious intrusion on the states and 
a more marginal federal interest, might furnish the 
occasion to begin the movement away from that 
unfortunate decision. 
Early and outright reversal of Garcia should not 
lightly be predicted, even assuming riew justices are 
appointed to the Court. Reversals typically come 
only after a precedent has been robbed of vitality. 
The Court decided Gideon"· Wainwright (1963), 
requiring states to appoint counsel for felony 
defendants · unable to afford a lawyer, only after 
twenty years of experience under Betts "· Brady 
proved that an ad hoc approach would not do. 
Likewise, it was easier for Justice Blackmun to 
rationalize the result in Garcia by pointing to the 
Court's difficulties in post~Nationall...eague of Cities 
decisions such as EEOC "· Wyoming and FERC "· 
Mississippi. 
Still, one can hope that eventually a majority of 
the justices will come to realize the mistake made in 
Garcia. Because federalism is an intrinsic com~ 
ponent of the constitl,ltional system-indeed, 
bolsters other constitutional values--safeguarding it 
cannot be left to the unrestrained discretion of the 
political branches. It may be that the authority 
pronounced in National League of Cities (and 
renounced in Garcia) ought to be sparingly used. 
But it is salutary that the political branches lc.now 
that the Coun has power to step in when the facts 
point to intervention. 
It is no less legitimate and proper for the 
Supreme Coun to concern itself with assuring the 
health of federalism as it is for the Court to uphold 
individuallibenies as such. In neither case is 
abdication of the Court's proper role consistent with 
the principles inhering in the Constitution. 
·~.:..'-/< 
A E. Dick Howard, White Burkett Miller Profeuur of Law and 
Public Affairs, is an expert in corutinaional law, jvrUprudence and 
rite Swprm~t Court. He is prtsmtJ, Counselor ro Govmwr Robb of 
Virginia and Chairman of rite Virginia Commission on rite 
Bicmtmnial of rite United St4te.S Corutitution. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIT D STATES 
Nos. 82-1913 AND 82-1951 
82-1913 v. 
SAN ANTONIO METROPO ITAN TRANSIT 
t AUTHORIT ET AL. 
RAYMOND J. DONO AN, SECRETARY OF 
LABO ,APPELLANT 
82-1951 v. 
SAN ANTON METROPOLITAN TRANSIT 
AUTHORITY ET AL. 
ON APPEA FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
OR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
[October -, 1984] 
STICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We revisit in these cases an issue raised in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). In that liti-
gation, this Court, by a sharply divided vote, ruled that the 
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the / 
minimumi\wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor V 
Standards Act (FLSA) against the States "in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions." I d., at 852. Although N a-
tional League of Cities supplied some examples of "tradi-
tional governmental functions," it did not offer a general 
explanation of how a "traditional" function is to be distin-
guished from a "nontraditional" one. Since then, federal and 
state courts have struggled with the task, thus imposed, of 
identifying a traditional function for purposes of state immu-
nity under the Commerce Clause. 
In the present cases, a Federal District Court concluded 
that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit sys-
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tern is a traditional governmental function and thus, under 
National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations im-
posed by the FLSA. Faced with the identical question, 
three Federal Courts of Appeals and one state appellate 
court have reached the opposite conclusion. 1 
Our examination of this "function" standard applied in 
these and other cases over the last eight years now persuades 
us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regula-
tory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental func-
tion" is not only unworkable but is inconsistent with estab-
lished principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very 
federalism principles on which National League of Cities pur-
ported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled. 
I 
The history of public transportation in San Antonio, Tex., 
is characteristic of the history of local mass transit in the 
United States generally. Passenger transportation for hire 
within San Antonio originally was provided on a private basis 
by a local transportation company. In 1913, the Texas Leg-
islature authorized the State's municipalities to regulate ve-
hicles providing carriage for hire. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 
147, § 4, ~ 12, now codified, as amended, as Tex. Rev. Civ. 
Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon 1963). Two 
years later, San Antonio enacted an ordinance setting forth 
franchising, insurance, and safety requirements for passen-
ger vehicles operated for hire. The city continued to rely on 
such publicly regulated private mass transit until1959, when 
it purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Com-
pany and replaced it with a public authority known as the San 
Antonio Trans~t System (SATS). SATS operated until1978, 
1 See Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority, 
701 F . 2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F . 2d 1060 (CAll 
1983), cert. pending, Nos. 82-1974 and 83-257; Kramer v. New Castle Area 
Transit Authority , 677 F . 2d 308 ( CA3 1982), cert. denied , 459 U. S. 1146 
(1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982). 
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when the city transferred its facilities and equipment to ap-
pellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
(SAMTA), a public mass-transit authority organized on a 
countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., 
Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA currently is the 
major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metro-
politan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehicles trav-
eled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million 
passengers. 
As did other localities, San Antonio reached the point 
where it came to look to the Federal Government for financial 
assistance in maintaining its public mass transit. SATS 
managed to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations 
for the first decade of its existence without federal or local 
financial aid. By 1970, however, its financial position had 
deteriorated to the point where federal subsidies were vital 
for its continued operation. SATS' general manager that 
year testified before Congress that "if we do not receive sub-
stantial help from the Federal Government, San Antonio may 
. .. join the growing ranks of cities that have inferior [public] 
transportation or may end up with no [public] transportation 
at all." 2 
The principal federal program to which SATS and other 
mass-transit systems looked for relief was the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 
302, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. §§ 1601 et seq., which pro-
vides substantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit 
programs. See generally Jackson Transit Authority v. 
Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15 (1982). UMTA now authorizes 
the Department of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the 
capital outlays and up to 50 percent of the operating expenses 
of qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49 
U. S. C. App. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its 
2 Urban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. before the 
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill). 
. . .,. 
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first UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in Decem-
ber 1970. From then until February 1980, SATS and 
SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants-more 
than $31 million in capital grants, over $20 million in operat-
ing assistance, and a minor amount in technical assistance. 
During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, it received $12.5 mil-
lion in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from sales 
taxes, and only $10.1 million from fares. Federal subsidies 
and local sales taxes currently account for about 75 percent of 
SAMTA's operating expenses. 
The present controversy concerns the extent to which 
SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and over-
time requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was en-
acted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions did not apply 
to local mass-transit employees or, indeed, to employees of 
state and local governments. §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52 Stat. 1060, 
1067. In 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage coverage 
to employees of any private mass-transit carrier whose an-
nual gross revenue was not less than $1 million. Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1961, §§ 2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 65, 71. 
Five years later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state 
and local-government employees for the first time by with-
drawing the minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from 
public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose 
rates and services were subject to state regulation. Fair 
Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §§ 102(a) and (b), 80 
Stat. 831. At the same time, Congress eliminated the over-
time exemption for all mass-transit employees other than 
drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat. 836. 
The application of the FLSA to public schools and hospitals 
was ruled to be within Congress' power under the Commerce 
Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). 
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like 
SATS were expanded in 1974 when Congress provided for 
the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption 
for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standards Amend-
' . 
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ments of 1974, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Congress simultaneously 
brought the States and their subdivisions further within the 
ambit of the FLSA by extending FLSA coverage to virtually 
all state and local-government employees. §§ 6(a)(1) and (6), 
88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(d) and (x). SATS com-
plied with the FLSA's overtime requirements until 1976, 
when this Court, in National League of Cities, supra, over-
ruled Maryland v. Wirtz, and held that the FLSA could not 
be applied constitutionally to the "traditional governmental 
functions" of state and local governments. Four months 
after National League of Cities was handed down, SATS in-
formed its employees that the decision relieved SATS of its 
overtime obligations under the FLSA. 3 
Matters rested there until September 17, 1979, when the 
Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor 
issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations "are not constitu-
tionally immune from the application of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act" under National League of Cities. Opinion . 
WH-499, 6 LRR 91:1138. On November 21 of that year, 
SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas. It sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary to 
the Wage and Hour Administration's determination, Na-
tional League of Cities precluded the application of the 
FLSA's overtime requirements to SAMTA's operations. 
The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U.S. C. §217 for en-
forcement of the overtime and record-keeping requirements 
of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action, 
appellant Garcia and several other SAMTA employees 
brought suit against SAMTA in the same District Court for 
overtime pay under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil 
3 Neither SATS nor SAMTA appears to have attempted to avoid the 
FLSA's minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage lev-
els in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the 
minimum wages prescribed by the FLSA. See Brief for National League 
of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8. 
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Action No. SA 79 CA 458. The District Court has stayed 
that action pending the outcome of these cases, but it allowed 
Garcia to intervene in the present litigation as a defendant in 
support of the Secretary. One month after SAMTA brought 
suit, the Department of Labor formally amended its FLSA 
interpretive regulations to provide that publicly owned local 
mass-transit systems are ·not entitled to immunity under N a-
tional League of Cities. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979), codified 
as 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) (1983). 
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted 
SAMTA's motion for summary judgment and denied the Sec-
retary's and Garcia's cross-motion for partial summary judg-
ment. Without further explanation, the District Court ruled 
that "local public mass transit systems (including [SAMTA]) 
constitute integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions" under National League of Cities. Juris. 
Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia 
both appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252. During the pendency of those appeals, Transporta-
tion Union v. Long Island R . Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), was 
decided. In that case, the Court ruled that commuter rail 
service provided by the state-owned Long Island Rail Road 
did not constitute a "traditional governmental function" and 
hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, under National 
League of Cities, from the requirements of the Railway 
Labor Act. Thereafter, it vacated the District Court's judg-
ment in the present cases and remanded them for further 
consideration in the light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102 
(1982). 
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view 
and again entered judgment for SAMTA. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 
(1983). The court looked first to what it regarded as the 
"historical reality" of state involvement in mass transit. It 
recognized that States not always had owned and operated 
mass-transit systems, but concluded that they had engaged 
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in a longstanding pattern of public regulation, and that this 
regulatory tradition gave rise to an "inference of sover-
eignty." !d., at 447-448. The court next looked to the 
record of federal involvement in the field and concluded that 
constitutional immunity would not result in an erosion of fed-
eral authority with respect to state-owned mass-transit sys-
tems, because many federal s~.~tmut~e:s themselves contain ex-
emptions for States and thus ~he withdrawal of federal V 
regulatory power over public mass-transit systems a super-
vening federal policy. !d., at 448-450. Although the Fed-
eral Government's authority over employee wages under the 
FLSA obviously would be eroded, Congress had not asserted 
any interest in the wages of public mass-transit employees 
until 1966 and hence had not established a longstanding fed-
eral interest in the field, in contrast to the century-old federal 
regulatory presence in the railroad industry found significant 
for the decision in Long Island. Finally, the court compared 
mass transit to the list of functions identified as constitution-
ally immune in National League of Cities and concluded that 
it did not differ from those functions in any material respect. 
The court stated: "If transit is to be distinguished from the 
exempt [National League of Cities] functions it will have to 
be by identifying- a t raditional state function in the same way 
pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when 
they see it, but they can't describe it." 557 F. Supp., at 
453. 4 
The Secretary and Garcia again took direct appeals from 
the District Court's judgment. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion. -- U. S. -- (1983). After initial argument, the 
'The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the 
four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F . 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to 
(1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made 
available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public 
service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is its principal provider; 
and (4) whether government is particularly suited to perform it because of 
a community-wide need. !d., at 1037. 
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cases were restored to our calendar for reargument, and the 
'!parties were requested to brief and argue the following addi-
tional question: 
"Whether or not the principles of the Tenth Amend-
ment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U. S. 833 (1976), should be reconsidered?" 
-- U. S. -- (1984). Reargument followed in due course. 
II 
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from 
regulation under the FLSA on the ground that it is a local 
transit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity. In 
a practical sense, SAMTA's operations might well be charac-
terized as "local." Nonetheless, it long has been settled that 
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to 
intrastate economic activities that affect interstate com-
merce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); 
· Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States 
v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a privately 
owned and operated enterprise, it could not credibly argue 
that Congress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause 
powers in prescribing minimum wages and overtime rates for 
SAMTA's employees. Any constitutional exemption from 
the requirements of the FLSA therefore must rest on 
SAMTA's status as a governmental entity rather than on the 
"local" nature of its operations. 
The prerequisites for governmental immunity under N a-
tional League of Cities were summarized by this Court in 
Hodel, supra. Under that summary, four conditions must 
be satisfied before a state activity may be deemed immune 
from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause. First, it is said that the federal statute at issue 
must regulate "the 'States as States.'" Second, the statute 
must "address matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of 
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state sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the fed-
eral obligation must "directly impair [the States'] ability 'to 
structure integral operatiQns in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions.'" Finally, the relation of state and federal 
interests must not be such that "the nature of the federal in-
terest . . . justifies state submission." 452 U. S., at 
287-288, and n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426 
U. S., at 845, 852, 854. 
The controversy in the present cases has focused on the 
third Hodel requirement-that the challenged federal statute 
trench on "traditional governmental functions." The Dis-
trict Court voiced a common concern: "Despite the abundance 
of adjectives, identifying which particular state functions are 
immune remains difficult." 557 F. Supp., at 447. Just how 
troublesome the task has been is revealed by the results 
reached in other federal cases. Thus, courts have held that 
regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v. 
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo. 
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CA8 1983), 
cert. pending, No. 83-183; licensing automobile drivers, 
United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978); 
operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid 
waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 
654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA6 1981); and operating a highway au-
thority, Malina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority, 
680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CAl 1982), are functions protected 
under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts 
have held that issuance of industrial development bonds, 
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc., 
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intra-
state natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. 
FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff'd, 661 F. 
2d 832 (CAlO 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC, 
457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads, 
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert. 
' •I 
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denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation, 
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 644 F. 2d 
1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system, 
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CAl 
1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. v. 
FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Lou-
isiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental 
health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, 
Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 
976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the 
aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and 
Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA9 1983), are not en-
titled to immunity. We find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases 
in the first group on one side of a line and each of the cases in 
the second group on the other side. The constitutional dis-
tinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for 
example, or between operating a highway authority and op-
erating a mental health facility, is elusive at best. 
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defin-
ing the scope of the governmental functions deemed pro-
tected under National League of Cities. In that case the 
Court set forth examples of protected and unprotected func-
tions, see 426 U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no ex-
planation of how those examples were identified. The only 
other case in which the Court has had occasion to address the 
problem is Long Island. 5 We there observed: "The deter-
mination of whether a federal law impairs a state's authority 
with respect to 'areas of traditional [state] functions' may at 
times be a difficult one." 455 U. S., at 684, quoting Na-
tional League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of 
5 See also, however, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 154, n. 6 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U. S. 742, 781, and n. 7 (1982) (opinion concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); Fry v. Un'ited States, 421 U. S. 542, 558, and n. 2 
(1975) (dissenting opinion). 
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that statement is demonstrated by this Court's own difficul-
ties in Long Island in developing a workable standard for 
"traditional governmental functions." We relied in large 
part there on "the historical reality that the operation of rail-
roads is not among the functions traditionally performed by 
state and local governments," but we simultaneously dis-
avowed "a static historical view of state functions generally 
immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., at 686 (first 
emphasis added; second emphasis in original). We held that 
the inquiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature 
was merely a means of determining whether the federal stat-
ute at issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id., 
at 686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes 
one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function 
not basic. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the 
historical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area, 
we nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the ex-
tended historical record of federal involvement in the field of 
rail transportation. I d., at 687-689. 
Many constitutional standards involve "undoubte[d] ... 
gray areas," Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558 (1975) 
(dissenting opinion), and, despite the difficulties that this 
Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally 
might be fair to venture the assumption that case-by-case 
development would lead to a workable standard for determin-
ing whether a particular governmental function should be im-
mune from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. 
A further cautionary note is sounded, however, by the 
Court's experience in the related field of state immunity from 
federal taxation. In South Carolina v. United States, 199 
U. S. 437 (1905), the Court held for the first time that the 
state tax immunity recognized in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 
113 (1870), extended only to the "ordinary" and "strictly gov-
ernmental" instrumentalities of state governments and not to 
instrumentalities "used by the State in the carrying on of an 
ordinary private business." 199 U. S., at 451, 461. While 
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the Court applied the distinction outlined in South Carolina 
for the following 40 years, at no time during that period did 
the Court develop a consistent formulation of the kinds of 
governmental functions that were entitled to immunity. 
The Court identified the protected functions at various times 
as "essential," "usual," "traditional," or "strictly govern-
mental." 6 While "these differences in phraseology . . . must 
not be too literally contradistinguished," Brush v. Commis-
sioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 (1937), they reflect an inability to 
specify precisely what aspects of a governmental function 
made it necessary to the "unimpaired existence" of the 
States. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the 
Court ultimately chose "not, by an attempt to formulate any 
ge,neral test, [to] risk embarrassing the decision of cases [con-
cerning] activities of a different kind which may arise in the 
future." Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. 8., at 365. 
If these tax immunity cases had any common thread, it was 
in the attempt to distinguish between "governmental" and 
"proprietary" functions. 7 • To say that the distinction be-
6 See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172 (1911) ("essential"); 
Helvering v. Therrell , 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. Pow-
ers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) ("usual"); United States v. California, 297 
U. S. 175, 185 (1936) ("activities in which the states have traditionally en-
gaged"); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905) 
("strictly governmental"). 
7 In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of "strictly govern-
mental" functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to 
a state-owned liquor-distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated: 
"The true distinctio?\s between ... those operations of the States essen-
tial to the execution of its [si<i!)governmental functions, and which the 
State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private charac-
ter"; under this standard, "[i]t is no part of the essential governmental 
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial 
light, water and the like." 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292 
U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monop-
oly, the Court stated that "the business of buying and selling commodities 
. .. is not the performance of a governmental function ," and that "[w]hen a 
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi 
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tween "governmental" and "proprietary" proved to be stable, 
however, would be something of an overstatement. In 1911, 
for example, the Court declared that the provision of a 
municipal water supply "is no part of the essential govern-
mental functions of a State." Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 
U. S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without any inter-
vening change in the applicable legal standards, the Court 
simply rejected its earlier position and decided that the pro-
vision of a municipal water supply was immune from federal 
taxation as an essential governmental function, even though 
municipal water works long had been operated for profit by 
private industry. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. 8., at 
370-373. At the same time that the ·court was holding a 
municipal water supply to be immune from federal taxes, it 
had held that a state-run commuter rail system was not im-
mune. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). Justice 
Black, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 427 (1938), 
was moved to observe: "An implied constitutional distinction 
which taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transpor-
tation system and exempts income of the manager of a munic-
ipal water. works system manifests the uncertainty created 
by the 'essential' and 'non-essential' test" (concurring opin-
ion). It was this uncertainty and instability that led the 
Court shortly thereafter, in New York v. United States, 326 
U. S. 572 (1946), unanimously to conclude that the distinction 
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions was 
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at 
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." I d., at 
369. In Powers, the Court upheld the application of the federal income tax 
to the income of trustees of a state-operated commuter railroad; the Court 
reiterated that "the State cannot withdraw sources of revenue from the 
federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a depar-
ture from the usual governmental functions and to which, by reason of 
their nature, the federal taxing power would normally extend," regardless 
of the fact that the proprietary enterprises "are undertaken for what the 
State conceives to be the public benefit." 293 U. S., at 225. Accord, Al-
len v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938). 
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"untenable" and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (opinion 
of Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, 
C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.); 
id., at 590-596 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.). 
See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457, 
and n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 
92, 101 (1946). 
Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary 
distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine the 
Court never explained the constitutional basis for that dis-
tinction. In South Carolina, it expressed its concern that 
unlimited state immunity from federal taxation would allow 
the States to undermine the Federal Government's tax base 
by expanding into previously private sectors of the economy. 
See 199 U. S., at 454-455. 8 Although the need to reconcile 
state and federal interests obviously demanded that state im-
munity have some limiting principle, the Court did not try to 
justify the particular result it reached; it simply concluded 
that a "line [must] be drawn," id., at 456, and proceeded to 
draw that line. The Court's elaborations in later cases, such 
as the assertion in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 
(1934), that "[w]hen a state enters the market place seeking 
customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto," 
sound more of ipse dixit than reasoned explanation. This in-
ability to give principled content to the distinction between 
"governmental" and "proprietary," no less significantly than 
its unworkability, led the Court to abandon the distinction in 
New York v. United States. 
The distinction the Court discarded as unworkable in the 
field of tax immunity has proved no more fruitful in the field 
of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause. N ei-
ther do any of the alternative standards that might be em-
8 That concern was especially weighty in South Carolina because liquor 
taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over one-
fourth of the Federal Government's revenues. See New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion). 
. ·. 
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ployed to distinguish between protected and unprotected 
governmental functions appear manageable. We rejected 
the possibility of making immunity turn on a purely historical 
standard of "tradition" in Long Island, and properly so. The 
most obvious defect of a historical approach to state immu-
nity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes 
in the historical functions of States, changes that have re-
sulted in a number of once-private functions like education 
being assumed by the States and their subdivisions. 9 At the 
same time, the only apparent virtue of a rigorous historical 
standard, namely, its promise of a reasonably objective meas-
ure for state immunity, is illusory. Reliance on history as an 
organizing principle results in linedrawing of the most arbi-
trary sort; the genesis of state governmental functions 
stretches over a historical continuum from before the Revolu-
tion to the present, and courts would have to decide by fiat 
precisely how longstanding a pattern of state involvement 
had to be for federal regulatory authority to be defeated. 10 
9 Indeed, the "traditional" nature of a particular governmental function 
can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently "tradi-
tional" function is often yesterday's suspect innovation. Thus, National 
League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an 
example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S., at 851. A 
scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 
282 (1893), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been 
provided not for recreation but for grazing domestic animals "in common," 
and that "[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private 
property [by eminent domain] for a public park ... would have been re-
garded as a novel exercise of legislative power." !d., at 297. 
1° For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of fed-
eral involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate stand-
ard for state immunity. Most of the Federal Government's current regu-
latory activity originated less than 50 years ago with the New Deal; and a 
good portion of it has developed within the past two decades. The recent 
vintage of this regulatory activity does not diminish the strength of the fed-
eral interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it 
affect the strength of the States' interest in being free from federal super-
vision. Although the Court's intergovernmental tax immunity decisions 
ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation be-
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A nonhistorical standard for selecting immune govern-
mental functions is likely to be just as unworkable as is a his-
torical standard. The goal of identifying "uniquely" govern-
mental functions, for example, has been rejected by the 
Court in the field of government tort liability in part because 
the notion of a "uniquely" governmental function is unman-
ageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 
61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (dissenting opinion). 
Another possibility would be to confine immunity to "neces-
sary'' governmental services, that is, services that would be 
provided inadequately or not at all unless the government 
provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co ., 220 U. S., at 
172. The set of services that fits into this category, how-
ever, may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated 
market produces less of some service than a State deems de-
sirable does not mean that the State itself must provide the 
service; in most if not all cases, the State can "contract out" 
by hiring private firms to provide the service ·or simply by 
providing subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to 
question how well equipped courts are to make this kind of 
determination about the workings of economic markets. 
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental 
problem at work here, a problem that explains why the Court 
was never able to provide a basis for the 
governmentaVproprietary distinction in the intergovernmen-
cause those activities "ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing] 
power from the beginning," New York v. United States, 326 U. S. , at 588 
(Stone, C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.), the 
Court has not in fact required federal taxes to have long historical records 
in order to be effective. The income tax at issue in Powers, supra, took 
effect less than a decade before the tax years for which it was challenged, 
while the federal tax whose application was upheld in New York v. United 
States took effect in 1932 and was rescinded less than two years later. See 
Helvering v. Powers , 293 U. S., at 222; Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of 
Governmental Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J. 3, 34, n. 116 
(1950). 
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tal tax immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar 
distinctions with respect to federal regulatory authority 
under National League of Cities is unlikely to succeed re-
gardless of how the distinctions are phrased. The problem is 
that neither the governmental/proprietary distinction nor 
any other that purports to separate out important govern-
mental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a 
democratic society. The essence of our federal system is 
that within the realm of authority left open to them under the 
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in 
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, 
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-in-
cluding the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any 
rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "inte-
gral," or "necessary': nature of governmental functions inev-
itably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. 
"The science of government . . . is the science of experi-
ment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and the 
States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic 
experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an 
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citi-
zenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a differ-
ent society left in private hands. In the words of Justice 
Black: 
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging 
line of demarcation between essential and non-essential 
governmental functions. Many governmental functions 
of today have at some time in the past been non-govern-
mental. The genius of our government provides that, 
within the sphere of constitutional action, the people-
acting not through the courts but through their elected 
legislative representatives-have the power to deter-
mine as conditions demand, what services and functions 
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the public welfare requires." Helvering v. Gerhardt, 
304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion). 
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and un-
workable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal 
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a par-
ticular governmental function is "integ:r:_al" or "traditional." 
Any such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time 
that it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, 
and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced 
from those principles. If there are to be limits on the Fed-
eral Government's power to interfere with state functions-
as undoubtedly there are-we must look elsewhere to find 
them. We accordingly return to the underlying issue that 
confronted this Court inN ational League of Cities-the man-
ner in which the Constitution insulates States from the reach 
of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 
III 
The central theme of National League of Cities was that 
the States occupy a special position in our constitutional sys-
tem and that the scope of Congress' authority under the 
Commerce Clause must reflect that position. Of course, the 
Commerce Clause by its specific language does not provide 
any special limitation on Congress' actions with respect to the 
States. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 248 (1983) 
(concurring opinion). It is equally true, however, that the 
text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than 
the final answer to every inquiry into questions of federalism, 
for "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are 
postulates which limit and control." Monaco v. Mississippi, 
292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National League of Cities re-
flected the general conviction that the Constitution preclude 
"the National Government [from] devour[ing] the essentials 
of state sovereignty." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 205 
(dissenting opinion). In order to be faithful to the underly-
/ 
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ing federal premises of the Constitution, courts must look for 
the "postulates which limit and control." 
What has proved problematic is not the perception that the 
Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the· 
Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those 
limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Con-
gress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce 
Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political 
sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States' "sepa-
rate and independent existence." Lane County v. Oregon, 7 
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach obviously underlay the 
Court's use of the "traditional governmental function" con-
cept inN ational League of Cities. It also has led to the sep-
arate requirement that the challenged federal statute "ad-
dress matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state 
sovereignty."' Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National 
League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845. In National League of 
Cities itself, for example, the Court concluded that decisions 
by a State concerning the wages and hours of its employees 
are an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 426 
U. S., at 845. The opinion did not explain what aspects of 
such decisions made them such an "undoubted attribute," and 
the Court since then has remarked on the uncertain scope of 
the concept. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 238, 
n. 11. The point of the inquiry, however, has remained to 
single out particular features of a State's internal governance 
that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state sovereignty. 
We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled 
constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress' Com-
merce Clause powers over the States merely by relying on a 
priori definitions of state sovereignty. In part, this ~s be-
cause of the elusiveness of objective criteria for "funda-
mental" elements of state sovereignty, a problem we have 
witnessed in the search for "traditional governmental func-
tions." There is, however, a more fundamental reason: the 
sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution itself. 
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A variety of sovereign powers, for example, are withdrawn 
from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 of the same Ar-
ticle works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty 
by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legisla-
tive powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause 
of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. See 
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review 
of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails 
the sovereign power of the States' judiciaries to make author-
itative determinations of law. See Martin v. Hunter's Les-
see, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application, 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, of the greater part of 
the Bill of Rights to the States limits the sovereign authority 
that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect 
to their citizens and to conduct their own affairs. 
The States unquestionably do "retai[n] a significant meas-
ure of sovereign authority." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., 
at 269 (POWELL,. J., dissenting). They do so, however, only 
to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of 
their original powers and transferred those powers to the 
Federal Government. In the words of James Madison to the 
Members of the First Congress: "Interference with the 
power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the 
power of Congress. If the power was not given, Congress 
could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, al-
though it should interfere with the laws, or even the Con-
stitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791). 
Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense 
of state autonomy in his dissenting opinion in Baltimore & 
Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 401 (1893), a defense 
quoted with approval in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 
64, 78-79 (1938): . 
"[T]he Constitution of the United States ... recog-
nizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of 
the States-independence in their legislative and inde-
pendence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [s]u-
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pervision over either the legislative or the judicial action 
of the States is in no case permissible except as to mat-
ters by the Constitution specifically authorized or dele-
gated to the United States. Any interference with 
either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the au-
thority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its 
independence." 
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the con-
tinued role of the States is to say little about the nature of 
that role. Only recently, this Court recognized that the pur-
pose of the constitutional immunity recognized in National 
League of Cities is not to preserve "a sacred province of state 
autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 236. With 
rare exceptions, like the guarantee, in Article IV, § 3, of 
state territorial integrity, the Constitution does not carve out 
express elements of state sovereignty that Congress may not 
employ its delegated powers to displace. James Wilson re-
minded the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787: "It is 
true, indeed, sir, although it presupposes the existence of 
state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose 
them to be the sole power to be respected." 2 Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power 
of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as 
well, and the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all 
powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the Con-
stitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between 
state and federal power lies. In short, we have no license to 
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when 
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause . 
. When we look for the States' "residuary and inviolable sov-
ereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. Wright ed. 1961) 
(J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather 
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different 
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tation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature 
of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by 
the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal 
system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself. 
It is no novelty to observe that the composition of the Fed-
eral Government was designed in large part to protect the 
States from overreaching by Congress. 11 The Framers thus 
gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive 
and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. 
The States were vested with indirect influence over the 
House of Representatives and the Presidency by their con-
trol of electoral qualifications and their role in presidential 
elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, §2, and Art. II,§ 1. They 
were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each 
State received equal representation and each Senator was to 
be selected by the legislature of his State. Art. I, § 3. The 
significance attached to the States' equal representation in 
the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any constitu-
tional amendment divesting a State of equal representation 
without the State's consent. Art. V. 
The extent to which the structure of the Federal Govern-
ment itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the 
States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madi-
son explained that the Federal Government "will partake suf-
ficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to in-
vade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives 
of their governments." The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B. 
Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson observed that "it 
was a favorite object in the Convention" to provide for the 
security of the States against federal encroachment and that 
n See, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Proc-
ess 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents 
of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982) . 
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the structure of the Federal Government itself served that 
end. 2 Elliot, at 438-439. Madison placed particular reli-
ance on the equal representation of the States in the .Senate, 
which he saw as "at once a constitutional recognition of the 
portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and 
an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty." 
The Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). He fur-
ther noted that "the residuary sovereignty of the States [is] 
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one 
branch of the [federal] legislature" (emphasis added). The 
Federalist No. 43, p. 315 (B. Wright ed. 1961). See also 
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In short, 
the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which spe-
cial restraints on federal power over the States inhered prin-
cipally in the workings of the National Government itself, 
rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal 
authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more prop-
erly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the 
structure of the federal system than by judicially created 
limitations on federal power. 
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserv-
ing the States' interests is apparent even today in the course 
of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been 
able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues 
into their own treasuries in the form of general and program-
specific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and 
local governments is a longstanding one; Congress provided 
federal land grants to finance state governments from the be-
ginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded 
as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. 12 In the past quarter-
century alone, federal grants to States and localities ·have 
12 See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovern-
mental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United 
States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in The Future of Fed-
eralism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981). 
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grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. 13 As a result, federal 
grants now account for about one-fifth of state and local gov-
ernment expenditures. 14 The States have obtained federal 
funding for such services as police and fire protection, educa-
tion, public health .and hospitals, parks and recreation, and 
sanitation. 15 Moreover, at the same time that the States 
have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they 
have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variety of 
obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce 
Clause. For example, the Federal Power Act, the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the 
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sher-
man Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States 
and their subdivisions. 1 The fact that some federal statutes 
13 A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, Federal. Expenditures by State for Fiscal 
Year 1983, p. 2 (1984) (Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Govern-
ment Accounts and Reports, Fiscal Service-Bureau of Government Fi-
nancial Operations, Dept. of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal 
Year 1982, p. 1 (1983 rev. ed.). 
14 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant 
Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984). 
15 See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 88 
Stat. 1535, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2201 et seq.; the Urban Park and 
Recreation Recovery Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3538, 16 U. S. C. § 2501 et seq.; 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, as 
amended, 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 62 
Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Serv-
ice Act, 58 Stat. 682, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.; the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, 88 Stat. 1660, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 300f et seq.; the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C.§ 3701 et seq.; the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 633, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5301 et seq.; and 
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 
1109, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Ex-
penditures, at 2-15. 
'
6 See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29 
U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1003(b)(1), 1002(32); and Parker v. Brown, 
317 u. s. 341 (1943). 
.... 
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such as the FLSA extend general obligations to the States 
cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of 
the States in the federal system has served to minimize the 
burdens that the States bear under the Commerce Clause. 17 
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal 
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of 
which has been the substitution of popular election of Sena-
tors by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, 
and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the 
States in the federal political process. 18 Nonetheless, 
against this background, we are convinced that the funda-
mental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on 
the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one 
of process rather than one of result. Any substantive re-
straint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find 
its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limita-
tion, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible 
. failings in the national political process rather than to dictate 
a "sacred province of state autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 
460 U. S., at 236. 
Insofar as the present cases are concerned, then, we need 
go no further than to state that we perceive nothing in the 
overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA, as 
applied to SAMTA, that is destructive of state sovereignty or 
violative of any constitutional provision. SAMTA faces 
nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime ob-
17 Even as regards the FLSA, Congress incorporated special provisions 
concerning overtime pay for law enforcement and firefighting personnel 
when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take account of the special 
concerns of States and localities with respect tq these positions. See 29 
U. S. C. § 207(k). Congress also declined to impose any obligations on 
state and local governments with respect to policymaking personnel who 
are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C. § 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and 
(ii). 
18 See, e. g., Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and 
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868 
(1979) . 
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ligations that hundreds of thousands of other employers, pub-
lic as well as private, have to meet. 
In these cases, the status of public mass transit simply un-
derscores the extent to which the structural protections of 
the Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed 
burdens. When Congress first subjected state mass-transit 
systems to FLSA obligations in 1966, and when it expanded 
those obligations in 1974, it simultaneously provided exten-
sive funding for state and local mass transit through UMTA. 
In the two decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided 
over $22 billion in mass transit aid to States and localities. 19 
In 1983 alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. 20 As 
noted above, SAMTA and its immediate predecessor have re-
ceived a substantial amount of UMTA funding, including over 
$12 million during SAMTA's first two fiscal years alone. In 
short, Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on 
the should~rs of States and localities that operate mass-tran-
sit systems, but has provided substantial countervailing fi-
nancial assistance as well, assistance that may leave individ-
ual mass transit systems better off than they would have 
been had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Con-
gress' treatment of public mass transit reinforces our convic-
tion that the national political process systematically protects 
States from the risk of having their functions in that area 
pandicapped by Commerce Clause regulation. 21 
19 See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions for 1983: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Appropriations, 97th Con g., 2d Sess., p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years 
1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983). 
20 Census, Federal Expenditures 15. 
21 Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that regulation under 
the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial 
benefits under the Spending Clause. The application of the FLSA to 
SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not provided federal 
funding under UMTA. 
·, 
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IV 
This analysis makes clear that Congress' action in affording 
SAMTA employees the protections of the wage and hour pro-
visions of the FLSA contravened no affirmative limit on Con-
gress' power under the Commerce Clause. The judgment of 
the District Court therefore must be reversed. 
Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system and 
that the scope of Congress' authority under the Commerce 
Clause must reflect that position. But the principal and 
basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in 
all congressional action-the built-in restraints that our sys-
tem provides through state participation in federal govern-
mental action. The political process ensures that laws that 
unduly burden the States will not be promulgated. In the 
factual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of the 
political process have performed as intended. 
These cases do not require us to identify or define what. af-
firmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on 
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce 
Clause. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). We 
note and accept Justice Frankfurter's observation in New 
York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 583 (1946): 
"The process of Constitutional adjudication does not 
thrive on conjuring up horrible possibilities that never 
happen in the real world and devising doctrines suffi-
ciently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest 
contingency. Nor need we go beyond what is required 
for a reasoned disposition of the kind of controversy now 
before the Court." 
Though the separate concurrence providing the fifth vote 
in National League of Cities was "not untroubled by certain 
possible implications" of the decision, 426 U. S., at 856, the 
Court in that case attempted to articulate affirmative limits 
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on the Commerce Clause power in terms of core govern-
mental functions and fundamental attributes of state sover-
eignty. But the model of democratic decisionmaking the 
Court there identified underestimated, in our view, the solici-
tude of the national political process for the continued vitality 
of the States. Attempts by other courts since then to draw 
guidance from this model have proved it both impracticable 
and doctrinally barren. In sum, in National League of Cit-
ies the Court tried to repair what did not need repair. 
We do not lightly overrule recent precedent. 22 We have 
not hesitated, however, when it has become apparent that a 
prior decision has departed from a proper understanding of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See 
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116-117 (1941). Due 
respect for the reach of congressional power within the fed-
eral system mandates that we do so now. 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), is 
overruled. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, 
and these cases are remanded to that court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
22 But see United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 83, 86-87 (1978). 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 
(1976), this Court held that the Commerce Clause does not 
empower Congress to enforce the minimum wage and over-
time provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
against States "in areas of traditional governmental ftmc-
tions." I d., at 852. Although National League of Cities 
provided examples of "traditional governmental functions," it 
did not offer a more general explanation of how "traditional" 
functions were to be distinguished from "nontraditional" 
ones. Since then, federal and state courts have devoted con-
siderable effort to the task of identifying traditional functions 
for purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause. 
In this case, a Federal District Court concluded that munici-
pal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system is a tra-
ditional governmental function and hence is exempt from the 
obligations of the FLSA under National League of Cities. 
Faced with the identical question, three Federal Courts of 
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Appeals and one state appellate court have reached a con-
trary conclusion. 1 
A review of the operation of the "traditional governmental 
function" standard in this and other cases now persuades us 
that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory 
immunity in terms of "traditional governmental functions" is 
both unworkable and inconsistent with the principles of fed-
eralism on which National League of Cities rests. For the 
reasons given below, we conclude instead that the prereq-
uisite for state immunity from Commerce Clause regulation 
must be a federal statutory scheme that singles out the 
States for unequal regulatory burdens. Because the FLSA 
imposes minimum-wage and overtime obligations evenhand-
edly on private as well as public employers, we hold today 
that its application to municipal mass-transit systems like 
that operated by appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (SAMTA) is within the power delegated to Con-
gress by the Commerce Clause. 
I 
SAMTA provides public transportation for the metropoli-
tan area of San Antonio, Tex. The history of public trans-
portation in San Antonio is characteristic of the history of 
local mass transit in the United States generally. Passenger 
transportation for hire within San Antonio originally was pro-
vided on a private basis by local transportation companies. 
In 1913, the Texas Legislature authorized the State's munici-
palities to regulate vehicles providing carriage for hire. 
1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 147, § 4, ~ 12, codified as amended 
at Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon 
1963). Two years later, San Antonio enacted an ordinance 
1 Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority, 701 F. 
2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F. 2d 1060 (CAll 1983), 
cert. pending, Nos. 82-1974 and 83-257; Kramer v. New Castle Area Tran-
sit Authority, 677 F. 2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1146 
(1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982). 
. . . 
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setting forth franchising, insurance, and safety requirements 
for passenger vehicles operated for hire. The city relied on 
publicly regulated private mass transit until 1959, when it 
purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Com-
pany and transformed it into a public authority called the San 
Antonio Transit System (SATS). SATS continued in opera-
tion until 1978, when San Antonio transferred its facilities 
and equipment to SAMTA, a public mass-transit authority 
organized on a countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev. 
Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA 
currently is a major source of transportation in the San Anto-
nio metropolitan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehi-
cles covered over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 
million passengers. 
Like other cities, San Antonio has come to look to the Fed-
eral Government for financial assistance in maintaining public 
mass transit. SATS managed to meet its operating ex-
penses and bond obligations without federal or local financial 
aid for the first decade of its existence. By 1970, however, 
its financial position had deteriorated to the point where 
federal subsidies became vital to its continued operation. 
SATS' general manager testified before Congress that year 
that "if we do not receive substantial help from the Federal 
Government, San Antonio may ... join the growing ranks of 
cities that have inferior [public] transportation or may end up 
with no [public] transportation at all." 2 
The principal federal program to which SATS and other 
mass transit systems looked for relief was the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), 78 Stat. 302, as 
amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1601 et seq., which provides sub-
stantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit programs. 
See generally Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 
457 U. S. 15 (1982). As amended, UMTA authorizes the De-
2 Urban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. Before the 
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill) . 
I' 
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partment of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the capital 
outlays and up to 50 percent of the operating expenses of 
qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49 
U. S. C. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its first 
UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in December 
1970. Between December 1970 and February 1980, SATS 
and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants-
more than $31 million in capital grants, over $20 million in op-
erating assistance, and a minor amount in technical assist-
ance. During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, it received 
$12.5 million in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from 
sales taxes, and only $10.1 million in fares. Federal subsi-
dies and local sales taxes currently account for roughly 75 
percent of SAMTA's operating expenses. 
The present controversy concerns the extent to which 
SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and over-
time requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was en-
acted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions did not cover 
either local mass-transit employees or employees of state and 
local governments. Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52 
Stat. 1060, 1067 (1938). In 1961, Congress extended mini-
mum-wage coverage to employees of all private mass-transit 
carriers whose annual gross revenues were not less than 
$1,000,000. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, 
Pub. L. No. 87-30, §§2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 66,72-73. Five years 
later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state and local 
government employees for the first time by withdrawing the 
minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from public hospi-
tals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and serv-
ices were subject to state regulation. Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, §§ 102(a) and (b), 
80 Stat. 831. At the same time, Congress eliminated the 
overtime exemption for all mass-transit employees other 
than drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat. 
836. The application of the FLSA to public schools and hos-
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pitals was held to be within Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). 
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like 
SATS were expanded in 1974 when Congress provided for 
the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption 
for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Con-
gress simultaneously brought the States and their subdi-
visions farther within the ambit of the FLSA by extending 
FLSA coverage to virtually all state and local government 
employees. §§ 6(a)(1) and (a)(6), 88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C. 
§§ 203(d) and (x). SATS complied with the FLSA's overtime 
requirements until 1976, when this Court overruled Mary-
land v. Wirtz in National League of Cities and held that the 
FLSA could not be applied constitutionally to the "traditional 
governmental functions" of state and local governments. 
Four months after National League of Cities was handed 
down, SATS informed its employees that the decision re-
lieved SATS of its overtime obligations under the FLSA.3 
Matters rested there until1979, when the Wage and Hour 
Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion 
that SAMTA's operations "are not constitutionally immune 
from the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act" under 
National League of Cities. Opinion WH-499, 6 Labor Rel. 
Rep. (BNA) 91:1138 (Sept. 17, 1979). On November 21, 
1979, SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor 
in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Texas. SAMTA sought a declaratory judgment that, con-
trary to the Wage and Hour Administration's determination, 
National League of Cities precluded the application of the 
FLSA's overtime requirements to SAMTA's operations. 
3 Evidently, neither SATS nor SAMTA has attempted to avoid the 
FLSA's minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage lev-
els in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the 
minimum wages set by the FLSA. See Brief for National League of Cities 
et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8. 
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The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U. S. C. §217 for en-
forcement of the overtime and record-keeping requirements 
of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action, 
Joseph Garcia and several other SAMTA employees brought 
suit against SAMTA in the District Court for overtime pay 
under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil Action No. SA 
79 CA 458. The District Court stayed that action pending 
the outcome of this suit but allowed Garcia to intervene in the 
present litigation as a defendant in support of the Secretary. 
One month after SAMTA brought suit, the Department of 
Labor formally amended its FLSA interpretive regulations 
to provide that publicly owned local mass-transit systems are 
not entitled to immunity under National League of Cities. 
44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979), codified at 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) 
(1983). 
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted a mo-
tion for summary judgment by SAMTA and denied a cross-
motion for partial summary judgment by the Secretary and 
Garcia. Without further explanation, the District Court 
held that "local mass transit systems (including [SAMTA]) 
constitute integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions" under National League of Cities. Juris. 
Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia 
appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. Dur-
ing the pendency of those appeals, we held in Transportation 
Union v. Long IslandR. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), that com-
muter rail service provided by the state-owned Long Island 
Rail Road did not constitute a "traditional governmental 
function" and hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, 
under National League of Cities, from the requirements of 
the Railway Labor Act. We accordingly vacated the Dis-
trict Court's judgment in the present cases and remanded for 
further consideration in light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102 
(1982). 
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view 
and again entered judgment for SAMTA. San Antonio Met-
"· 
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ropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 
(1983). The court looked first to the "historical reality" of 
state involvement in mass transit. It recognized that States 
historically had not owned and operated mass-transit sys-
tems, but concluded that they had engaged in a longstanding 
pattern of public regulation and that this regulatory tradition 
gave rise to an "inference of sovereignty." !d., at 447-448. 
The court next looked to the record of federal involvement in 
the field and concluded that constitutional immunity would 
not result in an erosion of federal authority with respect 
to state-owned mass-transit systems, because many federal 
statutes themselves contain exemptions for States and thus 
made the withdrawal of federal regulatory power over public 
mass-transit systems a supervening federal policy. Id., at 
448-450. Although the Federal Government's authority 
over employee wages under the FLSA obviously would be 
eroded, Congress had not asserted any interest in the wages 
of public mass-transit employees until1966 and hence had not 
established a longstanding federal interest in the field, in con-
trast to the century-old federal regulatory presence in the 
railroad industry found significant in Long Island. Finally, 
the court compared mass transit to the list of functions identi-
fied as constitutionally immune in National League of Cities 
and concluded that it did not differ from those functions in 
any material respect. The court stated: "If transit is to be 
distinguished from the exempt [National League of Cities] 
functions it will have to be by identifying a traditional state 
function in the same way pornography is sometimes identi-
fied: someone knows it when they see it, but they can't de-
scribe it." 557 F. Supp., at 453. 4 
• The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the 
four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F. 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to: 
(1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made 
available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public 
service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is particularly well 
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The Secretary and Garcia again appealed from the District 
Court's judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
U. S. -- (1983), and we now reverse. 
II 
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from 
regulation under the FLSA merely because it is a local tran-
sit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity. 
SAMTA's operations may well be characterized as "local" in a 
practical sense. Nonetheless, it long has been settled that 
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to 
all intrastate economic activities that affect interstate com-
merce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 
312 U. S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a privately owned and 
operated enterprise, it could not credibly argue that Con-
gress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause powers in 
setting minimum wages and overtime rates for SAMTA's em-
ployees. Any constitutional exemption from the require-
ments of the FLSA therefore must rest on SAMTA's status 
as a governmental entity rather than on the "local" nature of 
its operations. 
The prerequisites for the governmental immunity recog-
nized in National League of Cities were summarized by the 
Court in Hodel, supra. Under the test there set forth, four 
conditions must obtain before a state activity may be deemed 
immune from a particular federal regulation under the Com-
merce Clause. First, the federal statute at issue must regu-
late "the 'States as States.'" Second, the statute must "ad-
dress matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state 
sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the federal ob-
ligation must "directly impair [the State's] ability 'to struc-
suited to perfonn it because of a community-wide need; and (4) whether 
government is its principal provider. !d., at 1037. 
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ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions.' " Finally, the relation of state and federal inter-
ests must not be such that "the nature of the federal interest 
... justifies state submission." 452 U. S., at 287-288 and 
n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845, 
852, 854. 
The controversy in these cases has focused on the third 
Hodel requirement-that the challenged federal statute 
trench on "traditional governmental functions." The Dis-
trict Court voiced a common concern when it stated that 
"identifying which particular state functions are immune 
[under this standard] remains difficult." 557 F. Supp., at 
44 7. Just how difficult the task has been is reflected in the 
efforts of other federal courts. Thus, courts have held that 
regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v. 
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo. 
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CA8 1983), 
cert. pending, No. 83-183; licensing automobile drivers, 
United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978); 
operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid 
waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 
654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA6 1981); and operating a highway au-
thority, Malina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority, 
680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CAl 1982), are protected functions 
under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts 
have held that issuance of industrial development bonds, 
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc., 
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intra-
state natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. 
FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff'd, 661 F. 
2d 832 (CAlO 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC, 
457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads, 
Friends ofthe Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation, 
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 644 F. 2d 
I • 
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1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system, 
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CAl 
1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. v. 
FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Lou-
isiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental 
health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, 
Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 
976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the 
aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and 
Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA91983), are not en-
titled to immunity. It is difficult to identify an organizing 
principle that places each of the cases in the first group on 
one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group on 
the other side; the constitutional distinction between licens-
ing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or between 
operating a highway authority and operating a mental health 
facility, is elusive at best. 
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defin-
ing the scope of the governmental functions protected under 
National League of Cities. In that case the Court set forth 
examples of protected and unprotected functions, see 426 
U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how 
those examples were identified. The only other case in 
which the Court has had occasion to address the problem is 
Long Island. 5 We recognized there that "[t]he determina-
tion of whether a federal law impairs a state's authority with 
respect to 'areas of traditional [state] functions' may at times 
be a difficult one." 455 U. S., at 684, quoting National 
League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of that 
statement is demonstrated by this Court's own difficulties in 
Long Island in developing a workable standard for "tradi-
5 See also, however, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 460 U. S. -, -, n. 6 (1983) (slip op. 3, n. 6); FERC v. 
Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 781 and n. 7 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542, 558 and n. 2 (1975) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
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tiona! governmental functions." We relied in large part 
there on "the historical reality that the operation of railroads 
is not among the functions traditionally performed by state 
and local governments," but we simultaneously disavowed "a 
static historical view of state functions generally immune 
from federal regulation." 455 U. S., at 686 (first emphasis 
added; second emphasis in original). We held that the in-
quiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature was 
merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at 
issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id., at 
686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes 
one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function 
not. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the his-
torical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area, we 
nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the extended 
historical record of federal involvement in the field of rail 
transportation. I d., at 687-689. 
Many constitutional standards involve "undoubte[d] ... 
gray areas," Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558 (1975) 
(REHNQUIST, J., dissenting), and, despite the difficulties that 
this Court and other courts have encountered so far, it nor-
mally might be fair to venture the assumption that case-by-
case development by this Court would lead to a workable 
standard for determining whether a particular governmental 
function should be immune from federal regulation under the 
Commerce Clause. A further cautionary note is sounded, 
however, by the Court's experience in the related field of 
state immunity from federal taxation. In South Carolina v. 
United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905), the Court held for the 
first time that the state tax immunity recognized in Collector 
v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1870), extended only to the "ordinary" 
and "strictly governmental" instrumentalities of state gov-
ernments and not to instrumentalities "used by the State in 
the carrying on of an ordinary private business." 199 U. S., 
at 451, 461. While the Court applied the distinction outlined 
in South Carolina for the next succeeding 40 years, at no 
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time during that period did the Court develop a consistent 
formulation of the kinds of governmental functions that were 
entitled to immunity. The Court identified the protected 
functions at various times as "essential," "usual," "tradi-
tional," or "strictly governmental" ones. 6 While "these dif-
ferences in phraseology . . . must not be too literally contra-
distinguished," Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 
(1937), they reflect an inability to specify precisely what as-
pects of a governmental function made it necessary to the 
"unimpaired existence" of the the States. Collector v. Day, 
11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the Court ultimately chose "not, 
by an attempt to formulate any general test, [to] risk embar-
rassing the decision in cases [concerning] activities of a differ-
ent kind which may arise in the future." Brush, 300 U. S., 
at 365. 
If these tax immunity cases did have a common thread, it 
was an attempt to distinguish between "governmental" and 
"proprietary" functions. 7 To say that the distinction be-
a See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172 (1911) ("essential"); 
Helvering v. Therrell , 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. Pow-
ers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) ("usual"); United States v. California, 297 
U. S. 175, 185 (1936) ("activities in which the states have traditionally 
engaged"); South Carolina v. United States , 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905) 
("strictly governmental"). 
7 In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of "strictly govern-
mental" functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to 
a state-owned liquor distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated: 
"The true distinction is between . . . those operations of the States essen-
tial to the execution of its [sic] governmental functions, and which the 
State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private charac-
ter"; under this standard, "[i]t is no part of the essential governmental 
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial 
light, water and the like." 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292 
U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monop-
oly, the Court stated that "the business of buying and selling commodities 
.. . is not the performance of a governmental function," and that "[ w ]hen a 
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi 
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at 
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." I d., at 
82-1913 & 82-1951-0PINION 
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO TRANSIT AUTHORITY 13 
tween "governmental" and "proprietary'' functions proved to 
be unstable, however, would be something of an understate-
ment. In 1911, for example, the Court declared that the 
provision of municipal water supplies "is no part of the essen-
tial governmental functions of a state." Flint v. Stone Tracy 
Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without 
any intervening change in the applicable legal standards, the 
Court simply rejected its earlier position and decided that the 
provision of municipal water supplies was immune from fed-
eral taxation as an essential governmental function, even 
though municipal water works long had been operated for a 
profit by private industry. Brush, 300 U. S., at 370-373. 
At the same time that the Court was holding municipal water 
supplies to be immune from federal taxes, it had, in turn, 
held that a state-run commuter rail system was not immune. 
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). As Justice Black 
was moved to observe in H elvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 
405 (1938), "[a]n implied constitutional distinction which 
taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transportation 
system and exempts income of the manager of a municipal 
water works system manifests the uncertainty created by the 
'essential' and 'non-essential' test." Id., at 427 (concurring 
opinion). It was this uncertainty and instability that led the 
Court shortly thereafter, in New York v. United States, 326 
U. S. 572 (1946), to conclude unanimously that the distinction 
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions was 
"untenable" and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (Frank-
furter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, C. J., 
369. In Helvering v. Powers, supra, the Court upheld the application of 
the federal income tax to the income of trustees of a state-operated com-
muter railroad; the Court reiterated that "the State cannot withdraw 
sources of revenue from the federal taxing power by engaging in busi-
nesses which constitute a departure from the usual governmental functions 
and to which, by reason of their nature, the federal taxing power normally 
would extend," regardless of the fact that the proprietary enterprises "are 
undertaken for what the State conceives to be the public benefit." 293 
U. S., at 225. Accord, Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938). 
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joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring); id., at 
590-596 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting). See 
also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457, and 
n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, 
101 (1946). 
Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary 
distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine, 
moreover, the Court never explained the constitutional basis 
for the distinction. The Court expressed its concern in 
South Carolina that unlimited state immunity from federal 
taxation would allow the States to undermine the Federal 
Government's tax base by expanding into previously private 
sectors of the economy. See 199 U. S., at 454-455.8 The 
need to reconcile state and federal interests obviously de-
manded that state immunity have some limiting principle, 
but the Court did not try to justify the particular principle 
that it chose; it simply concluded that a "line [must] be 
drawn," 199 U. S., at 456, and proceeded to draw one. The 
Court's elaborations in subsequent cases, like the assertion in 
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 (1934), that "[w]hen a 
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests it-
self of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto," sound more of ipse 
dixit than reasoned explanation. This inability to give prin-
cipled content to the distinction between "governmental" and 
"proprietary" functions, no less significantly than the un-
workability of the distinction, led the Court to abandon the 
distinction with such alacrity in New York v. United States. 
We see no reason to believe that a distinction which the 
Court discarded as unworkable in the field of tax immunity 
can prove fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under 
the Commerce Clause. Neither do any of the alternative 
standards that might be employed to distinguish between 
8 That concern was especially vivid in South Carolina because liquor 
taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over one-
fourth of the Federal Government's revenues. See New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion). 
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protected and unprotected governmental functions appear 
manageable. We rejected the possibility of making immu-
nity turn on a purely historical standard of "tradition" in 
Long Island, and properly so. The most obvious defect of a 
historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents 
courts from accommodating changes in the historical func-
tions of States, changes that have resulted in a number of 
once-private functions like education being assumed by the 
States and their subdivisions. 9 At the same time, the only 
apparent virtue of a rigorous historical standard, its promise 
of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illu-
sory. Reliance on history as an organizing principle results 
in linedrawing of the most arbitrary sort; the genesis of state 
governmental functions stretches over a historical continuum 
from before the Revolution to the present, and courts would 
have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a pattern of 
state involvement had to be for federal regulatory authority 
to lapse. 10 
9 Indeed, the ''traditional" nature of a particular governmental function 
can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently "tradi-
tional" function is often yesterday's suspect innovation. Thus, National 
League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an 
example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S., at 851. A 
scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 
282 (1892), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been 
provided for grazing domestic animals rather than for recreation and that 
"[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private property 
[by eminent domain] for a public park ... would have been regarded as a 
novel exercise of legislative power." !d., at 297. 
1° For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of fed-
eral involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate stand-
ard for state immunity. Most of the Federal Government's current regu-
latory activity originated less than 50 years ago with the New Deal, and a 
good portion of it has developed within the past two decades. The recent 
vintage of this regulatory activity does not diminish the strength of the fed-
eral interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it 
affect the strength of the States' interest in being free from federal super-
vision. Although the Court's intergovernmental tax immunity decisions 
ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation 
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N onhistorical standards for selecting immune govern-
mental functions are likely to be just as unworkable as a his-
torical standard is. The goal of identifying "uniquely" gov-
ernmental functions, for example, has been rejected by the 
Court in the field of government tort liability in part because 
the notion of a "uniquely" governmental function is unman-
ageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 
61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Another possibility would be to confine immunity to "neces-
sary'' governmental services-that is, services that would be 
provided inadequately or not at all unless the government 
provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S., at 
172. The set of services that fit into this category, however, 
may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated market 
produces less of some service than a State deems desirable 
does not mean that the State itself must provide the service; 
in most if not all cases, the State can "contract out" by hiring 
private firms to provide the service or simply by providing 
subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to question 
how well equipped courts are to make this kind of determina-
tion about the workings of economic markets. 
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental 
problem at work here, a problem that explains why the 
Court was never able to provide a basis for the govern-
mental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmental tax 
immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar distinc-
because those activities "ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing] 
power from the beginning," New York v. United States, 326 U. S., at 588 
(Stone, C. J., concurring in the judgment), the Court has not in fact re-
quired federal taxes to have long historical records in order to be effective. 
The income tax at issue in Powers took effect less than a decade before the 
tax years for which it was challenged, while the federal tax whose applica-
tion was upheld in New York v. United States took effect in 1932 and was 
rescinded less than two years later. See Helvering v. Powers , 293 U. S., 
at 222; Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity-
A Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J . 3, 34, n. 116 (1950). 
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tions with respect to federal regulatory authority under N a-
tional League of Cities is unlikely to succeed regardless of 
how the distinctions are couched. The problem is that nei-
ther the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other 
that purports to separate important governmental functions 
from other ones can be faithful to the role of federalism in a 
democratic society. The essence of our federal system is 
that within the realm of authority left open to them under the 
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in 
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, 
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else--in-
cluding the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any 
rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "inte-
gral," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions inev-
itably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. 
"The science of government . . . is the science of experi-
ment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and the 
States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic 
experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an 
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citi-
zenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a differ-
ent society left in private hands. In the words of Justice 
Black: 
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging 
line of demarcation between essential and non-essential 
governmental functions. Many governmental functions 
of today have at some time in the past been non-govern-
mental. The genius of our government provides that, 
within the sphere of constitutional action, the people--
acting not through the courts but through their elected 
legislative representatives-have the power to deter-
mine as conditions demand, what services and functions 
the public welfare requires." H elvering v. Gerhardt, 
304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion). 
. ' 
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We therefore reject, as unsound in principle and unwork-
able in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal regula-
tion that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular 
governmental function is "integral" or "traditional." Any 
such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time that 
it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it 
breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from 
those principles. If there are to be limits on the immunity of 
state governments from federal regulation under the Com-
merce Clause, and limits there must be, we must look else-
where to find them. We accordingly return to the underly-
ing issue that confronted this Court in National League 
of Cities-the manner in which the Constitution insulates 
States from the reach of Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause. 
III 
The central principle of National League of Cities is that 
the States occupy a special position in our constitutional sys-
tem and that the scope of Congress' authority under the 
Commerce Clause must reflect that position. It is true that 
the Commerce Clause by its terms does not provide any spe-
cial limitation on Congress' actions with respect to the 
States. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. -,- (1983) 
(STEVENS, J., concurring) (slip op. 5). It is equally true, 
however, that the text of the Constitution can be no more 
than the beginning of an inquiry into questions of federalism, 
for "[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are 
postulates which limit and control." Monaco v. Mississippi, 
292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National League of Cities reflects 
the general conviction that in order to be faithful to the un-
derlying federal premises of the Constitution, courts must 
look for the "postulates which limit and control." 
What has proved problematic is not the idea that the Con-
stitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the Com-
merce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those 
limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Con-
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gress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce 
Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political 
sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States' "sepa-
rate and independent existence." Lane County v. Oregon, 7 
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach underlies the Court's use 
of the "traditional governmental function" concept in N a-
tional League of Cities. It also has led to the separate re-
quirement that the challenged federal statute "address mat-
ters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty.'" 
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National League of Cities, 
426 U. S., at 845. In National League of Cities itself, for 
example, the Court concluded that decisions by a State con-
cerning the wages and hours of its employees are an "un-
doubted attribute of state sovereignty." 426 U. S., at 845. 
The opinion did not explain what aspects of such decisions 
made them an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty," 
and the Court since has remarked on the uncertain scope 
of the concept, see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. · S., at--, 
n. 11 (slip op. 10, n. 11), but the point of the inquiry has re-
mained to single out particular features of a State's internal 
governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state 
sovereignty. 
We have come to doubt, however, that courts ultimately 
can identify principled constitutional limitations on the scope 
of Congress' Commerce Clause powers ov~r the States by re-
lying on a priori definitions of state sovereignty. In part, 
this is because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for 
"fundamental" elements of state sovereignty, a problem that 
we have witnessed in the search for "traditional govern-
mental functions." There is, however, a more fundamental 
reason: the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Con-
stitution itself. A variety of sovereign powers, for example, 
are withdrawn from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 
of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of 
state sovereignty, quite apart from whatever authority it 
may confer on Congress to regulate the "States as States," 
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by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legisla-
tive powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause 
of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. See 
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review 
of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails 
the sovereign power of the state judiciaries to make authori-
tative determinations of law. See Martin v. Hunter's Les-
see, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application 
of the greater part of the Bill of Rights to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment limits the sovereign authority 
that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect 
to their citizens and conduct their own affairs. 
The States unquestionably "retai[n] ... a significant meas-
ure of sovereign authority." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., 
at -- (POWELL, J., dissenting) (slip op. 5). They do so, 
however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not di-
vested them of their original powers and transferred those 
powers to the Federal Government. In the words of James 
Madison to the members of the first Congress: "Interference 
with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of 
the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Con-
gress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, 
although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Con-
stitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791). 
Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense 
of state autonomy in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 
U. S. 368 (1893), a defense quoted with approval in Erie R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78-79 (1938): 
"[T]he Constitution of the United States ... recog-
nizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of 
the States-independence in their legislative and inde-
pendence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [s]u-
pervision over either the legislative or the judicial action 
of the States is in no case permissible except as to mat-
ters by the Constitution specifically authorized or dele-
gated to the United States. Any interference with 
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either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the au-
thority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its 
independence." 149 U. S., at 401 (dissenting opinion) 
(emphasis added). 
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the con-
tinued role of the States is to say little about the nature of 
that role. Only last Term, this Court recognized that the 
purpose of the constitutional immunity recognized in N a-
tional League of Cities is not to preserve "a sacred province 
of state autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at--
(slip op. 9). With rare exceptions, like the guarantee of 
state territorial integrity in Article IV, § 3, the Constitution 
does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that 
Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace. 
As James Wilson reminded the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention in 1787, "although it presupposes the existence of 
state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose 
them to be the sole power to be respected." 2 Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power 
of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as 
well, cf. National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 856 (concur-
ring opinion), and the fact that the States remain sovereign 
with respect to all powers not vested in Congress or denied 
them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the 
frontier between state and federal power is to be drawn. In 
short, we have no license to employ freestanding conceptions 
of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause. 
When we look for the States' "residuary and inviolable sov-
ereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. Wright ed. 1961) 
(J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather 
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different 
measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limi-
tation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature 
of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by 
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the Framers to ensure the role of the "States as States" in 
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Gov-
ernment itself. It is no novelty to observe that the compo-
sition of the Federal Government was designed in large part 
to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. 11 The 
Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of 
the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal 
Government. The States were vested with indirect influ-
ence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency 
by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in 
presidential elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, and Art. II, 
§ 1. They were given more direct influence in the Senate, 
where each State received equal representation and each 
Senator was to be selected by the legislators of his State. 
Art. I, § 3. The significance attached to the States' equal 
representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohi-
bition on any constitutional amendment divesting a State of 
equal representation without the State's consent. Art. V. 
The extent to which the structure of the Federal Govern-
ment itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the 
States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madi-
son explained that the Federal Government "will partake suf-
ficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to in-
vade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives 
of their governments." The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B. 
Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson argued that "it 
was a favorite object in the Convention" to provide for the 
security of the States against federal encroachment and that 
the structure of the Federal Government itself served that 
end. 2 Elliot 438-439. Madison placed particular reliance 
"See, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Proc-
ess 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents 
of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982). 
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on the equal representation of the States in the Senate, which 
he saw as "at once a constitutional recognition of the portion 
of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an in-
strument for preserving that residuary sovereignty." The 
Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). Accord, id., 
No. 43, p. 315 ("[T]he residuary sovereignty of the States [is] 
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one 
branch of the [federal] legislature") (emphasis added). See 
also M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In 
short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which 
special restraints on federal power over the "States as 
States" inhered principally in the workings of the National 
Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the 
objects of federal authority. 
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserv-
ing the States' interests is apparent even today in the course 
of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been 
able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues 
into their own treasuries in the form of general and program-
specific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and 
local governments is a longstanding one; Congress provided 
federal land grants to finance state governments from the be-
ginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded 
as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. 12 In the past quarter-
century alone, federal grants to States and localities have 
grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. 13 As a result, federal 
grants now account for roughly one-fifth of state and local 
12 See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovern-
mental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United 
States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in The Future of Fed-
eralism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981). 
13 A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 2 (1984) 
(Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Government Accounts and 
Reports, Fiscal Service-Bureau of Government Financial Operations, 
Dept. of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal Year 1982, p. 1 (1983 
rev. ed.). 
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government expenditures. 14 The States have obtained fed-
eral funding for such services as police and fire protection, 
education, public health and hospitals, parks and recreation, 
and sanitation. 15 At the same time that the States have ex-
ercised their influence to obtain federal support, moreover, 
they have been able to exempt themselves from a wide vari-
ety of obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce 
Clause. For example, the Federal Power Act, the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the 
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sher-
man Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States 
and their subdivisions. 16 The fact that some federal statutes 
like the FLSA do extend general obligations to the States 
cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of 
the States in the federal system has served to minimize the 
burdens that the States have had to bear under the Com-
merce Clause. 
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal 
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of 
which has been the substitution of popular election of Sena-
tors by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, 
and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the 
"Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant 
Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984). 
16 See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 15 
U. S. C. §§2201 et seq. ; the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Act of 
1978, 16 U. S. C. §§ 2501 et seq. ; the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965, 20 U. S. C. §§ 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 
U. S. C. §§ 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Service Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 201 
et seq. ; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 300f et seq.; the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3701 et seq.; 
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C. §§ 5301 
et seq.; and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 
42 U. S. C. §§ 5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Expenditures 2-15. 
16 See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29 
U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and Parker v. Brown, 
317 u. s. 341 (1943). 
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States in the federal political process. 17 Nonetheless, 
against this background, we remain convinced that the funda-
mental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes on 
the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one 
of process rather than one of result. Any additional substan-
tive restraints on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers 
must find their justification in the procedural nature of this 
basic limitation, and they must be tailored to compensate for 
possible failings in the national political process rather to dic-
tate a "sacred province of state autonomy," EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U.S., at- (slip op. 9). 
The only substantive restraint that satisfies these criteria, 
in our judgment, is a requirement that Congress not attempt 
to single out the States for special burdens or otherwise dis-
criminate against them. The constitutional mechanisms for 
safeguarding the role of the States are unlikely to be at risk 
when Congress proceeds by uniform legislation that places 
burdens evenhandedly on States and private parties alike, for 
the outcome will reflect not only the States' own interests but 
the interests of all those who are similarly situated. In those 
circumstances, the structural features of the Constitution de-
signed to protect the States can be trusted to have served 
their purpose. The federal political process is unlikely to 
produce regulatory schemes that frustrate or obstruct state 
functions as long as those functions are shared by private 
parties as well and as long as Congress does not single out 
the States for regulatory burdens. We therefore hold that 
the implicit substantive limitations on congressional regula-
tion of the States under the Commerce Clause demand no 
more than that the statute at issue be a nondiscriminatory 
one. In allowing States to be subjected to nondiscriminatory 
federal legislation, it must be noted, we are not treating the 
constitutionality of such legislation as a nonjusticiable ques-
17 See, e. g., J. Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and 
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868 
(1979). 
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tion to be remitted to other branches of government. 18 In-
stead, we are holding that such legislation is constitutional-
that the restrictions on Commerce Clause power that inhere 
in the structure of the Constitution are not transgressed by 
statutes that accord equal treatment to States and similarly 
situated private parties. 19 
The idea that concerns about discrimination should form 
the linchpin of intergovernmental immunity doctrine is not, 
of course, a new one in this Court. The Court's first inter-
governmental-immunity decision, M'Cullogh v. Maryland, 
supra, rested in large part on concerns about discrimination. 
In striking down as unconstitutional a Maryland tax on unli-
censed banks that singled out the Bank of the United States, 
Chief Justice Marshall was careful to add that the prohibition 
on state taxation of federal instrumentalities "does not ex-
tend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in com-
mon with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax 
imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may 
hold in this institution, in common with other property of the 
same description throughout the State." 4 Wheat., at 436 
(emphasis added). The Court subsequently has observed 
that M'Cullogh "'could and perhaps should'" be read "'sim-
ply for the principle that the Constitution prohibits a State 
from taxing discriminatorily a federally established instru-
mentality."' United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720, 
733 (1982), quoting First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 392 U. S. 339, 350 (1968) (dissenting opinion). 
18 Cf. National League of Cities, 426 U.S., at 841-842, n. 12; New York 
v. United States , 326 U. S. 572, 581-582 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., joined by 
Rutledge, J.); J. Choper, supra, at 220-222; Matsumoto, National League 
of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce 
Clause Regulation, 1977 Ariz. State L. J . 35, 40-42. 
19 There thus is no inconsistency between the substantive rule of con-
stitutional immunity that we announce today and the intent of the Framers 
that this Court resolve "controversies relating to the boundary between 
the [state and federal] jurisdictions." The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. 
Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
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Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge advocated a discrimina-
tion-based standard for state immunity from federal taxation 
in New York v. United States, supra; they would have found 
"no restriction upon Congress to include the States in levying 
a tax exacted equally from private persons upon the same 
subject matter." 326 U. S., at 584. 
We recognize that a majority of the Court rejected Justice 
Frankfurter's approach to tax immunity doctrine in New 
York v. United States. See id., at 587-588 (Stone, C. J., 
joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment); id., at 592 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dis-
senting). More important for present purposes, we recog-
nize that the Court rejected the same standard with respect 
to regulatory immunity in National League of Cities. See 
426 U. S., at 843. While we adhere to National League of 
Cities' premise that the Commerce Clause is subject to spe-
cial limitations when Congress seeks to regulate the "States 
as States," we cannot accept its specific formulation of the 
rule of state immunity to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with the principles we announce today. Federal regulation 
that is otherwise within Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause may extend to state functions as long as it ap-
plies uniformly to private as well as public activities and does 
not discriminate against the States and their subdivisions. 20 
When these principles are applied here, the outcome is 
clear. Nothing in the statutory scheme of the FLSA dis-
criminates against SAMTA or any other municipally oper-
20 We should not be understood to suggest that every statute that does 
single out the States for special obligations is unconstitutional ipso facto. 
For example, Congress' undisputed authority to pre-empt state regulation 
of private activities entails the additional authority to forgo pre-emption 
and to require instead that States consider specified federal interests in 
regulating the same conduct, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 
763-768, and nn. 29-30 (1982), even though the exercise of the latter au-
thority requires Congress to address its commands to the States alone. 
We have no occasion now to consider under what other circumstances non-
uniform federal legislation might be constitutionally permissible. 
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ated mass-transit system. Instead, SAMTA faces the same 
minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of 
thousands of other employers, private as well as public, must 
meet. Indeed, as the Court noted inN ational League of Cit-
ies, 426 U. S., at 839, Congress incorporated special provi-
sions concerning overtime pay for police and firefighting per-
sonnel when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take 
account of the special concerns of States and localities with 
respect to these positions. See 29 U. S. C. § 207(k). Con-
gress also declined to impose any obligations on state and 
local governments with respect to policymaking personnel 
who are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C. 
§ 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and (ii). 21 
In this case, the status of public mass transit simply under-
scores the extent to which the structural protections of the 
Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed bur-
dens. While Congress first subjected state mass-transit sys-
tems to FLSA obligations in 1966 and expanded those obliga-
21 The only respect in which the FLSA might discriminate against public 
employers involves the statute's overtime requirements for employees cov-
ered by collective-bargaining agreements. Under 29 U. S. C. §§ 207(b)(l) 
and (2), an employee may be required to work more than 40 hours in a par-
ticular week without accruing overtime compensation if his total number of 
working hours over a 26-week or 52-week period fall within specified limits 
"in pursuance of an agreement ... made as a result of collective bargaining 
by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National 
Labor Relations Board." Because the National Labor Relations Act does 
not provide coverage for state and local government employees, see 29 
U. S. C. § 152(2), the National Labor Relations Board might not have ju-
risdiction to provide the necessary certification with respect to a public 
employer who otherwise qualified under§§ 207(b)(l) or (2). At most, how-
ever, the discrimination-based standard on which we rely today would pro-
hibit the application of the National Labor Relation Board certification 
requirement to public employers; the general overtime provisions of the 
National Labor Relations Act, which apply equally to public and private 
employers, would not be affected. If SAMTA could avail itself of the col-
lective-bargaining provisions of§ 207 but for the lack of National Labor Re-
lations Board certification, a matter that the record before us does not dis-
close, SAMTA is free to pursue the issue on remand. 
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tions in 1974, it simultaneously provided extensive funding 
for state and local mass transit through UMTA. In the two 
decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided over $22 
billion in mass transit aid to States and localities. 22 In 1983 
alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. 23 As noted 
above, SAMTA and its predecessor have received a substan-
tial amount of UMTA funding, including over $12 million dur-
ing SAMTA's first two fiscal years alone. In short, Con-
gress has not simply placed a financial burden on the 
shoulders of States and localities that operate mass-transit 
systems, but has provided substantial countervailing finan-
cial assistance as well-assistance that may leave individual 
mass transit systems better off than they would have been 
had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Congress' 
treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction 
that the national political process will systematically protect 
States from the risk of having their functions handicapped by 
Commerce Clause regulation. 24 
IV 
Today we reaffirm the fundamental premise of National 
League of Cities that Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause must accommodate the special role of the 
States in the federal system. We hold, however, that the 
necessary accommodation between federal power and state 
autonomy is realized when Congress places no burden on the 
States that it has not placed on private parties as well. For 
22 See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions for 1983: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years 
1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983). 
23 Census, Federal Expenditures 15. 
24 Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that nondiscrimina-
tory regulation under the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by coun-
tervailing financial benefits under the Spending Clause. The application 
of the FLSA to SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not 
provided federal funding under UMTA. 
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that reason, the judgment of the District Court is reversed 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 
(1976) , this Court held that the Commerce Clause does not 
empower Congress to enforce the minimum-wage and over-
time provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 
against States "in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions." I d., at 852. Although National League of Cities 
provided examples of "traditional governmental functions," it 
did not offer a more general explanation of how "traditional" 
functions were to be distinguished from "nontraditional" 
ones. Since then, federal and state courts have devoted con-
siderable effort to the task of identifying traditional functions 
for purposes of state immunity under the Commerce Clause. 
In this case, a Federal District Court concluded that munici-
pal ownership and operation of a mass-transit system is a tra-
ditional governmental function and hence is exempt from the 
obligations of the FLSA under National League of Cities. 
Faced with the identical question, three Federal Courts of 
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Appeals and one state appellate court have reached a con-
trary conclusion. 1 
A review of the operation of the "traditional governmental 
function" standard in this and other cases now persuades us 
that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory 
immunity in terms of "traditional governmental functions" is 
both1Unworkable t\and 'tnconsistent with the principles of fed-
eralism "~m which National League of Cities rests. For the 
reasons given below, we conclude instead that the prereq-
uisite for state immunity from Commerce Clause regulation 
must be a federal statutory scheme that singles out the 
States for unequal regulatory burdens. Because the FLSA 
imposes miiiilliUrn-wage and overtime obligations evenhand-
edly on private as well as public employers, we hold today 
that its application to municipal mass-transit systems like 
that operated by appellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority (SAMTA) is within the power delegated to Con-
gress by the Commerce Clause. 
I 
SAMTA provides public transportation for the metropoli-
tan area of San Antonio, Tex. The history of public trans-
portation in San Antonio is characteristic of the history of 
local mass transit in the United States generally. Passenger 
transportation for hire within San Antonio originally was pro-
Vl~de n a private basis by local transportation companies. 
I 91 the Texas Legislature authorized the State's munici-
pa 1 1es to reguia.te vehicles J?roviding carriag_e jor hire. 
19~en. Laws, ch. 147, § 4, ~ 12, codified as amended 
at Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon 
1963). Two years later, n Ant enacted an ordinance 
1 Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority, 701 F. 
2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council , 699 F. 2d 1060 (CAll 1983), 
cert. pending, Nos. 82- 1974 and 83-257; Kramerv. New Castle Area Tran-
sit Authority, 677 F . 2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1146 
(1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982). 
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setting forth franchising, insurance, and safety requirements 
for pas·senger vehicles operated for hire. The city relied on 
publicly regulated private mass transit until 1959, when it 
purchased the privately owned San Antonio Transit Com-
pany and transformed it into a public authority called the San 
Antonio Transit System (SATS). SATS continued in opera-
tion until 1978, when San Antonio transferred its facilities 
and equipment to SAMTA, a public mass-transit authority 
organized on a countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev. 
Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA 
currently is a major source of transportation in the San Anto-
nio metropolitan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehi-
cles covered over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 
million passengers. 
Like other cities, San Antonio has come to look to the Fed-
eral Government for financial assistance in maintaining public 
mass transit. SATS managed to meet its operating ex-
penses and bond obligations without federal or local financial 
aid for the first decade of its existence. By 1970, however, 
its financial position had deteriorated to the point where 
federal subsidies became vital to its continued operation. 
SATS' general manager testified before Congress that year 
that "if we do not receive substantial help from the Federal 
Government, San Antonio may ... join the growing ranks of 
cities that have inferior [public] transportation or may end up 
with no [public] transportation at all." 2 
The principal federal program to which SATS and other 
mass transit systems looked for relief was the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964 (UMTA), 78 Stat. 302, as 
amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 1601 et seq., which provides sub-
stantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit programs. 
See generally Jackson Transit Authority v. Transit Union, 
457 U. S. 15 (1982). As amended, UMTA authorizes the De-
' Urban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. Before the 
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill). 
.. 
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partment of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the capital 
outlays and up to 50 percent of the operating expenses of 
qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49 
U. S. C. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its first 
UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in December 
1970. Between December 1970 and February 1980, SATS 
and SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants-
more than $31 million in capital grants, over $20 million in op-
erating assistance, and a minor amount in technical assist-
ance. During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, it received 
$12.5 million in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from 
sales taxes, and only $10.1 million in fares. Federal subsi-
dies and local sales taxes currently account for roughly 75 
percent of SAMTA's operating expenses. 
The present controversy concerns the extent to which 
SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and over-
time requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was en-
acted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions dianht cover 
eitner local mass-transit employees or employees of state and 
local governments. Pub. L. No. 75-718, §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52 
Stat. 1060, 1067 (1938). In 1961, Congress extended mini-
mum-wage coverage to employees of all ~ mass-transit 
carriers whose annual gross revenues were not less than 
$1,000,000. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, 
Pub. L. No. 87-30, §§2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 66, 72-73. Five years 
later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state and local 
government employees for the first time by withdrawing the 
minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from public hospi-
tals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose rates and serv-
ices were subjec ate regulation. Fair Labor Standards 
Amendments f 1966 ub. L. No. 89-601, §§ 102(a) and (b), 
80 Stat. 831. the same time, Congress eliminated the 
overtime exemption for all mass-transit employees other 
than drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat. 
836. The application of the FLSA to public schools and hos-
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pitals was held to be within Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). 
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like 
SATS were expanded in 1974 when Congress provided for 
the progressive repeal of the surviving overtime exemption 
for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Con-
gress simultaneously brought the States and their subdi-
visions farther within the a 1t o e LSA b extending 
FLSKCoverage to virtually all state an 1 cal government 
employees. § 6 a)(l) an a) , 88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 . . C. 
'--"~ 
§§ 203(d) and (x). SATS complied with the FLSA's overtime 
requirements until 1976, when this Court overruled Mary-
land v. Wirtz in National League~ that the 
FLSA could not be applied constitutionally to the "traditional 
governmental functions" of state and local governments. 
Four months after National League of Cities was handed 
down, SATS informed its employees that the decision re-
lieved SATS of its overtime obligations under the FLSA. 3 
Matters rested there until1979, when the Wage and Hour 
Administration of the Department of Labor issued an opinion 
that SAMTA's operations "are not constitutionally immune 
from the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act" under 
National League of Cities. Opinion WH-499, 6 Labor Rel. 
Rep. (BNA) 91:1138 (Sept. 17, 1979). On November 21, 
1979, SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor 
in the United States District Court for the Western District 
of Texas. SAMTA sought a declaratory judgment that, con-
trary to the Wage and Hour Administration's determination, 
National League of Cities precluded the application of the 
FLSA's overtime requirements to SAMTA's operations. 
8 Evidently, neither SATS nor SAMTA has attempted to avoid the 
FLSA's minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage lev-
els in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the 
minimum wages set by the FLSA. See Brief for National League of Cities 
et al. as Amici Curiae 7-8. 
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The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U. S. C. §217 for en-
forcement of the overtime and record-keeping requirements 
of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action, 
Joseph Garcia and several other SAMTA employees brought 
suit against SAMTA in the District Court for overtime pay 
under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil Action No. SA 
79 CA 458. The District Court stayed that action pending 
the outcome of this suit but allowed Garcia to intervene in the 
present litigation as a defendant in support of the Secretary. 
One month after SAMTA brought suit, the Department of 
Labor formally amended its FLSA interpretive regulations 
to provide that publicly owned local mass-transit systems are 
not entitled to immunity under National League of Cities. 
44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979), codified at 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) 
(1983). 
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted a mo-
tion for summary judgment by SAMTA and denied a cross-
motion for partial summary judgment by the Secretary and 
Garcia. Without further explanation, the District Court 
held that "local mass transit systems (including [SAMTA]) 
constitute integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions" under National League of Cities. Juris. 
Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia 
appealed to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. Dur-
ing the pendency of those appeals, we held in Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), that com-
muter rail service provided by the state-owned Long Island 
Rail Road did not constitute a "traditional governmental 
function" and hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, 
under National League of Cities, from the requirements of 
the Railway Labor Act. We accordingly vacated the Dis-
trict Court's judgment in the present cases and remanded for 
further consideration in light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102 
(1982). 
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view 
and again entered judgment for SAMTA. San Antonio Met-
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ropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 
(1983). The court looked first to the "historical reality" of 
state involvement in mass transit. It ~zed that States 
historically had not owned and operated ~sys-
tElli!§, u concluded that the ad engaged in a lon standing 
pa~ and tha this regulatory tradition 
gave rise to an "Inference of sovereignty." I d., at 447-448. 
The court next looked to the record of federal involvement in 
the field and concluded that constitutional immunity would 
not result in an erosion of federal authority with respect 
to state-owned mass-transit systems, because many federal 
statutes themselves contain exemptions for States and thus 
make the withdrawal of federal regulatory power over public 
mass-transit systems a supervening federal policy. Id., at 
448-450. Although the Federal Government's authority 
over employee wages under the FLSA obviously would be 
eroded, Congress had not asserted any interest in the wages 
of public mass-transit employees until1966 and hence had not 
established a longstanding federal interest in the field, in con-
trast to the century-old federal regulatory presence in the 
railroad industry found significant in Long Island. Finally, 
the court compared mass transit to the list of functions identi-
fied as constitutionally immune in National League of Cities 
and concluded that it did not differ from those functions in 
any material respect. The court stated: "If transit is to be 
distinguished from the exempt [National League of Cities] 
functions it will have to be by identifying a traditional state 
function in the same way pornography is sometimes identi-
fied: someone knows it when they see it, but they can't de-
scribe it." 557 F. Supp., at 453. 4 
• The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the 
four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F. 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to: 
(1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made 
available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public 
service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is particularly well 
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The Secretary and Garcia again appealed from the District 
Court's judgment. We noted probable jurisdiction, 
U. S. -- (1983), and we now reverse. 
II 
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from 
regulation under the FLSA merely because it is a local tran-
sit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity. 
SAMTA's operations may well be characterized as "local" in a 
practical sense. Nonetheless, it long has been settled that 
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to 
all intrastate economic activities that affect interstate com-
merce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); Wickard v. 
Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States v. Darby, 
312 U. S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a privately owned and 
operated enterprise, it could not credibly argue that Con-
gress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause powers in 
setting minimum wages and overtime rates for SAMTA's em-
ployees. Any constitutional exemption from the require-
ments of the FLSA therefore must rest on SAMTA's status 
as a governmental entity rather than on the "local" nature of 
its operations. 
The prerequisites for the governmental immunity recog-
nized in National League of Cities were summarized by the 
Court in Hodel, supra. Under the test there set forth, four 
conditions must obtain before a state activity may be deemed 
immune from a particular federal regulation under the Com-
merce Clause. First, the federal statute at issue must regu-
late "the 'States as States.'" Second, the statute must "ad-
dress matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state 
sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the federal ob-
ligation must "directly impair [the State's] ability 'to struc-
suited to perform it because of a community-wide need; and (4) whether 
government is its principal provider. ld., at 1037. 
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ture integral operations in areas of traditional governmental 
functions."' Finally, the relation of state and federal inter-
ests must not be such that "the nature of the federal interest 
... justifies state submission." 452 U. S., at 287-288 and 
n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845, 
852, 854. 
The controversy in these cases has focused on the third 
Hodel requirement-that the challenged federal statute 
trench on "traditiona Ye mental functions." The Dis-
trict Court voiced a common concern when it stated that 
"identifying which particular state functions are immune 
[under this standard] remains difficult." 557 F. Supp., at 
44 7. Just how difficult the task has been is reflected in the 
efforts of other federal courts. Thus, courts have held that 
regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v. 
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo. 
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CAS 1983), 
cert. pending, No. 83-183; licensing automobile drivers, 
United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978); 
operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid 
waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 
654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA6 1981); and operating a highway au-
thority, Malina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority, 
680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CAl 1982), are protected functions 
under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts 
have held that issuance of industrial development bonds, 
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc., 
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intra-
state natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. 
FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff'd, 661 F. 
2d 832 (CAlO 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC, 
457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads, 
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation, 
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 644 F. 2d 
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1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system, 
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CAl 
1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. v. 
FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Lou-
isiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental 
health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, 
Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 
976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the 
aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and 
Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA9 1983), are not en-
titled to immunity. It is difficult to identify an organizing 
principle that places eacli of the cases in the first group on 
one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group on 
the other side; the constitutional distinction between licens-
ing drivers and regulating traffic, for example, or between 
operating a highway authority and operating a mental health 
facility, is elusive at best. 
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defin- l ~ 
ing the scope of the governmental functions protected under _ ~ 
National League of Cities. In that case the Court set forth M~ 
examples of protected and unprotected functions, see 426 /~ · - / · -
U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no explanation of how 
those examples were identified. The only other case in 
which the Court has had occasion to address the problem is 
Long Island. 5 We recognized there that "[t]he determina-
tion of whether a federal law impairs a state's authority with 
respect to 'areas of traditional [state] functions' may at times 
be a difficult one." 455 U. S., at 684, quoting National 
League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of that 
statement is demonstrated by this Court's own difficulties in 
Long Island in developing a workable standard for "tradi-
~
5 See also, however, Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 460 U. S. -, -, n. 6 (1983) (slip op. 3, n. 6); FERC v. 
Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 781 and n. 7 (1982) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542, 558 and n. 2 (1975) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). 
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tional governmental functions." We relied in large part 
there on "the historical reality that the operation of railroads 
is not among the functions traditionally performed by state 
and local governments," but we simultaneously disavowed "a 
static historical view of state functions generally immune 
from federal regulation." 455 U. S., at 686 (first emphasis 
added; second emphasis in original). We held that the in-
quiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature was 
merely a means of determining whether the federal statute at 
issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id., at 
686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes 
one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function 
not. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the his-
torical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area, we 
nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the extended 
historical record of federal involvement in the field of rail 
transportation. I d., at 687-689. 
Many constitutional standards involve "undoubte[d] ... 
gt:ay areas," Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. S42, 558' (1975) 
(R~HNQUIST, J., dissenting), and, despite the difficulties that 
this Court and other courts have encountered so far, it nor-
mally might be fair to venture the assumption that case-by-
case development by this Court would lead to a workable 
Stahcrnrd for determining whether a particular governmental 
function should be immune from federal regulation under the 
Commerce Clause. A further cautionary note is sounded, 
however, by the Court's experience in the related field of 
state immunity from federal taxation. In South Carolina v. 
United States, 199 U. S. 437 (1905), the Court held for the 
first time that the state tax immunity recognized in Collector 
v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (1870), extended only to the "ordinary" 
and "strictly governmental" instrumentalities of state gov-
ernments and not to instrumentalities "used by the State in 
the carrying on of an ordinary private business." 199 U. S., 
at 451, 461. While the Court applied the distinction outlined 
in South Carolina for the next succeeding 40 years, at no 
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time during that period did the Court develop a consistent 
formulation of the kinds of governmental functions that were 
entitled to immunity. The Court identified the protected 
functions at various times as "essential," "usual," "tradi-
tional," or "strictly governmental" ones. 6 While "these dif-
ferences in phraseology . . . must not be too literally contra-
distinguished," Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 
(1937), they reflect an inability to specify precisely what as-
pects of a governmental function made it necessary to the 
"unimpaired existence" of the the States. Collector v. Day, 
11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the Court ultimately chose "not, 
by an attempt to formulate any general test, [to] risk embar-
rassing the decision in cases [concerning] activities of a differ-
ent kind which may arise in the future." Brush, 300 U. S., 
at 365. 
If these tax immunity cases did have a common thread, it 
was an attempt to di.stingt!ish between "governmental" and 
"proprietary" functions. 7 To say that t~ dihinction be-
6See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911) ("essential"); 
Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. PCYW-
ers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) ("usual"); United States v. California, 297 
U. S. 175, 185 (1936) ("activities in which the states have traditionally 
engaged"); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905) 
("strictly governmental"). 
7 In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of "strictly govern-
mental" functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to 
a state-owned liquor-distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated: 
"The true distinction is between ... those operations of the States essen-
tial to the execution of its [sic] governmental functions, and which the 
State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private charac-
ter"; under this standard, "[i]t is no part of the essential governmental 
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial 
light, water and the like." 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292 
U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monop-
oly, the Court stated that "the business of buying and selling commodities 
. . . is not the performance of a governmental function," and that "[ w ]hen a 
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi 
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at 
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." I d., at 
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tween "governmental" and "proprietary'' functions proved to 
be unstable, however, would be something of an understate-
ment. In 1911, for example, the Court declared that the 
provision of municipal water supplies "is no part of the essen-
tial governmental functions of a state." Flint v. Stone Tracy 
Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without 
any intervening change in the applicable legal standards, the 
Court simply rejected its earlier position and decided that the 
provision of municipal water supplies was immune from fed-
eral taxation as an essential governmental function, even 
though municipal water works long had been operated for a 
profit by private industry. Brush, 300 U. S., at 370-373. 
At the same time that the Court was holding municipal water 
supplies to be immune from federal taxes, it had, in turn, 
held that a state-run commuter rail system was not immune. 
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). As Justice Black 
was moved to observe in H elvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 
405 (1938), "[a]n implied constitutional distinction which 
taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transportation 
system and exempts income of the manager of a municipal 
water works system manifests the uncertainty created by the 
'essential' and 'non-essential' test." Id., at 427 (concurring 
opinion). It was this uncertainty and instability that led the 
Court shortly thereafter, in New York v. United States, 326 
U. S. 572 (1946), to conclude unanimously that the distinction 
between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions was 
"untenable" and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (Frank-
furter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, C. J., 
369. In Helvering v. Powers, supra, the Court upheld the application of 
the federal income tax to the income of trustees of a state-operated com-
muter railroad; the Court reiterated that "the State cannot withdraw 
sources of revenue from the federal taxing power by engaging in busi-
nesses which constitute a departure from the usual governmental functions 
and to which, by reason of their nature, the federal taxing power normally 
would extend," regardless of the fact that the proprietary enterprises "are 
undertaken for what the State conceives to be the public benefit." 293 
U. S., at 225. Accord, Allen v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938). 
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joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring); id., at 
590-596 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting). See 
also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457 and 
n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, 
101 (1946). 
Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary 
distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine, 
moreover, the Court n explained the constitutional basis 
for the distinction. The Co expresse 1 s c cern in 
Soutn CaroT:i:na that unlimited state immunity from federal 
taxation would allow the States to undermine the Federal 
Government's tax base by expanding into previously private 
sectors of the economy. See 199 U. S., at 454-455.8 The 
need to reconcile state and federal interests obviously de-
manded that state immunity have some limiting principle, 
but the Court did not try to justify the particular principle 
that it chose; it simply concluded that a "line [must] be 
drawn," 199 U. S., at 456, and proceeded to draw one. The 
Court's elaborations in subsequent cases, like the assertion in 
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 (1934), that "[w]hen a 
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests it-
self of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto," sound more of ipse 
dixit than reasoned explanation. This inability to give prin-
cipled content to the distinction between "governmental" and 
"proprietary" functions, no less significantly than the un-
workability of the distinction, led the Court to abandon the 
distinction with such alacrity in New York v. United States. 
We see no reason to believe that a distinction which the 
Court discarded as unworkable in the field of tax immunity 
can prove fruitful in the field of regulatory immunity under 
the Commerce Clause. Neither do any of the alternative 
standards that might be employed to distinguish between 
8 That concern was especially vivid in South Carolina because liquor 
taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over one-
fourth of the Federal Government's revenues. See New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion). 
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protected and unprotected governmental functions appear 
manageable. We rejected the possibility of making immu-
nity turn on a purely historical standard of "tradition" in 
Long Island, and properly so. The most obvious defect of a 
historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents 
courts from accommodating changes in the historical func-
tions of States, changes that have resulted in a number of 
once-private functions like education being assumed by the 
States and their subdivisions. 9 At the same time, the only 
apparent virtue of a rigorous historical standard, its promise 
of a reasonably objective measure for state immunity, is illu-
sory. Reliance on history as an organizing principle results 
in linedrawing of the most arbitrary sort; the genesis of state 
governmental functions stretches over a historical continuum 
from before the Revolution to the present, and courts would 
have to decide by fiat precisely how longstanding a pattern of 
state involvement had to be for federal regulatory authority 
to lapse. 10 
9 Indeed, the "traditional" nature of a particular governmental function 
can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently "tradi-
tional" function is often yesterday's suspect innovation. Thus, National 
League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an 
example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S., at 851. A 
scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 
282 (1892), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been 
provided for grazing domestic animals rather than for recreation and that 
"[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private property 
[by eminent domain] for a public park . . . would have been regarded as a 
novel exercise of legislative power." I d., at 297. 
1° For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of fed-
eral involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate stand-
ard for state immunity. Most of the Fe~ Government's current regu- ~ 
latory activit originated less than 50 ears a o with ffie "New I>eiir, and a 
good ort10n of it as eve ope within the past two decades. The recent 
vintage of this regu atory actiVIty does no Imims e s rength of the fed-
eral interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it 
affect the strength of the States' interest in being free from federal super-
vision. Although the Court's intergovernmental tax immunity decisions 
ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation 
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tL _ '"" 
N onhistorical standards for selecting immune govern-
mental functions are li:Kely to be just as unworkable as a his-
torical standard is. The goal of identifying "uni uely" gov-
ernmental functions, for example, nas been rejecte by the 
Co~f government tort liability in part because 
the notion of a "uniquely" governmental function is unman-
ageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 
61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Another possibility would be to confine immunity to "neces-
sary" governmental services-that is, services that would be 
provided inadequately or not at all unless the government 
provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S., at 
172. The set of services that fit into this category, however, 
may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated market 
produces less of some service than a State deems desirable 
does not mean that the State itself must provide the service; 
in most if not all cases, the State can "contract out" by hiring 
private firms to provide the service or simply by providing 
subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to question 
how well equipped courts are to make this kind of determina-
tion about the workings of economic markets. 
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental 
pr9bl~m at work here, a problem that explams wliy the 
Cou:ft was never able to provide a basis for the govern-
mental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmental tax 
because those activities "ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing] 
power from the beginning," New York v. United States, 326 U. S., at 588 
(Stone, C. J., joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment), the Court has not in fact required federal taxes to have long 
historical records in order to be effective. The income tax at issue in Pow-
ers took effect less than a decade before the tax years for which it was chal-
lenged, while the federal tax whose application was upheld in New Y ark v. 
United States took effect in 1932 and was rescinded less than two years 
later. See Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S., at 222; Rakestraw, The Recip-
rocal Rule of Governmental Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J. 
3, 34, n. 116 (1950). 
82-1913 & 82-1951-0PINION 
GARCIA Vo SAN ANTONIO TRANSIT AUTHORITY 17 
immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar distinc-
tions with respect to 1ederarregtllatory authori1y_unaer N a-
tiona£ League oj ~is unli:Kely to succeed regardless of 
hoWThe 1 m 
0 
s are couc e . e problem is that nei-
ther the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other 
that purports o separa e 1m ortant overnmental fu ctions 
from o er es can e ruthful to the role of federalism in a 
democra 1c soc1e . e essence o our e era sys em is 
tha~e realm of authority left open to them under the 
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in 
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, 
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-in-
cluding the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any 
rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "inte-
gral," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions inev-
itably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. 
"The science of government 0 • • is the science of experi-
ment," Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 226 (1821), and the 
States cannot serve as laboratories for social and economic 
experiment, see New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an 
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citi-
zenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a differ-
ent society left in private hands. In the words of Justice 
Black: 
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging 
line of demarcation between essential and non-essential 
governmental functions. Many governmental functions 
of today have at some time in the past been non-govern-
mental. The genius of our government provides that, 
within the sphere of constitutional action, the people-
acting not through the courts but through their elected 
legislative representatives-have the power to deter-
mine as conditions demand, what services and functions 
l 
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the public welfare requires." H elvering v. Gerhardt, 
304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion). 
We therefore reject, as unsound in principle and unwork-
able in praCtice, a nile of state immunity from federal regula-
tion that turns on aluCiiciaf armraisal of wh.ether_ a particular 
governmentaliUnctfon is "integral" or "traditional." Any 
sucli ru e ea s o mcons1s ent results at the same time that 
it disserves principles of democratic self-governance, and it 
breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from 
those principles. If there are to be limits on the immunity of 
state governments from ederal re lation un er t e om-
merce ause, and limi s t ere must be, we must look else-
where to find them. We accoraingly return to the un<fei.ly-
ing Issue t a confronted this Court in National League 
of Cities-the manner in which the Constitution insulates 
States from the reach of Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause. 
III 
The central principle of National League of Cities is that 
the States occupy a special position in our constitutional sys-
tem and that the scope of Congress' authority under the 
Commerce Clause must reflect that position. It is true that 
the Commerce Clause by its terms does not provide any spe-
cial limitation on Congress' actions with respect to the • 
States. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. -,-(1983) 
(STEVENS, J., concurring) (slip op. 5). It is equally true, 
however, that the text of the Constitution provides the be-
ginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into 
questions of federalism, for "[b]ehind the words of the con-
stitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control." 
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National 
League of Cities reflects the general conviction that the Con-
stitution precludes "the National Government [from] devour-
[ing] the essentials of state sovereignty." Maryland v. 
Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting). In order 
to be faithful to the underlying federal premises of the Con-
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stitution, courts must look for the "postulates which limit and 
control." 
What has proved problematic is not the idea that the Con-
stitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the Com-
merce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those 
limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Con-
gress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce 
Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political 
sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States' "sepa-
rate and independent existence." Lane County v. Oregon, 7 
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach underlies the Court's use 
of the "traditional governmental function" concept in N a-
tional League of Cities. It also has led to the separate re-
quirement that the challenged federal statute "address mat-
ters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state sovereignty.'" 
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National League of Cities, 
426 U. S., at 845. In National League of Cities itself, for 
example, the Court concluded that decisions by a State con-
cerning the wages and hours of its employees are an "un-
doubted attribute of state sovereignty." 426 U. S., at 845. 
The opinion did not explain what aspects of such decisions 
made them an "undoubted attribute of state sovereignty," 
and the Court since has remarked on the uncertain scope 
of the concept, see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S., at--, 
n. 11 (slip op. 10, n. 11), but the point of the inquiry has re-
mained to single out particular features of a State's internal 
governance that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state 
sovereignty. 
We have come to doubt, however, that courts ultimately I 
can identifY principled constitutiona mitations on the scope 
of Congress' Commercecfause powers over the States Oy-re-
lymg on a prtort wns o s a e sovereignty. In part, 
this is because of the elusiveness of objective criteria for 
"fundamental" elements o s ate sovereignty, a prob em that 
we have witnessed in the search for "traditional govern-
mental functions." There is, however, a more fundamental 
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reason: the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Con-
stitution itself":'--A'Variety or sovereign powerS', for example, 
are withdrawn from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 
of the same Article works an equally sharp contraction of 
state sovereignty, quite apart from whatever authority it 
may confer on Congress to regulate the "States as States," 
by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legisla-
tive powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause 
of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. See 
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review 
of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails 
the sovereign power of the state judiciaries to make authori-
tative determinations of law. See Martin v. Hunter's Les-
see, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application 
of the greater part of the Bill of Rights to the States through 
the Fourteenth Amendment limits the sovereign authority 
that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect 
to their citizens and conduct their own affairs. 
The States unquestionably "retai[n] . . . a significant meas-
ure of sovereign authority." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., 
at -- (POWELL, J., dissenting) (slip op. 5). They do so, 
however, only to the extent that the Constitution has not di-
vested them of their original powers and transferred those 
powers to the Federal Government. In the words of James 
Madison to the members of the first Congress: "Interference 
with the power of the States was no constitutional criterion of 
the power of Congress. If the power was not given, Con-
gress could not exercise it; if given, they might exercise it, 
although it should interfere with the laws, or even the Con-
stitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791). 
Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense 
of state autonomy in Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 
U. S. 368 (1893), a defense quoted with approval in Erie R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78-79 (1938): 
"[T]he Constitution of the United States . . . recog-
nizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of 
'· 
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the States-independence in their legislative and inde-
pendence in their judicial departments. [Federal] [s]u-
pervision over either the legislative or the judicial action 
of the States is in no case permissible except as to mat-
ters by the Constitution specifically authorized or dele-
gated to the United States. Any interference with 
either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the au-
thority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its 
independence." 149 U. S., at 401 (dissenting opinion) 
(emphasis added). 
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the con-
tinued role of the States is to say little about the nature of 
that role. Only last Term, this Court recognized that the 
purpose of the constitutional immunity recognized in N a-
tional League of Cities is not to preserve "a sacred province 
of state autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at--
(slip op. 9). With rare exceptions, like the guarantee of 
state territorial integrity in Article IV, § 3, the Constitution 
does not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that 
Congress may not employ its delegated powers to displace. 
As James Wilson reminded the Pennsylvania ratifying con-
vention in 1787, "although it presupposes the existence of 
state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose 
them to be the sole power to be respected." 2 Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power 
of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as 
well, cf. National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 856 (concur-
ring opinion), and the fact that the States remain sovereign 
with respect to all powers not vested in Congress or denied 
them by the Constitution offers no guidance about where the 
frontier between state and federal power is to be drawn. In 
short, we have no license to employ freestanding conceptions 
of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause. 
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When we look for the States' "residuary and inviolable sov-
ereignty," The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. Wright ed. 1961) 
(J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather 
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different 
measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limi-
tation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature 
of Congress' Article I powers, the principal means chosen by 
the Framers to ensure the role of the "States as States" in 
the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Gov-
ez:!?.ment itself. It is no novelty o observ e compo-
sition of the Federal Government was designed in large part 
to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. 11 The 
Framers thus gave the States a role in the selection both of 
the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Federal 
Government. The States were vested with indirect influ-
ence over the House of Representatives and the Presidency 
by their control of electoral qualifications and their role in 
presidential elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, and Art. II, 
§ 1. They were given more direct influence in the Senate, 
where each State received equal representation and each 
Senator was to be selected by the legislators of his State. 
Art. I, § 3. The significance attached to the States' equal 
representation in the Senate is underscored by the prohi-
bition on any constitutional amendment divesting a State of 
equal representation without the State's consent. Art. V. 
The extent to which the structure of the Federal Govern-
ment itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the 
States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madi-
son explained that the Federal Government "will partake suf-
ficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to in-
11 See, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Proc-
ess 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Govern-
ment, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents 
of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982). 
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vade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives 
of their governments." The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B. 
Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson argued that "it 
was a favorite object in the Convention" to provide for the 
security of the States against federal encroachment and that 
the structure of the Federal Government itself served that 
end. 2 Elliot 438-439. Madison placed particular reliance 
on the equal representation of the States in the Senate, which 
he saw as "at once a constitutional recognition of the portion 
of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an in-
strument for preserving that residuary sovereignty." The 
Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). Accord, id., 
No. 43, p. 315 ("[T]he residuary sovereignty of the States [is] 
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one 
branch of the [federal] legislature") (emphasis added). See 
also M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In 
short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which 
special restraints on federal power over the "States as 
States" inhered principally in the workings of the National 
Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the 
objects of federal authority. 
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserv-
ing the States' interests is apparent even today in the course 
of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been 
able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues 
into their own treasuries in the form of general and program-
specific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and 
local governments is a longstanding one; Congress provided 
federal land grants to finance state governments from the be-
ginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded 
as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. 12 In the past quarter-
century alone, federal grants to States and localities have 
12 See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovern-
mental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United 
States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in The Future of Fed-
eralism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981). 
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grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. 13 As a result, federal 
grants now account for roughly one-fifth of state and local 
government expenditures. 14 The States have obtained fed-
eral funding for such services as police and fire protection, 
education, public health and hospitals, parks and recreation, 
and sanitation. 15 At the same time that the States have ex-
ercised their influence to obtain federal support, moreover, 
they have been able to exempt themselves from a wide vari-
ety of obligations imposed by Congress under the Commerce 
Clause. For example, the Federal Power Act, the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the 
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sher-
man Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States 
and their subdivisions. 16 The fact that some federal statutes 
like the FLSA do extend general obligations to the States 
cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of 
the States in the federal system has served to minimize the 
13 A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal Year 1983, p. 2 (1984) 
(Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Government Accounts and 
Reports, Fiscal Service-Bureau of Government Financial Operations, 
Dept. of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal Year 1982, p. 1 (1983 
rev. ed.). 
14 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant 
Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984). 
15 See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, 15 
U. S. C. §§ 2201 et seq.; the Urban Park and Recreation Recovery Act of 
1978, 16 U. S. C. §§ 2501 et seq.; the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Act of 1965, 20 U. S. C. §§ 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 
U. S. C. §§ 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Service Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 201 
et seq.; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U. S. C. §§ 300f et seq.; the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U. S. C. §§ 3701 et seq.; 
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U. S. C.§§ 5301 
et seq.; and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 
42 U. S. C. §§ 5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Expenditures 2-15. 
'
6 See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29 
U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and Parker v. Brown, 
317 u. s. 341 (1943). 
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burdens that the States have had to bear under the Com-
merce Clause. 
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal 
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of 
which has been the substitution of popular election of Sena-
tors by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, 
and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the 
States in the federal political process. 17 Nonetheless, 
against this background, we remain convinced that the funda-
mental limitation that the constitutional scheme im oses on 
the ommerce ause o ro ec 
of process ra er 
tive res raints on e exe c1se of Commerce Clause powers 
must find their justification in the procedural nature of this 
basic limitation, and they must be tailored to compensate for 
possible failings in the national political process rather to dic-
tate a "sacred province of state autonomy," EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 460 U. S., at-- (slip op. 9). 
The only substantive restraint that satisfies these criteria, 
in our judgment, is a requirement that Congress not attempt 
to single out the States for special burdens or otherwise dis-
criminate against them. The constitutional mechanisms for 
safeguarding the role of the States are unlikely to be at risk 
when Congress proceeds by uniform legislation that places 
burdens evenhandedly on States and private parties alike, for 
the outcome will reflect not only the States' own interests but 
the interests of all those who are similarly situated. In those 
circumstances, the structural features of the Constitution de-
signed to protect the States can be trusted to have served 
their purpose. The federal political process is unlikely to 
produce regulatory schemes that frustrate or obstruct state 
functions as long as those functions are shared by private 
parties as well and as long as Congress does not single out 
17 See, e. g., J . Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and 
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868 
(1979). 
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the States for regulatory burdens. We therefore hold that 
the implicit substantive limitations on congressional regula-
tion of the States under the Commerce Clause demand no 
more than that the statute at issue be a nondiscriminatory 
one. In allowing States to be subjected to nondiscriminatory 
federal legislation, it must be noted, we are not treating the 
constitutionality of such legislation as a nonjusticiable ques-
tion to be remitted to other branches of government. 18 In-
stead, we are holding that such legislation is constitutional-
that the restrictions on Commerce Clause power that inhere 
in the structure of the Constitution are not transgressed by 
statutes that accord equal treatment to States and similarly 
situated private parties. 19 
The idea that concerns about discrimination should form 
the linchpin of intergovernmental immunity doctrine is not, 
of course, a new one in this Court. The Court's first inter-
governmental-immunity decision, M'Cullogh v. Maryland, 
supra, rested in large part on concerns about discrimination. 
In striking down as unconstitutional a Maryland tax on unli-
censed banks that singled out the Bank of the United States, 
Chief Justice Marshall was careful to add that the prohibition 
on state taxation of federal instrumentalities "does not ex-
tend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in com-
mon with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax 
imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may 
hold in this institution, in common with other property of the 
same description throughout the State." 4 Wheat., at 436 
18 Cf. National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 841-842, n. 12; New York 
v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 581-582 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., joined by 
Rutledge, J. ); J . Choper, supra, at 220-222; Matsumoto, National League 
of Cities-From Footnote to Holding-State Immunity from Commerce 
Clause Regulation, 1977 Ariz. State L. J . 35, 40-42. 
19 There thus is no inconsistency between the substantive rule of con-
stitutional immunity that we announce today and the intent of the Framers 
that this Court resolve "controversies relating to the boundary between 
the [state and federal] jurisdictions." The Federalist No. 39, p. 285 (B. 
Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). 
,. ~ 
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(emphasis added). The Court subsequently has observed 
that M'Cullogh "'could and perhaps should'" be read "'sim-
ply for the principle that the Constitution prohibits a State 
from taxing discriminatorily a federally established instru-
mentality."' United States v. New Mexico, 455 U. S. 720, 
733 (1982), quoting First Agricultural Bank v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 392 U. S. 339, 350 (1968) (dissenting opinion). 
Justices Frankfurter and Rutledge advocated a discrimina-
tion-based standard for state immunity from federal taxation 
in New York v. United States, supra; they would have found 
"no restriction upon Congress to include the States in levying 
a tax exacted equally from private persons upon the same 
subject matter." 326 U. S., at 584. 
We recognize that a majority of the Court rejected Justice 
Frankfurter's approach to tax immunity doctrine in New 
York v. United States. See id., at 587-588 (Stone, C. J., 
joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment); id., at 592 (Douglas, J., joined by Black, J., dis-
senting). More important for present purposes, we recog-
nize that the Court rejected the same standard with respect 
to regulatory immunity in National League of Cities. See 
426 U. S., at 843. While we adhere to National League of 
Cities' premise that the Commerce Clause is subject to spe-
cial limitations when Congress seeks to regulate the "States 
as States," we cannot accept its specific formulation of the 
rule of state immunity to the extent that it is inconsistent 
with the principles we announce today. Federal regulation 
that is otherwise within Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause may extend to state functions as long as it ap-
plies uniformly to private as well as public activities and does 
not discriminate against the States and their subdivisions. 20 
00 We should not be understood to suggest that every statute that does 
single out the States for special obligations is unconstitutional ipso facto. 
For example, Congress' undisputed authority to pre-empt state regulation 
of private activities entails the additional authority to forgo pre-emption 
and to require instead that States consider specified federal interests in 
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When these principles are applied here, the outcome is 
clear. Nothing in the statutory scheme of the FLSA dis-
criminates against SAMTA or any other municipally oper-
ated mass-transit system. Instead, SAMTA faces the same 
minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of 
thousands of other employers, private as well as public, must 
meet. Indeed, as the Court noted inN ational League of Cit-
ies, 426 U. S., at 839, Congress incorporated special provi-
sions concerning overtime pay for police and firefighting per-
sonnel when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take 
account of the special concerns of States and localities with 
respect to these positions. See 29 U. S. C. § 207(k). Con-
gress also declined to impose any obligations on state and 
local governments with respect to policymaking personnel 
who are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C. 
§ 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and (ii). 21 
regulating the same conduct, see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 
763-768 and nn. 29-30 (1982), even though the exercise of the latter author-
ity requires Congress to address its commands to the States alone. We 
have no occasion now to consider under what other circumstances nonuni-
form federal legislation might be constitutionally permissible. 
21 The only respect in which the FLSA might discriminate against public 
employers involves the statute's overtime requirements for employees cov-
ered by collective-bargaining agreements. Under 29 U. S. C. §§ 207(b)(1) 
and (2), an employee may be required to work more than 40 hours in a par-
ticular week without accruing overtime compensation if his total number of 
working hours over a 26-week or 52-week period fall within specified limits 
"in pursuance of an agreement ... made as a result of collective bargaining 
by representatives of employees certified as bona fide by the National 
Labor Relations Board." Because the National Labor Relations Act does 
not provide coverage for state and local government employees, see 29 
U. S. C. § 152(2), the National Labor Relations Board might not have ju-
risdiction to provide the necessary certification with respect to a public 
employer who otherwise qualified under §§ 207(b)(l) or (2). At most, how-
ever, the discrimination-based standard on which we rely today would pro-
hibit the application of the National Labor Relation Board certification 
requirement to public employers; the general overtime provisions of the 
National Labor Relations Act, which apply equally to public and private 
employers, would not be affected. If SAMTA could avail itself of the col-
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In this case, the status of public mass transit simply under-
scores the extent to which the structural protections of the 
Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed bur-
dens. While Congress first subjected state mass-transit sys-
tems to FLSA obligations in 1966 and expanded those obliga-
tions in 1974, it simultaneously provided extensive funding 
for state and local mass transit through UMTA. In the two 
decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided over $22 
billion in mass transit aid to States and localities. 22 In 1983 
alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. 23 As noted 
above, SAMTA and its predecessor have received a substan-
tial amount of UMTA funding, including over $12 million dur-
ing SAMTA's first two fiscal years alone. In short, Con-
gress has not simply placed a financial burden on the 
shoulders of States and localities that operate mass-transit 
systems, but has provided substantial countervailing finan-
cial assistance as well-assistance that may leave individual 
mass transit systems better off than they would have been 
had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Congress' 
treatment of public mass transit reinforces our conviction 
that the national political process will systematically protect 
States from the risk of having their functions handicapped by 
Commerce Clause regulation. 24 
lective-bargaining provisions of§ 207 but for the lack of National Labor Re-
lations Board certification, a matter that the record before us does not dis-
close, SAMTA is free to pursue the issue on remand. 
22 See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions for 1983: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years 
1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983). 
23 Census, Federal Expenditures 15. 
24 Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that nondiscrimina-
tory regulation under the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by coun-
tervailing financial benefits under the Spending Clause. The application 
of the FLSA to SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not 
provided federal funding under UMTA. 
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IV 
Today we reaffirm the fundamental premise of National 
League of Cities that Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause must accommodate the special role of the 
States in the federal system. We hold, however, that the 
necessary accommodation between federal power and state 
autonomy is realized when Congress places no burden on the 
States that it has not placed on private parties as well. For 
that reason, the judgment of the District Court is reversed 
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We revisit in these cases an issue raised in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976). In that liti-
gation, this Court, by a sharply divided vote, ruled that the 
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the 
minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA) against the States "in areas of tradi-
tional governmental functions." !d., at 852. Although Na-
tional League of Cities supplied some examples of "tradi-
tional governmental functions," it did not offer a general 
explanation of how a "traditional" function is to be distin-
guished from a "nontraditional" one. Since then, federal and 
state courts have struggled with the task, thus imposed, of 
identifying a traditional function for purposes of state immu-
nity under the Commerce Clause. 
In the present cases, a Federal District Court concluded 
that municipal ownership and operation of a mass-transit sys-
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tern is a traditional governmental function and thus, under 
National League of Cities, is exempt from the obligations im-
posed by the FLSA. Faced with the identical question, 
three Federal Courts of Appeals and one state appellate 
court have reached the opposite conclusion. 1 
Our examination of this "function" standard applied in 
these and other cases over the last eight years now persuades 
us that the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regula-
tory immunity in terms of "traditional governmental func-
tion" is not only unworkable but is inconsistent with ~sta,b­
lished principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very 
@er~l~~~ciE_les on which N ationoJ1.eague2J'Qi§ p ur-
ported to rest. That case, accordingly, is overruled. 
I 
The history of public transportation in San Antonio, Tex., 
is characteristic of the history of local mass transit in the 
United States generally. Passenger transportation for hire 
within San Antonio originally was provided on a private basis 
by a local transportation company. In 1913, the Texas Leg-
islature authorized the State's municipalities to regulate ve-
hicles providing carriage for hire. 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 
147, § 4, ~ 12, now codified, as amended, as Tex. Rev. Civ. 
Stat. Ann., Art. 1175, §§ 20 and 21 (Vernon 1963). Two 
years later, San Antonio enacted an ordinance setting forth 
franchising, insurance, and safety requirements for passen-
ger vehicles operated for hire. The city continued to rely on 
such publici re lated private mass transit until 1959, when 
it pure ased the privately owned San Antonio T~ansll Com-
pany and replaced it with a public authority known as the San 
Antonio Transit System (SATS). SATS operated until1978, 
1 See Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority, 
701 F. 2d 50 (CA6 1983); Alewine v. City Council, 699 F. 2d 1060 (CAll 
1983), cert. pending, Nos. 82-1974 and 83-257; Kramer v. New Castle Area 
Transit Authority, 677 F. 2d 308 (CA3 1982), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 1146 
(1983); Francis v. City of Tallahassee, 424 So. 2d 61 (Fla. App. 1982). 
J 'TSf 
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when the city transferred its facilities and equipment to ap-
pellee San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
(SAMTA), a public mass-transit authority organized on a 
countywide basis. See generally Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., 
Art. 1118x (Vernon Supp. 1984). SAMTA currently is the 
major provider of transportation in the San Antonio metro-
politan area; between 1978 and 1980 alone, its vehicles trav-
eled over 26 million route miles and carried over 63 million 
passengers. 
As did other localities, San Antonio reached the point 
where it came to look to the Federal Government for financial 
assistance in maintaining its public mass transit. BATs 
managoo to meet its operating expenses and bond obligations 
for the first decade of its existence without federal or local 
financial aid. By 1970, however, its financial position had 
deteriorated to the point where federal subsidies were vital 
for its continued operation. SATS' general manager that 
year testified before Congress that "if we do not receive sub-
stantial help from the Federal Government, San Antonio may 
... join the growing ranks of cities that have inferior [public] 
transportation or may end up with no [public] transportation 
at all." 2 
The principal federal program to which SATS and other 
mass-transit systems looked for relief was the 'Qrban Mass 
Tr~4 (UMTA), Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 
302, as amended, 49 U. S. C. App. §§ 1601 et seq., which pro-
vides substantial federal assistance to urban mass-transit 
programs. See generally Jackson Transit Authority v. 
Transit Union, 457 U. S. 15 (1982). UMTA now authorizes 
the Departm~nt of Transportation to fund 75 percent of the 
'< ca ital outla ' s and u to 50 ercent of the o~enses 
of qualifying mass-transit programs. §§ 4(a), 5(d) and (e), 49 
U. S. C. App. §§ 1603(a), 1604(d) and (e). SATS received its 
•.Urban Mass Transportation: Hearings on H. R. 6663 et al. before the 
Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency, 91st Cong. , 2d Sess., p. 419 (1970) (statement of F. Norman Hill). 
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I 
first UMTA subsidy, a $4.1 million capital grant, in Decem-
ber 1970. From then until February 1980, SATS and 
SAMTA received over $51 million in UMTA grants-more 
than $31 million in capital grants, over~ $20-million in operat-
ing assistance, and a minor amount in technical assistance. 
During SAMTA's first two fiscal years, it received $12.5 mil-
lion in UMTA operating grants, $26.8 million from sales 
taxes, and only $10.1 million from fares. Federal subsidies 
{ and lo~s currently account for abotif75 percent of 
~ SAMTA's operatmg expenses. 
The present controversy concerns the extent to which 
SAMTA may be subjected to the minimum-wage and over-
time requirements of the FLSA. When the FLSA was en-
acted in 1938, its wage and overtime provisions did not apply 
to local mass-transit employees or, indeed, to employees of 
state and local governments. §§ 3(d), 13(a)(9), 52 Stat. 1060, 
1067. In 1961, Congress extended minimum-wage coverage 
to employees of any private mass-transit carrier whose an-
nual gross revenue was not less than $1 million. Fair Labor 
Standards Amendments of 1961, §§ 2(c), 9, 75 Stat. 65, 71. 
Five years later, Congress extended FLSA coverage to state 
and local-government employees for the first time by with-
drawing the minimum-wage and overtime exemptions from 
public hospitals, schools, and mass-transit carriers whose 
rates and services were subject to state regulation. Fair 
Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §§ 102(a) and (b), 80 
Stat. 831. At the same time, Congress eliminated the over-
time exemption for all mass-transit employees other than 
drivers, operators, and conductors. § 206(c), 80 Stat. 836. 
The application of the FLSA to public schools and hospitals/ 
was ruled to be within Congress' power under the Commerce 
Clause. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). 
The FLSA obligations of public mass-transit systems like 
SATS were expanded in ~4 when CoEgr,ess provided for 
the progressive repeal of e rv"vi o ertime ex_emytion 
for mass-transit employees. Fair Labor Standar s amend-
1 "'..._. ~ 
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ments of 1974, § 21(b), 88 Stat. 68. Congress simultaneously 
brought the States and their subdivisions further within the 
ambit of the FLSA by extending FLSA coverage to virtually 
all state and local-government employees. §§ 6(a)(1) and (6), 
88 Stat. 58, 60, 29 U. S. C. §§ 203(d) and (x). SATS com-
plied with the FLSA's overtime requirements until 1976, 
when this Court, in National League of Cities, supra, over-
ruled Maryland v. Wirtz, and held that the FLSA could not 
be applied constitutionally to the "traditional governmental 
functions" of state and local governments. Four months 
after National League of Cities was handed down, SATS in-
formed its employees that the decision relieved SATS of its 
overtime obligations under the FLSA. 3 
Matters rested there until September 17, 1979, when the 
Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor 
issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations "are not constitu-
tionally immune from the application of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act" under National League of Cities. Opinion 
WH-499, 6 LRR 91:1138. On November 21 of that year, 
SAMTA filed this action against the Secretary of Labor in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Texas. It sought a declaratory judgment that, contrary to 
the Wage and Hour Administration's determination, Na-
tional League of Cities precluded the application of the 
FLSA's overtime requirements to SAMTA's operations. 
The Secretary counterclaimed under 29 U. S. C. § 217 for en-
forcement of the overtime and record-keeping requirements 
of the FLSA. On the same day that SAMTA filed its action, 
appellant Garcia and several other SAMTA employees 
brought suit against SAMTA in the same District Court for 
overtime pay under the FLSA. Garcia v. SAMTA, Civil 
3 Neither SATS nor SAMTA appears to have attempted to avoid the 
FLSA's minimum-wage provisions. We are informed that basic wage lev-
els in the mass-transit industry traditionally have been well in excess of the 
minimum wages prescribed by the FLSA. See Brief for National League 
of Cities et a!. as Amici Curiae 7-8. 
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Action No. SA 79 CA 458. The District Court has stayed 
that action pending the outcome of these cases, but it allowed 
Garcia to intervene in the present litigation as a defendant in 
support of the Secretary. One month after SAMTA brought 
suit, the Department of Labor formally amended its FLSA 
interpretive regulations to provide that publicly owned local 
mass-transit systems are not entitled to immunity under N a-
tional League of Cities. 44 Fed. Reg. 75,630 (1979), codified 
as 29 CFR § 775.3(b)(3) (1983). 
On November 17, 1981, the District Court granted 
SAMTA's motion for summary judgment and denied the Sec-
retary's and Garcia's cross-motion for partial summary judg-
ment. Without further explanation, the District Court ruled 
that "local public mass transit systems (including [SAMTA]) 
constitute integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions" under National League of Cities. Juris. 
Statement in No. 82-1913, p. 24a. The Secretary and Garcia 
both appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1252. During the pendency of those appeals, Transporta-
tion Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), was 
decided. In that case, the Court ruled that commuter rail 
service provided by the state-owned Long Island Rail Road 
did not constitute a "traditional governmental function" and 
hence did not enjoy constitutional immunity, under National 
League of Cities, from the requirements of the Railway 
Labor Act. Thereafter, it vacated the District Court's judg-
ment in the present cases and remanded them for further 
consideration in the light of Long Island. 457 U. S. 1102 
(1982). 
On remand, the District Court adhered to its original view 
and again entered judgment for SAMTA. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445 
(1983). The court looked first to what it regarded as the 
"historical reality" of state involvement in mass transit. It 
recognized that States not always had owned and operated 
mass-transit systems, but concluded that they had engaged 
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in a longstanding pattern of public regulation, and that this 
regulatory tradition gave rise to an "inference of sover-
eignty." Id., at 447-448. The court next looked to the 
record of federal involvement in the field and concluded that 
constitutional immunity would not result in an erosion of fed-
eral authority with respect to state-owned mass-transit sys-
tems, because many federal statutes themselves contain ex-
emptions for States and thus make the withdrawal of federal 
regulatory power over public mass-transit systems a super-
vening federal policy. Id., at 448-450. Although the Fed-
eral Government's authority over employee wages under the 
FLSA obviously would be eroded, Congress had not asserted 
any interest in the wages of public mass-tr ns1t employees 
u:rltiri9 a e ce a no es a 1s e a ongstan ilig fed-
era mterest in the field, in contrast to the century-old federal 
regulatory presence in the railroad industry found significant 
for the decision in Long Island. Finally, the court compared 
mass transit to the list of functions identified as constitution-
ally immune in N atwna Le ue o Cities an cone u e that 
it 1 no 1 er om t ose nctions 1 any material respect. 
The court stated: "If transit is to be distinguished from the 
exempt [National League of Cities] functions it will have to 
be by identifying a traditional state function in the same way 
pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when 
they see it, but they can't describe it." 557 F. Supp., at 
453. 4 
The Secretary and Garcia again took direct appeals from 
the District Court's judgment. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion. -- U. S. -- (1983). After initial argument, the 
'The District Court also analyzed the status of mass transit under the 
four-part test devised by the Sixth Circuit in Amersbach v. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F. 2d 1033 (1979). In that case, the Court of Appeals looked to 
(1) whether the function benefits the community as a whole and is made 
available at little or no expense; (2) whether it is undertaken for public 
service or pecuniary gain; (3) whether government is its principal provider; 
and (4) whether government is particularly suited to perform it because of 
a community-wide need. ld., at 1037. 
.. ~ 
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cases were restored to our calendar for reargument, and the 
I
' parties were requested to brief and argue the following addi-
tional question: 
"Whether or not the rinci les of the Tenth Amend-
ment as set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery, 
"426U. S. 833 (1976), should be reconsidered?" 
-- U. S. -- (1984). Reargument followed in due course. 
II 
Appellees have not argued that SAMTA is immune from 
regulation under the FLSA on the ground that it is a local 
transit system engaged in intrastate commercial activity. In 
a practical sense, SAMTA's operations might well be charac-
terized as "local." Nonetheless, it long has been settled that 
Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause extends to 
intrastate economic activities that affect interstate com-
merce. See, e. g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 258 (1964); 
· Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 125 (1942); United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Were SAMTA a rivatel ~ 
owned and operated enterprise, it cou not credibly argue 
that Congress exceeded the bounds of its Commerce Clause 
powers in prescribing minimum wages and overtime rates for 
SAMTA's employees. Any constitutional exemption from 
the requirements of the FLSA therefore must rest on 
SAMTA's status as a governmental entity rather than on the 
"local" nature of its operations. 
The prerequisites for governmental immunity under N a-
tional League of Cities were summarized by this Court in 
!lgjjel, supra. Under that summary, four conditions must 
be satisfied before a state activity may be deemed immune 
from a particular federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause. First, it is said that the federal statute at issue 
must regulate "the 'States as States."' Second, the statute j~ 
must "address ma~disputably 'attribute[s] of 
~
'I 
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state sovereignty."' Third, state compliance with the fed-
eral obligation must "d~air [the States'] ability 'to 
structure inte al o erations in areas of traditional govern-
men a nctions. ' ina y, t e relation of state an federal 
intereStSiniist not be such that "the nature of the federal in-
terest . . . justifies state submission." 452 U. S., at 
287-288, and n. 29, quoting National League of Cities, 426 
U. S., at 845, 852, 854. 
The controversy in the present cases has focused on the 
t ird Hodel re uirement-that th chal n ed federal statute 
trenc on raditiona governmental functions ' The Dis-
trict Court vo1c co on conce : espite the abundance 
of adjectives, identifying which particular state functions are 
immune remains difficult." 557 F. Supp., at 447. Just how 
troublesome the task has been is revealed by the results 
reached in other federal cases. Thus, courts have held that 
regulating ambulance services, Gold Cross Ambulance v. 
City of Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 967-969 (WD Mo. 
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 705 F. 2d 1005 (CAS 1983), 
cert. pending, No. 83-183; licensing automobile drivers, 
United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095, 1102-1103 (CA9 1978); 
operating a municipal airport, Amersbach v. City of Cleve-
land, 598 F. 2d 1033, 1037-1038 (CA6 1979); performing solid 
waste disposal, Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 
654 F. 2d 1187, 1196 (CA61981); and operating a highway au-
thority, Malina-Estrada v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority, 
680 F. 2d 841, 845-846 (CAl 1982), are functions protected 
under National League of Cities. At the same time, courts 
have held that issuance of industrial development bonds, 
Woods v. Homes and Structures of Pittsburgh, Kansas, Inc., 
489 F. Supp. 1270, 1296-1297 (Kan. 1980); regulation of intra-
state natural gas sales, Oklahoma ex rel. Derryberry v. 
FERC, 494 F. Supp. 636, 657 (WD Okla. 1980), aff'd, 661 F. 
2d 832 (CAlO 1981), cert. denied sub nom. Texas v. FERC, 
457 U. S. 1105 (1982); regulation of traffic on public roads, 
Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 38 (CA2), cert. 
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denied, 434 U. S. 902 (1977); regulation of air transportation, 
Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 644 F. 2d 
1334, 1340-1341 (CA9 1981); operation of a telephone system, 
Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. FCC, 553 F. 2d 694, 700-701 (CAl 
1977); leasing and sale of natural gas, Public Service Co. v. 
FERC, 587 F. 2d 716, 721 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Lou-
isiana v. FERC, 444 U. S. 879 (1979); operation of a mental 
health facility, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, 
Inc., 669 F. 2d 671, 680-681 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 
976 (1982); and provision of in-house domestic services for the 
aged and handicapped, Bonnette v. California Health and 
Welfare Agency, 704 F. 2d 1465, 1472 (CA91983), are not en-
titled to immunity. We find it difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases 
in the first group on one side of a line and each of the cases in 
the second group on the other side. The constitutional dis-
tinction between licensing drivers and regulating traffic, for 
example, or between operating a highway authority and op-
erating a mental health facility, is elusive at best. 
Thus far, this Court itself has made little headway in defin-
ing the sco e o e governmenta nctions deemed pro-
tee e un er atwna League of Ct tes. In that case the 
Court set forth examples of protected and unprotected func-
tions, see 426 U. S., at 851, 854, n. 18, but provided no ex-
planation of how those examples were identified. The only 
other case in which the Court has had occasion to addre s ffie 
p~s Long Is an . e there o serve : "The deter-
mination of wnether a federal law impairs a state's authority 
with respect to 'areas of traditional [state] functions' may at 
times be a difficult one." 455 U. S., at 684, quoting N a-
tional League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 852. The accuracy of 
5 See also, however,v:;;fferson County Pha~/eutical Assn. v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 460 U. S. 150, 154, n. 6 (1983), FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U. S. 742, 781, and n. 7 (1982) (opinion concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part); Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 558, and n. 2 
(1975) (dissenting opinion). 
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that statement is demonstrated by this Court's own difficul-
ties in Long Island in developing a workable standard for 
"traditional governmental functions." We relied in large 
part there on "the historical reality that the operation of rail-
roads is not among the functions traditionally performed by 
state and local governments," but we simultaneously dis-
avowed "a static historical view of state functions generally 
immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., at 686 (first 
emphasis added; second emphasis in original). We held that \....../ 
the inquiry into a particular function's "traditional" nature 
was merely a means of determining whether the federal stat-
ute at issue unduly handicaps "basic state prerogatives," id., 
at 686-687, but we did not offer an explanation of what makes 
one state function a "basic prerogative" and another function 
not basic. Finally, having disclaimed a rigid reliance on the 
historical pedigree of state involvement in a particular area, 
we nonetheless found it appropriate to emphasize the ex-
tended historical record of federal involvement in the field of 
rail transportation. Id., at 687-689. 
Many constitutional standards involve "undoubte[d] . . . ~ ~ 
gray areas, ry v. nite States, 421 U. S. 542,' 558 (1975) I ' 
(dissenlJng opinion), and, despite the difficulties that this 
Court and other courts have encountered so far, it normally 
might be fair to venture the assum ion that c~e .c._..~~  
develo ment would lead to a workable standard for e ermm- _ , .. ~- -L _ / ; . 
ing whe Rer a particular governmen a nction should be im- ~ 
mune from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause. /1-..,~ · 
A further cautionary note is sounded, however b the 
Court's experience in the related field of tate immunitY! from J5 1 • 1... 
fed~. In South Carolina v. nt e a es:--I99 ~ 
U~5), the Court held for the first time that the 
state tax immunity recognized in Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 
113 (1870), extended only to the "ordinary" and "strictly gov-
ernmental" instrumentalities of state governments and not to 
instrumentalities "used by the State in the carrying on of an 
ordinary private business." 199 U. S., at 451, 461. While 
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the Court applied the distinction outlined in South Carolina 
for the following 40 years, at no time during that period did 
the Court develop a consistent formulation of the kinds of 
governmental functions that were entitled to immunity. 
The Court identified the protected functions at various times 
as "essential," "usual," "traditional," or "strictly govern-
mental." 6 While "these differences in phraseology . . . must 
not be too literally contradistinguished," Brush v. Commis-
sioner, 300 U. S. 352, 362 (1937), they reflect an inability to 
specify precisely what aspects of a governmental function 
made it necessary to the "unimpaired existence" of the 
States. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall., at 127. Indeed, the 
Court ultimately chose "not, by an attempt to formulate any 
ge,neral test, [to] risk embarrassing the decision of cases [con-
cerning] activities of a different kind which may arise in the 
future." Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S., at 365. 
If these tax immunity cases had any common thread, it was 
in the attempt to distinguish between "governmental" and 
"proprietary" functions. 7 To say that the distinction be-
6 See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 172 (1911) ("essential"); 
Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 225 (1938) (same); Helvering v. Pow-
ers, 293 U. S. 214, 225 (1934) ("usual"); United States v. California, 297 
U. S. 175, 185 (1936) ("activities in which the states have traditionally en-
gaged"); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 461 (1905) 
("strictly governmental"). 
7 In South Carolina, the Court relied on the concept of "strictly govern-
mental" functions to uphold the application of a federal liquor license tax to 
a state-owned liquor-distribution monopoly. In Flint, the Court stated: 
"The true distinction is between ... those operations of the States essen-
tial to the execution of its [sic] governmental functions, and which the 
State can only do itself, and those activities which are of a private charac-
ter"; under this standard, "[i]t is no part of the essential governmental 
functions of a State to provide means of transportation, supply artificial 
light, water and the like." 220 U. S., at 172. In Ohio v. Helvering, 292 
U. S. 360 (1934), another case involving a state liquor-distribution monop-
oly, the Court stated that "the business of buying and selling commodities 
... is not the performance of a governmental function," and that "[w]hen a 
state enters the market place seeking customers it divests itself of its quasi 
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tween "governmental" and "proprietary" proved to be stable, 
however, would be something of an overstatement. In 1911, 
for example, the Court declared that the provision of a 
municipal water supply "is no part of the essential govern-
mental functions of a State." Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 
U.S. 107, 172. Twenty-six years later, without any inter-~ 
vening change in t~l standards, the Court 
sim2ly rej~ted. its earlier osition and decided that t'llePro-
vision of a mumcipal wa er supp y was Immune from federal 
taxation as an essential governmental function, even though 
municipal water works long had been operated for profit by 
private industry. Brush v. Commissioner, 300 U. S., at 
370-373. At the same time that the Court was holding a 
municipal water supply to be immune from federal taxes, it 
had held that a state-run commuter rail system was not im-
mune. Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214 (1934). Justice 
Black, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U. S. 405, 427 (1938), 
was moved to observe: "An implied constitutional distinction 
which taxes income of an officer of a state-operated transpor-
tation system and exempts income of the manager of a munic-
i al w s stem manifests the uncertainty created 
by the 'essential' and' n-essential' test" (concurring opinion). 
It was this uncertainty and instability that led the Court 
shortly thereafter, in New York v. United §.tates, 326 U. S. 
572 (~6), unanimo~s!_y~n~~e that the distinction be-
tween "gove~ano ''J)ropRm~was "un-
sovereignty pro tanto, and takes on the character of a trader, so far, at 
least, as the taxing power of the federal government is concerned." I d., at 
369. In Powers, the Court upheld the application of the federal income tax 
to the income of trustees of a state-operated commuter railroad; the Court 
reiterated that "the State cannot withdraw sources of revenue from the 
federal taxing power by engaging in businesses which constitute a depar-
ture from the usual governmental functions and to which, by reason of 
their nature, the federal taxing power would normally extend," regardless 
of the fact that the proprietary enterprises "are undertaken for what the 
State conceives to be the public benefit." 293 U. S. , at 225. Accord, Al-
len v. Regents, 304 U. S. 439, 451-453 (1938). 
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tenable" and must be abandoned. See id., at 583 (opinion of 
Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J.); id., at 586 (Stone, 
C. J., concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.); 
id., at 590-596 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.). 
See also Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444, 457, 
and n. 14 (1978) (plurality opinion); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 
92, 101 (1946). 
Even during the heyday of the governmental/proprietary 
distinction in intergovernmental tax-immunity doctrine the 
Court never ex lai constitutional basis for that dis-
tinction. In South Carolina, 1 expresse 1 s concern that 
unlimited state immunity from federal taxation would allow 
the States to undermine the Federal Government's tax base 
by expanding into previously private sectors of the economy. 
See 199 U. S., at 454-455. 8 Although the need to reconcile 
state and federal interests obviously demanded that state im-
munity have some limiting principle, the Court did not try to 
justify the particular result it reached; it simply concluded 
that a "line [must] be drawn," id., at 456, and proceeded to 
draw that line. The Court's elaborations in later cases, such 
as the assertion in Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 369 
(1934), that "[ w ]hen a state enters the market place seeking 
customers it divests itself of its quasi sovereignty pro tanto," 
sound more of ipse dixit than reasoned explanation. This in-
ability to give principled content to the distinction between 
- "governmental" and "proprietary," no less significantly than 
its unworkability, led the Court to abandon the distinction 
with alacrity in New York v. United States. 
The distinction the Court discarded as unworkable in the 
field of tax immunity has proved no more fruitful in the field 
of regulatory immunity under the Commerce Clause. N ei-
ther do any of the alternative standards that might be em-
8 That concern was especially weighty in South Carolina because liquor 
taxes, the object of the dispute in that case, then accounted for over one-
fourth of the Federal Government's revenues. See New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572, 598, n. 4 (1946) (dissenting opinion). 
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ployed to distinguish between protected and unprotected 
governmental functions appear manageable. We rejec!ed 
the possibility of making immunity turn on a purelx_ hist2._r1cal 
sta~" in Long Island, and properly so. The 
most obvious defect of a h~ch to state immu-
nity is that it prevents a court from accommodating changes 
in the historical functions of States, changes that h~ve re-
sulted in a number of once-private functions like education 
being assumed by the States and their subdivisions. 9 At the 
same time, the only apparent virtue of a rigorous historical 
standard, namely, its promise of a reasonably objective meas-
ure for state immunity, is illusory. Reliance on history as an 
organizing principle results in linedra~bi­
tr~ e IS s a e governmental nc ions 
stretches over a historical continuum from before the Revolu-
tion to the present, and courts would have to decide by fiat 
pi:_eciself how longstanding a pa e o s a e o ent 
had to oe for federal regulatory authority to be defeated. 10 
9 Indeed, the "traditional" nature of a particular governmental function 
can be a matter of historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently "tradi-
tional" function is often yesterday's suspect innovation. Thus, National 
League of Cities offered the provision of public parks and recreation as an 
example of a traditional governmental function. 426 U. S. , at 851. A 
scant 80 years earlier, however, in Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 
282 (1893), the Court pointed out that city commons originally had been 
provided not for recreation but for grazing domestic animals "in common," 
and that "[i]n the memory of men now living, a proposition to take private 
property [by eminent domain] for a public park . . . would have been re-
garded as a novel exercise of legislative power." ld., at 297. 
1° For much the same reasons, the existence vel non of a tradition of fed-
eral involvement in a particular area does not provide an adequate stand-
ard for state immunity. Most of the Federal Government's current regu-
latory activ_ity ~nated less than 0 years ago with the New ea , and a 
good portion of 1t has develOpea witliin the past two decades. The recent 
vintage of this regulatory activity does not diminish the strength of the fed-
eral interest in applying regulatory standards to state activities, nor does it ~ 
affect the stren of the States' interest in being free from federa su er- ) 
vis1on. !though the o s intergovernmental tax 1mmumfy dec18lons 
ostensibly have subjected particular state activities to federal taxation be-
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{j) A onhistorica standard for selecting immune govern-
menta fun s 1s 1 ely to 11& just as unworkable as is a his-
torical standard. The goal ~denti ng umque y_' govern-GJ 
mental functions, for example, has been r cte by the 
Court in the field of government tort liability in part because 
the notion of a "uniquely" governmental function is unman-
ageable. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 
61, 64-68 (1955); see also Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & 
Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 433 (1978) (dissenting opinion). 
he · · ity would be to confine immunity toCnfa~- (j) 
sa " overnmenta serv1 that is, services that wou e 
prov1 e ma equa e o not at all unless the government 
provided them. Cf. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S., at 
172. The set of servjces that fits into this category, how-
ever, may well be negligible. The fact that an unregulated 
market produces less of some service than a State deems de-
sirable does not mean that the State itself must provide the 
service; in most if not all cases, the State can "contract out" 
by hiring private firms to provide the service or simply by 
providing subsidies to existing suppliers. It also is open to 
question how well equipped courts are to make this kind of 
determination about the workings of economic markets. 
We believe, however, that there is a more fundamental 
problem at work here, a problem that explains w}lyt:lie"Cou rt 
was never able to provide a basis for the 
governmental/proprietary distinction in the intergovernmen-
cause those activities "ha[ve] been traditionally within [federal taxing] hJJ-~J7~~ 
power from the beginning," New York v. United States, 326 U. S. , at 588 /) :='".J _J _ ...., 
(Stone, C. J. , concurring, joined by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.), the /-,--v-~ 
Court has not in fact required federal taxes to have long historical records 
in order to be effective. The income tax at issue in Powers, supra, took 
effect less than a decade before the tax years for which it was challenged, 
while the federal tax whose application was upheld in New York v. United 
States took effect in 1932 and was rescinded less than two years later. See 
Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S., at 222; Rakestraw, The Reciprocal Rule of 
Governmental Tax Immunity-A Legal Myth, 11 Fed. Bar J. 3, 34, n. 116 
(1950). 
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tal tax immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar 
distinctions with respect to federal regulatory authority 
under National League of Cities is unlikely to succeed re-
gardless of how the distinctions are phrased. The ,2!0blem_is Th-e.-~ 
that neither the governmental/proprietary distinCtion nor 
J..- 7-L-tJ) 
any other that purports to separate out important govern-
mental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a ~ ~ ~ 
democratic society. The essence of our feder~ is ~ ~ 
that witliliithe realm of authority left open to them under the 4 
Constitution, the States must be equally free to engage in 
1
, 
any activity that their citizens choose for the common weal, ~ ~ 
no matter how unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else-in- ~/~ ~ /J. ~ "\) 
eluding the judiciary-deems state involvement to be. Any tf -~ 
rule of state immunity that looks to the "traditional," "i~ 
g!!ll," or "necessary" nature of governmental functions inev-
itably invites an unelec d federal judiciary to make decisions 
about w~olicies it avors an w ic ones it 1slikes. 
"The science of government . . . is the science of experi- ___, 
ment," Anderson v. Dun 04, 226 (1821), and the ..L dJ. 112 
States cannot serve as boratories !' social and economic 4 f3 JAJ- h ·' 1 '_;J 
ex~ see New S ce v. Liebmann, 2'8~ U. S . ..) ~~
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), if they must pay an  1 
added price when they meet the changing needs of their citi- · 
zenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a differ- .:::; 
ent society left in private hands. In the words of Justice 
Black: 
"There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging 
line of demarcation between essential and non-essential 
governmental functions. Many governmental functions 
of today have at some time in the past been non-govern-
mental. The genius of our government provides that, 
within the sphere of constitutional action, the people-
acting not through the courts but through their elected 
le 'slative representatives-have the power to deter-
mine as con 1tions emand, what services and functions 
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the public welfare requires." Helvering v. Gerhardt, 
304 U. S., at 427 (concurring opinion). 
We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and un-
workable in practice;a-ruled?f. state ~unj,ty from federal 
regulation that turns on a~ Ic~:~~sal of whether a par-
ticular governmental funC1on Yslllfegi?al" or "traditional." 
Any such rule leads to inconsistent results at the same time 
that it 'disserves principles of democratic self- overnance 
and it breeds1nconsistency precise y ecause it is divorced 
from those principles. If there are to be limits on the Fed-
eral Government's power to interfere with state functions-
as undoubtedly there are-we must look elsewhere to find 
them. We accordingly return to the underlying issue that 
confronted this Court inN ational League of Cities-the man-
ner in which the Constitution insulates States from the reach 
of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. 
III 
The central theme of National League of Cities was that 
the States occupy a special position in our constitutional sys-
tem and that the scope of Congress' authority under the 
Commerce Clause must reflect that position. Of course, the 
Commerce Cl use b · s s e · c langua e does not provide 
any special limitation on Congress' ac Ions wit respect to the 
States. See "EEOc v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 248 (1983) 
(concurring opinion). It is equally true, however, that the 
text of the Constitution provides the beginning rather than 
the final answer to every inquiry into questions of federalism, 
for "[b ]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are 
postulates which limit and control." Monaco v. Mississippi, 
292 U. S. 313, 322 (1934). National League of Cities re-
flected the general conviction that the Constitution precludes 
"the National Government [from] devour[ing] the essentials 
of state sovereignty." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S., at 205 
(dissenting opinion). In order to be faithful to the underly-
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ing federal premises of the Constitution, courts must look for 
the "postulates which limit and control." 
What has proved problematic is not the perception that the 
Constitution's federal structure imposes limitations on the 
Commerce Clause, but rather the nature and content of those 
limitations. One approach to defining the limits on Con-
gress' authority to regulate the States under the Commerce 
·Clause is to identify certain underlying elements of political 
sovereignty that are deemed essential to the States' "sepa-
rate and independent existence." Lane County v. Oregon, 7 
Wall. 71, 76 (1869). This approach obviously underlay the 
Court's use of the "traditional governmental function" con-
cept in National League of Cities. It also has led to the sep-
arate requirement that the challenged federal statute "ad-
dress matters that are indisputably 'attribute[s] of state 
sovereignty."' Hodel, 452 U. S., at 288, quoting National 
League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 845. In National League of 
Cities itself, for example, the Court concluded that decisions •' 
by a State concerning the wages an ours f its emplo ees ~~ 0 
are an un ou e a ribu~ e sovereignty." 426 ~ ~ 
U~, at 845. The opinion did not explain ·what aspects of 
such decisions made them such an "undoubted attribute," and ~J!...L-t...­
the Court since then has remarked on the uncertain scope of 
the concept. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 238, 
n. 11. The point of the inquiry, however, has remained to 
single out particular features of a State's internal governance 
that are deemed to be intrinsic parts of state sovereignty. 
We doubt that courts ultimately can identify principled 
constitutional limitations on the scope of Congress' Com-
merce Clause powers over the States merely by relying on a 
priori definitions of state sovereignty. In part, this is be-
cause of the elusiveness of objective criteria for "funda-
mental" elements of state sovereignty, a problem we have 
witnessed in the search for "tra · · ental func-
tions." There is, however, mor ndamental reaso :the 
sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution Itself. 
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A variety of sovereign powers, for example, are withdrawn 
from the States by Article I, § 10. Section 8 of the same Ar-
ticle works an equally sharp contraction of state sovereignty 
by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legisla-
tive powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause 
of Article VI) to displace contrary state legislation. "'See 
Hodel, 452 U. S., at 290-292. By providing for final review 
of questions of federal law in this Court, Article III curtails 
the sovereign power of the States' judiciaries to make author-
itative determinations of h:fw. See Mailfn v. Hunter's Les-
see, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816). Finally, the developed application, 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, of the greater part of 
the Bill of Rights to tile mires"11mits the sovereign authority 
that States otherwise would possess to legislate with respect 
to their citizens and to conduct their own affairs. 
The States unquestionably do "retai[n] a significant meas-
ure of soverei authority." boc v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., 
at 269 ( ELL, , dissenting). They do so, however, only 
to the exten t at the Constitution has not divested them of 
their original powers and transferred those powers to the 
Federal Government. In the words of James Madison to the 
Members of the First Congress: "Interference with the 
power of the States was no constitutional criterion of the 
f
power of Congress. If ~w~l" wa~ no~ given, Congress 
could not exercise it;- ii given~xercise 1t, al-
thougl1ifsliOuidTriterfere with the laws, or even the Con-
stitution of the States." 2 Annals of Cong. 1897 (1791). 
Justice Field made the same point in the course of his defense 
of state autonomy in his dissenting opinion in Baltimore & 
Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 401 (1893), a defense 
quoted with approval in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 
64, 78-79 (1938): 
"[T]he Constitution of the United States ... recog-
nizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of 
tlie a es-m ependence in their legislative and inde-
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pervision over either the legislative or t judicial action 
of the States is in no case permissibl except as to mat-
ters by the Constitutio s ec1 call uthorized or dele-
gated to the United States. A ny interference with 
either, except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the au-
thority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its 
independence." 
As a result, to say that the Constitution assumes the con-
tinued role of the States is to say little about the nature of 
that role. Only recently, this Court recognized that the pur-
pose of the constitutional immunity recognized in National 
League of Cities is not to preserve "a sacred province of state 
autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S., at 236. With 
rare exce tions like the guarantee, in Article IV, § ~ 
s ate territorial integrit the Constit~oes not carve_g.ut J 
ex ress e emen s o s ate soverei t on ess rna not 
em loy its el ate powers to dis lace. James Wilson re-
minde the Pennsylvania ratifying convention in 1787: "It is 
true, indeed, sir, although it presupposes the existence of 
state governments, yet this Constitution does not suppose 
them to be the sole power to be respected." 2 Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution 439 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (Elliot). The power 
of the Federal Government is a "power to be respected" as 
well, and the fact that the States remain sovereign as to all 
powers not vested in Congress or denied them by the Con-
stitution offers no guidance about where the frontier between 
state and federal power lies. In short, we have no license to 
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when 
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause. 
I~ 
When we look for the States' "residuary and inviolable sov-
~ty," The Federalist No. 39, p. . Wnght e . 1961) 
(J. Madison), in the shape of the constitutional scheme rather 
than in predetermined notions of sovereign power, a different 
measure of state sovereignty emerges. Apart from the limi-
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~AAA~~--~ ~~ 
VY,.__- · t ation -on federal authority inherent in the dele ated nature 
/'\ of Con ess Article I ower , e prmcipal means chosen oy ~ 
the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal 
system lies in the tructure of the Federal Government itself. 
It is no novelty t o se e that the composition of the Fed-
eral Government was designed in large part to protect the 
States from overreaching by Congress. 11 The Framers thus 
gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive 
-v'v-~ 
L'k-L+v-b-- ,.._ 
and the egis atlve ranches o the Fooeral Government. 
The States were vested with indirect influence over the 
House of Representatives and the Presidency by their con-





elections. U. S. Const., Art. I, § 2, and Art. II, § 1. They 
were given more direct influence in the Senate, where each 
State received equal representation and each Senator was to 
be selected by the legislature of his State. Art. I, § 3. The 
significance attached to the States' equal representation in 
the Senate is underscored by the prohibition of any constitu-
tional amendment divesting a State of equal representation 
without the State's consent. Art. V. 
The extent to which the structure of the Federal Govern-
ment itself was relied on to insulate the interests of the 
States is evident in the views of the Framers. James Madi-
son explained that the Federal Government "will partake suf-? 
ficiently of the spirit [of the States], to be disinclined to in- ~ 
vade the rights of the individual States, or the prerogatives 
of their governments." The Federalist No. 46, p. 332 (B.  
Wright ed. 1961). Similarly, James Wilson observed that "it ~ ~
was a favorite object in the Convention" to provide for the ~-. · _- ~ J 
security of the States against federal encroachment and that ~ ~~ 
 
11 See, e. g., J. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Proc-
ess 175-184 (1980); Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selectwlr orthe N a'tiumrl. Govern-
ment, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954); La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism Redux: Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents 
of the Nation, 60 Wash. U. L. Q. 779 (1982). 
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the structure of the Federal Government itself served that 
end. 2 Elliot, at 438-439. Madison placed particular reli-
ance on the equal representation of the States in the Senate, 
which he saw as "at once a constitutional recognition of the 
portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and 
an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty." 
The Federalist No. 62, p. 408 (B. Wright ed. 1961). He fur-
ther note~esiduary sovereignty of the States [is] 
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one 
branch of the [federal] legislature" (emphasis added). The 
Federalis~ p. 315 (B. Wright ed. 1961). See also 
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 435 (1819). In short, 
the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which spe-
cial restraints on federal power over the States inhered prin-
cipally in the workings of the National Government itself, 
rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal 
authority. State sovereign interests, then, are more prop-
erly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the 
structure of the federal system than by judicially created 
limitations on federal power. 
The effec_!jveness of the federal political process in preserv-~ . 
ing the States' interests is apparent even today in the course 
of federal legislation. On the one hand, the States have been 7 ~ 
able to direct a substantial proportion of federal revenues ~--- ~ . _ 
into their own treasuries in the form of general and program- /~' --~ 
specific grants in aid. The federal role in assisting state and "-1:.....--
local govern!!lents is a longstandfngo ne; Congress provided ~La _,. ..... A .• #--.. 
federal land grants to finance state governments from the be- r-r---r~ 
ginning of the Republic, and direct cash grants were awarded 
as early as 1887 under the Hatch Act. 12 In the past quarter-
century alone, federal grants to States and localities have 
12 See, e. g., A. Howitt, Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovern-
mental Relations 3-18 (1984); Break, Fiscal Federalism in the United 
States: The First 200 Years, Evolution and Outlook, in The Future of Fed-
eralism in the 1980s, pp. 39-54 (July 1981). 
~ ..... 
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grown from $7 billion to $96 billion. 13 As a result, federal 
grants now account for about one-fifth of state and local gov-
ernment expenditures. 14 The States have obtained federal I 
funding for such services as police and fire protection, educa-
tion, public health and hosl![tals, parks and recreation,alld 
sanitation. r~oreover, at the same time that the Stat~s 
have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they 
have been able to exempt themselves from a wide variet of 
obligations Impose y s under the Commerce 
ause. or examp e, t e Federal Power Act, the National 
Labor Relations Act, the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the 
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, and the Sher-
man Act all contain express or implied exemptions for States 
and their subdivisions. 16 The fact that some federal statutes 
13 A. Howitt, supra, at 8; Bureau of the Census, U. S. Dept. of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, Federal Expenditures by State for Fiscal 
Year 1983, p. 2 (1984) (Census, Federal Expenditures); Division of Govern-
ment Accounts and Reports, Fiscal Service-Bureau of Government Fi-
nancial Operations, Dept. of the Treasury, Federal Aid to States: Fiscal 
Year 1982, p. 1 (1983 rev. ed.). 
14 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant 
Features of Fiscal Federalism 120, 122 (1984). 
15 See, e. g., the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 197 4, 88 
Stat. 1535, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 2201 et seq.; the Urban Park and 
Recreation Recovery Act of 1978, 92 Stat. 3538, 16 U. S. C. § 2501 et seq.; 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 27, as 
amended, 20 U. S. C. § 2701 et seq.; the Water Pollution Control Act, 62 
Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.; the Public Health Serv-
ice Act, 58 Stat. 682, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.; the Safe Drink-
ing Water Act, 88 Stat. 1660, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 300f et seq.; the 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 197, as 
amended, 42 U. S. C.§ 3701 et seq.; the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 633, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5301 et seq.; and 
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 
1109, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 5601 et seq. See also Census, Federal Ex-
penditures, at 2-15. 
16 See 16 U. S. C. § 824(f); 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); 29 
U. S. C. § 652(5); 29 U. S. C. §§ 1003(b)(l), 1002(32); and Parker v. Brown, 
317 u. s. 341 (1943). 
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such as the FLSA extend general obligations to the States 
cannot obscure the extent to which the political position of 
the States in the federal system has served to minimize the 
burdens that the States bear under the Commerce Clause. 17 
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal 
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of 
which has been the substitution of popular election of Sena-
tors by the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, 
and that these changes may work to alter the influence of the 
States in the federal political process. 18 Nonetheless, } 
against this background, we are convinced that the funda-
mental limitation that the constitutional scheme imposes- on 
~----~,__-
the Commerce Clause to protect the "States as States" is one 
of process rather than one of result. Any substantivere-
straint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find 
its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limita-
tion, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible 
failings in the national political process rather than to dictate 
a "sacred province of state autonomy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 
460 U. S., at 236. 
Insofar as the present cases are concerned, then, we need 
go no further than to state that we erceive nothin 1 the 
overtime and minimum-wa e re. uiremen s of th LSA, as 
apphe o AMTA, a is destructive of state sover i ty or 
violative of any constltu 10na provision. SAMTA faces 
nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime ob-
17 Even as regards the FLSA, Congress incorporated special provisions 
concerning overtime pay for law enforcement and firefighting personnel 
when it amended the FLSA in 1974 in order to take account of the special 
concerns of States and localities with respect to these positions. See 29 
U. S. C. § 207(k). Congress also declined to impose any obligations on 
state and local governments with respect to policymaking personnel who 
are not subject to civil service laws. See 29 U. S. C. § 203(e)(2)(C)(i) and 
(ii). 
18 See, e. g., Choper, supra, at 177-178; Kaden, Politics, Money, and 
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 860-868 
(1979). 
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ligations that hundreds of thousands of other employers, pub-
lic as well as private, have to meet. 
In these cases, the status of public mass transit simply un-
derscores the extent to which the structural protections of 
the Constitution insulate the States from federally imposed 
burdens. When Congress first subjected state mass-transit 
systems to FLSA obligations in 1966, and when it expanded 
those obligations in 1974, it simultaneously provided exten-
sive funding for state and local mass transit through UMTA. 
In the two decades since its enactment, UMTA has provided 
over $22 billion in mass transit aid to States and localities. 19 
In 1983 alone, UMTA funding amounted to $3.7 billion. 2Q As 
noted above, SAMTA and its immediate predecessor have re-
ceived a substantial amount of UMTA funding, including over 
$12 million during SAMTA's first two fiscal years alone. In 
short, Congress has not simply placed a financial burden on 
the shoulders of States and localities that operate mass-tran-
sit systems, but has provided substantial countervailing fi-
nancial assistance as well, assistance t at may leave individ-
ualmass transit systems better off than they would have 
been had Congress never intervened at all in the area. Con-
gress' treatment of public mass transit reinforces our convic-
tion that the national political process systematically protects 
States from the risk of having their functions in that area 
handicapped by Commerce Clause regulation. 21 
19 See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions for 1983: Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 808 (1982) (fiscal years 
1965-1982); Census, Federal Expenditures 15 (fiscal year 1983). 
20 Census, Federal Expenditures 15. 
21 Our references to UMTA are not meant to imply that regulation under 
the Commerce Clause must be accompanied by countervailing financial 
benefits under the Spending Clause. The application of the FLSA to 
SAMTA would be constitutional even had Congress not provided federal 
funding under UMTA. 
.. 
• 
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IV 
This analysis makes clear that Congress' action in affording 
SAMTA employees the protections of the wage and hour pro-
visions of the FLSA contravened no affirmative limit on Con-
gress' 2ower under the Commerce Clause. The judgment of 
the District Court must therefore be reversed. 
Of course, we continue to recognize that the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system and 
tha~ess' authority under the Commerce 
Clause must reflect that position. But the principal and 
basic limit on the federal commerce ower is thatmherent in 
all congressiOnal action-the built-in restraints that our sys-
tem provides through state participation in federal govern-
mental action. The political process ensures that laws that ~ 
unduly burden the St~s wilt- not -9e-promutgated:-1n the ) 
factu:tt-s"etting-of-i ards of the 
political process have performed as intended. 
This case does not require us to identify or define what af-
firmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on 
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce 
Clause. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). We 
note and accept Justice Frankfurter's observation in New 
York -v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 583 (1946): 
"The process of Constitutional adjudication does not 
thrive on conjuring up horrible possibilities that never 
happen in the real world and devising doctrines suffi-
ciently comprehensive in detail to cover the remotest 
contingency. Nor need we go beyond what is required 
for a reasoned disposition of the kind of controversy now 
before the Court." 
Though the separate concurrence providing the fifth vote 
in National League of Cities was "not untroubled by certain 
possible implications" of the decision, 426 U. S., at 856, the 
Court in that case attempted to articulate affirmative limits 
~/ 
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on the Commerce Clause power in terms of core govern-
mental functions and fundamental attributes of state sover-
eignty. But the model of democratic decisionmaking the 
Court there identified underestimated, in our view, the solici- ~ 
tude of the national olitical rocess for the continued ~y 5 
of t e Sfates. Attempts y ot er courts sm en o draw 
gulaance om this model have proved it both impracticable 
and doctrinally barren. In sum, in National League of Cit-
ies the Court tried to repair what did not need repair. 
We do not lightly overrule recent precedent. 22 We have 
not hesitated, however, when it has become apparent that a 
prior decision has departed from a proper understanding of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See 
United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116-117 (1941). Due I 
respect for the reach of congressional power within the fed-
eral system mandates that we do so now. 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), is 
overruled. The judgment of the District Court is reversed, 
and these cases are remanded to that court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
22 But see United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 83, 86-87 (1978). 
~ ~¥~ (H-~7-f p6z); 
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[December-, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in 
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and 
local governments. Because I believe this decision substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution, 
I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history 
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered 
and overruled. There have been few cases, however, in 
which the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent 
decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The 
1 National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition 
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
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reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the 
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently 
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, Na-
tional League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions 
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. R., 
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in 
Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the 
principles of National League of Cities but found them inap-
plicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in in-
terstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test 
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and 
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the · 
states' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions." 
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the 
test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was con-
sidered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional 
doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute 
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the 
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its rela-
tionship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of 
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), 
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to 
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, N a-
like National League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeat-
edly accepted by our subsequent decisions. 
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tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects 
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that even 
where the requirements of the National League of Cities 
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature 
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies 
state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S. , 
at 288 n. 29. The joint federaVstate system of regulation in 
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the 
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic 
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on 
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, -- (1983). Neverthe-
less , even in such a case, a "departure from the doctrine of 
stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. 
Rumsey , -- U. S.--, -- (1984). See also Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-69;,n. 34 (1982) (STEVENS, J .. 
concurring). In the present case, the five JUstices who com-
pose the majority today participated in National League of 
Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial 
decision, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, 
are not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple prec-
edents that we witness in this case. 3 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR, the only new member1~e Court since our deci-
sion in National League of Cities , has joined the Court in reaffirming its 
principles. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
U. S. 678 (1982) , and FERC v. Mississippi , 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting in part). 
3 As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands re-
spect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health , Inc.,- U. S.- (1983). In this re-
spect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of 
our institutions." Lile , "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va. 
L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916). 
.. 
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Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weaken-
ing the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less 
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution 
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal 
system of government guaranteed by the Constitution and 
implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some 
genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, 
today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to 
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit 
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to deter-
mine the. wage rates and hours of employment of all state and 
local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional 
view of our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent 
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, 
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the states in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself." 
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces 
its decision in National League of Cities because it "in-
evitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make deci-
sions about which state policies its favors and which ones it 
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which 
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress pur-
ports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be 
detennined from time to time by political decisions made by 
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says 
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does· not 
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected ma-
jority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In 
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
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in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-
eral system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court. 
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's 
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews 
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the rati-
fication of the Constitution and the extent to which this 
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a 
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system. 
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the in-
disputably local service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the. test of State immunity approved 
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable 
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unwork-
able, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League 
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to 
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court 
radically departs from long settled constitutional values and 
ignores the role of judicial review in our system of 
government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is 
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental func-
tions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor 
required, such a task. • The Court discusses and condemns 
' In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sover-
eignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is, 
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise 'defi-
nitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provi-
sions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's at-
tempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unhelpful. A 
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining 
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Cen-
ter, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends 
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely 
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions," 
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11, 
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League 
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for de-
termining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of 
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of 
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's 
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas . . . where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state ... compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 
426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balanc-
ing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the 
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry ex-
plicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by 
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects 
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
of the Earth v. Carey , 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles 
of National League of Cities , notwithstanding some of the language of the , 
lower courts. E. g., United States v. Best , 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA91978~ .} 
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). 
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply 
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts in-
terpreting National League of Cities . Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, 
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific 
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular 
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. 
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the 
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See 
ante, at 10. 
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weighing the respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), 
for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immu-
nity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional 
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred 
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique 
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at 
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes 
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in 
subsequent cases. 6 
• 
6 In undertaking such balancing, we have considered , on the one hand, 
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into 
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicate~ the cen-
tral concerns of the Commerce Clause , viz., the promotion of a national 
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U. S. 226, 244 (STEVENS, J ., concurring). See also, for example, United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 
(1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad 
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essen-
tial to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi , 456 U. S. 742, 757 
(1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate com-
merce than electric energy . ... "). Similarly, we have considered 
whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the 
goals of the federal program. S e Fr;J,qV~ Qnited States, 421 U. S. 542 
(1975). See also Hodel 452 U. S~" 282}hatibhal surface mining standard 
necessary to insure compet1tion amon tates does not un ermine States' 
efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we 
have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply with 
federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of Cities·, 426 
U. S., at 846-851. 
'In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity 
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "govern-
mental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying 
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
" p 
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Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is 
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of 
Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted 
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications 
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also 
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under chal-
lenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at 
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does 
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circum-
stances that warrant the conclusion today that National 
League of Cities is necessarily wrong. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the 
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State 
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the 
various States, but once in office they are members of the 
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States , 435 U. S. 444 
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitu-
tional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself 
will protect whatever rights the States may have. 
7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some 
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal ac-
tion affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante , at 27. The 
Court asserts that "(i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safe-
guards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid . The 
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify 
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative 
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined 
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opi~ion , 
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other stand-
ard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunc-
tion of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirma-
tive limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be 
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such 
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies 
to overrule National League of Cities. 
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federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the 
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the Presi-
dent as a representative of the States' interest against fed-
eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power .... " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, --
(1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the elec-
toral role of the States. 9 
8 One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is 
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
are amply p~tected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted 
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an 
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at --. 
9 At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal 
government sufficed to protect, the States might have had a somewhat 
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, 
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court to-
day, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord 
with current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ... 
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justi-
fied by some necessity , the special rather than the ordinary case." 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at 
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, 
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have com-
bined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory 
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators), 
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests , and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. !d., at 50-51. As one 
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop in-
dependent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, la-
borers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports 
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions 
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of 
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in pre-
serving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But 
such political success is not relevant to the question whether 
the political processes are the proper means of enforcing con-
stitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally 
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests 
and the positions of state officials is reduced. " Kaden, "Federalism in the 
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the 
'80s, at 97 (1981). 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the 
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no 
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the 
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental 
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra , at 1-24 
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the 
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the 
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional 
theory, there would remain· serious questions as to its factual premises. 
10 The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the 
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitu-
tionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See 
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to 
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman , 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981): Regardless of the will-
ingness of the federal government to provide federal aid , the constitutional 
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies 
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State 
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance 
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 1, et seq ee Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 
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does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less neces-
sary to rectify the cases in which it does do so. 12 The States' 
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional 
law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the 
people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's 
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal politi-
cal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon-
sistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At 
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled prov-
ince of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with re-
spect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 1 Cranch 
137, 177 (1803). In rejecting the role of the judiciary in pro-
tecting the States from federal overreaching, the Court's 
opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teaching of the 
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its 
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to 
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and 
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions. 
12 This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the elec-
toral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities , a much 
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been 
made in either Buckley v. Valeo , 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the 
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to cer-
tain appointments and thus arguably ''it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The 
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed 
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its con-
trary view. 
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most famous case in our history. 13 
III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major role that 
cannot be preempted by the national government. As con-
temporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying con-
ventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitu-
tion was predicated on this understanding of federalism. 
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to 
ensure that the important role promised the States by the 
proponents of the Constitution was realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was 
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too 
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable 
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until 
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of 
rights, including a prqvision explicitly reserving powers in 
the States, would be among the first business of.the new Con-
gress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the sev-
eral States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Sub-
ject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the 
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost." 
13 The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental func-
tion analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and eco-
nomic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observa-
tion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected 
federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one 
for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may engage in 
"social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court does not ex-
plain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the federal govern-
ment, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities 
to experiment and serve as "laboratories." 
:.. 
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Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159 
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that 
"the general government being paramount to, and in every 
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter 
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying 
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in Anti-
Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209. 
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State 
ratifying convention. 14 See generally 1-~ebates in the - ~ 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (J. Elliot 2d. Ad. 1854). As a result, eight e.-
States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amend-
ments to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these in-
cluded among their recommendations some version of what 
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was 
the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously de-
fective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision 
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the 
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded 
that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 505 and passim 
(1971). It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a 
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new 
Congress. See generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 
(June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly, 
the ten amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were 
"Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Feder-
alists' claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United 
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example, 
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy .. . that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary Historyj--!_~1~0,~5~1~1 ~(1~97.!..:1~)·'-:-;-;-;--:-::-----:-::----- - _sL 
11 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding rati-
fication of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in-
cluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim. 
., 
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proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First 
Congress. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights , supra, 983-1167. 
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents 
the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in our constitu-
tional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental 
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "un-
sound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sys-
tem so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example, 
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of con-
trasts between the attributes of a "national" government and 
those of the government to be established by the Constitu-
tion. While a national form of government would possess an 
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form 
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead con-
sisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject 
within their respective spheres to the general authority than 
the general authority is subject to them, within its own 
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed govern-
ment extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects." ld. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate 
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
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tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
I d., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the 
federal government would be "most extensive and important 
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments 
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this 
division of powers, the State governments generally would 
be more important than the federal government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sover-
eignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States 
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of 
the federal government. The States would serve this essen-
tial role because they would attract and retain the loyalty- of 
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders 
thought, were .found in the objects peculiar to State govern-
ment. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regu-
lat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to 
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately 
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus, 
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as 
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and prop-
erty," a fact which "contributes more than any other circum-
stance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, 
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid. 
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people 
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the 
business of State governments, and "with the members of 
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of 
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party 
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like 
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the every-
day concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loy-
alty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental 
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Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426 
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly 
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usu~p­
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the 
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the 
States and the federal government, a balance designed to 
protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can re-
sult from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce 
Clause as a power "deleg3:ted to the United States" by ~he 
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall 
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing 
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the 
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common de-
fense and the general welfare before its brief reference to 
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the 
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regu-
lated was that which the states themselves lacked the practi-
cal capability to regulate. See, e. g., 1 M. Farrand, The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); 
The Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. -Wy-
oming, 460 U. S. 226, 265 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, the language of the clause itself focuses on activities 
that only a national government could regulate: commerce 
with foreign nations and Indian tribes and "among" the sev-
eral states. 
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To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had 
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its 
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a 
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests 
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States. 
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of 
the essential role of the States in our federal system. 
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was 
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The 
Court observed that "our federal system of government im-
poses definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regu-
late the activities of States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment 
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability 
to .function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843, 
(~Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
1"1 ~Court has recognized repeatedly that State sover-
eignty is a fundamental component of our system of govern-
ment. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon, 
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution rec-
ognized "the necessary existence of the States, and, within 
their proper spheres, the independent authority of the 
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority 
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation 
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly 
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at 
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City 
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that 
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based 
on.$tate sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683 
(1982), although finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to 
a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to 
I 
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say that the States possess constitutionally preserved sover-
eign powers. 
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in detennining the constitutionality 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court ex-
plicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sover-
eignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has 
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state 
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra; 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter 
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by 
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849,. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federal-
ism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Al-
though it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a 
significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20 
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific 
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explic-
itly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ... 
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The 
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their 
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution 
"The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when 
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See 
ante, at 8. 
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has not divested them of their original powers and trans-
ferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; 
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial re-
view of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism 
appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial role 
that opponents of the Constitution feared they would 
occupy. 17 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of 
[the services] performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not 
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of 
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize 
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See 
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities 
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the ev-
eryday lives of citizens. These are services that people are 
in a position to understand and evaluate, and in a democracy, 
have the right to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is func-
17 As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the 
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as in-
struments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus 
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus 
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the con-
cerns of State and local governments). 
11 The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occu,rs at 
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing 
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as 
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is 
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a gov-
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide 
. . . " and that the states and local governments are better 
able than the national government to perform them. 426 
U. S., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N a-
tional League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic 
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to posi-
tions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the 
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the 
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the 
operation of the state and local governments with that of the 
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily 
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the 
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and 
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar 
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments 
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations. 
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes. 
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely 
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of 
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the 
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees 
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities 
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actu-
ally involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the 
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen 
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 
System 95 (1979). • 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous spe-
cial interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make. sub-
stantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These 
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and en-
actment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a 
''political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States and localities. See supra, n. 9. 
- · . --4 - -· 
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that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as acces-
sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions 
in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these fed-
eral employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge. 
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their 
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense 
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the 
services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and 
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services, 
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervi-
sors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies. 
It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington as the 
Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self-govern-
ment" .is best exemplified. 
IV 
The question presented in this case is whether the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a 
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on 
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold-
~ng does far more than simply answer this question in the 
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's 
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions 
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinc-
tion between public and private employers that had been 
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's 
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright 
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of 
the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
11 The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that 
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the 
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National 
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R., 
and FERC v. Mississippi. See supra n. 5 and ante, at--. 
The Court does not find in this case that the "federal interest 
is demonstrably greater." 426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., 
concurring). No such finding could have been made, for the 
state interest is compelling. The financial impact on States 
and localities of displacing their control over wages, hours, 
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with their 
employees could have serious, as well as unanticipated, ef-
fects on State and local planning, budgeting, and the levying 
of taxes. 20 As we said in National League of Cities , federal 
control of the terms and conditions of employment of State 
employees also inevitably "displaces state policies regarding 
the manner in which [States] will structure delivery of those 
governmental services that .citizens require." !d., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intra-
city mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of 
service traditionally provided by local government. It is 
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from 
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which 
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.'" The 
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of 
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's 
opinion in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975). 
20 As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 1f:-j 
U. S. 183, 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting),._ .,Extension of the FLSA to the J/....;- \!:.- f 
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and threaten their au-
tonomy in the regulation of health and education." Id., at 203. 
21 In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his 
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional as-
pects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view 
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., 
at 686. 
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course must be intimately familiar with these services and 
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also 
know that their constituents and the press respond to the ad-
equacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is 
this kind of state and local control and accountability that the 
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preserva-
tion of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly 
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that 
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify 
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain 
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal 
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), 
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, 
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hos-
pitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opin-
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in 
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the 
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government 
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at 
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once 
again a realistic one. 
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic 
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional 
role of judicial review, I dissent. 
12/16 
1st CHAMBERS DRAFT 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Nos. 82-1913 AND 82-1951 
JOE G. GARCIA, APPELLANT 
82-1913 v. 
SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT 
AUTHORITY ET AL. 
RAYMOND J. DONOVAN, SECRETARY OF 
LABOR, APPELLANT 
82-1951 v. 
SAN ANTONIO METROPOLITAN TRANSIT 
AUTHORITY ET AL. 
ON APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
[December -, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in 
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on stat~ and 
local governments. Because I believe this decision substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution, 
I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history 
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered 
and overruled. I can recall, however, no case in which the 
principle of stare decisis was ignored as flagrantly as we now 
witness. 1 The reasoning of the Court in National League of 
1 National League of Cities, following some changes in _the composition 
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz , 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Un-
. ' ' 
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Cities, and the principle applied there, have been reiterated 
consistently over the past eight years. Since its decision in 
1976, National League of Cities has been cited and quoted in 
opinions joined by every member of the present Court. 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 
264, 287-293 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long 
Island R. R., 455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mis-
sissippi, 456 U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three 
years ago, in Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court 
reaffirmed the principles of National League of Cities but 
found them inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily 
engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test 
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and 
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the 
states' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions." 
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the 
test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was con-
sidered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional 
doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute 
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the 
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its rela-
tionship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of 
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), 
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to 
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, N a-
tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects 
like National League of Cities, the holding of Wirtz had not been repeat-
edly accepted by our subsequent decisions . 
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of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that even 
where the requirements of the National League of Cities 
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature 
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies 
state submission.'" Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., 
at 288 n. 29. The joint federal/state system of regulation in 
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the 
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic 
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on 
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, -- (1983). Neverthe-
less, even in such a case, however, a "departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey,-- U.S.--,-- (1984). See also Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STE-
VENS, concurring). In the present case, the five Justices 
who compose the majority today participated in National 
League of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability 
of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of 
this Court, are not served by the abrupt overruling of multi-
ple precedents we witness in this case. 3 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weaken-
ing the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less 
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR succeeded Justice Stewart in September 1981, and 
participated in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982). 
3 As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands re-
spect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,- U. S.- (1983). In this re-
spect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of 
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va. 
L. Rev. 955,956 (1916). 
82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT 
4 GARCIAv. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH. 
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal 
system guaranteed by ~he Constitution and implicit in the 
very name of our country. Despite some genuflecting in 
Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's decision 
effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless 
rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act 
["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' 
power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage 
rates and hours of employment of all state and local em-
ployees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional view of 
our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent • 
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, 
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the states in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself." 
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces 
its decision in National League of Cities because it "in-
evitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make deci-
sions about which state policies its favors and which ones it 
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which 
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress pur-
ports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be 
determined from time to time by political decisions made by 
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says 
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not 
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected ma-
jority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In 
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-
eral system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
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ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court. 
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's 
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews 
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the rati-
fication of the Constitution and the extent to which this 
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a 
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system. 
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the in-
disputably local service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved 
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable 
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unwork-
able, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League· 
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to 
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court 
radically departs from long settled principles of constitu-
tionalism and of the role of judicial review in our system of 
government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is 
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental ftmc-
tions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor 
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns 
• In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sover-
eignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is, 
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise defi-
nitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provi-
sions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's at-
tempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unpersuasive. A 
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining 
governmental functions. E . g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Cen-
ter, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends 
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles 
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the 
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely 
historical" functions, '"uniquely' governmental functions," 
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11, 
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League 
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for de-
termining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of 
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of 
Cities and concurred. separately to point out that the Court's 
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 
426 U. S., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring). 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balanc-
ing approach, JusTICE BLA.CKMUN quite correctly cited the 
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry ex-
plicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by 
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects 
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), 
lower courts. E. g., in United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978) 
and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA61981). 
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply 
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts in-
terpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, 
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific 
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular 
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. 
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the 
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See 
ante, at 10. 
6 In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand, 
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immu-
nity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional 
doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred 
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique 
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at 
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes 
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in 
subsequent cases. 6 
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is 
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of 
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into 
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the cen-
tral concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U. S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). E. g. United Transporta-
tion Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 (1982) ("Con-
gress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor services is 
necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the na-
tional economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982), ("it is 
difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than 
electric energy .. . . "). Similarly, we have considered whether exempt-
ing States from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the federal 
program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975). See also Hodel, 
452 U. S. at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure 
competition among States does not undermine States' efforts to maintain 
adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we have assessed the 
injury done to the States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause 
enactments. See National League of Cities, 426 U. S., at 846-851. 
6 In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity 
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "govern-
mental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United 
States , 326 U. S. 572 (1946) , it has not taken the drastic approach of relying 
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitu-
tional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself 
will protect whatever rights the States may have. 
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Cities. Although JusTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted 
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications 
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also 
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under chal-
lenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at 
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does 
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circum-
stances that warrant a different holding. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the 
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State 
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the 
various States, but once in office they are members of the 
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the 
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the Presi-
dent as a representative of the · States' interest against fed-
7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some 
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal ac-
tion affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The 
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safe-
guards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid . The 
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify 
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative 
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined 
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion, 
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other stand-
ard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunc-
tion of the "political process. " The Court's failure to specify the "affirma-
tive limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be 
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such 
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies 
to overrule National League of Cities. 
8 One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is 
composed of individuals, individual rights are amply protected by the legis-
lative process. Yet, the position adopted today is indistinguishable in 
principle. The Tenth Amendment was adopted as an essential part of the 
Bill of Rights and should be viewed as such. See infra, at --. 
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eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power .... " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, --
(1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the elec-
toral role of the States. 9 
9 At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal 
government sufficed to protect the States might have had somewhat more 
practical, although not more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, whose 
seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today, 
predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with 
current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ... 
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justi-
fied by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at 
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, 
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have com-
bined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory 
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators), 
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one 
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop in-
dependent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, la-
borers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports 
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests 
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the 
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the 
'80s 97 (1981). 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the 
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no 
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the 
,. 
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions 
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of 
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in pre-
serving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But 
political success is not relevant to the question whether the 
political processes are the proper means of enforcing constitu-
tional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally does 
not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less neces-
sary to rectify the infrequent cases in which it does do so. 12 
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental 
value of federalism.") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24 
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the 
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the 
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional 
theory,. there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises. 
10 The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the 
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitu-
tionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See 
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to 
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the will-
ingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional 
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies 
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State 
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Inslirance 
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 24. The Court does not 
suggest that this restraint will continue after its decision is understood. 
Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to accept the 
Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and other stat-
utes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions. 
12 This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
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The States' role in our system of government is a matter of 
constitutional law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respec-
tively, or to the people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's 
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal politi-
cal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon-
sistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At 
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled prov-
ince of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with re-
spect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In reject-
ing the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from 
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explana-
tion for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our 
history.'3 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the elec-
toral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much 
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been 
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the 
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to cer-
tain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The 
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed 
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its con-
trary view. 
'
8 The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
suggests that under the application of the "trad1tional" governmental func-
tion analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and eco-
nomic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observa-
tion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice 
Brandeis, dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an un-
elected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular func-
tion is one for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may 
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III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major role that 
cannot be preempted by the national government. As con-
temporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying con-
ventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitu-
tion was predicated on this understanding of federalism. 
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to 
ensure that the important role promised the States by the 
proponents of the Constitution was realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was 
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too 
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable* 
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until 
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of 
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in 
the States, would be among the first business of the new Con-
gress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the sev-
eral States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Sub-
ject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the 
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost." 
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159 
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that 
"the general government being paramount to, and in every 
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter 
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying 
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 1788), reprinted in Anti-
Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209. 
engage in "social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court's 
decision putting federal Commerce Clause enactments beyond judicial re-
view, however, surely does not enhance the States' opportunities to serve 
as "laboratories." 
J • 
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Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State 
ratifying convention. 14 See generally Elliot, Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (1854). As a result, eight States voted for the 
Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted 
after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their 
recommendations some version of what later became the 
Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that 
the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a 
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers 
to the States, that in order to secure the votes for rati-
fication, the Federalists eventually conceded that such pro-
visions were necessary. See Schwartz, A Documentary His-
tory of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 and passim. It was 
thus generally agreed that co.nsideration of a bill of rights 
would be among the first business of the new Congress. See 
generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 (June 8, 1789) (re-
marks of James Madison). Accordingly, the ten amend-
ments that we know as the Bill of Rights were proposed and 
adopted early in the first session of the First Congress. 
Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, 
supra, 983-1167. · 
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents 
the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in our constitu-
tional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental 
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "un-
sound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
14 Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Feder-
alist claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United 
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example, 
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights, supra, at 510, 511. 
16 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding rati-
fication of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in-
cluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim. 
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Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sys-
tem so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example, 
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of con-
trasts between the attributes of a "national" government and 
those of the government to be established by the Constitu-
tion. While a national form of government would possess an 
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form 
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead con-
sisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject 
within their respective spheres to the general authority than 
the general authority is subject to them, within its own 
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed govern-
ment extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects." !d. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate 
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
.. 
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Id., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the 
federal government would be "most extensive and important 
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments 
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this 
division of powers, the State governments generally would 
be more important than the federal government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sover-
eignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States 
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of 
the federal government. The States would serve this essen-
tial role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of 
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders 
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to State govern-
ment. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regu-
lat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to 
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately 
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus, 
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as 
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and prop-
erty," a fact which "contributes more than any other circum-
stance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, 
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid. 
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people 
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the 
business 9f State governments, and "with the members of 
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of 
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party 
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like 
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the every-
day concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loy-
alty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental 
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426 
... 
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U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly 
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurp-
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the 
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the 
States and the federal government, a balance designed to 
protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can re-
sult from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce 
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the 
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall 
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing 
. the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the 
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common de-
fense and the general welfare before its brief reference to 
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the 
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regu-
lated was that which the states themselves were powerless to 
regulate. See, e. g., 1M. Farrand, The Records of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); The Federalist Nos. 
7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 
226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting). Indeed, the 
language of the clause itself focuses on activities that only a 
national government could regulate: commerce with foreign 
nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states. 
To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had 
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its 
authority in regulating activities beyond the capability of a 
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests 
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States . 
"', ' .... 
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In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of 
the essential role of the States in our federal system. 
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was 
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The 
Court observed that "our federal system of government im-
poses definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regu-
late the activities of States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment 
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability 
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843, 
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sover-
eignty is a fundamental component of our system of govern-
ment. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon, 
74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Con-
stitution recognized "the necessary ~xistence of the States, . 
and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority 
of the States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this au-
thority extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regu-
lation ... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not 
expressly delegated to the national government are re-
served." Id., at 76. Recently, in Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the 
Court recognized that the state action exemption from the 
antitrust laws was based on State sovereignty. Similarly, in 
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 
455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway 
Labor Act applicable to a state-owned railroad, the unani-
mous Court was careful to say that the States possess. con-
stitutionally preserved sovereign powers. 
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality 
of the Public Utility .Regulatory Policies Act, the Court ex-
plicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sover-
eignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
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sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has 
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state 
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra; 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter 
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by 
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federal-
ism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Al-
though it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a 
significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20 
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific 
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explic-
itly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ... 
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The 
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their 
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution 
has not divested them of their original powers and trans-
ferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; 
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign power without judicial review of its 
action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to 
18 The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when 
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See 
ante, at 8. 
I • 
' .. 
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relegate the States to precisely the trivial role that oppo-
nents of the Constitution feared they would occupy. 17 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of 
[the services] performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not 
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of 
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize 
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See 
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities 
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the ev-
eryday lives of people. These are services that people have 
the ability to understand and evaluate as well as the right, in 
a democracy, to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is func-
17 As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the 
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as in-
struments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus 
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et alas Amicus 
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the con-
cerns of State and local governments). 
18 The · Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at 
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing 
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as 
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is 
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a gov-
ernmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at 
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actu-
ally involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the 
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen 
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 
System 95 (1979). 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous spe-
cial interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make sub-
stantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These 
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and en-
actment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a 
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide 
. . . " and that the states and local governments are better 
able than the national government to perform them. 426 
U. S., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N a-
tional League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic 
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to posi-
tions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the 
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the 
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the 
operation of the state and local governments with that of the 
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily 
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the 
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and 
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar 
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments 
and agencies typically are authorized to write regulations. 
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes. 
Like the original legislation, these are drafted largely by 
staff personnel. Thus, the administration and enforcement 
of federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the 
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees 
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities 
that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as acces-
sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions 
in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these fed-
eral employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge. 
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their 
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense 
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the 
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States and localities. 
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services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and 
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services, 
than are state legislatures, city councils, and boards of super-
visors of local agencies. Thus, while I share the Court's con-
cern with "principles of democratic self-government," I 
think they are better served by National League of Cities 
than the Court's position today. 
IV 
The question presented in this case is whether the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a 
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on 
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold-
ing does far more than simply answer this question in the 
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's 
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions 
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinc-
tion between public and private employers that had been 
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's 
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright 
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of 
the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
I return now to the balancing test approved in National 
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R., 
and FERC v. Mississippi. Under this test, the Court 
should consider whether the service or activity at issue is one 
that "the states and their political subdivisions have tradi-
tionally afforded their citizens." National League of Cities, 
supra, at 855. See ante, at --. One cannot think of a 
19 The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that 
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the 
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's 
opinion in Fry, supra, at 547 n. 7. 
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more fundamental and traditional activity of a State than 
determination of the terms and conditions of employment of 
its own employees. Moreover, the Court does not find in 
this case that the "federal interest is demonstrably greater." 
No such finding could have been made, for the state interest 
is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities 
of displacing their control over wages, hours, overtime regu-
lations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees 
could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State 
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As 
we said in National League of Cities, federal control also 
inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in 
which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental 
services that citizens require." !d., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intra-
city mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of 
service traditionally provided by local government. It is 
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from 
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which 
citizens are more 'familiar[] and minutely conversant.'" The 
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of 
course must be intimately familiar with these services and 
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also 
know that their constituents and the press respond to the ad-
equacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is 
20 As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 
supra, extention of the FLSA to the States could "disrupt the fiscal policy 
of the states and threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and 
education." I d., at 302. 
21 In Long Island R . Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his 
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional as-
pects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view 
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., 
at 686. 
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this kind of state and local control and accountability that the 
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preserva-
tion of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly 
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that 
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify 
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain 
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal 
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), 
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, 
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hos-
pitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opin-. 
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in 
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the 
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government 
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at 
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once 
again a realistic one. 
As I view the Court' decision today as rejecting the basic 
precepts of ourfederal system and limiting the constitutional 
role of judicial review, I dissent. 
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The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in 
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on stat~ and 
local governments. Because I believe this decision substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution, 
I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history 
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered 
r----------~=an~d~ov~e~rru~l::::e::;.d·:.-1\..:....:.,,.:.:::;~ in which the 
principle of stare decisis as we now 
witness. 1 The reasoning of the Court in National League of 
1 National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition 













82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT 
2 GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH. 
Cities, and the principle applied there, have been reiterated 
consistently over the past eight years. Since its decision in 
1976, National League of Cities has been cited and quoted in 
opinions joined by every member of the present Court. 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 
264, 287-293 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long 
Island R. R., 455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mis-
sissippi, 456 U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three 
years ago, in Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court 
reaffirmed the principles of National League of Cities but 
found them inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily 
engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test 
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and 
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the 
states' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions." 
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the 
test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was con-
sidered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional 
doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute 
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the 
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its rela-
tionship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of 
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), 
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to 
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, Na-
tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects 
like National League of Cities, the olding f Wirtz had not been repeat-
edly accepted by our subsequent dec sions. 
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of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that even 
where the requirements of the National League of Cities 
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature 
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies 
state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., 
at 288 n. 29. The joint federal/state system of regulation in 
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the 
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic 
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on 
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, -- (1983). Neverthe-
less, even in such a case, hmv~ a "departure from the doc- -~ 
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey,-- U. S. --,-- (1984). See also Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STE-
VENS, concurring). In the present case, the five Justices 
who compose the majority today participated in National 
League of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability 
of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of }/) ~ .;'_, L, ~ ~ _ 
this Court, are not served by the ~ overruling of multi- ,--~,~~ 
ple precedents we witness in this case. 3 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weaken-
ing the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less 
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution 
( 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR succeeded Justice Stewart in September 1981, and'\ 
participated in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 45S J 
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982). ~ 
3 As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands re-
spect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. , - U. S.- (1983). In this re-
spect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of 
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va. 
L. Rev. 955~# 
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itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal 
system guaranteed by the Constitution and implicit in the 
very name of our country. Despite some genuflecting in 
Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's decision 
effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless 
rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act 
["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' 
power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage 
rates and hours of employment of all state and local em-
ployees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional view of 
our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent 
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, 
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the states in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself." 
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces 
its decision in National League of Cities because it "in-
evitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make deci-
sions about which state policies its favors and which ones it 
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which 
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress pur-
ports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be 
determined from time to time by political decisions made by 
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says 
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not 
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected ma-
jority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In 
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-
eral system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
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ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court. 
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's 
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews 
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the rati-
fication of the Constitution and the extent to which this 
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a 
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system. 
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the in-
disputably local service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved 
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable 
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unwork-
able, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League 
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to 
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court 
radically departs from long settled principles of constitu-
tionalism and of the role of judicial review in our system of 
government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is 
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental func-
tions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor 
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns 
'InN ational League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sover-
eignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is, 
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise defi-
nitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provi-
sions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's at-
tempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is ~· A 
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining 
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Cen-
ter, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends 
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles 
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the 
• 
. ,. 
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely 
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions," 
and " 'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11, 
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League 
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for de-
termining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of 
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of 
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's 
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas . . . where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 
426 U. S., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring). 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balanc-
ing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the 
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry ex-
plicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by 
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects 
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), 
lower courts. E. g., in United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978) 
and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA61981). 
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply 
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts in-
terpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, 
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific 
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular 
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. 
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the 
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" amortg them. See 
ante, at 10. 
5 In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand, 
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
. . . . 
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immu-
nity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional 
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred 
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique 
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at 
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes 
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in 
subsequent cases. 6 
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is 
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of 
• 
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into 
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the cen-
tral concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U. S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). E . g: United Transporta-
tion Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 (1982) ("Con-
gress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor services is 
necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the na-
tional economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982), ("it is 
difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than 
electric energy ... . "). Similarly, we have considered whether exempt-
ing States from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the federal 
program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975). See also Hodel, 
452 U. S. at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure 
competition among States does not undermine States' efforts to main · 
adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we have assessed the 
injury done to the States if forced to comply with feder ommerce Clause 
enactments. See National League of Cities , 426 U. S., at 846-851. 
5 In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity 
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "govern-
mental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying 
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitu-
tional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself 
will protect whatever rights the States may have . 
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Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted 
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications 
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also 
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under chal-
lenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at 
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does 
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circum-
stances that warrant a-ffiffere~t aol:ffing. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the 
~ electoral process g;w:~n~ that particular exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State 
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the 
various States, but once in office they are members of the 
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the 
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the Presi-
dent as a representative of the States' interest against fed-
7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some 
"affinp.ative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal ac-
tion affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The 
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safe-
guards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The 
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify 
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative 
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined 
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion, 
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other stand-
ard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunc-
tion of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirma-
tive limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be 
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such 
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies 
to overrule National League of Cities. 
8 One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is 
composed of individuals, individual rights e amply protected by the~ 
~ process. Yet, the position adopt d today is indistinguishable in 
principle. The Tenth Amendment an essential part of the 
Bill of Rights, . See infra, at --. 
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eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power .... " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, --
(1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the elec-
toral role of the States. 9 
'At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal 
government sufficed to protect the States might have had somewhat more 
practical, although not more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, whose 
seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today, 
predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with 
current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ... 
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justi-
fied by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary c:ise." 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at 
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, 
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have com-
bined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory 
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators), 
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. I d., at 50-51. As one 
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop in-
dependent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, la-
borers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports 
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests 
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the 
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the 
'80s 97 (1981). 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the 
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no 
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the 
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions 
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of 
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in pre-
serving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But 
political success is not relevant to the question whether the 
political procesfes are the proper means of enforcing constitu-
tional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally does 
not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less neces-
sary to rectify the iafl'~em cases in whic~ it does do so. 12 
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental 
value of federalism.") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24 
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the 
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore· the 
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional 
theory, there would remain serious. questions as to its factual premises. 
10 The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the 
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitu-
tionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See 
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to 
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the will-
ingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional 
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies 
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State 
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Instirance 
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(l); and the Sherman Act, 
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 24. The Court does not 
suggest that this restraint will continue after its decision is understood. 
Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to accept the 
Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and other stat-
utes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions. 
12 This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
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The States' role in our system of government is a matter of 
constitutional law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respec-
tively, or to the people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's 
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal politi-
cal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon-
sistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At 
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled prov-
ince of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with re-
spect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In reject-
ing the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from 
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explana-
tion for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our 
history. 13 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the elec-
toral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much 
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been 
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the 
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to cer-
tain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The 
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed 
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its con-
trary view. . 
18 The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which· state 
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental func-
tion analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and eco-
nomic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observa-
tion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice 
Brandeis, dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an un-
elected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular func-
tion is one for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may 
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III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major role that 
cannot be preempted by the national government. As con-
temporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying con-
ventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitu-
tion was predicated on this understanding of federalism. 
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to 
ensure that the important role promised the States by the 
proponents of the Constitution was realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was 
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too 
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable 
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until 
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of 
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in 
the States, would be among the first business of the new Con-
gress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the sev-
eral States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Sub-
ject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the 
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost." 
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists. versus Federalists 159 
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that 
"the general government being paramount to, and in every 
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter 
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying 
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 1788), reprinted in Anti-
Federalists versus Federalist~,_§.U ra, at 208-209. 
engage in "social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. llle Cg~'~ . 
dsgisign puttiBg ieaSF-al Cemmen:fi .Cl:mse enactmeats bey9JKLjyffic ~~ 
vi~\'• heweveP, l!ffi'ily. dees not enhance the~~pportunities to erve  
as "laboratories." 
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Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State 
ratifying convention. 14 See generally Elliot, Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (1854). As a result, eight States voted for the 
Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted 
after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their 
recommendations some version of what later became the 
Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that 
the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a 
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers 
to the States, that in order to secure the votes for rati-
fication, the Federalists eventually conceded that such pro-
visions were necessary. See Schwartz, A Documentary His-
tory of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 and passim. It was 
thus generally agreed that consideration of a bill of rights 
would be among the first business of the new Congress. See 
generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 (June 8, 1789) (re-
marks of James Madison). Accordingly, the ten amend-
ments that we know as the Bill of Rights were proposed and 
adopted early in the first session of the First Congress. 
Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, 
supra, 983-1167. 
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents 
the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in our constitu-
tional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental 
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "un-
sound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
14 Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Feder-
alist claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United 
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example, 
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights, supra, at 510, 511. 
15 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding rati-
fication of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in-
cluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762--766 and passim. 
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Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sys-
tem so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example, 
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of con-
trasts between the attributes of a "national" government and 
those of the government to be established by the Constitu-
tion. While a national form of government would possess an 
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form 
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead con-
sisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject 
within their respective spheres to the general authority than 
the general authority is subject to them, within its own 
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed govern-
ment extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects." Id. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate 
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people.; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
'• 
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I d., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the 
federal government would be "most extensive and important 
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments 
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this 
division of powers, the State governments generally would 
be more important than the federal government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sover-
eignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States 
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of 
the federal government. The States would serve this essen-
tial role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of 
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders 
thought, were found in the objec~s peculiar to State govern-
ment. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regu-
lat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to 
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately 
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus, 
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as 
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and prop-
erty," a fact which "contributes more than any other circum-
stance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, 
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid. 
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people 
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the 
business of State governments, and "with the members of 
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of 
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party 
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like 
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the every-
day concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loy-
alty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental 
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426 
,. 
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U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly 
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurp-
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the 
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the 
States and the federal government, a balance designed to 
protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can re-
sult from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce 
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the 
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall 
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing 
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the 
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common de-
fense and the general welfare before its brief reference to 
"Co_mmerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the I 
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regu-
lated was that which the states themselves were powerless o ' 
regulate. See, e. g., 1M. Farrand, The Recordsoftlle Fed-
eral Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); The Federalist Nos. I·.··. 
7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 
226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting). Indeed, the 
language of the clause itself focuses on activities that only a I 
national government could regulate: commerce with foreign 
nations and Iridian tribes and "among" the several states. 
To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had 
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its 
authority -ftr regulating activities beyond the capability of a £-u _ 
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests d 
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States. 
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In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of 
the essential role of the States in our federal system. 
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was 
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The 
Court observed that "our federal system of government im-
poses definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regu-
late the activities of States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment 
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability 
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843, 
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sover-
eignty is a fundamental component of our system of govern-
ment. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Or~gon, 
74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Con-
. stitution recognized "the necessary existence of the States, 
and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority 
of the States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this au-
thority extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regu-
lation ... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not 
expressly delegated to the national government are re-
served." Id., at 76. Recently, in Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the 
Court recognized that the state action exemption from the 
antitrust laws was based on State sovereignty. Similarly, in 
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 
455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway 
Labor Act applicable to a state-owned railroad, the unani-
mous Court was careful to say that the States possess. con-
stitutionally preserved sovereign powers. 
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court ex-
plicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sover-
eignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
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sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has 
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state 
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra; 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter 
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by 
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federal-
ism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Al-
though it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a 
significant measure of sovereign authority,'" ante, at 20 
(quoting EE.OC v. Wyomirig, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific 
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explic-
itly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ... 
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The 
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their 
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution 
has not divested them of their original powers and trans-
ferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; 
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign power ~thout judicial review of its 
action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to 
16 The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when 
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See 
ante, at 8. 
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relegate the States to precisely the trivial role that oppo-
nents of the Constitution feared they would occupy. 17 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of 
[the services] performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not 
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of 
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize 
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See 
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities 
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the ev-
eryday lives of people. These are services that people lwiwe"' 
~ to understand and evaluate as well as the right, in 
a democracy, to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is func-
17 As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the 
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as in-
struments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus 
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et alas Amicus 
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the con-
cerns of State and local governments). 
18 The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at 
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing 
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as 
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is 
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a gov-
ernmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at 
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actu-
ally involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the 
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen 
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 
System 95 (1979). 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous spe-
cial interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make sub-
stantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These 
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and en-
actment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a 
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide 
... " and that the states and local governments are better 
able than the national government to perform them. 426 
U. S., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N a-
tional League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic 
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to posi-
tions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the 
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the 
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the 
operation of the state and local governments with that of the 
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily 
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the 
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and 
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar 
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments 
and agencies ~y are authorized to write regulations. 
Often these are m~e important than the text of the statutes. 
~ n-/ ~ the original legislation, these are drafted largely by -r staff personnel. lhe administration and enforcement 
'. 
-6 
of fe eral aws and regu ~tions necessarily are largely in the 
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees 
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities 
that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as acces-
sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions 
in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these fed-
eral employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge. 
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their 
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense 
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the 
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States and localities. 
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IV 
The question presented in this case is whether the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a 
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on 
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold-
ing does far more than simply answer this question in the 
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's 
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions 
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinc-
tion between public and private employers that had been 
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's 
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright 
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of 
the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
I return now to the balancing test approved in National 
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R., 
and FERC v. Mississippi. OJnder this test, the Court 
should consider whether the service or activity at issue is one 
that "the states and their polibca sUbdivisions have tradi-
tionally afforded their citizens." National League of Cities, 
supra, at 855. See ante, at --. ~ One cannot think of a 
19 The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that 
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the 
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's 
opinion in Fry, supra, at 547 n. 7. 
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more fundamental and traditional activity of a State than l 
determination of the terms and conditions of employment of / 
its own employees. Moreover, the Court does not find in 
this case that the "federal interest is demonstrably greater." 
No such finding could have been made, for the state interest 
is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities 
of displacing their control over wages, hours, overtime regu-
lations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees 
could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State 
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As 
we said in National League of Cities, federal control also 
inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in 
which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental 
services that citizens require." Id., at 847) 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intra-
city mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of 
service traditionally provided by local government. It is 
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from 
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which 
citizens are more 'familiar[] and minutely conversant.'" The 
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of 
course must be intimately familiar with these services and 
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also 
know that their constituents and the press respond to the ad-
equacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is 
20 As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz , 
supra, extention of the FLSA to the States could "disrupt the fiscal policy 
of the states and threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and 
education." ld., at 302. 
21 In Long Island R . Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his 
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional as-
pects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view 
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation. " 455 U. S., 
at 686. 
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this kind of state and local control and accountability that the 
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preserva-
tion of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly 
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that 
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify 
even a single aspect of stat~thority that would remain 
when the Commerce Clause 1s invoked to justify federal 
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), 
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, 
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hos-
pitals, institutions, and schools. • Although the Court's opin-
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in 
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the 
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government 
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty,, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at 
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once 
again a realistic one. 
As I view the Court' decision today as rejecting the basic 
precepts of o~ederal system and limiting the constitutional 
role of judicial review, I dissent. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in 
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and 
local governments. Because I believe this decision substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution, 
I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history 
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered 
and overruled. There have been few cases, however, in 
which the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent 
decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The 
1 National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition 
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
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reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the 
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently 
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, Na-
tional League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions 
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in 
Long Island R. Co .. , supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed 
the principles of National League of Cities but found them 
inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in 
interstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League ofCities .test ap-
plicable to this case is the third one [repeated and re-
formulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the 
states' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability to structure integral operations 
in areas of traditional governmental functions." 455 
U. S., at 684. 
The Court in that case recognized that the test "may at 
times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that 
unanimous decision as settled constitutional doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute 
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the 
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its rela-
tionship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of 
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), 
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to 
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, N a-
like National League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeat-
edly accepted by our subsequent decisions. 
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tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects 
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 426 U. S., at 764, n. 28. 
The Court went on to say that even where the require-
ments of the National League of Cities standard are met, 
"'[t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal 
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submis-
sion."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., at 288 n. 29. 
The joint federal/state system of regulation in FERC was 
such a "situation," but there was no hint in the Court's opin-
ion that National League of Cities-or its basic standard-
was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
Although the doctrine is not rigidly applied to constitu-
tional questions, "any departure from the doctrine of stare 
decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 
--U.S.--,-- (1984). See also Oregon v. Kennedy, 
456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concur-
ring). In the present case, the five Justices who compose 
the majority today participated in National League of Cities 
and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial deci-
sion, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are 
not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple prece-
dents that we witness in this case. 3 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weaken-
ing the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less 
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution 
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal 
system of government guaranteed by the Constitution and 
2JUSTICE O'CONNOR, the only new member in the Court since our deci-
sion in National League of Cities, has joined the Court in reaffirming its 
principles. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting in part). 
3 In this respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the 
very nature of our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare 
Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916). 
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implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some 
genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, 
today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to 
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit 
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to deter-
mine the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and 
local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional 
view of our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent 
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, 
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the states in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself." Ante, at 21-22 
(emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces 
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inev-
itably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies its favors and which ones it dis-
likes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which the 
States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports 
to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be deter-
mined from time to time by political decisions made by mem-
bers of the federal government, decisions the Court says will 
not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not 
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected ma-
jority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In 
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-
eral system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court. 
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In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's 
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews 
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the rati-
fication of the Constitution and the extent to which this 
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a 
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system. 
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the in-
disputably local service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved 
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable 
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unwork-
able, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League 
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to 
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court 
radically departs from long settled constitutional values 
and ignores the role of judicial review in our system of 
government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is 
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental func-
tions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor 
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns 
4 In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sover-
eignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is, 
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise defi-
nitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general pro-
visions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's 
attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unhelpful. A 
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining 
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Cen-
ter, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends 
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles 
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the 
lower courts. E. g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978) and 
Hybttd Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). 
·' 
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely 
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions," 
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11, 
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League 
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for de-
termining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of 
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of 
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's 
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 
426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balanc-
ing approach, JuSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the 
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry ex-
plicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by 
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects 
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), 
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply 
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts in-
terpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, 
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific 
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular 
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. 
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the 
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See 
ante, at 10. 
5 In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand, 
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into 
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immu-
nity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional 
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred 
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique 
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." Id., at 
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Assn., 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes 
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in 
subsequent cases. 6 
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the cen-
tral concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U. S. 226, 244 (STEVENS, J., concurring). See also, for example, United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 
(1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad 
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essen-
tial to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 
(1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate com-
merce than electric energy . ... "). Similarly, we have considered 
whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the 
goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 
(1975). See also Hodel , 452 U. S., at 282 (national surface mining stand-
ards necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine 
States' efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other 
hand, we have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to com-
ply with federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of 
Cities, 426 U. S., at 846-851. 
6 In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity 
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "govern-
mental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying 
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitu-
tional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself 
will protect whatever rights the States may have. 
82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT 
8 GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH. 
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is 
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of 
Cities. Although JusTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted 
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications 
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also 
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under chal-
lenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at 
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does 
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circum-
stances that warrant the conclusion today that National 
League of Cities is. necessarily wrong. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the 
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State 
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the 
various States, but once in office they are members of the 
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the 
7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some 
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal ac-
tion affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The 
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safe-
guards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The 
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify 
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative 
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined 
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion, 
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other stand-
ard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunc-
tion of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirma-
tive limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be 
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such 
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies 
to overrule National League of Cities. 
8 One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is 
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted 
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Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the Presi-
dent as a representative of the States' interest against fed-
eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power .... " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, --
(1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the elec-
toral role of the States. 9 
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an 
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at --. 
9 At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal 
government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat 
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, 
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court to-
day, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord 
with current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ... 
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be jus-
tified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at 
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, 
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have com-
bined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory 
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators), 
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one 
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop in-
dependent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, la-
borers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports 
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests 
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the 
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the 
'80s, at 97 (1981). 
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions 
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of 
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in pre-
serving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But 
such political success is not relevant to the question whether 
the political processes are the proper means of enforcing con-
stitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 Colurn. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the 
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no 
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the 
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental 
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24 
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind offederal regulation applicable to the 
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the 
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional 
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises. 
10 The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the 
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitu-
tionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See 
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to 
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the will-
ingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional 
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies 
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State 
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance 
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 1, et seq.; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its 
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to 
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and 
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions. 
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does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less neces-
sary to rectify the cases in which it does do so. 12 The States' 
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional 
law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the 
people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's 
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal politi-
cal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon-
sistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At 
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled prov-
ince of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with 
respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 1 
Cranch 137, 177 (1803). In rejecting the role of the judiciary 
in protecting the States from federal overreaching, the 
Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teach-
ing of the most famous case in our history. 13 
12 This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the elec-
toral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much 
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been 
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United 
States , 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the 
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to cer-
tain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The 
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed 
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its con-
trary view. 
18 The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
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III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major role that 
cannot be preempted by the national government. As con-
temporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying con-
ventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Consti-
tution was predicated on this understanding of federalism. 
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to 
ensure that the important role promised the States by the 
proponents of the Constitution was realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was 
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too 
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable 
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until 
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of 
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in 
the States, would be among the first business of the new Con-
gress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the sev-
eral States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which sl}all extend to every Sub-
ject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the 
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost." 
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159 
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that 
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental func-
tion analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and eco-
nomic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observa-
tion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected 
federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one 
for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may engage in 
"social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court does not ex-
plain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the federal govern-
ment, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities 
to experiment and serve as "laboratories." 
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"the general government being paramount to, and in every 
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter 
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying 
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in Anti-
Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209. 
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State 
ratifying convention. 14 See generally 1-4, Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (J. Elliot 2d. cd. 1854). As a result, eight 
States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amend-
ments to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these in-
cluded among their recommendations some version of what 
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was 
the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously de-
fective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision 
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the 
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded 
that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 505 and passim 
(1971). It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a 
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new 
Congress. See generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 
(June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly, 
the 10 amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were 
proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First 
Congress. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, 983-1167. 
"Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Feder-
alists' claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United 
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example, 
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History. 510, 511 (1971). 
l& Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding rati-
fication of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in-
cluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim. 
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This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents 
the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in our constitu-
tional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental 
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "un-
sound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sys-
tem so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example, 
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of con-
trasts between the attributes of a "national" government and 
those of the government to be established by the Constitu-
tion. While a national form of government would possess an 
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form 
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead con-
sisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject 
within their respective ·spheres to the general authority than 
the general authority is subject to them, within its own 
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed govern-
ment extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects." Ibid. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate 
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
... ;~ 
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which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
!d., at 313. 
Madison considered that the operations of the federal gov-
ernment would be "most extensive and important in times of 
war and danger; those of the State Governments in times of 
peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this division of 
powers, the State governments generally would be more im-
portant than the federal government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sover-
eignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States 
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of 
the federal government. The States would serve this essen-
tial role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of 
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders 
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to State govern-
ment. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regu-
lat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to 
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately· 
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus, 
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as 
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and prop-
erty," a fact which "contributes more than any other circum-
stance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, 
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid. 
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people 
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the 
business of State governments, and "with the members of 
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of 
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party 
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like 
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the every-
day concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loy-
alty. Ibid. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental 
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Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426 
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly 
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurp-
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the 
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the 
States and the federal government, a balance designed to 
protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can re-
sult from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce 
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the 
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall 
have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing 
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the 
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common de-
fense and the general welfare before its brief reference to 
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the 
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regu-
lated was that which the states themselves lacked the practi-
cal capability to regulate. See, e. g., 1 M. Farrand, The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); 
The Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wy-
oming, 460 U. S. 226, 265 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, the language of the clause itself focuses on activities 
that only a national government could regulate: commerce 
with foreign nations and Indian tribes and "among" the sev-
eral states. 
·. 
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To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had 
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its 
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a 
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests 
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States. 
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of 
the essential role of the States in our federal system. 
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was 
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The 
Court observed that "our federal system of government im-
poses definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regu-
late the activities of States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment 
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability 
to function effectively in a federal system." !d., at 842-843, 
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sover-
eignty is a fundamental component of our system of govern-
ment. More than a century ago, 'in Lane County v. Oregon, 
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution 
recognized "the necessary existence of the States, and, 
within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the 
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority 
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation 
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly 
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at 
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City 
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that 
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based 
on State sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R . Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), al-
though finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to a state-
owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that 
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the States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign 
powers. 
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court ex-
plicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sover-
eignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has 
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state 
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra; 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter 
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by 
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federal-
ism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Al-
though it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] 
a significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20 
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific 
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explic-
itly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ... 
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The 
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their 
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution 
18 The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when 
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See 
ante, at 8. 
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has not divested them of their original powers and trans-
ferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; 
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial 
review of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federal-
ism appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial 
role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would 
occupy. 17 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of 
[the services] performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not 
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of 
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize 
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See 
supra, n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities 
engaged in by state ·and local governments that affect the 
everyday lives of citizens. These are services that people 
are in a position to understand and evaluate, and in a democ-
racy, have the right to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is 
17 As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the 
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as in-
struments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus 
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus 
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the con-
cerns of State and local governments). 
18 The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at 
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing 
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No. 45, at 316. This is 
as true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation 
is likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a 
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than 
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functions such as these which governments are created to 
provide . . . " and that the states and local governments are 
better able than the national government to perform them. 
426 U. S., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N a-
tional League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic 
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to posi-
tions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the 
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the 
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the 
operation of the state and local governments with that of the 
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily 
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the 
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and 
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar 
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments 
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations. 
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes. 
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely 
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of 
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the 
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees 
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities 
at the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people ac-
tually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the 
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen 
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 
System 95 (1979). 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous spe-
cial interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbYing, and make sub-
stantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These 
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and en-
actment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a 
''political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States and localities. See supra, n. 9. 
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that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as acces-
sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions 
in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these fed-
eral employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge. 
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their 
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense 
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the 
services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and 
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services, 
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervi-
sors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies. 
It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington as 
the Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self-gov-
ernment" is best exemplified. 
IV 
The question presented in this case is whether the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a 
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on 
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold-
ing does far more than simply answer this question in the 
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's 
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions 
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinc-
tion between public and private employers that had been 
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's 
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright 
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of 
the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
19 The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that 
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the 
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National 
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. Co., 
and FERC v. Mississippi. See supra, n. 5 and ante, at 
The Court does not find in this case that the "federal 
interest is demonstrably greater." 426 U. S., at 856 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). No such finding could have 
been made, for the state interest is compelling. The finan-
cial impact on States and localities of displacing their control 
over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor 
relations with their employees could have serious, as well as 
unanticipated, effects on State and local planning, budgeting, 
and the levying of taxes. 20 As we said in National League of 
Cities, federal control of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of State employees also inevitably "displaces state poli-
cies regarding the manner in which [States] will structure de-
livery of those governmental services that citizens require." 
Id., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intra-
city mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of 
service traditionally provided by local government. It is 
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from 
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which 
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.' " The 
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's 
opinion in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975). 
211 As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 
U. S. 183, 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Extension of the FLSA to the 
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and threaten their 
autonomy in the regulation of health and education." !d., at 203. 
21 In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his 
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional as-
pects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view 
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., 
at 686. 
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Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of 
course must be intimately familiar with these services and 
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also 
know that their constituents and the press respond to the ad-
equacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is 
this kind of state and local control and accountability that the 
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preserva-
tion of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly 
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that 
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify 
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain 
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal 
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), 
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffinned, 
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hos-
pitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opin-
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in 
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the 
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government 
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at 
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once 
again a realistic one. 
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic 
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional 
role of judicial review, I dissent. 
' . 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in 
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on stat~ and 
local governments. Because I believe this decision substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution, 
I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history 
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered 
and overruled. I ea:afee~lll however, DO CllSii in which the 
prmc1p e o s are ectsts · as we now 
witness. 1 The reasoning oft e Court in National League of 
1 National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition 
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
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Cities, and the principle applied there, have been reiterated 
consistently over the past eight years. Since its decision in 
1976, National League of Cities has been cited and quoted in 
opinions joined by every member of the present Court. 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 
264, 287-293 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long 
Island R. R., 455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mis-
sissippi, 456 U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three 
years ago, in Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court 
reaffirmed the principles of National League of Cities but 
found them inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily 
engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test 
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and 
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the 
states' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions." 
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the 
test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was con-
sidered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional 
doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute 
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the 
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its rela-
tionship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of 
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), 
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to 
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, Na-
tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects 
like National League of Cities, the ~of Wirtz had not been repeat-
edly accepted by our subsequent decisions. 
·. 
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of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that even 
where the requirements of the National League of Cities 
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature 
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies 
state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., 
at 288 n. 29. The joint federal/state system of regulation in 
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the 
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic 
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on 
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416,- (1983). Neverthe-
less, even in such a case, iloweve11 a "departure from the doc-
trine of stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona 
v. Rumsey,-- U. S. --,-- (1984). See also Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STE-
VENS, concurring). In the present case, the five Justices 
who compose the majority today· participated in National 
League of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability 
of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of 
this Court, are not served by the ae~'Pt overruling of multi-
ple precedents we witness in this case. 3 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have i:q weaken-
ing the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less 
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR succeeded Justice Stewart in September 1981, and 
participated in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982). 
3 As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands re-
spect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,- U. S.- (1983). In this re-
spect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of 
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va. 
L. Rev. 955t 56 (1916). 
,., ~,. 
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itself. A unique feature of the United Statesfs the federal 
system guaranteed by the Constitution and Implicit in the 
very name of our country. Despite some genuflecting in 
Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, today's decision 
effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless 
rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act 
["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' 
power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage 
rates and hours of employment of all state and local em-
ployees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional view of 
our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent 
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, 
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the states in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself." 
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces 
its decision in National League of Cities because it "in-
evitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make deci-
sions about which state policies its favors and which ones it 
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which 
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress pur-
ports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be 
determined from time to time by political decisions made by 
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says 
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not 
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected ma-
jority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In 
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-
eral system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
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ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court. 
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's 
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews 
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the rati-
fication of the Constitution and the extent to which this 
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a 
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system. 
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the in-
disputably local service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved 
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable 
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unwork-
able, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League 
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to 
define state . immunity are unsound in principle, the Court 
radically departs from lon set led constitu-
..--------~~~ and t e ro e of judicial review in our system of 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is 
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental func-
tions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor 
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns 
' In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sover-
eignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is, 
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise defi-
nitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provi-
sions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's at-
tempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is ttfi~erj\tlasi~. A 
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining 
governmental functions. E . g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Cen-
ter, Inc ., 669 F . 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends 
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles 
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the 
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely 
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions," 
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11, 
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League 
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for de-
termining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of 
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of 
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's 
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas . . . where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 
426 U. 8., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring). 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balanc-
ing approach, JusTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the 
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry ex-
plicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by 
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects 
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), 
lower courts. E. g., WUnited States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978) ;:r 
and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). 
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply 
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts in-
terpreting National League of Cities . Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, 
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific 
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular 
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. 
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the 
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See 
ante, at 10. 
6 In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hafld, 
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
,, . 
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immu-
nity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional 
doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred 
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique 
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at 
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes 
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in 
subsequent cases. 6 
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is 
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of 
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into 
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the cen-
tral concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U. S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concUrring). /!J-:-r1 Untted ransp a-
tion Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 (1982) ("Con- ....__ _____ _ _ 
gress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor services is 
necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to the na-
tional economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 (1982), ("it is 
difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than 
electric energy . . . . "). Similarly, we have considered whether exempt-
ing States from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the federal 
program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975). See also Hodel, 
452 U. S. at 282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure 
competition among States does not undermine States' efforts to maintain 
adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we have~ssessed the c:\.h.o 
injury done to the States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause 
enactments. See National League of Cities , 426 U. S., at 846-851. 
6 In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity 
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "govern-
mental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying 
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitu-
tional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself 
will protect whatever rights the States may have. 
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Cities. Although JuSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted 
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications 
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities , it also 
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under chal-
lenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S. , at 
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does 
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circum-
stances that warrant Hlaf1ef'€~:fietmlK~--=-------L---------
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the 
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State 
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the 
various States, but once in office they are members of the 
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the 
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the Presi-
dent as a representative of the States' interest against fed-
7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some 
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal ac-
tion affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The 
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safe-
guards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The 
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify 
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative 
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined 
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion, 
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other stand-
ard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunc-
tion of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirma-
tive limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be 
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such 
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies 
to overrule National League of Cities. 
8 One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is ~\.A h c. .j 
compose of individuals, individual rights are amply protected by the~~~- 1-
~ process. Yet, the position adopted today is indistinguishable in 
principle. The Tenth Amendment v. 11s a6~tee f1i an essential part of the 
Bill of Right~fut6 ~ho t:tl6 ee viewe6 a~ sud1:1 See infra, at --. 
•also is 
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eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power .... " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, --
(1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the elec-
toral role of the States. 9 
9 At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal ~\ 
government sufficed to rotect the States might have hadJE;'Oinewhat more c.Y 
practical, although not more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, whose 
seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court today, 
predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord with 
current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ... 
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justi-
fied by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection· of the National Government, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at 
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, 
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have com-
bined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory 
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators), 
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. I d., at 50-51. As one 
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop in-
dependent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, la-
borers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports 
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests 
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the 
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the _,._ o.J-
'808)97 (1981). ) 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the 
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no 
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the 
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions 
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of 
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in pre-
serving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But 
po 1 1ca success is not relevant to the question whether the 
political processes are the proper means of enforcing constitu-
tional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally does 
not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less neces-
sary to rectify the iH:fre~tteflcj cases in which it does do so. 12 )-
role of the states)._n the federal system and protecting the fundamental~ 
value of federalismT"))Mf ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24 
(detailing the "drruh'atic shift" in kind offederal regulation applicable to the 
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the 
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional 
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises. 
10 The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the 
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitu-
tionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See 
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to 
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the will-
ingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional 
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies 
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State 
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Re-
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance • 
porting and Discloeure Aot, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Ooropational Safety~
Serority Act, 29 U.S. C. §§1002(32), 1003(b)(l); and tche Shennan Act, I>~
Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 24. The Court does not: 
suggest that this restraint will continue after its decision ~\. 
Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail._t~ ~;:~~t- .. t~e b 
Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and other stat-
utes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions. 
12 This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
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The States' role in our system of government is a matter of 
constitutional law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respec-
tively, or to the people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's 
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal politi-
cal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon-
sistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At 
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled prov-
ince of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with re-
spect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In reject-
ing the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from 
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explana-
tion for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our . 
history. 13 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the elec-
toral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much 
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been 
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the 
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to cer-
tain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U.S., at 841-842.n. 12. The 
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed 
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its con-
trary view. 
13 The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental func-
tion analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and eco- S 
nomic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observa-
tion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (lffistie~ 
Brandeis, dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an un-
elected fe eral judiciary'' makes decisions as to whether a particular func-
tion is one for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may 
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III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major role that 
cannot be preempted by the national government. As con-
temporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying con-
ventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitu-
tion was predicated on this understanding of federalism. 
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to 
ensure that the important role promised the States by the 
proponents of the Constitution was realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was 
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too 
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable 
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until 
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of 
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in 
the States, would be among the first business of the new Con-
gress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the sev-
eral States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Sub-
ject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the 
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost." 
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159 
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that 
"the general government being paramount to, and in every 
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter 
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying the Court does not 
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 1788), reprinted in Anti- eJc la.l.V\ ~ow \~v~ 
Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209. ~/StzLh.!;. vi d~AAllt 0ct¥ __ .., ~e.. l'l"\lf~ ot 'f"\1\JL. 
engage in "social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. 
aeeieieH flloltti.RS :feael'al CoaUAQt'QQ Claase jl~aetmef!tS eeye'REI jaaieial ~ 
view, aomQ17Ql'7 illolt'Qly QOQil J enhance th  opportunities to erve 
as "laboratories." 
f.t.tl.t..hJ ~eYif\~+) 
"-li tkou:t\.f".L.t..Du..ru ..V 
.... " •' U.tJ k..U) 'e..u,) , 
~ 
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Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State 
ratifying convention. 14 See generally Elliot, Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (1854). As a result, eight States voted for the 
Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted 
after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their 
recommendations some version of what later became the 
Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that 
the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a 
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers 
to the States, that in order to secure the votes for rati-
fication, the Federalists eventually conceded that such pro-
visions were necessary. See Schwartz, A Documentary His-
tory of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 and passim. It was 
thus generally agreed that consideration of a bill of rights 
would be among the first business of the new Congress. See 
generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 (June 8, 1789) (re-
marks of James Madison). Accordingly, the ten amend-
ments that we know as the Bill of Rights were proposed and 
adopted early in the first session of the First Congress. 
Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, 
supra, 983-1167. 
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents 
the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in our constitu-
tional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental 
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "un-
sound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
14 Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Feder-
alistl claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United 
Stales in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example, 
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy .. . that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights, supra, at 510, 511. 
16 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding rati-
fication of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in- · 
eluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 761 66 and passim. 
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Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sys-
tem so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example, 
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of con-
trasts between the attributes of a "national" government and 
those of the government to be established by the Constitu-
tion. While a national form of government would possess an 
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form 
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead con-
sisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject 
within their respective spheres to the general authority than 
the general authority is subject to them, within its own 
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed govern-
ment extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects." Id. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate 
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity oft,he State." 
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Id., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the 
federal government would be "most extensive and important 
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments 
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this 
division of powers, the State governments generally would 
be more important than the federal government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sover-
eignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States 
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of 
the federal government. The States would serve this essen-
tial role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of 
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders 
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to State govern-
ment. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regu-
lat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to 
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately 
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus, 
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as 
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and prop-
erty," a fact which "contributes more than any other circum-
stance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, 
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid. 
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people 
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the 
business of State governments, and "with the members of 
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of 
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party 
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like 
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the every-
day concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loy-
alty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental 
Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426 
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U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly 
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurp-
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the 
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the 
States and the federal government, a balance designed to 
protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can re-
sult from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce 
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the 
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall 
have power ... to ~egulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing 
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the 
United States, pay its debts, and pr~vide for the common de-
fense and the general welfare before its brief reference to 
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the 
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regu-
lated was that which the states themselves were powerless to 
regulate. See, e. g., 1M. Farrand, The Records ofthe Fed-
eral Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); The Federalist Nos. 
7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 
226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting). Indeed, the 
language of the clause itself focuses on activities that only a 
national government could regulate: commerce with foreign 
nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states. 
To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had 
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its 
aut ority ~ regulating activities beyond the capability of a 
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests 
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States. 
' .,. 
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In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of 
the essential role of the States in our federal system. 
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was 
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The 
Court observed that "our federal system of government im-
poses definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regu-
late the activities of States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment 
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability 
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843, 
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sover-
eignty is a fundamental component of our system of govern-
ment. More tha~a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon, 
"74 U. 8. ~7 Wall.} 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Con-
stitution recognized "the necessary existence of the States, 
and, within their proper spheres, the independent authority 
of the States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this au-
thority extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regu-
lation ... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not 
expressly delegated to the national government are re-
served." I d., at 76. Recently, in Community Communica-
tions Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the 
Court recognized that the state action exemption from the 
antitrust laws was based on State sovereignty. Similarly, in 
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 
455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), although finding the Railway 
Labor Act applicable to a state-owned railroad, the unani-
mous Court was careful to say that the States possess. con-
stitutionally preserved sovereign powers. 
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court ex-
plicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sover-
eignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT 
18 GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH. 
sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has 
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state 
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra; 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter 
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by 
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federal-
ism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Al-
though it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a 
significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20 
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific 
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explic-
itly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ... 
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The 
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their 
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution 
has not divested them of their original powers and trans-
ferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; 
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign powel) WI ou JUdicial review of its 
action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to 
18 The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when 
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See 
ante, at 8. 
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relegate the States to precisely the trivial role that oppo-
nents of the Constitution feared they would occupy. 17 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of 
[the services] performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not 
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of 
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize 
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See 
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities · 
en a ed in b state and local governments that affect the ev-
eryday lives of These are services that people 
ike tteility to understand and evaluate as well as the right, in 
a democracy, to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is func-
17 As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the 
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as in-
struments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus 
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus 
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the con-
cerns of State and local governments). 
18 The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at 
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing 
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as 
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is 
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a gov-
ernmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at 
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actu-
ally involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the 
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen 
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 
System 95 (1979). 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous spe-
cial interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying/and make sub-
stantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These 
groups are ·thought to have significant influence in the shaping and en-
actment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a 
---
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide 
. . . " and that the states and local governments are better 
able than the national government to perform them. 426 
U. S., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N a-
tional League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic 
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to posi-
tions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the 
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the 
state and ·local levels. One must compare realistically the 
operation of the state and local governments with that of the 
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily 
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the 
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and 
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar 
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal de artments 
and agencies · are authorize to write regulations. 
\ Often these are more important than the text of the statutes. 
--------. the original legislation, these are drafted largely by 
staff personnel. ~ lJ!e administration and enforcement 
of federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the 
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees 
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities 
that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as acces-
sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions 
in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these fed-
eral employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge. 
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their 
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense 
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the 
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States and localities. 
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services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and 
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services, 
than are state legislatures, city councils, ~boards of su er-
~----.--~ VIsors 9i 18 !31 agencies. ' 
The question presented in this case is whether the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a 
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on 
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold-
ing does far more than simply answer this question in the 
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's 
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions 
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for \ 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinc- "7_ 
tion between public and private employers that had been 
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's 
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright 
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of 
the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
I return now to the balancing test approved in National 
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R., 
and FERC v. Mississippi. Under this test, the Court 
should consider whether the service or activity at issue is one 
that "the states and their political subdivisions have tradi-
tionally afforded their citizens." National League of Cities, 
supra, at 855. See ante, at --. One cannot think of a 
19 The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that 
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of th~ 
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's 
opinion in Fry, supra, at 547 n. 7. 
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more fundamental and traditional activity of a State than 
determination of the terms and conditions of employment of 
its own employees. Moreover, the Court does not find in 
this case that the "federal interest is demonstrably greater." 
No such finding could have been made, for the state interest 
is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities 
of displacing their control over wages, hours, overtime regu-
lations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees 
could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State 
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As 
we said in National League of Cities, federal control also 
inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in 
which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental 
services that citizens require." ld., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intra-
city mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of 
service traditionally provided by local government. It is 
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from 
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems. 21 Services of this kind are recisely those "with which 
citizens are more 'familiar. and minutely conversant. e 
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of 
course must be intimately familiar with these services and 
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also 
know that their constituents and the press respond to the ad-
equacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is 
20 As Justice Dou las observed in his dissent in Ma land v. Wirtz 
supra, exten ion of the FLSA to e tates could "disrupt the fiscal policy 
of the states nd threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and 
education." !d., at 302. 
21 In Long Island R . Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his 
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional as-
pects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view 
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S. , 
at 686. 
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this kind of state and local control and accountability that the 
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preserva-
tion of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly 
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that 
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify 
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain 
when. the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal 
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), 
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, 
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hos-
pitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opin-
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in 
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the 
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government 
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at 
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once 
again a realistic one. s 
As I view the Court' decision today as re · ectin the basic 
precepts of ou e era sys em and limiting the constitutional 
role of judicial review, I dissent. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in 
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and 
local governments. Because I believe this decision substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution, 
I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history 
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered 
and overruled. There have been cases, however, in which 
the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent deci-
sions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The 
'National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition 
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
'• . 
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reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the 
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently 
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, N a-
tional League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions 
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. R., 
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in 
Long Island R. R., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the 
principles of National League of Cities but found them inap-
plicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in in-
terstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test 
applicable to this case is the third one [repeated and 
reformulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the 
states' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions." 
455 U. S., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the 
test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was con-
sidered in that unanimous decision as settled constitutional 
doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute 
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the 
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its rela-
tionship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of 
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), 
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to 
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854. n. 18, Na-
likeN ational League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeat-
edly accepted by our subsequent decisions. 
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tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects 
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 
426 U. S., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that even 
where the requirements of the National League of Cities 
standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which the nature 
of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies 
state submission."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., 
at 288 n. 29. The joint federal/state system of regulation in 
FERC was such a "situation," but there was no hint in the 
Court's opinion that National League of Cities-or its basic 
standard-was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely persuasive on 
a constitutional question. City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 462 U. S. 416, -- (1983). Neverthe-
less, even in such a case, a "departure from the doctrine of 
stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. 
Rumsey, -- U. S. --, -- (1984). See also Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STE-
VENS, concurring) . . In the present case, the five Justices 
who compose the majority today participated in National 
League of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability 
of judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority of 
this Court, are not served by the precipitous overruling of 
multiple precedents we witness in this case. 3 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weaken-
ing the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR succeeded Justice Stewart in September 1981, and 
participated in United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co, 455 
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982). 
3 As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a doctrine that demands re-
spect in a society governed by the rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, Inc ., - U. S. - (1983). In this re-
spect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the very nature of 
our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis ," 4 Va. 
L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916). 
.. 
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important than what the Court has done to the Constitution 
itself. A unique feature of the United States government is 
the federal system guaranteed by the Constitution and im-
plicit in the very name of our country. Despite some genu-
flecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, to-
day's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to 
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit 
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to deter-
mine the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and 
local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional 
view of our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent 
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, 
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the states in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself." 
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces 
its decision in National League of Cities because it "in-
evitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make deci-
sions about which state policies its favors and which ones it 
dislikes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which 
the States may exercise their authority, when Congress pur-
ports to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be 
determined from time to time by political decisions made by 
members of the federal government, decisions the Court says 
will not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not 
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected ma-
jority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In 
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-
eral system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
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ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court. 
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's 
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews 
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the rati-
fication of the Constitution and the extent to which this 
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a 
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system. 
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the in-
disputably local service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved 
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable 
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unwork-
able, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League 
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to 
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court 
radically departs from long settled constitutional values and 
ignores the role of judicial review in our system of 
government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is 
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental func-
tions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor 
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns 
'InN ational League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sover-
eignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is, 
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise defi-
nitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general provi-
sions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's at-
tempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is irrelevant". A 
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining 
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Cen-
ter, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends 
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles 
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the 
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely 
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions," 
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, · at 10-11, 
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League 
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for de-
termining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of 
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today' s opinion joined National League of 
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's 
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 
426 U. S., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring). 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balanc-
ing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the 
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry ex-
plicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by 
the federal legislation at issue in that case, against the effects 
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), 
lower courts. E . g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA91978) and 
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). 
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply 
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts in-
terpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, 
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific 
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular 
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. 
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the 
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See 
ante, at 10. 
5 In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand, 
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immu-
nity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional 
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred 
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique 
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at 
236. · See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Ass'n, 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling Na-
tional League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes 
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in 
subsequent cases. 5 
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into 
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the cen-
tral concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U. S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). See also for example 
United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 
678, 688 (1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of 
railroad labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail serv-
ice essential to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 
742, 757 (1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of inter-
state commerce than electric energy .. . . "). Similarly, we have consid-
ered whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine 
the goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 
(1975). See also Hodel, 452 U. S. at 282 (national surface mining standards 
necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine States' 
efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we 
have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply with 
federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of Cities, 426 
U. S., at 846-851. 
6 In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity 
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "go:vern-
mentaUproprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying 
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitu-
tional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself 
will protect whatever rights the States may have. 
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Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is 
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of 
Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted 
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications 
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also 
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under chal-
lenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at 
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does 
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circum-
stances that warrant the conclusion today that National 
League of Cities is necessarily wrong. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the 
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power will not infringe oh residual State 
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the 
various States, but once in office they are members of the 
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the 
7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some 
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal ac-
tion affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The 
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safe-
guards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The 
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify 
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative 
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined 
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion, 
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other stand-
ard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunc-
tion of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirma-
tive limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be 
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such 
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies 
to overrule National League of Cities. 
8 One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is 
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted 
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Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the Presi-
dent as a representative of the States' interest against fed-
eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power .... " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, --
(1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the elec-
toral role of the States. 9 
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an 
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at --. 
9 At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal 
government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat 
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, 
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court to-
day, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord 
with current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ... 
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be justi-
fied by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Col urn. 
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at 
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, 
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have com-
bined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory 
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators), 
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one 
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop in-
dependent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, la-
borers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports 
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests 
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the 
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the 
'80s, at 97 (1981). 
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions 
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of 
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in pre-
serving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But 
political success in obtaining federal grants is not relevant to 
the question whether the political processes are the proper 
means of enforcing constitutional limitations. 11 The fact that 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the 
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no 
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the 
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental 
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24 
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the 
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the 
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional 
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises. 
10 The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the 
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitu-
tionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See 
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to 
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the will-
ingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional 
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies 
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State 
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance 
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(l); and the Sherman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 1, et seq.; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its 
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to 
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and 
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions. 
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Congress generally does not transgress constitutional limits 
on its power to reach State activities does not make judicial 
review any less necessary to rectify the cases in which it does 
do so. 12 The States' role in our system of government is a 
matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace. "The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States, respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const., 
Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's 
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal politi-
cal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon-
sistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At 
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled prov-
ince of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with re-
spect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In reject-
ing the role of the judiciary in protecting the States from 
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no explana-
tion for ignoring the teaching of the most famous case in our 
history. 13 
12 This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the elec-
toral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much 
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been 
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the 
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to cer-
tain appointments and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. · The 
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed 
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its con-
trary view. 
13 The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
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III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major role that 
cannot be preempted by the national government. As con-
temporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying con-
ventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Constitu-
tion was predicated on this understanding of federalism. 
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to 
ensure that the important role promised the States by the 
proponents of the Constitution was realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was 
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too 
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable 
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until 
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of 
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in 
the States, would be among the first business of the new Con-
gress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the sev-
eral States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Sub-
ject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the 
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost." 
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159 
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental func-
tion analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and eco-
nomic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observa-
tion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice 
Brandeis, J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an 
unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular 
function is one for the federal or state governments, the States no longer 
may engage in "social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The 
Court does not explain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the 
federal government, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their 
opportunities to experiment and serve as "laboratories." 
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(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that 
"the general government being paramount to, and in every 
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter 
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying 
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 1788), reprinted in Anti-
Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209. 
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State 
ratifying convention. 14 See generally Elliot, Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (1854). As a result, eight States voted for the 
Constitution only after proposing amendments to be adopted 
after ratification. 15 All eight of these included among their 
recommendations some version of what later became the 
Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that 
the proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a 
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers 
to the States, that in order to secure the votes for rati-
fication, the Federalists eventually conceded that such pro-
visions were necessary. See Schwartz, A Documentary His-
tory of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 and passim. It was 
thus generally agreed that consideration of a bill of rights 
would be among the first business of the new Congress. See 
generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 (June 8, 1789) (re-
marks of James Madison). Accordingly, the ten amend-
ments that we know as the Bill of Rights were proposed and 
adopted early in the first session of the First Congress. 
14 Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Feder-
alists claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United 
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example, 
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights, supra, at 510, 511. 
16 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding rati-
fication of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in-
cluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim. 
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Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, 
supra, 983-1167. 
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents 
the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in our constitu-
tional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental 
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "un-
sound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sys-
tem so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example, 
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of con-
trasts between the attributes of a "national" government and 
those of the government to be established by the Constitu-
tion. While a national form of government would possess an 
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form 
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead con-
sisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject 
within their respective spheres to the general authority than 
the general authority is subject to them, within its own 
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed govern-
ment extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects." Id. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate 
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
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tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
I d., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of the 
federal government would be "most extensive and important 
in times of war and danger; those of the State Governments 
in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this 
division of powers, the State governments generally wo~ld 
be more important than the federal government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sover-
eignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States 
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of 
the federal government. The States would serve this essen-
tial role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of 
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders 
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to State govern-
ment. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regu-
lat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to 
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately 
awake .... " · The Federalist No. 17, supra, p. 107. Thus, 
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as 
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and prop-
erty," a fact which "contributes more than any other circum-
stance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, 
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid. 
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people 
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the 
business of State governments, and "with the members of 
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of 
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party 
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like 
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the every-
day concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loy-
alty. !d. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental 
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Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
Thus, the harm to the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426 
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly 
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurp-
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the 
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the 
States and the federal government, a balance designed to 
protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can re-
sult from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce 
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the 
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall 
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing 
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the 
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common de-
fense and the general welfare before its brief reference to 
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the 
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regu-
lated was that which the states themselves were powerless to 
regulate. See, e. g., 1M. Farrand, The Records of the Fed-
eral Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); The Federalist Nos. 
7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 
226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting). Indeed; the 
language of the clause itself focuses on activities that only a 
national government could regulate: commerce with foreign 
nations and Indian tribes and "among" the several states. 
To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
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turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had 
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its 
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a 
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests 
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States. 
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of 
the essential role of the States in our federal system. 
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was 
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The 
Court observed that "our federal system of government im-
poses definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regu-
late the activities of States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment 
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability 
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843, 
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State sover-
eignty is a fundamental component of our system of govern-
ment. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon, 
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution rec-
ognized "the necessary existence of the States, and, within 
their proper spheres, the independent authority of the 
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority 
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation 
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly 
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at 
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City 
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that 
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based 
on State sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683 
(1982), although finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to 
a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to 
say that the States possess constitutionally preserved sover-
eign powers. 
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Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court ex-
plicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sover-
eignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has 
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of.. state 
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra; 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter 
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by 
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federal-
ism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Al-
though it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a 
significant measure of sovereign authority,'" ante, at 20 
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226, 269 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific 
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explic-
itly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ... 
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The 
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their 
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution 
has not divested them of their original powers and trans-
ferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 
18 The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when 
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See 
ante, at 8. 
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20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; 
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial re-
view of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federalism 
appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial role 
that opponents of the Constitution feared they would 
occupy. 17 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of 
[the services] performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and·furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not 
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of 
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize 
the concerns (}f local, democratic self-government. See 
supra n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities 
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the ev-
eryday lives of citizens. These are services that people are 
in a position to understand and evaluate as well as the right, 
in a democracy, to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is func-
17 As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the 
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as in-
struments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus 
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et alas Amicus 
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the con-
cerns of State and local governments). 
18 The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at 
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for d~aling 
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No.45, at 316. This is as 
true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation is 
likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a gov-
ernmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than at 
the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people actu-
ally involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the 
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen 
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tions such as these which governments are created to provide 
. . . " and that the states and local governments are better 
able than the national government to perform them. 426 
U. S., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N a-
tional League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic 
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to posi-
tions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the 
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the 
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the 
operation of the state and local governments with that of the 
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily 
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the 
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and 
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar 
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments 
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations. 
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes. 
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely 
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of 
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the 
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees 
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities 
that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as acces-
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 
System 95 (1979). 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous spe-
cial interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make sub-
stantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These 
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and en-
actment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a 
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States and localities. 
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sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions 
in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these fed-
eral employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge. 
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their 
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense 
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the 
services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and 
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services, 
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervi-
sors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies. 
It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington as the 
Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self govern-
ment" is best exemplified. 
IV 
The question presented in this case is whether the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a 
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on 
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold-
ing does far more than simply answer this question in the 
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's 
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions 
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinc-
tion between public and private employers that had been 
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's 
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright 
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of 
the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
19 The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that 
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the 
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's 
opinion in Fry, supra, at 547 n. 7. 
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National 
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. R., 
and FERC v. Mississippi. Under this test, the Court 
should consider whether the service or activity at issue is one 
that "the states and their political subdivisions have tradi-
tionally afforded their citizens." National League of Cities, 
supra, at 855. See ante, at --. One cannot think of a 
more fundamental and traditional activity of a State than 
determination of the terms and conditions of employment of 
its own employees. Moreover, the Court does not find in 
this case that the "federal interest is demonstrably greater." 
No such finding could have been made, for the state interest 
is compelling. The financial impact on States and localities 
of displacing their ycontrol over wages, hours, overtime regu-
lations, pensions, and labor relations with their employees 
could have serious, as well as unanticipated, effects on State 
and local planning, budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As 
we said in National League of Cities, federal control also 
inevitably "displaces state policies regarding the manner in 
which [States] will structure delivery of those governmental 
services that citizens require." Id., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intra-
city mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of 
service traditionally provided by local government. It is 
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from 
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which 
20 As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 
supra, extension of the FLSA to the States could "disrupt the fiscal policy 
of the states and threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and 
education." Id., at 302. 
21 In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his 
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional as-
pects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view 
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citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.'" The 
Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of 
course must be intimately familiar with these services and 
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also 
know that their constituents and the press respond to the ad-
equacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is 
this kind of state and local control ;:md accountability that the 
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preserva-
tion of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly 
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that 
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify 
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain 
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal 
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), 
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, 
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hos-
pitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opin-
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in 
dissent, wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the 
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government 
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at 
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once 
again a realistic one. 
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic 
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional 
role of judicial review, I dissent. 
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The Court today, m its 5-4 decision, overrules National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in 
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and 
local governments. Because I believe this decision substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution, 
I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history 
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered 
and overruled. There have been few cases, however, in 
which the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent 
decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The 
1 National League of Cities , following some changes in the composition 
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
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reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the 
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently 
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, N a-
tional League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions 
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in 
Long Island R. Co.(, supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed 
the principles of National League of Cities but found them 
inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in 
interstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test ap-
plicable to this case is the third one [repeated and re-
formulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the 
states' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability to structure integral operations 
in areas of traditional governmental functions." 455 
U. S., at 684. 
The Court in that case recognized that the test "may at 
times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that 
unanimous decision as settled constitutional doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute 
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the 
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its rela-
tionship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of 
state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), 
which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to 
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, N a-
like National League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeat-
edly accepted by our subsequent decisions. 
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tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects 
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 426 U. S., at 764, n. 28. 
The Court went on to say that even where the require-
ments of the National League of Cities standard are met, 
"'[t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal 
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submis-
sion."' Ibid., quotjng Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., at 288 n. 29. 
The joint federal/state system of regulation in FERC was 
such a "situation," but there was no hint in the Court's opin-
ion that National League of Cities-or its basic standard-
was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
Although the doctrine is not rigidly applied to constitu-
tional questions, "any departure from the doctrine of stare 
decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 
--U.S.--,-- (1984). See also Oregon v. Kennedy, 
456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concur-
ring). In the present case, the five Justices who compose 
the majority today participated in National League of Cities 
and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial deci-
sion, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are 
not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple prece-
dents that we witness in this case. 3 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weaken-
ing the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less 
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution 
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal 
system of government guaranteed by the Constitution and 
2 JUSTICE O'CONNOR, the only new member in the Court since our deci-
sion in National League of Cities, has joined the Court in reaffirming its 
principles. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J., dissenting in part). 
8 Ift this l"esped,Stare decisis represents "a natural evolution from the 
very nature of our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare 
Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916). 
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implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some 
genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, 
today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to 
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit 
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to deter-
mine the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and 
local employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional 
view of our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent 
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, 
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the states in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself." Ante, at 21-22 
(emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces 
its decision in National League of Cities because it "inev-
itably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies its favors and which ones it dis-
likes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which the 
States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports 
to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be deter-
mined from time to time by political decisions made by mem-
bers of the federal government, decisions the Court says will 
not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not 
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected ma-
jority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In 
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-
eral system may depend upon the grace of elected federal of-
ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court. 
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In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's 
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews 
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the rati-
fication of the Constitution and the extent to which this 
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a 
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system. 
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the in-
disputably local service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved 
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable 
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unwork-
able, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League 
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to 
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court 
radically departs from long settled constitutional values 
and ignores the role of judicial review in our system of 
government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is 
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental ftmc-
tions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor 
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns 
• In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sover-
eignty as including "traditional governmental functions," a realm which is, 
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise defi-
nitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general pro-
visions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's 
attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unhelpful. A 
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining 
governmental functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Cen-
ter, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends 
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles 
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the 
lower courts. E. g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA91978) and 
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). 
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as standards "traditional governmental function[s]," "purely 
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions," 
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11, 
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League 
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for de-
termining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of 
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of 
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's 
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state ... compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 
426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balanc-
ing approach, JusTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the 
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry ex-
plicitly weighed the seriousness of the problem addressed by 
the federal legislation at issue in that ~ase, against the effects 
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
weighing the respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), 
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply 
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts in-
terpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, 
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific 
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular 
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. 
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the 
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See 
ante, at 10. 
• In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand, 
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into 
. ;· .. 
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for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immu-
nity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional 
doctrine ... whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred 
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique 
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." Id., at 
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Assn., 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling N a-
tional League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes 
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in 
subsequent cases. 6 
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the cen-
tral concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U. S. 226, 244 (STEVENS, J., concurring). See also, for example, United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 
(1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad 
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essen-
tial to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 
(1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate com-
merce than electric energy .... "). Similarly, we have considered 
whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the 
goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 
(1975). See also Hodel, 452 U. S., at 282 (national surface mining stand-
ards necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine 
States' efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other 
hand, we have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to com-
ply with federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of 
Cities, 426 U. S., at 846-851. 
6 In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity 
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "govern-
mentaUproprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying 
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitu-
tional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself 
will protect whatever rights the States may have . 
'. 
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Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is 
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of 
Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted 
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications 
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also 
stated that "the result with respect to the statute under chal-
lenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at 
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does 
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circum-
stances that warrant the conclusion today that National 
League of Cities is necessarily wrong. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the 
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State 
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the 
various States, but once in office they are members of the 
federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the 
7 Late in it~ opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some 
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal ac-
tion affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 27. The 
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safe-
guards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The 
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify 
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative 
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined 
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion, 
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other stand-
ard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunc-
tion of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirma-
tive limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be 
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such 
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies 
to overrule National League of Cities. 
8 One can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is 
composed of individuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted 
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Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the Presi-
dent as a representative of the States' interest against fed-
eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power . . . . " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, --
(1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the elec-
toral role of the States. 9 
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an 
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at --. 
9 At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal 
government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat 
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, 
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court to-
day, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord 
with current reality .• Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has ... 
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an inftrusion to be jus-
tified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at 
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, 
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have com-
bined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory 
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators), 
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. !d., at 50-51. As one 
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop in-
dependent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, la-
borers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports 
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests 
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the 
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the 
'80s, at 97 (1981). 
. . 
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions 
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of 
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in pre-
serving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But 
such political success is not relevant to the question whether 
the political processes are the proper means of enforcing con-
stitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the 
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no 
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the 
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental 
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24 
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the 
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the 
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional 
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises. 
10 The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the 
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitu-
tionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See 
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to 
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State 
School v. Haldernw,n, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the will-
ingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional 
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies 
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State 
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance 
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 1, et seq.; see Parker v. Braum, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its 
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to 
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and 
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions . 
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does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less neces-
sary to rectify the cases in which it does do so. 12 The States' 
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional 
law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the 
people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in the Court's 
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal politi-
cal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon- r 
sistent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At 
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled prov-
ince of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with 
respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 1 
Cranch 137, 177 (1803). In rejecting the role of the judiciary 
in protecting the States from federal overreaching, the 
Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teach-
ing of the most famous case in our history. 13 
12 This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the elec-
toral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much 
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been 
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the 
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to cer-
tain appointments and thus arguably ''it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The 
Court nevertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed 
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its con-
trary view. 
18 The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
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III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major role that 
cannot be preempted by the national government. As con-
temporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying con-
ventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Consti-
tution was predicated on this understanding of federalism. 
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to 
ensure that the important role promised the States by the 
proponents of the Constitution was realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was 
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too 
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable 
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until 
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of 
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in 
the States, would be among the first business of the new Con-
gress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the sev-
eral States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Sub-
ject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the 
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost." 
Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159 
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that 
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" governmental func-
tion analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and eco-
nomic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observa-
tion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected 
federal judiciary'' makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one 
for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may engage in 
"social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court does not ex-
plain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the federal govern-
ment, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities 
to experiment and serve as "laboratories." 
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"the general government being paramount to, and in every 
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter 
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying 
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in Anti-
Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209. 
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State 
ratifying convention. 14 See generally 1-4, Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (J. Elliot 2d. cd. 1854). As a result, eight 
States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amend-
ments to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these in-
cluded among their recommendations some version of what 
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was 
the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously de-
fective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision 
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the 
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded 
that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 505 and passim 
(1971). It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a 
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new 
Congress. See generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 
(June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly, 
the 10 amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were 
proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First 
Congress. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, 983-1167. 
14 Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Feder-
alists' claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United 
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example, 
James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History. 510, 511 (1971). 
15 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding rati-
fication of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in-
cluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 762-766 and passim. 
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This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents 
the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in our constitu-
tional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental 
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "un-
sound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sys-
tem so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example, 
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of con-
trasts between the attributes of a "national" government and 
those of the government to be established by the Constitu-
tion. While a national form of government would possess an 
"indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form 
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead con-
sisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject 
within their respective spheres to the general authority than 
the general authority is subject to them, within its own 
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed govern-
ment extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, ... leav[ing] to the several States a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects." Ibid. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate 
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
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which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
Id., at 313. 
Madison considered that the operations of the federal gov-
ernment would be "most extensive and important in times of 
war and danger; those of the State Governments in times of 
peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this division of 
powers, the State governments generally would be more im-
portant than the federal government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sover-
eignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States 
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of 
the federal government. The States would serve this essen-
tial role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of 
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders 
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to jtate govern-
ment. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regu-
lat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to 
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately 
awake . ... " The Federalist No. 17, sy:p/a, p. 107. Thus, 
he maintained that the people would perceive the States as 
"the immediate and most visible guardian of life and prop-
erty," a fact which "contributes more than any other circum-
stance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, 
esteem and reverence towards the government." Ibid. 
Madison took the same position, explaining that "the people 
will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the 
business of _s'tate governments, and "with the members of 
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of 
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party 
attachments .... " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like 
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the every-
day concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loy-
alty. Ibid. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental 
I ·C ' 
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Value: National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
Thus, the hann to the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426 
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly 
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurp-
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the 
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the 
States and the federal government, a balance designed to 
protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can re-
sult from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce 
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the 
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall 
have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing 
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the 
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common de-
fense and the general welfare before its brief reference to 
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the 
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regu-
lated was that which the states themselves lacked the practi-
cal capability to regulate. See, e. g., 1 M. Farrand, The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); 
The Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wy-
oming, 460 U. S. 2~6, 265 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, the language of the clause itself focuses on activities 
that only a national government could regulate: commerce 
with foreign nations and Indian tribes and "among" the sev-
eral states. 
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To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had 
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its 
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a 
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests 
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States. 
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of 
the essential role of the States in our federal system. 
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was 
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The 
Court observed that "our federal system of government im-
poses definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regu-
late the activities of States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment 
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability 
to function effectively in a federal system." I d., at 842-843, 
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that ,State sover-
eignty is a fundamental component of our system of govern-
ment. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon, 
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution 
recognized "the necessary existence of the States, and, 
within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the 
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority 
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation 
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly 
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at 
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City 
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that 
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based 
on ~tate sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), al-
though finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to a state-
owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that 
\.c . 
'· c . $ 
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the States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign 
powers. 
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court ex-
plicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sover-
eignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has 
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state 
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra; 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter 
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by 
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federal-
ism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Al-
though it says that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] 
a significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20 
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific 
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explic-
itly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ... 
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The 
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their 
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution 
18 The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when 
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See 
ante, at 8. 
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has not divested them of their original powers and trans-
ferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; 
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial 
review of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federal-
ism appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial 
role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would 
occupy.'7 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of 
[the services] performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not 
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of 
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize 
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See 
supra, n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities 
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the 
everyday lives of citizens. These are services that people 
are in a position to understand and evaluate, and in a democ-
racy, have the right to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is 
17 As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the 
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as in-
struments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus 
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus 
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the con-
cerns of State and local governments). 
18 The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at 
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing 
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No. 45, at 316. This is 
as true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation 
is likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a 
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than 
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functions such as these which governments are created to 
provide . . . " and that the states and local governments are 
better able than the national government to perform them. 
426 U. S., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N a-
tional League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic 
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to posi-
tions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the 
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the 
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the 
operation of the state and local governments with that of the 
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily 
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the 
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and 
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar 
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments 
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations. 
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes. 
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely 
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of 
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the 
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees 
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities 
at the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people ac-
tually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the 
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen 
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 
System 95 (1979). 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous spe-
cial interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make sub-
stantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These 
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and en-
actment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a 
''political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States and localities. See supra, n. 9. 
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that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as acces-
sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions 
in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these fed-
eral employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge. 
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their 
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense 
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the 
services traditionally rendered by states and localities, and Ca. r · .s 
are inevitably less responsive to reCipients of such services, 
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of supervi-
sors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agencies. 
It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington as 
the Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self-gov-
ernment" is best exemplified. 
IV 
The question presented in this case is whether the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a 
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on 
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold-
ing does far more than simply answer this question in the 
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's 
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions 
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinc-
tion between public and private employers that had been 
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's 
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright 
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of 
the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
11 The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that 
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the 
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National 
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. Co., 
and FERC v. Mississippi. See supra, n. 5 and ante, at 
--. The Court does not find in this case that the "federal 
interest is demonstrably greater." 426 U. S., at 856 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). No such finding could have 
been made, for the state interest is compelling. The finan-
cial impact on States and localities of displacing their control 
over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor 
relations with their employees could have serious, as well as 
unanticipated, effects on ,State and local planning, budgeting, I· C · 
and the levying of taxes. 20 As we said in National League of 
Cities, federal control of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of State employees also inevitably "displaces state poli-
cies regarding the manner in which [States] will structure de-
livery of those governmental services that citizens require." 
Id., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intra-
city mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of 
service traditionally provided by local government. It is 
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from 
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those "with which 
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.'" The 
States as States by means of the commerce power. " See also the Court's 
opinion in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975). 
00 As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 
U. S. 183, 201 (Douglas, J. , dissenting). Extension of the FLSA to the 
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and threaten their 
autonomy in the regulation of health and education." I d., at 203. 
21 In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his 
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional as-
pects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view 
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., 
at 686. 
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Federalist, su1A(No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of 
course must "be i~timately familiar with these services and 
sensitive to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also 
know that their constituents and the press respond to the ad-
equacy, fair distribution, and cost of these services. It is 
this kind of state and local control and accountability that the 
Framers understood would insure the vitality and preserva-
tion of the federal system that the Constitution explicitly 
requires. See National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that 
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify 
even a single aspect of state authority that would remain 
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal 
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), 
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, 
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hos-
pitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opin-
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in 
dissent, wrote presciently that· the Court's reading of the 
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government 
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at 
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once 
again a realistic one. 
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic 
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional 
role of judicial review, I dissent. 
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[February -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUS-
TICE REHNQUIST, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR join, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), a case in 
which we held that Congress lacked authority to impose the 
requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on state and 
local governments. Because I believe this decision substan-
tially alters the federal system embodied in the Constitution, 
I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the history 
of this Court in which prior decisions have been reconsidered 
and overruled. There have been few cases, however, in 
which the principle of stare decisis and the rationale of recent 
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decisions were ignored as abruptly as we now witness. 1 The 
reasoning of the Court in National League of Cities, and the 
principle applied there, have been reiterated consistently 
over the past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, N a-
tional League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions 
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 287-293 
(1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 
455 U. S. 678, 684-686 (1982); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 
U. S. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in 
Long Island R. Co., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed 
the principles of National League of Cities but found them 
inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in 
interstate commerce. The Court stated: ' 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities test ap-
plicable to this case is the third one [repeated and re-
formulated in Hodel], which examines whether 'the 
states' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability to structure integral operations 
in areas of traditional governmental functions." 455 
U. S., at 684. 
The Court in that case recognized that the test "may at 
times be a difficult one," ibid., but it was considered in that 
unanimous decision as settled constitutional doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who constitute 
the majority in this case also were the majority in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for example, the 
Court made clear that the State's regulation of its rela-
tionship with its employees is an 'undoubted attribute of 
1 National League of Cities, following some changes in the composition 
of the Court, had overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968). Un-
like National League of Cities, the rationale of Wirtz had not been repeat-
edly accepted by our subsequent decisions. 
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state sovereignty.' 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), 
" ·--"~~-which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to 
state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, N a-
tional League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects 
of a State's sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 426 U. S., at 764, n. 28. 
The Court went on to say that even where the require-
ments of the National League of Cities standard are met, 
"'[t]here are situations in which the nature of the federal 
interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submis-
sion."' Ibid., quoting Hodel, supra, 452 U. S., at 288 n. 29. 
The joint federal/state system of regulation in FERC was 
such a "situation," but there was no hint in the Court's opin-
ion that National League of Cities-or its basic standard-
was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
Although the doctrine is not rigidly applied to constitu-
tional questions, "any departure from the doctrine of stare 
decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, 
--U.S.--,-- (1984). See also Oregon v. Kennedy, 
456 U. S. 667, 691-692 n. 34 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concur-
ring). In the present case, the five Justices who compose 
the majority today participated in National League of Cities 
and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial deci-
sion, and with it respect for the authority of this Court, are 
not served by the precipitous overruling of multiple prece-
dents that we witness in this case. 3 
z JusTICE O'CONNOR, the only new member in the Court since our deci-
sion in National League of Cities, has joined the Court in reaffirming its 
principles. See United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 
U. S. 678 (1982), and FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 775 (1982) 
(O'CONNOR, J ., dissenting in part). 
3 As one commentator noted, stare decisis represents "a natural evolu-
tion from the very nature of our institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the 
Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955, 956 (1916). 
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Whatever effect the Court's decision may have in weaken-
ing the application of stare decisis, it is likely to be less 
important than what the Court has done to the Constitution 
itself. A unique feature of the United States is the federal 
system of government guaranteed by the Constitution and 
implicit in the very name of our country. Despite some 
genuflecting in Court's opinion to the concept of federalism, 
today's decision effectively reduces the Tenth Amendment to 
meaningless rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor 
Standards Act ["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit 
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to deter-
mine the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and 
local employees. · Ante, at 27. In rejecting the traditional 
view of our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent 
in the delegated nature of Congress' Article I powers, 
the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the 
role of the states in the federal system lies in the struc-
ture of the Federal Government itself." Ante, at 21-22 
(emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the Court renounces 
its decision in National League of Cities because it ''inev-
itably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions 
about which state policies its favors and which ones it dis-
likes." Ante, at 17. In other words, the extent to which the 
States may exercise their authority, when Congress purports 
to act under the Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be deter-
mined from time to time by political decisions made by mem-
bers of the federal government, decisions the Court says will 
not be subject to judicial review. I note that it does not 
seem to have occurred to the Court that it-an unelected ma-
jority of five Justices-today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. In 
doing so, there is only a single passing reference to the Tenth 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
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in support of the view that the role of the States in the fed-
eral system may depend upon the· grace of elected federal of-
ficials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by this 
Court. 
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the Court's 
criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III reviews 
briefly the understanding of federalism that ensured the rati-
fication of the Constitution and the extent to which this 
Court, until today, has recognized that the States retain a 
signficant measure of sovereignty in our federal system. 
Part IV considers the applicability of the FLSA to the in-
disputably local service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity approved 
in National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable 
and unsound in principle. In finding the test to be unwork-
able, the Court begins by mischaracterizing National League 
of Cities and subsequent cases. In concluding that efforts to 
define state immunity are unsound in principle, the Court 
radically departs from long settled constitutional values 
and ignores the role of judicial review in our system of 
government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing that it is 
difficult to define a priori "traditional governmental func-
tions." National League of Cities neither engaged in, nor 
required, such a task. 4 The Court discusses and condemns 
• In National League of Cities, we referred to the sphere of state sover-
eignty as including ''traditional governmental functions," a realm which is, 
of course, difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of precise defi-
nitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and. applying the general pro-
visions of our Constitution. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's 
attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of definition is unhelpful. A 
number of the cases it cites simply do not involve the problem of defining 
governmental functions. E . g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Cen-
ter, Inc., 669 F. 2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 976 (1982); Friends 
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as standards ''traditional governmental function[s]," "purely 
historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental functions," 
and "'necessary' governmental services." Ante, at 10-11, 
15, 16. But nowhere does it mention that National League 
of Cities adopted a familiar type of balancing test for de-
termining whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature of 
our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today's opinion joined National League of 
Cities and concurred separately to point out that the Court's 
opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas ... where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state . . . compli-
ance with imposed federal standards would be essential." 
426 U. S., at 856 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a balanc-
ing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited the 
part of the opinion that reaffirmed Fry v. United States, 421 
U. S. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis reaffirming Fry ex-
plicitly weighed the seriousness ofthe problem addressed by 
the federill legislation at issue in that case, against the effects 
of compliance on State sovereignty. 426 U. S., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 902 
(1977). A number of others are not properly analyzed under the principles 
of National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the language of the 
lower courts. E. g., United States v. Best, 573 F. 2d 1095 (CA9 1978) and 
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). 
Moreover, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court simply 
lists various functions thought to be protected or unprotected by courts in-
terpreting National League of Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, 
however, the courts considered the issue of State immunity on the specific 
facts at issue; they did not make blanket pronouncements that particular 
things inherently qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. 
Having thus considered the cases out of context, it was not difficult for the 
Court to conclude that there is no "organizing principle" among them. See 
ante, at 10. 
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weighing the respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U. S. 226 (1983), 
for example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of immu-
nity articulated in National League of Cities is a functional 
doctrine . . . whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred 
province of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique 
benefits of a federal system . . . not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." I d., at 
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rec-
lamation Assn., 452 U. S. 264 (1981). In overruling N a-
tional League of Cities, the Court incorrectly characterizes 
the mode of analysis established therein and developed in 
subsequent cases. 6 · 
_ 
5 In undertaking such balancing, we have considered, on the one hand, 
the strength of the federal interest in the challenged legislation and the im-
pact of exempting the States from its reach. Central to our inquiry into 
the federal interest is how closely the challenged action implicates the cen-
tral concerns of the Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
eeonomy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U. S. 226, 244 (STEVENS, J., concurring). See also, for example, United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 U. S. 678, 688 
(1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad 
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essen-
tial to the national economy."); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742, 757 
(1982), (''it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate com-
merce than electric energy .... "). Similarly, we have considered 
whether exempting States from federal regulation would undermine the 
goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 
(1975). See also Hodel, 452 U. S., at 282 (national surface mining stand-
ards necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine 
States' efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). On the other 
hand, we have also assessed the injury done to the States if forced to com-
ply with federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National League of 
Cities, 426 U. S., at 846-851. 
5 In addition, reliance on the Court's difficulties in the tax immunity 
field is misplaced. Although the Court has abandoned the "govern-
mental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see New York v. United 
States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946), it has not taken the drastic approach of relying 
solely on the structure of the federal government to protect the States' im-
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Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the FLSA, is 
the identical statute that was at issue in National League of 
Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN's concurrence noted 
that he was "not untroubled by certain possible implications 
of the Court's opinion" in National League of Cities, it also 
stated that ''the result with respect to the statute under chal-
lenge here [the FLSA] is necessarily correct." 426 U. S., at 
856 (emphasis added). His opinion for the Court today does 
not discuss the statute, nor identify any changed circum-
stances that warrant the conclusion today that National 
League of Cities is necessarily wrong. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role in the 
electoral process guarantees that particular exercises of the 
Commerce Clause power will not infringe on residual State 
sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are elected from the 
various States, but once in office they are members of the 
munity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U. S. 444 
(1978). Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem of defining constitu-
tional boundaries of federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal government itself 
will protect whatever rights the States may have. 
7 Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that after all there may be some 
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on federal ac-
tion affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at '2:7. The 
Court asserts that "[i]n the factual setting of these cases the internal safe-
guards of the political process have performed as intended." Ibid. The 
Court does not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it identify 
the circumstances in which the "political process" may fail and "affirmative 
limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined 
by the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected." Today's opinion, 
however, has rejected the balancing standard and suggests no other stand-
ard that would enable a court to determine when there has been a malfunc-
tion of the "political process." The Court's failure to specify the "affirma-
tive limits" on federal power, or when and how these limits are to be 
determined, may well be explained by the transparent fact that any such 
attempt would be subject to precisely the same objections on which it relies 
to overrule National League of Cities. 
' . 
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federal government. 8 Although the States participate in the 
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the Presi-
dent as a representative of the States' interest against fed-
eral encroachment. We noted recently "the hydraulic pres-
sure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power . . . . " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919, --
(1983). The Court offers no reason to think that this pres-
sure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its pow-
ers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the elec-
toral role of the States. 9 
8 One. Can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress is 
composed ofindividuals, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 
are amply protected by the political process. Yet, the position adopted 
today is indistinguishable in principle. The Tenth Amendment also is an 
essential part of the Bill of Rights. See infra, at --. 
'At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the federal 
government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat 
more practical, although not a more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, 
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by the Court to-
day, predicated his argument on assumptions that simply do not accord 
with current reality. Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action has . . . 
always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be jus-
tified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case." 
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States 
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. 
L. Rev. 543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view clearly at 
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, 
but "a variety of structural and political changes in this century have com-
bined to make Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values." 
Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory 
Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The adoption 
of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for direct election of senators), 
the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less repre-
sentative of State and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one 
observer explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop in-
dependent constituencies among groups such as farmers, businessmen, la-
borers, environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally supports 
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The Court apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions 
from the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of 
the "effectiveness of the federal political process in pre-
serving the States' interests .... " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But 
such political success is not relevant to the question whether 
the political processes are the proper means of enforcing con-
stitutional limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally 
certain national initiatives, their tendency to identify with state interests 
and the positions of state officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the 
Courts: Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the 
'80s, at 97 (1981). 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial 
Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the 
breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no 
longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the 
role of the states in the federal system and protecting the fundamental 
value of federalism") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 1-24 
(detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal regulation applicable to the 
States over the past two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the 
numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of constitutional 
theory, there would remain serious questions as to its factual premises. 
10 The Court believes that the significant financial assistance afforded the 
States and localities by the federal government is relevant to the constitu-
tionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments to the States. See 
ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has never held, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government establishes a right to 
control activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhurst State 
School v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17-18 (1981). Regardless of the will-
ingness of the federal government to provide federal aid, the constitutional 
question remains the same: whether the federal statute violates the sover-
eign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. 
11 Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, the Court identifies 
several major statutes that thus far have not been made applicable to State 
governments: the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. 824(f); the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. § 152(2); the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act, 29 U. S. C. § 402(e); the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. § 652(5); the Employee Retirement Insurance 
Security Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b)(1); and the Sherman Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 1, et seq.; see Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 (1943). Ante, at 
' . 
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does not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less neces-
sary to rectify the cases in which it does do so. 12 The States' 
role in our system of government is a matter of constitutional 
law, not of legislative grace. "The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to 
the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the 
people." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infinnities in the Court's 
reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., that federal politi-
cal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, are the sole 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon-
sist~nt with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
system. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At 
least since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled prov-
ince of the federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with 
respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress. 1 
Cranch 137, 177 (1803). In rejecting the role of the judiciary 
in protecting the States from federal overreaching, the 
Court's opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the teach-
24. The Court does not suggest that this restraint will continue after its 
decision here. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest groups will fail to 
accept the Court's open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and 
other statutes to apply to the States and their local subdivisions. 
11 This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for assessing the 
constitutionality of challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests through the elec-
toral process. As the Court noted in National League of Cities, a much 
stronger argument as to inherent structural protections could have been 
made in either Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (1976) or Myers v. United 
States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926), than can be made here. In these cases, the 
President signed legislation that limited his authority with respect to cer-
tain appointments and thus arguably ''it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 U. S., at 841-842 n. 12. The 
Court neyertheless held the laws unconstitutional because they infringed 
on presidential authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any authority for its con-
trary view. 
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ing of the most famous case in our history. 13 
III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major role that 
cannot be preempted by the national government. As con-
temporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying con-
ventions make clear, the States' ratification of the Consti-
tution was predicated on this understanding of federalism. 
Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to 
ensure that the important role promised the States by the 
proponents of the Constitution was realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the Constitution was 
rooted in the fear that the national government would be too 
powerful and eventually would eliminate the States as viable 
political entities. This concern was voiced repeatedly until 
proponents of the Constitution made assurances that a bill of 
rights, including a provision explicitly reserving powers in 
the States, would be among the first business of the new Con-
gress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the sev-
eral States \Vere to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every Sub-
ject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul the 
whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be lost." 
11 The Court states that the decision in National League of Cities "in-
vite[s] an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state 
policies it favors and which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
suggests that under the application of the ''traditional" governmental func-
tion analysis, "the states cannot serve as laboratories for social and eco-
nomic experiment." Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis's famous observa-
tion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Apparently the Court believes that when "an unelected 
federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether a particular function is one 
for the federal or state governments, the States no longer may engage in 
"social and economic experiment." Ante, at 17. The Court does not ex-
plain how leaving the States virtually at the mercy of the federal govern-
ment, without recourse to judicial review, will enhance their opportunities 
to experiment and serve as "laboratories." 
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Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 
1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists 159 
(J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George Mason feared that 
''the general government being paramount to, and in every 
respect more powerful than the state governments, the latter 
must give way to the former." Address in the Ratifying 
Convention of Virginia (June 4-12, 1788), reprinted in Anti-
Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-209. 
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost every State 
ratifying convention. 14 See generally 1-4, Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution (J. Elliot 2d. cd. 1854). As a result, eight 
States voted for the Constitution only after proposing amend-
ments to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these in-
cluded among their recommendations some version of what 
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was 
the concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously de-
fective without a specific bill of rights, including a provision 
reserving powers to the States, that in order to secure the 
votes for ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded 
that such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History, 505 and passim 
(1971). It was thus generally agreed that consideration of a 
bill of rights would be among the first business of the new 
Congress. See generally 1 Annals of Congress 432-437 
(June 8, 1789) (remarks of James Madison). Accordingly, 
the 10 amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were 
14 Opponents of the Constitution were particularly dubious of the Feder-
alists' claim that the States retained powers not delegated to the United 
States in the absence of an express provision so providing. For example, 
James Winthrop wrote that "(i]t is a mere fallacy ... that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History. 510, 511 (1971). 
16 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very close to withholding rati-
fication of the Constitution until the adoption of a bill of rights that in-
cluded, among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. See 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra., at 762-766 and passim. 
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proposed and adopted early in the first session of the First 
Congress. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, 983-1167. 
This history, which the Court simply ignores, documents 
the integral role of the Tenth Amendment in our constitu-
tional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, the fundamental 
character of the Court's error today. Far from being "un-
sound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal sys-
tem so carefully designed by the Framers and adopted in the 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of the 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal and 
state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, for example, 
Madison explained this division by drawing a series of con-
trasts between the attributes of a "national" government and 
those of the government to be established by the Constitu-
tion. While a national form of government would possess an 
''indefinite supremacy over all persons and things," the form 
of government contemplated by the Constitution instead con-
sisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form distinct 
and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject 
within their respective spheres to the general authority than 
the general authority is subject to them, within its own 
sphere." The Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
Under the Constitution, the sphere of the proposed govern-
ment extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, ... leav(ing] to the several States a residuary and in-
violable sovereignty over all other objects." Ibid. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these separate 
spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution 
to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite. The former will be exercised 
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotia-
82-1913 & 82-1951-DISSENT 
GARCIA v. SAN ANTONIO METRO. TRANSIT AUTH. 15 
tion, and foreign commerce; . . . . The powers reserved 
to the several States will extend to all the objects, 
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the in-
ternal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State." 
Id. , at 313. 
Madison considered that the operations of the federal gov-
ernment would be "most extensive and important in times of 
war and danger; those of the State Governments in times of 
peace and security." Ibid. As a result of this division of 
powers, the State governments generally would be more im-
portant than the federal government. · Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of sover-
eignty reserved to the States would ensure that the States 
would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the power of 
the federal government. The States would serve this essen-
tial role because they would attract and retain the loyalty of 
their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, the Founders 
thought, were found in the objects peculiar to state govern-
ment. For example, Hamilton argued that the States "regu-
lat[e] all those personal interests and familiar concerns to 
which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately 
awake .... " The Federalist No. 17, p. 107. Thus, he 
maintained that the people would perceive the States as "the 
immediate and most visible guardian of life and property," a 
fact which "contributes more than any other circumstance to 
impressing upon the minds of the people affection, esteem 
and reverence towards the government." Ibid. Madison 
took the same position, explaining that ''the people will be 
more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the business 
of state governments, and ''with the members of these, will a 
greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal ac-
quaintance and friendship, and of family and party attach-
ments . . . . " The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like Hamil-
ton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the everyday 
concerns of the people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. 
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Ibid. See also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: 
National League of Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
81 (1981). 
Thus, the hann to the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 426 
U. S., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly 
of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17. Rather, by usurp-
ing functions traditionally performed by the States, federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause undermines the 
constitutionally mandated balance of power between the 
States and the federal government, a balance designed to 
protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that can re-
sult from the Court's decision is predicated on the Commerce 
Clause as a power "delegated to the United States" by the 
Constitution. The relevant language states: "Congress shall 
have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." 
Art. I, § 8. Section eight identifies a score of powers, listing 
the authority to lay taxes, borrow money on the credit of the 
United States, pay its debts, and provide for the common de-
fense and the general welfare before its brief reference to 
"Commerce." It is clear from the debates leading up to the 
adoption of the Constitution that the commerce to be regu-
lated was that which the states themselves lacked the practi-
cal capability to regulate. See, e. g. , 1 M. Farrand, The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937); 
The Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. Wy-
oming, 460 U. S. 226, 265 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, the language of the clause itself focuses on activities 
that only a national government could regulate: commerce 
with foreign nations and Indian tribes and "among" the sev-
eral states. 
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To be sure, this Court has construed the Commerce Clause 
to accommodate unanticipated changes over the past two cen-
turies. As these changes have occurred, the Court has had 
to decide whether the federal government has exceeded its 
authority by regulating activities beyond the capability of a 
single state to regulate or beyond legitimate federal interests 
that outweighed the authority and interests of the States. 
In so doing, however, the Court properly has been mindful of 
the essential role of the States in our federal system. 
The opinion for the Court in National League of Cities was 
faithful to history in its understanding of federalism. The 
Court observed that "our federal system of government im-
poses definite limits upon the authority of Congress to regu-
late the activities of States as States by means of the com-
merce power." 426 U. S., at 842. The Tenth Amendment 
was invoked to prevent Congress from exercising its "power 
in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability 
to function effectively in a federal system." /d., at 842-843, 
quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that state sover-
eignty is a fundamental component of our system of govern-
ment. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon, 
7 Wall. 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution 
recognized ''the necessary existence of the States, and, 
within their proper spheres, the independent authority of the 
States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this authority 
extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior regulation 
... ; to [the States] and to the people all powers not expressly 
delegated to the national government are reserved." I d., at 
76. Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City 
of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40, 53 (1982), the Court recognized that 
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was based 
on state sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678, 683 (1982), al-
though finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to a state-
owned railroad, the unanimous Court was careful to say that 
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the States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign 
powers. 
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 
456 U. S. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the constitutionality 
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, the Court ex-
plicitly considered whether the Act impinged on state sover-
eignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment. These repre-
sent only a few of the many cases in which the Court has 
recognized not only the role, but the importance, of state 
sovereignty. See also, e. g., United States v. Fry, supra; 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter 
noted, the States are not merely a factor in the "shifting eco-
nomic arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 
U. S. 77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established by 
the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of federal-
ism that pays only lip service to the role of the States. Al-
though it says that the States ''unquestionably do 'retai[n] 
a significant measure of sovereign authority,"' ante, at 20 
(quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 269 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet specific 
areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states explic-
itly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States ... 
are reserved to the States." U. S. Const., Amend. 10. The 
Court recasts this language to say that the States retain their 
sovereign powers "only to the extent that the Constitution 
11 The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth Amendment only once, when 
it restates the question put to the parties for reargument in this case. See 
ante, at 8. 
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has not divested them of their original powers and trans-
ferred those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 
20. This rephrasing is not a distinction without a difference; 
rather, it reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Con-
gress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign power, and to do so without judicial 
review of its action. Indeed, the Court's view of federal-
ism appears to relegate the States to precisely the trivial 
role that opponents of the Constitution feared they would 
occupy. 17 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as ''typical ~f 
[the services] performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and furnishing public services." 426 U. S., at 851. Not 
only are these activities remote from any normal concept of 
interstate commerce, they are also activities that epitomize 
the concerns of local, democratic self-government. See 
supra, n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of activities 
engaged in by state and local governments that affect the 
everyday lives of citizens. These are services that people 
are in a position to understand and evaluate, and in a democ-
racy, have the right to oversee. 18 We recognized that "it is 
17 As the amici argue, ''the ability of the [S]tates to fulfill their role in the 
constitutional scheme is dependent solely upon their effectiveness as in-
struments of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as Amicus 
Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League of Cities et al as Amicus 
Curiae (a brief on behalf of every major organization representing the con-
cerns of State and local governments). 
11 The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at 
local levels of government, where people with first hand knowledge of local 
problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing 
with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; No. 45, at 316. This is 
as true today as it was when the Constitution was adopted. "Participation 
is likely to be more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a 
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional organizations, than 
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functions such as these which governments are created to 
provide . . . " and that the states and local governments are 
better able than the national government to perform them. 
426 U. S., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved in N a-
tional League of Cities "disserves principles of democratic 
self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court looks myopically only to persons elected to posi-
tions in the federal government. It disregards entirely the 
far more effective role of democratic self-government at the 
state and local levels. One must compare realistically the 
operation of the state and local governments with that of the 
federal government. Federal legislation is drafted primarily 
by the staffs of the congressional committees. In view of the 
hundreds of bills introduced at each session of Congress and 
the complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly familiar 
with many of the statutes enacted. Federal departments 
and agencies customarily are authorized to write regulations. 
Often these are more important than the text of the statutes. 
As is true of the original legislation, these are drafted largely 
by staff personnel. The administration and enforcement of 
federal laws and regulations necessarily are largely in the 
hands of staff and civil service employees. These employees 
may have little or no knowledge of the States and localities 
at the state and federal levels. [Additionally,] the proportion of people ac-
tually involved from the total population tends to be greater, the lower the 
level of government, and this, of course, better approximates the citizen 
participation ideal." ACIR, Citizen Participation in the American Federal 
System 95 (1979). 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the rise of numerous spe-
cial interest groups that engage in sophisticated lobbying, and make sub-
stantial campaign contributions to some members of Congress. These 
groups are thought to have significant influence in the shaping and en-
actment of certain types of legislation. Contrary to the Court's view, a 
"political process" that functions in this way is unlikely to safeguard the 
sovereign rights of States and localities. See supro, n. 9. 
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that will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as acces-
sible and responsive as those who occupy analogous positions 
in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of these fed-
eral employees or the officials who are ultimately in charge. 
The great majority are conscientious and faithful to their 
duties. My point is simply that members of the immense 
federal bureaucracy are not elected, know less about the 
services traditionally rendered by States and localities, and 
are inevitably less responsive to recipients of such services, 
than are state legislatures, city councils, boards of super-
visors, and state and local commissions, boards, and agen-
cies. It is at these state and local levels-not in Washington 
as the Court so mistakenly thinks-that "democratic self-
government" is best exemplified. 
IV 
The question presented in this case is whether the exten-
sion of the FLSA to the wages and hours of employees of a 
city-owned transit system unconstitutionally impinges on 
fundamental state sovereignty. The Court's sweeping hold-
ing does far more than simply answer this question in the 
negative. In overruling National League of Cities, today's 
opinion apparently authorizes federal control, under the aus-
pices of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions 
of employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the distinc-
tion between public and private employers that had been 
drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The Court's 
action reflects a serious misunderstanding, if not an outright 
rejection, of the history of our country and the intention of 
the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
11 The opinion of the Court in National League of Cities makes clear that 
the very essence of a federal system of government is to impose "definite 
limits upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the 
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I return now to the balancing test approved in National 
League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long Island R. Co., 
and FERC v. Mississippi. See supra, n. 5 and ante, at 
--. The Court does not find in this case that the "federal 
interest is demonstrably greater." 426 U. S., at 856 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring). No such finding could have 
been made, for the state interest is compelling. The finan-
cial impact on States and localities of displacing their control 
over wages, hours, overtime regulations, pensions, and labor 
relations with their employees could have serious, as well as 
unanticipated, effects on state and local planning, budgeting, 
and the levying of taxes. 20 As we said in National League of 
Cities, federal control of the terms and conditions of employ-
ment of State employees also inevitably "displaces state poli-
cies regarding the manner in which [States] will structure de-
livery of those governmental services that citizens require." 
Id., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of an intra-
city mass transit system is relatively new in the life of our 
country. It nevertheless is a classic example of the type of 
service traditionally provided by local government. It is 
local by definition. It is indistinguishable in principle from 
the traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage sys-
tems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those ''with which 
citizens are more 'familiarly and minutely conversant.'" The 
States as States by means of the commerce power." See also the Court's 
opinion in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975). 
• As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 
U. S. 183, 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Extension of the FLSA to the 
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and threaten their 
autonomy in the regulation of health and education.'' /d., at 203. 
21 In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court recognized that "[t]his 
Court's emphasis on traditional governmental functions and traditional as-
pects of state sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical view 
of state functions generally immune from federal regulation." 455 U. S., 
at 686. 
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Federalist, No. 46, p. 316. State and local officials of course 
must be intimately familiar with these services and sensitive 
to their quality as well as cost. Such officials also know that 
their constituents and the press respond to the adequacy, fair 
distribution, and cost of these services. It is this kind of 
state and local control and accountability that the Framers 
understood would insure the vitality and preservation of the 
federal system that the Constitution explicitly requires. See 
National League of Cities, supra, at 847-852. 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to recognize that 
the States retain some sovereign power, it does not identify 
even a single aspect of state authority that would 17emain 
when the Commerce Clause is invoked to justify federal 
regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183 (1968), 
overruled by National League of Cities and today reaffirmed, 
the Court sustained an extension of the FLSA to certain hos-
pitals, institutions, and schools. Although the Court's opin-
ion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, Justice Douglas, in 
dissent; wrote presciently that the Court's reading of the 
Commerce Clause would enable "the National Government 
[to] devour the essentials of state sovereignty, though that 
sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." I d., at 
205. Today's decision makes Justice Douglas's fear once 
again a realistic one. 
As I view the Court's decision today as rejecting the basic 
precepts of our federal system and limiting the constitutional 
role of judicial review, I dissent. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), a 
case in which we held that Congress lacked authority to 
impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on 
state and local governments. Because I believe this 
decision substantially alters the federal system embodied 
in the Constitution, I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the 
history of this Court in which prior decisions have been 
reconsidered and overruled. I can recall, however, no 
case in which the principle of stare decisis was ignored 
as flagrantly as we now witness • 1 The reasoning of the 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
,. 
2. 
Court in National League of Cities, and the principle 
applied there, have been reiterated consistently over the 
past eight years. 
~ 
Since its decision in 19~, National 
League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions 
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass~ 452 u.s. 264, 287-
293 (1981): United Trans:eortation Union v. Long Island R. 'R· 
FeR C.... 
/1 
~ 455 u.s. 678, 684-686 (1982); ~&a&~al Bfter~:r 
-Regulatol'y Cofftfft'n v. Mississi:eEi, 456 u.s. 742, 764-767 
1?· 
(1982). Less than three years ago, in Long Island RA~' 
su:era, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the principles of 
National League of Cities but found them inapplicable to 
1National League of Cities, following some 
changes in the composition of the Court, had overruled 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 u.s. 183 (1968). Unlike National 
League of Cities, the holding of Wirtz had not been 
repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions. 
j 
-ll(.·,' ."" 
the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in interstate 
commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities 
test applicable to this case is the third one 
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel] , which 
examines whether 'the states' compliance with 
the federal law would~directly impair their 
ability 'to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions~'" 
LJss u.r. 
/ 
,%-, at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the 
test "may at times be a difficult onew ibid., but i tf 
-applicatiQM was considered in that unanimous decision as 
settled constitutional doctrine. 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN the author of today's 
o National League of Cities, 
1982. 
join JUSTICE BLACKMUN are t e 
In that case, the Court said: 
~-Y ~~kl 
~~pa ,,. ~~~..:tAr~ 
~4/~~~~-
"In National League of Ci tiel v. User 
for example, the Court mad 
State's regulation of its relationship with its 
employees is an 'undoubted attribute of state 
~\Tereignty ·.::w: ~at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553 
(1957), which upheld a federal labor regulation 
as applied to state railroad employees, 426 
4. 
u.s., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities 
acknowledged that not all aspects of a State's 
sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 
~\t. ~S· c¥ 1f(J~f ~ / 
~ ~'An. 28~ The Court went on to say that even 
where the requirements of the National League of Cities 
standard are met, 
I 
'1Jhere are situations in which the 
nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that 
~ qutth~j H!d., ~,,./ 
) 0 '-1'5"2 (./-!>-IA.f-Z:..ffJ 
Ibid .j\ The j oint t1· L"). it justifies state submissiort;•. 
federal/state system of regulation in FERC was such a 
"situation", but there was no hint in JUSTICE BLACKMON's 
~~~r 
op1n1on that National League of Cities - or its basic 
" 







-it i~ tr11e that The doctr inc of stare decisis 
\~ ~ ~~ f'I""-"''\..L 0,... ~ c.= !• ~~~ 
... does Ret apply with tfie :!\U.e h1 -a- constitutional 
~A·"'. 
case as it does VJhere the meaning of tfie Consli tat16n ~ 
- not at isstle. City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
... ' 0 i S• .. J ' "'1?"; ~ (\J<L.,Qrf4l...ss
1 
Reproductive Health, ~u.s .• __ ) (1983). ;1 <E.ven in 
~a__ tl ft 
tJ:r.i:..s... case, AQWiW P E• ~departure from the doctr inc of 
1\ 
stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. 
rl L. fd. J 112-
Rumsey, u.s. __ , (1984). See also Oregon v. 
L,ctl--
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 691"' n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STEVENS.? 
concurring). In the present case, the five Justices who 
compose the majority today participated in National League 
of Cities and the cases reaffirming it.
2 
The stability of 
2Justice O'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart in 
September 1981, and participated in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R.~Co., 455 U.S. 678,- eQ4 6860-(1982)~ 




judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority 
of this Court, are not served by the abrupt overruling of 
multiple precedents we witness in this case. 3 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have 
il-
in weakening the application of stare decisis, tfiis is 
likely to be less important than what the Court has done 
to the Constitution itself. A unique feature of the 
United States is the federal system guaranteed by the 
Constitution and implicit in the very name of our country. 
Despite some genuflecting in Court's opinion to the 
3As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a 
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the 
rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., ~ u.s. ---~983). In this 
respect, stare decisis represents "a rlatural evolution 
from the very nature of our institutions." Lile, "Some ? 
Views on the Rule of Sta~ Decis:s," 4 Va. L. Rev. 95},~ lf 
(1916). "See also, 8. § 1HckJr Tl=le Supreme Court e:l'\a-
(the Idea of Pre~£ess Q2 (1970) : Htl~hes, The Sapr ewe Cotlf'"t 
of the Pt:1ited SLates (1928+--
, 1 
7. 
concept of federalism, today' s decision caR be 'JiQwea 2"-
effectively reduc~ the Tenth Amendment to meaningless 
rhetoric when Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause. The Court holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act 
["FLSA"] "contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' 
power under the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage 
rates and hours of employment of all state and local 
employees. Ante, at 27. In rejecting the tradi tiona! 
view of our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority 
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' 
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by 
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in 
the federal system lies in the structure of the 
~ederal ~overnmenjt " 
\t~l\-
Ante, at 21~22 (emphasis added). 
states 
The "structure" said to "ensure the role of the 
in the 
I\ ) j lJj .rf. ' J .5 -hJ-r S. :> Y' ~ 
federal system' 1s thei--r~ fun.ct t in "the 




of the federal government". Id. , at .c?!'f. To leave no 
doubt about its intention, the Court renounces its 
decision in National League of Cities because it 
"inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make 
decisions about which state policies its favors and which 
ones it dislikes". Ante, at 17. In other words, the 
extent to which the States may exercise their authority, 
Y\ 
whe~ Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause, 
~~~ determined from time to time by political 
)\ 
decisions made by members of the federal government, 
decisions the Court says will not be subject to judicial 
review. ~I note that it does not seem to have 
occurred to the Court that it - anJ' unelected majority of 
five Justices today rejects almost 200 years of the 
understanding of the constitutional status of federalism. 
11' .. , .... 
9. 
a-~~~ 
In doing so, there is only sbQ ~ me~tion of the Tenth 
1\ 
Amendment. Nor is so much as a dictum of any court cited 
in support of the view that the role of the States in the 
federal system may depend upon the grace of elected 
federal officials, rather than on the Constitution as 
interpreted by this Court. 
In ~pinion that follows, Part II addresses 
the Court's criticisms of National League of Cities. Part 
III reviews briefly the understanding of federalism that 
ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the 
extent to which this Court, until today, has recognized 
that the States retain a signficant measure of sovereignty 
in our federal system. Part IV considers the 
applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local 




').· ... 1 
10. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity 
approved in National League of Cities and its progeny is 
unworkable and unsound in principle. In finding the test 
to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracterizing 
National League of Cities and subsequent cases. In 
concluding that efforts to define state immunity are 
unsound in principle, the Court radically departs from 
long settled principles of constitutionalism and of the 
role of judicial review in our system of government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing 
that it is difficult to define a priori "traditional 
governmental functions." National League of Cities 
neither engaged in, 4 nor required, such a task. The Court 
Footnote(s) 4 will appear on following pages. 
11. 
discusses and condemns "traditional 
/\ 
governmental 
functions," "purely historical" functions, "'uniquely' 
governmental functionf'j " and "'necessary' governmental 
services." Ante, at 10-11, 15, 16. But nowhere does it 
4 In National League of Cities, we referred to 
the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional 
governmental functions," a realm which is, of course, 
difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of 
precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting 
and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's attempt to 
demonstrate the impossibility of definition is 
unpersuasive. A number of the cases it cites simply do 
not involve the problem of defining governmental 
functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health 
Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 
976 (1982): Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 2V 
(CA2) , cer t. denied, 434 u.S. 90~ ( 1977) . A number of 
others are not properly analyzed under the principles of 
National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the 
language of the low_,er courts. E.g., in United States v. 
Best, 573 F.2d 109'S (CA9 1978) aJ1-d Hybud Equipment Corp. 
v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 118V' (CA6 1981) • Moreover, 
rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court 
simply lists various functions thought to be protected or 
unprotected by courts interpreting National League of 
Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, however, the 
courts considered the issue of State immunity on the 
specific facts at issue; they did not make blanket 
pronouncements that particular things inherently qualified 
- as traditional governmental functions or did not. Having 
' thus considered the cases out of context, it ·~ 
su.r.prisin9 tl:lat: t:fie CGnrt could --Hntl no "or nizing 
~ principle" among them. See ante, at 10. 
~ ~ lP'"lt.{. liP 
~:./  y) . ·a· ;J 
1/rv;::;r rv"'( 1 ~ ~ v1 ~ ~ ~ ------;;? 
~~~~ 
,•):• .... ~ 
12. 
mention that National League of Cities adopted a familiar 
type of balancing test for determining whether Commerce 
Clause enactments transgress constitutional limitations 
imposed by the federal nature of our system of government. 
This omission is os~ial:t:y noteworthy, since the author 
of today 1 s opinion joined National League of Cities and 
~tnd-
concurred separately to lle4;.e that the Court 1 s opinion in 
..... 
that case "adopt[s] a balancing approach [that] does not 
outlaw federal power in areas where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state 
compliance with imposed federal standards would be 
essential." 426 u.s. , at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMON_, 
concurring). 
In J reading National League of Cities to 




correctly cited -efl.a.t part of the opinion that reaffirmed 
~ v. United States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975). The Court • s 
analysis reaffirming explicitly weighed the 
seriousness of the problem addressed by the federal 
legislation at issue in that case, against the effects of 
compliance on State sovereignty. 426 u.s., at 852-853. 
Our subsequent decisions also adopted this approach of 
weighing the respective interests of the States and 
federal government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 u.s. 226 
5 In undertaking such balancing, we have 
considered, on the one hand, the strength of the federal 
interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of 
exempting the States from its reach. Central to our 
inquiry into the federal interest is how closely the 
challenged action implicates the central concerns of the 
\ S 'V economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. 
~3 Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
(10 v· ' WYoming, ~ S. Ct. }:QS4t -r&6-5 (1983) (JUSTICE STEVENS 
V\ concurring). ~.J!!l:lsog. United Transportation Union v. Long 
~~ Island Rail Road Co. , 455 u.S. 678, 688 ( 1982) ("Congress 
v long ago concluded that federal regulation of railroad 
," ·' 
labor services is necessary to prevent disruptions in 
vi tal rail service essential to the national economy.") ; 
Footnote continued on next page. 
'. 
14. 
{1983), for example, the Court stated that "[t]he 
~ 
principle of iu?tmni ~articulated in National League of 
Cities is a functional doctrine whose ultimate 
purpose is not to create a sacred province of state 
autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits of a 
federal system . not be lost through undue , federal 
interference in certain core state functions." Id., at 
236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass 'n., 452 u.s. 264 {1981). In overruling 
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 757 {1982), {"it is 
difficult to conceive of a more basic element of 
interstate commerce than electric energy ."). 
Similarly, we have considered whether exempting States 
from federal regulation would undermine the goals of the 
federal program. ~~e$ Fry v. United States, 421 u.s. 542 
{1975) ~ee also H3Mel, 452 u.s. at 282 {national surface 
mining sta~ards necessary to insure competition among 
States does not undermine States' efforts to maintain 
adequate intrastate standards). On the other hand, we 
have assessed the injury done to the States if forced to 
comply with federal Commerce Clause enactments. See 
National League of Cities, 426 u.s., at 846-851. 
'· 
15. 
National League of Cities, the Court incorrectly 
characterizes the mode of analysis established therein and 
developed in subsequent cases. 6 
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the 
FLSA, is the identical statute that was at issue in 
National League of Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMON's 
concurrence noted that he was "not untroubled by certain 
possible implications of the Court's opinion" in National 
League of Cities, it also stated that "the result with 
6 rn addition, reliance on the Court's 
difficulties in the tax immunity field is misplaced. 
Although the Court has abandoned the 
"governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see 
New York v. United States, 326 u.s. 572 (1946), it has not 
taken the drastic approach of relying solely on the 
structure of the federal government to protect the States' 
immunity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United 
States, 435 u.s. 444 (1978). Thus, faced with an equally 
difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of 
federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal 




respect to the 
t u-.F5LA] 
statute under challenge here is necessarily 
" 
correct." 426 u.s., at 856 (emphasis added). His opinion 
for the Court today does not discuss the statute, nor 
identify any changed circumstances that warrant a 
different holding. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role 
in the electoral process guarantees that particular 
~ 
exercises of the Commerce Clause power .,do" not infringe on 
residual State . t 7 sovereign y. Alth~ the States 
7Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that 
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the 
constitutional structure might impose on federal action 
affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 
27. The Court asserts that " [ i] n the factual setting of 
these cases the internal safeguards of the political 
process have performed as intended." Ibid. But. -the Court -
identifie- standards- as o d- untl-er what-
c.i-f'-eums-t-aRC.e-s- he "political process" may fai 1 and 
"affirmative imits" are to be imposed. Presumably, such 
limits are t be determined by the Judicial Branch even 
Footnote continued on next page. ·~~~ 
i\.u. ~ d.o.t-.s t\o+- expla.t~ ~ bud hr ..J.h''s j t..< J5 .,t.1;1 +. IJ rJv c/.d-11 r ,-+ 1 - J 
I A ,. , /., '~ t<M- cl r' CU)'1 ~ - ' I l(}."'l 
17. 
participate in the Electoral College, this is hardly a 
reason to view the President as a representative of the 
8 
States' interest against federal encroachment. Members of 
Congress are elected from the various States, but once in 
8 office they are members of the federal government. We 
noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within 
each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits 
~-
of its power II Immigration and Naturalization 
r~ .~, 
it is "unelec ed". ~ today's opinion .!\~ 
the balancing tandard , ~~QHQQ iA tbe- ~Quer.;U. ' 
caGes a-.s .OSl.e-t.I.Jl~d, nd suggests no other standard-,_ 
that would enable a court t determine when t~he has been 
a malfunction of the "poli ical process". The Court's 
unwil li ngq,e~s er- i-Rabilit;y to specify the ' ffirmative "' J 
limits" on federal power, or w-hen and how these limits are)V 
to be determined, may well be explained by the transparent 
fact that any such attempt would be subject to precisely 
the same objections on which it relies to overrule 
National ~eague of Cities. 
One can hardly 1magine this Court saying that 
because Congress is composed of individuals, individual 
rights are amply protected by the legislative process. 
Yet, the position adopted today is indistinguishable in 
principle. The Tenth Amendment was adopted as an 
essential part of the Bill of Rights and should be ~d 





Service v. Chadha, The 
Court offers no reason to think that this pressure will 
not operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under 
the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of 
the States. 9 
9At one time in our history, the view that the 
structure of the federal government sufficed to protect 
the States might have had somewhat more practical, 
although not more logical, basis. Professor Wechsler, 
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by 
the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions 
that simply do not accord with current reality. Professor 
Wechsler wrote: .. National action has always been 
regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be 
justified by some necessity, the special rather than the 
ordinary case... Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
543, 544 {1954). Not only is the premise of this view 
clearly at odds with the~roliferation of national 
legislation over the past ,75 years, but .. a variety of '1 
structural and political c anges in this ce~y ha~~ 
combined to make Congress particularly insensi~ to state 
and local values... Advisory Comm' n on Intergovernmental 
Relations [ACIR], Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, 
Impact and Reform 50 {1984). The adoption of the 
Seventeenth Amendment {providing for direct election of 
senators), the weakening of political parties on the local 
level, and the rise of national media, among other things, 
have ~ongress ~0 ee increasingly less 
represe tative of State and local interests, and more 
Footnote continued on next page. 
,., ~ 
19. 
The Court apparently thinks that the States' 
success at obtaining federal funds for various projects 
and exemptions from the obligations of some federal 
statutes is indicative of the "effectiveness of the 
federal political process in preserving the States' 
• 
likely to be responsive to the demands of various national 
constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one observer 
explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop 
independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, 
businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, 
each of which generally supports certain national 
initiatives, their tendency to identify with state 
interests and the positions of state officials is 
reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the Courts: Agenda fo~'l ,.\ 
the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the '8 0;3.1 ~ 
{1981) • r-,J 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State ~ 
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 84;~~ 
(1979) (changes in political practices and the breadth of 
national initiatives mean that the political branches "may 
no longer be as well suited as they once were to the task 
of safeguarding the role of the states in the federal 
system and protecting the fundamental valueS of 
federalism.") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, supra, at 
1- 24 (detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of federal 
regulation applicable to the States over the past two 
decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the numerous 
problems with the Court's position in terms of 
constitutional theory, there would remain serious 






interests ••• "Ante, at 23-24. 10 But political success 
is not relevant to the question whether the political 
processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional 
limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally does not 
10The Court that the significant 
financial assistance affor States and localities by 
the federal governmen is relevant to the 
constitutionality of extend ng Commerce Clause enactments 
to the States. See ante, a 23-24, 26. This Court has 
never held ~QE implied, however, that the mere 
disbursement of funds by the federal government 
establishes a right to contr 1 activities that benefit 
from such funds. See Pennhurs State School v. Halderman, 
4(jl§} u.s. 1, 17-18 (1981) • Re ardless of the willingness 
of the federal government to pay iR \iOO~il er pef't= for ..,-
the constitutional question remains 
the federal statute violates the 
sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth 
v The r£-tma t 'Sa Qne effort 0to reassure t:Re etabils (}-
Amendment 11 ..,1-zjc;A.& ¥ ~ 
~ ~ ajor statutes tha thus far have not been 
ade applicable o State governments: the Federal Power 
Act, 16 u.s.c. '-82 (f); the Nat' s ,] Labor~elations Act !-17 
29 u.s.c. §1521 ) ; the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, 9 u.s.c. §402(e); the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 u.s.c. §652(5); the Employee Retiremen 
Insurance Sec rity Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ ( , 1002 32 ; 
and the Sher n Act, Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (194 ) • 
Ante, at 2 The Court does not suggest that 
th1s res aint will continue after its decision is 
underst d. Indeed, it is unlikely that special interest 
groups ill fail to accept the Court's open invitation to 
Congress to extend these and other statutes to apply 




transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less 
necessary to rectify the infrequent cases in which it does 
do so. 12 The States' role in our system of government is 
a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace. 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
to the States and their local subdivisions. 
12This Court has never efore abdicated 
responsibility for assessing the c stitutionality of 
challenged action on the ground t t affected parties 
o:-------.....__;:t;:.h~e~o~r:...::e::..t::.:l~· c~a lly are a b 1 e to 1 ook for their own 
1nterests As the Court noted League of 1 _ 
Cities, a much stronger argument inherent structural GA~ 
protections cou1.d. pave been made in \;Buckley v. Valeo, 4~ 
u.s. 1 (1976}.; -.. Myers v. United States, 272 u.s. 52 
(1926} , than can be made 1Jith r;Q&pect tq 1 i mi tat ions '*' ~,..q, 
~Re Cemmerce Qla~~e. In these cases, the President signed 
legislation · limited his authority with respect to 
certain ointments and thus arguably "it was no concern 
of t 's Court that the law violated the Constitution." 
u.s., at 841-842 n. 12. The Court nevertheless held 
laws unconstitutional because they infringed on 
presidential authority, the President's consent 
notwithstanding. The Court does not address this point; 
nor does it cite any authority for its contrary view. 
22. 
reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." 
u.s. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in 
the Court's reasoning is the result of its holding, i. e., 
that federal political 
I~ )'4._~~14. 
officials are the sole judges of ~ 
~ .) 
the limits of their own power. This result is 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our 
constitutional system. See, e .g., The Federalist No. 78 
(Hamilton). At least since Marbury v. Madison it has been 
the settled province of the federal judiciary "to say what 
the law is" with respect to the constitutionality of acts 
of Congress. In rejecting the role of the judiciary in 
protecting the States from federal overreaching, the 
Court • s opinion offers no explanation for ignoring the 
teaching of the most famous case in our history. 13 




lJ,wk &w" ~J s\.sL1 
Federalism refers to the dual federal aRd state 
<system of our country, a 51ystem in wl:lieh the States play a 
().),·~ 
major role that cannot be preempted by the ~deral 
government. As contemporaneous writings and the debates 
at the ratifying conventions make clear beyoRd all ~gu~t, 
13The Court states that the decision in National 
League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary 
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and 
which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" 
governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve 
as laboratories for social and economic experiment". 
Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observation 
~New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 u.s. 262, 311 
Apparently the Court believes that when "an 
unelected federal judiciary" makes decisions as to whether 
a particular function is one for the federal or state 
governments, the States no longer may engage in "social 
and economic experiment". Ante, at 17. ['fhe argument is 
especially perplexing in light of the Court's ruling that 
the federal government alone will make these decisions. It 
is unclear how the States are afforded any more 
,f7
1
_,v"Y opportunity to serve as "laboratories" in these 
;:::;:. ~ircumstances.:.J 
w~ hP 
Y--1~ --- ­rr/ 
~ 
~~~~=r&- ~~~.,._ '3.d-~~ sl 
,· 
~ ~~ ~ ~r-c.6'1~ 
~t.Z-~c~Ly 
~f- ;J¢& P mf'a.. ~u..f~~;~ 
~ r~~~~k,..a-rr-~ 
the States' ratification of the Constitution was 
predicated on this understanding of federalism. Indeed, 
~
\/)8~~ endment was adopted0~~~~VL 
":-.:, ~--the ~m~  , role- promised the States by the-
\ I I I /"'\.. 1/.l ' d tJ.COl +--> . }-;, .J.Ij, />' 
~4N~ ~fot~t•l"- ,~ ~&~~--
.proponents of the Consti-tution was reaH ze&w- See, e. g., 
Lf3 z__ -l.jJ? 
James Madison, 1 Annals of Congress ~June 
1 789) • 
Much of the to the 
Constitution was rooted in the fear 
government would be too powerful and 
eliminate the States as viable political entities. -Foe 
) w Jb&;L vJ jvU- ) 
-e.xamQle, Samuel Adams arguedj\that if the several States 
• _.f 
were \ to be joined in "one entire Nation, under one 
Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to every 
Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & controul 
\ ··,. 
25. 
the whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these States must be 
lost ... Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee 
(Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus 
Federalists 159 (J. Lewis ed. 1967). Likewise, George 
Mason feared that .. the general government being paramount 
to, and in every respect more powerful than the state 
governments, the latter must give way to the former ... 
Address in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 
1788) , reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus Federalists, 
supra, at 208-209. 
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost 
every State ratifying convention. 14 
~~~ 
See) Elliot, Debates 
14opponents of the Constitution were 
particularly dubious of the Federalist claim that the 
States retained powers not delegated to the United States 
in the absence of an express provision so providing. For 
example, the Letters of Brutus called the claim that 
Footnote continued on next page. 
26. 
~ 
"tn the Several State Cot:tueot ions on the Adopt..i OR of the 
Federal Constitution (1854). 
-......._ 
As a result, eight States 
voted for the Constitution only after proposing amendments 
to be adopted after ratification. 15 All eight of these 
included among their recommendations some version of what 
later became the Tenth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the 
concern that the proposed Constitution was seriously 
defective without a specific bill of rights, including a 
provision reserving powers to the States, that in order to 
~~ 
/::{.' -~ secure the votes for ratification, 
~' ,{.-\~ 
the Federalists 
~~v,~~~~ -nondelegated powers were reserved to the States •more 
"'f { \ specious than solid." Letters of Brutus, reprinted in 
Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, at 505, 507. 
Similarly, James Winthrop wrote that "[i]t is a mere 
------------~f~a~l~l~a~c~y that what rights are not given are 
reserv Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Ri1~ s, supra, at 510, 511. 
he Virginia legislature came very close to 
refusing to ratify the Constitution until the adoption of 
a Bill of Right r See Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, 








eventually conceded that such provisions were necessary. 
See Schwartz, A Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, 
supra, at 505 and passim. It was thus generally agreed 
~
that the pr-e~eserl of a bill of rights would be among the 
first business of the new Congress. Accordingly, the ten 
amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights were 
proposed and adopted early in the first session bf the 
& st Congress. Id., at 983- 1167. 
This history, which the Court ~ignores, 
1\. 
documents the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in 
our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, 
the fundamental character of the Court's error today. Far 
from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial 
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is essential to 
maintaining the federal 
Constitution. 
B 
The Framers had 
~Cstj~ 





ideas about the 
~ ~ 
Constitution's division of authority between the federal 
and state governments. In The Federalist No. 39, 
for example, Madison explained this division by drawing a 
series of contrasts between the attributes of a national 
government and those of a federal form of government. 
While a national form of government would possess an 
.. indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, .. the 
federal form of government contemplated by the 
Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal 
authorities [which] form distinct and independent portions 
29. 
spheres to the general authority than the general 
authority is subject to them, within its own sphere." 
\ ~ ~is+ tJo. ~"<. J ( T Co·~ eel. t1ftl'l 
.!.2.::!:J cJSt25Y Under the Constitution, the sphere of the 
"" 
proposed government extended to jurisdiction of "certain 
enumerated objects, only, . leav[ing] to the several 
States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all 
other objects." Id. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these 
separate spheres of sovereignty in ~he Federalist No. 45: 
v~ ... v c::>' .. '-
"The powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the Federal Government are few 
and defined. Those which are to remain in the 
State Governments are numerous and indefinite. 
The former will be exercised principally on 
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, 
and foreign commerce; The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to 
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course 
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and 
properties of the people; and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State." 
Madison considered that the operations of 
the federal government would be "most extensive and 
,. 
30. 
important in times of war and danger; those of the State 
Governments in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a 
result of this division of powers, the State governments 
would have a distinct advantage in 
over the federal government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of 
sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the 
States would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the 
power of the federal government. The States would serve 
this essential role because they would attract and retain 
the loyalty of their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, 
the Founders thought, were found in the objects peculiar 
to State government. For example, Hamil ton argued that 
the States "regulat [e) all those personal interests and 
familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals 
31. 
is more immediately aware." ) Thus, he maintained that ~ ~ 
,.,hk oC.. 
:t?Qopl Q uet:J:ld percp1Ve.;1 the States as "the immediate and 
~sible guardiarP-1f life and property," a fact whicH-
"contributeiP any other circumstance to 
impressing upon the minds of the people affection, esteem 
and reverence towards the government." The Federalist No. 
Wf. 
17, J a-t! 107. Madison took the same position, explaining 
that "the people will be more familiarly and minutely 
conversant" with the business of State governments, and 
"i w{ ith the members of these, will a greater proportion of 
the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and 
friendship, and of family and party attachments • .. 
f'' 
The Federalist No. 46) ~ 316. Like Hamilton, Madison saw 
the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the 
people as the source of their citizens' loyalty. Id. See 
32. 
also Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National 
League of Cities 
\;;;; 
(1981) • 
in Perspective., 1981 S~ Rev. 81 
717 ~
Thus, the harm to the States that results from 
federal overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not 
simply a matter of dollars and cents. National League of 
Cities, 426 u.s., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the 
wisdom or folly of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 
17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed 
by the States, federal overreaching under the Commerce 
Clause undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of 
power between the States and the federal government, a 





The opinion for the Court in National League of 
Cities was faithful to history in its understanding of 
~ ~~-
federalism. ) 6bserv~ that "our federal system of 
government imposes definite limits upon the authority of 
Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by 
~.){, us. J <itJ.. ~ 
means of the commerce power, ") tQ.g eo at t 1nvokea tlhe Tenth 
lrJ;:j ·,1\vJ..J ~ ~ -C.o._ .&,(.~~~ ·Js 
Amendment }to maJ(e elga:r tl:lae __.,..,..Congress may R9t e:x:gn~'ise 
power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or 
their ability to function effectively in a federal 
14· 
system."' .426 Ul!l., 
States, 421 u.s. 542, 
at 842-843 > tquoting > KfY. v. United 
547 n. 7 (1975)) 1( This Court has 
recognized repeatedly that State sovereignty is a 
fundamental component of our system of government. More 
than a century ago, in Lane County v. Oregon, 74 u.s. (7 
Wall.) 71 (1868), the Court stated that the Constitution 
34. 
recognized "the necessary existence of the States, and, 
within their proper spheres, the independent authority of 
the States." It concluded, as Madison did, that this 
authority extended to "nearly the whole charge of interior 
regulation • . ; to [the States 1 and to the people all 
powers not expressly delegated to the national government 
are reserved." Id., 
fVl'\i' 
at 76. Recently, in Community 
Communications Co. v. C i t y of Bo u 1 de r , 4 55 U . S • 40, .£3 
(1982) , the Court recognized that the state action 
exemption from the antitrust laws was based on State 
sovereignty. Similarly, in United Transportation Union v. 
Long Island Railroad Co., 455 ~ 678, 683 (1982), 
although finding the Railway Labor Act applicable to a 
~.c~k~ 
state-owned railroad, the Court 1\ recognj zed tb~ t:b~ 
tAA- d:,_ ~~ ·- ~f 
~ States possess constitutionally preserved sovereign 
. 
~ '1'/t~~ .... /; 
"' ~ . 
35. 
powers. ~ ..Ph Federal Regulatory Connnieeion v. Mississippi, 
456 u.s. 742, 752 (1982)' in 
constitutionality of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the 
Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the 
Tenth Amendment. These represent only a few of the many 
cases in which the Court has recognized not only the role, 
but the importance, of state sovereignty. See also, e. 
~' United States v. ~' supra; Metcalf & Eddy v. 
Mitchell, 269 u.s. 514 (1926); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 u.s. 
559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter noted, the States are 
not merely a factor in the "shifting economic 
arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 u.s. 
77' 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established 
by the Framers for governing our Federal Uni 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
:D 
In con tr as t, the Court today 
of federalism that pays only lip service .. 
36. 
National 
the States . al't€l fails -eo ackaowled.!ie th.Q .potenti:~ impacto--
of impc:rs'±-rt'9'--t~ FLSA an the States. Although it says that 
the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n] a significant 
measure of sovereign authority,'" ante, at 20 (quoting 
EEOC v. -- Wyoming, 460 u.s. 226, 269 (POWELL, J. , 
dissenting)), it fails to recognize the broad, yet 
specific areas of sovereignty that the Framers intended 
the States to retain. Indeed, the Court barely 
acknowledges that the Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That 
16The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth 
Amendment only once, when it restates the question put to 
the parties for reargument in this case. See ante, at 8. 
. 
' 
.. it ~ •• 
37. 
Amendment states explicitly that "[t] he powers not 
delegated to the United States • . are reserved to the 
States." u.s. Const., Amend. 10. The Court recasts this 
language to say that the States retain their sovereign 
powers "only to the extent that the Constitution has not 
divested them of their original powers and transferred 
those powers to the Federal Government." Ante, at 20. 




~ reflects the Court's unprecedented view that Congress 
is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's 
traditional sovereign power without judicial review of its 
action.\ 
7
Indeed, the Court's view of federa~a~;s" 
the States to precisely the trivial role that opponents of 
the Constitution feared they would occupy • 
38. 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire 
prevention, police protection, sanitation, and public 
health as "typical of [the services] performed by state 
and local governments in discharging their dual functions 
of administering the public law and furnishing public 
services." 426 u.s., at 851. Not only are these 
activities remote from any normal concept of interstate 
commerce, they are also activities that epitomize the 
concerns of local, democratic self-government. See supra 
n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of 
activities engaged in by state and local governments that 
affect the everyday lives of people. These are services 
that people have the ability to understand and eva~u~e as 
well as the right, in a democracy, to oversee~ We 
Footnote(s) 17 will appear on following pages. 
39. 
recognized that "it is functions such as these which 
governments are created to provide " and that the 
states and local governments are better able than the 
national government to perform them. 426 u.s. , at 851. 
IV. 
\1 17The Framers recognized that the most effective 
..,l'tt-~ democracy occurs at local levels of government, where 
peopl~etoe first hand knowledge of local problems ~ 
~more ready access to public officials responsible for 
dealing with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; 
No.45, at 316. This is as true today as it was when the 
Constitution was adopted. "Participation is likely to be 
more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a 
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional 
organizations, than at the state and federal levels. 
[Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved 
from the total population tends to be greater, the lower 
the level of government, and this, of course, better 
pproximates the citizen participation ideal." ACIR, 
i tizen Participation in the American Federal System 95 
(1979) • 
recognized that "it is functions such as these which 
governments are created to provide n and that the 
states and local governments are better able than the 
national government to perform them. 426 u.s. , at 851. 
IV. 
\1 17The Framers recognized that the most effective 
~~~~ democracy occurs at local levels of government, where 
peopl~aue first hand knowledge of local problems ~ 
~more ready access to public officials responsible for 
dealing with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; 
No.45, at 316. This is as true today as it was when the 
Constitution was adopted. "Participation is likely to be 
more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a 
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional 
organizations, than at the state and federal levels. 
[Additionally,) the proportion of people actually involved 
from the total population tenda to .be _a_rA.;l_r&>r .o..h~ ~ - -- -. •-
lfp/ss 12/14/84 
Rider A, p. 39 Garcia 
We have witnessed in recent years the Moreover, 
;nterests groups that engage in sophisticated 
rise of numerous special • 
and make substantial campaign contributions to some lobbying, 
These groups are thought to have significant members of Congress. 
influence in the shaping and passing of certaina(~egislation. 
"political process" fmaart? ens - as the 
This is hardly the way the 




The question presented in this case is whether 
the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of 
employees of a city-owned transit system 
unconstitutionally impinges on fundamental State 
sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more 
than simply answer this question in the negative. In 
overruling National League of Cities, today's opinion 
apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices 
of the Commerce Clause, 18 over the terms and conditions of 
~~~ 
~ 
asculation(of the powers of the States 
that can result rom t~~decision is predicated on the 
Commerce Clause as a power "delegated to the United 
States" by the ~t. The relevant language 
states: "Congress shall have power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states 
and with the Indian tribes." Art. I, §8. Section 8 
identifies a score of powers, listing the authority to lay 
taxes, borrow money on the credit of the United States, 
pay its debts, provide for the common defense and the 
general welfare before its brief reference to "Commerce." 
It is clear from the debates leading up to the adoption of 
the Constitution that the commerce to be regulated was 
that which the states themselves were powerless to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
41. 
employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the 
distinction between public and private employers that had 
been drawn carefully in National League of Cities. The 
~
Court's action reflects a misunderstanding, if not an 
'\ 
outright rejection, of the history of our country and the 
intention of the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
~..,-r~~lJ~ 
regulate. See 1 Farran , The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 178 , 21 ev. ed. 1937). See also EEOC v. 
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 265 ( 1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, 
dissenting). Indeed, the language of the clause itself 
focuses on activities that only a national government 
could regulate: commerce with foreign nations and Indian 
tribes and "among" the several states. 
To be sure, this Court has construed the 
Commerce Clause to accommodate unanticipated changes over 
the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, 
the Court has had to decide whether the federal government 
has extended its authority in regulating activities beyond 
the capability of a single state to regulate or beyond 
legitimate federal interests that outweighed the authority 
and interfgts of the states. 0 ~r 
The opinion of the Court in National Lea~ue _;. 
~ of Cities makes clear that ehc eery ceec!l'\8@ 85 ane eral 
~~' system of government d~~o to impose "definite limits upon 
~he author1ty of Congress to regulate the activities of 
~o> the States as States by means of the commerce power." See 





AceordiR~ , I return to the balancing test 
"'\ 
approved in National League of Cities and accepted in 
Hodel, Long Island R.R.~ and FERC v. Mississipp tl) 
\t}' ~~"- sloJl ~;w 
~\ ""'" whether the service or activity at issue is one that "the 
I 
states and their political subdivisions have traditionally 
afforded their citizens." National League of Cities, 
supra, at 855. 
~in this 
demonstrably 
See ante, at 
case that the "federal 
greater" .... 
te-Jf:IM a mJ:;;::erwd j t ~ o.f ita -o~w""n---~~t:: 
not 
interest is 
~uld have been ~~J for the state interest is 
.1\ 
The financial impact on States and 
localities of displacing their control over wages, hours, 
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with 





serious and pa rb~s 
..t 
unanticipated effects on State and 
J4/ a-u.fC ~<c""j r~ I 
local budgeting and 
A " As we said in National League of Cities, federal 
~~ 
control "displaces state policies regarding the manner in 
~ I:~ 
which ~fwill structure delivery of those governmental 
services that citizens require." Id., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of 
an intra-city mass transit system is relatively new in the 
life of our country. It nevertheless is a classic example 
of the type of service traditionally provided by local 
?l- .~~d' 4t' ~h bl . • .. 1 f th government ~ ItC~ 1ngu1s a e 1n pr1nc1p e rom e 
traditional services of providing and maintaining streets, 
20As Justice Douglas observed in his dissent in 
Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, extent ion of the FLSA to the 
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and 
threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and 
education." Id., at 302. 
44. 
public lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage 
systems. 21 Services of this kind are precisely those 
11 Wi th which citizens are more 1 familiar [] and minutely 
conversant. 111 The Federalist, supra, No. 46, at 316. 
State and local officials of course must be intimately 
familiar with these services and sensitive to their 
~~~~~. 
quali~, . ou~u officials also know that their constituents 
~ 
as we~l as the press respond to the adequacy, fair 
"\ 
~' 
.~\.{ distribution, and cost of these services. is this kind 
jf,f ·/ of state and local control and accountability that the 
~r-~ ·~( ~ 
,~ ~). s Framers understood would insure the vitality and 
\, '- ·~ t" /(,/ 
\(' '( \\ 
~ -t" ?, preservation of the federal system that the Constitution 
1(" ~~~~\._ 
~~ ~'»~} ~ -----
/(~ 21 rn Long Island R.R.. G9:i:;-: the unanimous Court 
\,..V  • recognized that 11 [t] his Court 1 s emphasis on traditional 
\- ~ ,~ governmental functions and traditional aspects of state 
'0 \\ ~ sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical 
""\ 'ic .. X 'y,) view of state functions generally immune from federal 
Y ~ { / regulation. 11 455 u.s., at 686. 
~.) ~~ /~~y· ~ I J!) 
v ~~-~.' '\.~ .. ~~ / '<' f~>-v· 
~, ~¥"'> ~~ ~. ~ 
)(9 'I;! y o/\l. r '1::'" ., 
45. 
explicitly requires. See National League of Cities, 
supra, at 847-852. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved 
in National League of Cities "disserves the principles of 
/ 
\ democratic self government." Ante, at xxx. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court looks myopically only to 
persons elected to positions in the federal government. 
It disregards entirely the far more effective role of 
democratic self government at the state and local levels. 
One must compare realistically the operation of the state 
and local governments with that of the federal government. 
Federal legislation is drafted primarily by the staffs of 
the congressional committees. In view of the hundreds of 
bills introduced at each session of Congress and the 
it is virtually impossible for 
46. 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly 
familiar with many of the statutes enacted. Federal 
departments and agencies typically are authorized to write 
regulations. Often these are more important than the text 
of the statutes. Like the original legislation, these are 
drafted largely by staff personnel. Thus, the 
administration and enforcement of federal laws and 
regulations necessarily of staff and 
civil service employees. 
In recognizing that this 
works, I imply no criticism of or 
the is 
that members of the immense federal bureaucracy 
H.s; 
serv1ces traditionally rendered by 
~~ 
states and localities, and 
1 






1t fair to 
Ante, at 
v 
Although the Court's opinion purports to 
recognize that the States retain some sovereign power, it 
~ 
does not identify even a single aspect of state authority .., 
that would remain when the Commerce Clause is invoked to 
justify federal regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, 
overruled by National League of Cities and today 




to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. Although 
the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively narrow, 
Justice Douglas, in dissent, wrote presciently that the 
Court's reading of the Commerce Clause would enable "the 
National Government [to] devour the essentials of state 
sovereignty, though that sovereignty is attested by the 
Tenth Amendment". !d., at 205. Today' s decision makes 
Justice Douglas's fear once again a realistic one. 
~·< 6'L'c~f4. ~~'<t ~ 
~~v-t-~~ 
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82-1913 and 82-1951 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et 
al. 
Donovan v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority et 
al. 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), a 
case in which we held that Congress lacked authority to 
impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on 
state and local governments. Because I believe this 
decision substantially alters the federal system embodied 
in . the Constitution, I dissent. 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the 
history of this Court in which prior decisions have been 
reconsidered and overruled. I can recall, however, no 
' I. 
2. 
case in which the principle of stare decisis was ignored 
as flagrantly as we now witness. 1 The reasoning of the 
Court in National League of Cities, and the principle 
applied there, have been reiterated consistently over the 
past eight years. Since its decision in 1976, National 
League of Cities has been cited and quoted in opinions 
joined by every member of the present Court. Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., 452 u.s. 264, 287-
293 (1981): United Transportation Union v. Long Island 
R.R. ,_455 U.S. 678, 684-686 (1982): FERC v. Mississippi, 
456 u.s. 742, 764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, 
in Long Island R.R., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed 
the principles of National League of Cities but found them 
inapplicable to the regulation of a railroad heavily 
engaged in interstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities 
test applicable to this case is the third one 
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel], which 
examines whether 'the states' compliance with 
the federal law would directly impair their 
ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions.'" 
3. 
455 u.s., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that 
the test "may at times be a difficult one," ibid., but it 
was considered in that unanimous decision as settled 
constitutional doctrine. 
As recently as June 1, 1982 the five Justices who 
constitute the majority in this case also were the 
majority in FERC v. Mississippi. In that case, the Court 
said: 
"In National League of Cities, supra, for 
example, the Court made clear that the State's 
regulation of its relationship with its 
employees is an 'undoubted attribute of state 
sovereignty.' 426 u.s., at 845. Yet, by 
holding 'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 
u.s. 553 (1957}, which upheld a federal labor 
regulation as applied to state railroad 
employees, 426 U.S., at 854. n. 18, National 
League of Cities acknowledged that not all 
aspects of a State's sovereign authority are 




426 u.s., at 764 n. 28. The Court went on to say that 
even where the requirements of the National League of 
Cities standard are met, "'[t]here are situations in which 
the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such 
that it justifies state submission.'" Ibid., quoting 
Hodel, supra, 452 u.s., at 288 n. 29. The joint 
federal/state system of regulation in FERC was such a 
"situation", but there was no hint in the Court's opinion 
that National League of Cities - or its basic standard -
was subject to the infirmities discovered today. 
The doctrine of stare decisis is never entirely 
persuasive on a constitutional question. City of Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 
(1983). Nevertheless, even in such a case, however, a 
"departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands 
5. 
special justification." Arizona v. Rumsey, u.s. __ , 
(1984). See also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 u.s. 667, 
691-692 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring). In 
the present case, the five Justices who compose the 
majority today participated in National League of Cities 
and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of judicial 
decision, and with it respect for the authority of this 
Court, are not served by the abrupt overruling of multiple 
precedents we witness in this case. 3 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have 
in weakening the application of stare decisis, it is 
likely to be less important than what the Court has done 
to the Constitution itself. A unique feature of the 
United States is the federal system guaranteed by the 
Constitution and implicit in the very name of our country. 
..... 
6. 
Despite some genuflecting in Court's opinion to the 
concept of federalism, today's decision effectively 
reduces the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric when 
Congress acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause. The Court 
holds that the Fair Labor Standards Act [ "FLSA"] 
"contravened no affirmative limit on Congress' power under 
the Commerce Clause" to determine the wage rates and hours 
of employment of all state and local employees. Ante, at 
27. In rejecting the traditional view of our federal 
system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority 
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' 
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by 
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in 
the federal system lies in the structure of the 
Federal Government itself." 
Ante, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
To leave no doubt about its intention, the 
Court renounces its decision in National League of Cities 
7. 
because it "inevitably invites an unelected federal 
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies its 
favors and which ones it dislikes". Ante, at 17. In 
other words, the extent to which the States may exercise 
their authority, when Congress purports to act under the 
Commerce Clause, henceforth is to be determined from time 
to time by political decisions made by members of the 
federal government, decisions the Court says will not be 
subject to judicial review. I note that it does not seem 
to have occurred to the Court that it - an unelected 
majority of five Justices - today rejects almost 200 years 
of the understanding of the constitutional status of 
federalism. In doing so, there is only a single passing 
reference to the Tenth Amendment. Nor is so much as a 
dictum of any court cited in support of the view that the 
.. 
8 . 
role of the States in the federal system may depend upon 
the grace of elected federal officials, rather than on the 
Constitution as interpreted by this Court. 
In my opinion that follows, Part II addresses the 
Court's criticisms of National League of Cities. Part III 
reviews briefly the understanding of federalism that 
ensured the ratification of the Constitution and the 
extent to which this Court, until today, has recognized 
that the States retain a signficant measure of sovereignty 
in our federal system. Part IV considers the 
applicability of the FLSA to the indisputably local 
service provided by an urban transit system. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity 
approved in National League of Cities and its progeny is 
9. 
unworkable and unsound in principle. In finding the test 
to be unworkable, the Court begins by mischaracter iz ing 
National League of Cities and subsequent cases. In 
concluding that efforts to define state immunity are 
unsound in principle, the Court radically departs from 
long settled principles of constitutionalism and of the 
role of judicial review in our system of government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing 
that it is difficult to define a priori "traditional 
governmental functions." National League of Cities 
neither engaged in, nor required, such a task. 4 The Court 
discusses and condemns as standards "traditional 
governmental function[s] ," "purely historical" functions, 






governmental services." Ante , at 10 -11 , 15 , 16 • But 
nowhere does it mention that National League of Cities 
adopted a familiar type of balancing test for determining 
whether Commerce Clause enactments transgress 
constitutional limitations imposed by the federal nature 
of our system of government. This omission is noteworthy, 
since the author of today's opinion joined National League 
of Cities and concurred separately to point out that the 
Court's opinion in that case "adopt[s] a balancing 
approach [that] does not outlaw federal power in areas 
. where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and 
where state compliance with imposed federal 
standards would be essential." 426 U.S., at 856 (JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN concurring). 
11. 
In reading National League of Cities to embrace a 
balancing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMUN quite correctly cited 
the part of the opinion that reaffirmed KE.Y_ v. United 
States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis 
reaffirming Fry explicitly weighed the seriousness of the 
problem addressed by the federal legislation at issue in 
that case, against the effects of compliance on State 
' sovereignty. 426 u.s., at 852-853. Our subsequent 
decisions also adopted this approach of weighing the 
respective interests of the States and federal 
government. 5 In EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), for 
example, the Court stated that "[t]he principle of 
immunity articulated in National League of Cities is a 
functional doctrine ••. whose ultimate purpose is not to 





that the unique benefits of a federal system not be 
lost through undue federal interference in certain core 
state functions." Id., at 236. See also Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 u.s. 264 (1981). 
In overruling National League of Cities, the Court 
incorrectly characterizes the mode of analysis established 
therein and developed in subsequent cases. 6 
Moreover, the statute at issue in this case, the 
FLSA, is the identical statute that was at issue in 
National League of Cities. Although JUSTICE BLACKMUN 's 
concurrence noted that he was "not untroubled by certain 
possible implications of the Court's opinion" in National 
League of Cities, it also stated that "the result with 
respect to the statute under challenge here [the FLSA] is 
necessarily correct." 426 U.S., at 856 (emphasis added). 
13. 
His opinion for the Court today does not discuss the 
statute, nor identify any changed circumstances that 
warrant a different holding. 
B 
Today's opinion does not explain how the States' role 
in the electoral process guarantees that particular 
exercises of the Commerce Clause power will not infringe 
on residual State sovereignty. 7 Members of Congress are 
elected from the various States, but once in office they 
are members of the federal government. 8 Although the 
States participate in the Electoral College, this is 
hardly a reason to view the President as a representative 
of the States' interest against federal encroachment. We 
noted recently "the hydraulic pressure inherent within 
each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits 
. ' 
of its power II Immigration and Naturalization 
Service v • Chadha , 4 6 2 u . s . 919 , (1983). The Court 
offers no reason to think that this pressure will not 
operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the 
Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the 
States. 9 
The Court apparently thinks that the States' 
success at obtaining federal funds for various projects 
and exemptions from the obligations of some federal 
statutes is indicative of the "effectiveness of the 
federal political process in preserving the States' 
interests. • . " Ante, at 23-24. 10 But political success 
is not relevant to the question whether the political 
processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional 
limitations. 11 The fact that Congress generally does not 
15. 
transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less 
necessary to rectify the infrequent cases in which it does 
do so. 12 The States' role in our system of government is 
a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace. 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." 
u.s. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling than the logical infirmities in 
the Court's reasoning is the result of its holding, i. ~' 
that federal political officials, invoking the Commerce 
Clause, are the sole judges of the limits of their own 
power. This result is inconsistent with the fundamental 
principles of our constitutional system. See, e .g., The 
.. 
' 
, . . . . 
' 
16. 
Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At least since Marbury v. 
Madison it has been the settled province of the federal 
judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to the 
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In rejecting the 
role of the judiciary in protecting the States from 
federal overreaching, the Court's opinion offers no 
explanation for ignoring the teaching of the most famous 
case in our history.l3 
III 
A 
In our federal system, the States have a major 
role that cannot be preempted by the national government. 
As contemporaneous writings and the debates at the 
ratifying conventions make clear, the States' ratification 
of the Constitution was predicated on this understanding 
·' 
17. 
of federalism. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment was adopted 
specifically to ensure that the important role promised 
the States by the proponents of the Constitution was 
realized. 
Much of the initial opposition to the 
Constitution was rooted in the fear that the national 
.government would be too powerful and eventually would 
eliminate the States as viable political entities. This 
concern was voiced repeatedly until proponents of the 
Constitution made assurances that a bill of rights, 
including a provision explicitly reserving powers in the 
States, would be among the first business of the new 
Congress. Samuel Adams argued, for example, that if the 
several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, 







every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & 
controul the whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these 
States must be lost." Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard 
Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in Anti-Federalists 
versus Federalists 159 (J. Lewis ed. 196 7) • Likewise, 
George Mason feared that "the general government being 
paramount to, and in every respect more powerful than the 
state governments, the latter must give way to the 
former." Address in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia 
(June 4-12 1788), reprinted in Anti-Federalists versus 
Federalists, supra, at 208-209. 
Antifederalists raised these concerns in almost 
every State ratifying convention. 14 See generally 
Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (1854). As a result, 
19. 
eight States voted for the Constitution only after 
proposing amendments to be adopted after ratification. 15 
All eight of these included among their recommendations 
some version of what later became the Tenth Amendment. 
Ibid. So strong was the concern that the proposed 
Constitution was seriously defective without a specific 
bill of rights, including a provision reserving powers to 
the States, that in order to secure the votes for 
ratification, the Federalists eventually conceded that 
such provisions were necessary. See Schwartz, A 
Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 
and passim. It was thus generally agreed that 
consideration of a bill of rights would be among the first 
business of the new Congress. See generally 1 Annals of 









Madison). Accordingly, the ten amendments that we know as 
the Bill of Rights were proposed and adopted early in the 
first session of the First Congress. Schwartz, A 
Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, 983 -
1167. 
This history, which the Court simply ignores, 
documents the integral role of the the Tenth Amendment in 
our constitutional theory. It exposes as well, I believe, 
the fundamental character of the Court's error today. Far 
from being "unsound in principle," ante, at 18, judicial 
enforcement of the Tenth Amendment is essential to 
maintaining the federal system so carefully designed by 




The Framers had definite ideas about the nature of 
the Constitution's division of authority between the 
federal and state governments. In The Federalist ' No. 39, 
for example, Madison explained this division by drawing a 
series of contrasts between the attributes of a "national" 
government and those of the government to be established 
by the Constitution. While a national form of government 
would possess an "indefinite supremacy over all persons 
and things," the form of government contemplated by the 
Constitution instead consisted of "local or municipal 
authorities [which] form distinct and independent portions 
of the supremacy, no more subject within their respective 
spheres to the general authority than the general 
authority is subject to them, within its own sphere." The 
Federalist No. 39, p. 256 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Under the 
22. 
Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government 
extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, leav[ing] to the several States a residuary 
and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Id. 
Madison elaborated on the content of these 
separate spheres of sovereignty in The Federalist No. 45: 
"The powers de leg a ted by the proposed 
Constitution to the Federal Government are few 
and defined. Those which are to remain in the 
State Governments are numerous and indefinite. 
The former will be exercised principally on 
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, 
and foreign commerce: The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to 
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course 
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and 
properties of the people: and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State." 
Id., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of 
the federal government would be "most extensive and 
important in times of war and danger: those of the State 
Governments in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a 
.. 
23. 
result of this division of powers, the State governments 
generally would be more important than the federal 
government. Ibid. 
The Framers believed that the separate sphere of 
sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure that the 
States would serve as an effective "counterpoise" to the 
power of the federal government. The States would serve 
this essential role because they would attract and retain 
the loyalty of their citizens. The roots of such loyalty, 
the Founders thought, were found in the objects peculiar 
to State government. For example, Hamilton argued that 
the States "regulat [e) all those personal interests and 
familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals 
is more immediately awake • • • " The Federalist No. 17, 
supra, p. 107. Thus, he maintained that the people would 
24. 
perceive the States as "the immediate and most visible 
guardian of life and property," a fact which "contributes 
more than any other circumstance to impressing upon the 
minds of the people affection, esteem and reverence 
towards the government." Ibid. Madison took the same 
position, explaining that "the people will be more 
familiarly and minutely conversant" with the business of 
State governments, and "with the members of these, will a 
greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal 
acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party 
attachments • . • II The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. Like 
Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the 
everyday concerns of the people as the source of their 
citizens' loyalty. Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a 
25. 
Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in 
Perspective, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
Thus, the harm to the States that results from 
federal overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not 
simply a matter of dollars and cents. National League of 
C i t i e s , 4 2 6 U • S • , at 8 4 6-8 51 • Nor i s it a rna t t e r of the 
wisdom or folly of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 
17. Rather, by usurping functions traditionally performed 
by the States, federal overreaching under the Commerce 
Clause undermines the constitutionally mandated balance of 
power between the States and the federal government, a 
balance designed to protect our fundamental liberties. 
c 
The emasculation of the powers of the States that 
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26. 
Commerce Clause as a power "delegated to the United 
States" by the Constitution. The relevant language 
states: "Congress shall have power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations and among the several states 
and with the Indian tribes." Art. I, §8. Section eight 
identifies a score of powers, listing the authority to lay 
taxes, borrow money on the credit of the United States, 
pay its debts, and provide for the common defense and the 
general welfare before its brief reference to "Commerce." 
It is clear from the debates leading up to the adoption of 
the Constitution that the commerce to be regula ted was 
that which the states themselves were powerless to 
regulate. See, e. g., 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787 (rev. ed. 1937): The 
Federalist Nos. 7, 11, 22, 42, 45. See also EEOC v. 
27. 
Wyoming, 460 u.s. 226, 265 (1983) (JUSTICE POWELL, 
dissenting). Indeed, the language of the clause itself 
focuses on activities that only a national government 
could regulate: commerce with foreign nations and Indian 
tribes and "among" the several states. 
To be sure, this Court has construed the 
Commerce Clause to accommodate unanticipated changes over 
the past two centuries. As these changes have occurred, 
the Court has had to decide whether the federal government 
has exceeded its authority in regulating activities beyond 
the capability of a single state to regulate or beyond 
legitimate federal interests that outweighed the authority 
and interests of the States. In so doing, however, the 
Court properly has been mindful of the essential role of 










The opinion for the Court in National League of 
Cities was faithful to history in its understanding of 
federalism. The Court observed that "our federal system 
of government imposes definite limits upon the authority 
of Congress to regulate the activities of States as States 
by means of the commerce power." 4 26 U.S. , at 84 2. The 
Tenth Amendment was invoked to prevent Congress from 
exercising its "power in a fashion that impairs the 
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively 
in a federal system.'" Id., at 842-843, quoting !.E.Y_ v. 
United States, 421 u.s. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
This Court has recognized repeatedly that State 
sovereignty is a fundamental component of our system of 
government. More than a century ago, in Lane County v. 




the Constitution recognized "the necessary existence of 
the States, and, within their proper spheres, the 
independent authority of the States." It concluded, as 
Madison did, that this authority extended to "nearly the 
whole charge of interior regulation .•• ; to [the States] 
and to the people all powers not expressly delegated to 
the national government are reserved." Id. , at 7 6. 
Recently, in Community Communications Co. v. City of 
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982}, the Court recognized that 
the state action exemption from the antitrust laws was 
based on State sovereignty. Similarly, in United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 U.S. 
678, 683 (1982}, although finding the Railway Labor Act 
applicable to a state-owned railroad, the unanimous Court 
.; 
30. 
was careful to say that the States possess 
constitutionally preserved sovereign powers. 
Again, in Federal Regulatory Commission v. 
Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 752 (1982), in determining the 
constitutionality of the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act, the Court explicitly considered whether the 
Act impinged on state sovereignty in violation of the 
Tenth Amendment. These represent only a few of the many 
cases in which the Court has recognized not only the role, 
but the importance, of state sovereignty. See also, e. 
~, United States v. ~, supra: Metcalf & Eddy v. 
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926): Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 u.s. 
559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter noted, the States are 
not merely a factor in the "shifting economic 





77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established 
by the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
D 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view 
of federalism that pays only lip service to the role of 
the States. Although it says that the States 
"unquestionably do 'retai[n] a significant measure of 
sovereign authority,'" ante, at 20 (quoting EEOC v. 
Wyoming, 460 U.s. 226, 269 (POWELL, J., dissenting)), it 
fails to recognize the broad, yet specific areas of 
sovereignty that the Framers intended the States to 
retain. Indeed, the Court barely acknowledges that the 
Tenth Amendment exists. 16 That Amendment states 
' -> ·"I 
. . 
32. 
explicitly that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States • • are r .eserved to the States." U.s. Const., 
Amend. 10. The Court recasts this language to say that 
the States retain their sovereign powers "only to the 
extent that the Constitution has not divested them of 
their original powers and transferred those powers to the 
Federal Government." Arite, at 20. This rephrasing is not 
a distinction without a difference; rather, it reflects 
the Court's unprecedented view that Congress is free under 
the Commerce Clause to assume a State's traditional 
sovereign power without judicial review of its action. 
Indeed, the Court's view of federalism appears to relegate 
the States to precisely the trivial role that opponents of 
the Constitution feared they would occupy. 17 
33. 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire 
prevention, police protection, sanitation, and public 
health as "typical of [the services] performed by state 
and local governments in discharging their dual functions 
of administering the public law and furnishing public 
services." 426 u.s., at 851. Not only are these 
activities remote from any normal concept of interstate 
commerce, they are also activities that epitomize the 
concerns of local, democratic self-government. See supra 
n. 5. In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of 
activities engaged in by state and local governments that 
affect the everyday lives of people. These are services 
that people have the ability to understand and evaluate as 






recognized that "it is functions such as these which 
governments are created to provide " and that the 
states and local governments are better able than the 
national government to perform them. 426 u.s., at 851. 
The Court maintains that the standard approved 
in National League of Cities "disserves principles of 
democratic self government." Ante, at 18. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court looks myopically only to 
persons elected to positions in the federal government. 
It disregards entirely the far more effective role of 
democratic self-government at the state and local levels. 
One must compare realistically the operation of the state 
and local governments with that of the federal government. 
Federal legislation is drafted primarily by the staffs of 
the congressional committees. In view of the hundreds of 
·" 
35. 
bills introduced at each session of Congress and the 
complexity of many of them, it is virtually impossible for 
even the most conscientious legislators to be truly 
familiar with many of the statutes enacted. Federal 
departments and agencies typically are authorized to write 
regulations. Often these are more important than the text 
of the statutes. Like the original legislation, these are 
drafted largely by staff personnel. Thus, the 
administration and enforcement of federal laws and 
regulations necessarily are largely in the hands of staff 
and civil service employees. These employees may have 
little or no knowledge of the States and localities that 
will be affected by the statutes and regulations for which 
they are responsible. In any case, they hardly are as 
.. 
36. 
accessible and responsive as those who occupy analogous 
positions in State and local governments. 
In drawing this contrast, I imply no criticism of 
these federal employees or the officials who are 
ultimately in charge. The great majority are 
conscientious and faithful to their duties. My point is 
simply that members of the immense federal bureaucracy are 
not elected, know less about the services traditionally 
rendered by states and localities, and are inevitably less 
responsive to recipients of such services, than are state 
legislatures, city councils, and boards of supervisors of 
local agencies. Thus, while I share the Court's concern 
with "principles of democratic self-government," I think 
they are better served by National League of Cities than 




The question presented in this case is whether 
the extension of the FLSA to the wages and hours of 
employees of a city-owned transit system 
unconstitutionally impinges on fundamental state 
sovereignty. The Court's sweeping holding does far more 
than simply answer this question in the negative. In 
overruling National League of Cities, today's opinion 
apparently authorizes federal control, under the auspices 
of the Commerce Clause, over the terms and conditions of 
employment of all state and local employees. Thus, for 
purposes of federal regulation, the Court rejects the 
distinction between public and private employers that had 
been drawn carefully in National r .. eague of Cities. 'I'he 




an outright rejection, of the history of our country and 
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution. 19 
I return now to the balancing test approved in 
National League of Cities and accepted in Hodel, Long 
Island R.R. , and FERC v. Mississippi. Under this test, 
the Court should consider whether the service or activity 
at issue is one that "the states and their political 
subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens." 
National League of Cities, supra, at 855. See ante, at 
One cannot think of a more fundamental and 
traditional activity of a State than determination of the 
terms and conditions of employment of its own employees. 
Moreover, the Court does not find in this case that the 
"federal interest is demonstrably greater." No such 
finding could have been made, for the state interest is 
39. 
compelling. The financial impact on States and 
localities of displacing their control over wages, hours, 
overtime regulations, pensions, and labor relations with 
their employees could have serious, as well as 
unanticipated, effects on State and local planning, 
budgeting, and the levying of taxes. 20 As we said in 
National League of Cities, federal control also inevitably 
"displaces state policies regarding the manner in which 
[States] will structure delivery of those governmental 
services that citizens require." Id., at 847. 
The Court emphasizes that municipal operation of 
an intra-city mass transit system is relatively new in the 
life of our country. It nevertheless is a classic example 
of the type of service traditionally provided by local 




indistinguishable in principle from the traditional 
services of providing and maintaining streets, public 
lighting, traffic control, water, and sewerage systems. 21 
Services of this kind are precisely those "with which 
citizens are more 1 familiar [] and minutely conversant. 1 " 
The Federalist, supra, No. 46, p. 316. State and local 
officials of course must be intimately familiar with these 
services and sensitive to their quality as well as cost. 
Such officials also know that their constituents and the 
press respond to the adequacy, fair distribution, and cost 
of these services. It is this kind of state and local 
control and accountability that the Framers understood 
would insure the vitality and preservation of the federal 
system that the Constitution explicitly requires. See 





Although the Court's opinion purports to 
recognize that the States retain some sovereign power, it 
does not identify even a single aspect of state authority 
that would remain when the Commerce Clause is invoked to 
justify federal regulation. In Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 
U.S. 183 (1968) ,overruled by National League of Cities and 
today reaffirmed, the Court sustained an extension of the 
FLSA to certain hospitals, institutions, and schools. 
Although the Court's opinion in Wirtz was comparatively 
narrow, Justice Douglas, in dissent, wrote presciently 
that the Court's reading of the Commerce Clause would 
enable "the National Government [to] devour the essentials 
of state sovereignty, though that sovereignty is attested 
',. 
42. 
by the Tenth Amendment". Id., at 205. Today's decision 
makes Justice Douglas's fear once again a realistic one. 
As I view the Court' decision today as rejecting the 
basic precepts of ourfederal system and limiting the 
constitutional role of judicial review, I dissent. 
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1National Lea~ue of Cities, following some 
changes in the composit1on of the Court, had overruled 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 u.s. 183 (1968). Unlike National 
League of Cities, the holding of Wirtz had not been 
repeatedly accepted by our subsequent decisions. 
2Justice 0 'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart in 
September 1981, and participated in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 u.s. 678 (1982), and FERC 
V. MlSSissippi, 456 U.S .-=r4"2 (1982). 
3As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a 
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the 
rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., U.S. ___ (1983). In this 
respect, stare decisis represents "a natural evolution 
from the very nature of our institutions." Li le, "Some 
Views on the Rule of Stare Decisis," 4 Va. L. Rev. 955,956 
(1916). 
4In National League of Cities, we referred to 
the sphere of state sovereignty as including "traditional 
governmental functions," a realm which is, of course, 
difficult to define with precision. But the luxury of 
precise definitions is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting 
and applying the general provisions of our Constitution. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court's attempt to 
demonstrate the impossibility of definition is 
unpersuasive. A number of the cases it cites simply do 
not involve the problem of defining governmental 
functions. E. g., Williams v. Eastside Mental Health 
Center, Inc., 669 F.2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 
976 (1982): Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 
(CA2), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). A number of 
others are not properly analyzed under the principles of 
National League of Cities, notwithstanding some of the 
language of the lower courts. E.g., in United States v. 
Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (CA9 1978) and Hybud Equipment Corp. 
v. City of Akron, 654 F. 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). Moreover, 
rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court 
simply lists various functions thought to be protected or 
unprotected by courts interpreting National League of 
Cities. Ante, at 9-10. In the cited cases, however, the 
courts considered the issue of State immunity on the 
specific facts at issue; they did not make blanket 
. . 
pronouncements that particular things inherently qualified 
as traditional governmental functions or did not. Having 
thus considered the cases out of context, it was not 
difficult for the Court to conclude that there is no 
"organizing principle" among them. See ante, at 10. 
5 In undertaking such balancing, we have 
considered, on the one hand, the strength of the federal 
interest in the challenged legislation and the impact of 
exempting the States from its reach. Central to our 
inquiry into the federal interest is how closely the 
challenged action implicates the central concerns of the 
Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national 
economy and free trade among the states. See EEOC v. 
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244 (JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring}. 
E. g. United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road 
Co., 455 U.S. 678, 688 (1982} ("Congress long ago 
concluded that federal regulation of railroad labor 
services is necessary to prevent disruptions in vital rail 
service essential to the national economy."}: FERC v. 
Mississiepi, 456 u.s. 742, · 757 (1982}, ("it is difficult 
to conce1ve of a more basic element of interstate commerce 
than electric energy • "} . Similarly, we have 
considered whether exempting States from federal 
regulation would undermine the goals of the federal 
program. See!£[ v. United States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975}. 
See also Hodel, 452 U.S. at 282 (national surface mining 
standards necessary to insure competition among States 
does not undermine States' efforts to maintain adequate 
intrastate standards}. On the other hand, we have 
assessed the injury done to the States if forced to comply 
with federal Commerce Clause enactments. See National 
League of Cities, 426 U.S., at 846-851. 
6 In addition, reliance on the Court's 
difficulties in the tax immunity field is misplaced. 
Although the Court has abandoned the 
"governmental/proprietary" distinction in this field, see 
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946}, it has not 
taken the drast1c approach of relying solely on the 
structure of the federal government to protect the States' 
immunity from taxation. See Massachusetts v. United 
States, 435 u.s. 444 (1978}. Thus, faced with an equally 
difficult problem of defining constitutional boundaries of 
federal action directly affecting the States, we did not 
adopt the view many would think naive, that the federal 
government itself will protect whatever rights the States 
may have. 
7Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that 
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the 
constitutional structure might impose on federal action 
affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." Ante, at 
27. The Court asserts that " [ i] n the factual setting of 
these cases the internal safeguards of the political 
process have performed as intended." Ibid. The Court does 
not explain the basis for this judgment. Nor does it 
identify the circumstances in which the "political 
process" may fail and "affirmative limits" are to be 
imposed. Presumably, such limits are to be determined by 
the Judicial Branch even though it is "unelected". 
Today's op1n1on, however, has rejected the balancing 
standard and suggests no other standard that would enable 
a court to determine when there has been a malfunction of 
the "political process". The Court's failure to specify 
the "affirmative limits" on federal power, or when and how 
these limits are to be determined, may well be explained 
by the transparent fact that any such attempt would be 
subject to precisely the same objections on which it 
relies to overrule National League of Cities. 
8one can hardly imagine this Court saying that 
because Congress is composed of individuals, individual 
rights are amply protected by the legislative process. 
Yet, the posit ion adopted today is ind ist ingui shable in 
principle. The Tenth Amendment was adopted as an 
essential part of the Bill of Rights and should be viewed 
as such. See infra, at 
9At one time in our history, the view that the 
structure of the federal government sufficed to protect 
the States might have had somewhat more practical, 
although not more logical, bas is. Professor Wechsler, 
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by 
the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions 
that simply do not accord with current reality. Professor 
Wechsler wrote: "National action has always been 
regarded as exceptional in our polity, an instrusion to be 
justified by some necessity, the special rather than the 
ordinary case." Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and 
Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 
543, 544 (1954). Not only is the premise of this view 
clearly at odds with the proliferation of national 
legislation over the past 30 years, but "a variety of 
structural and political changes in this century have 
combined to make Congress particularly insensitive to 
state and local values." Advisory Comm'n on 
Intergovernmental Relations [ACIR], Regulatory Federalism: 
Policy, Process, Impact and Reform 50 (1984). The 
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment (providing for 
direct election of senators), the weakening of political 
parties on the local level, and the rise of national 
media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly 
less representative of State and local interests, and more 
likely to be responsive to the demands of various national 
constituencies. Id., at 50-51. As one observer 
explained, "As Senators and members of the House develop 
independent constituencies among groups such as farmers, 
businessmen, laborers, environmentalists, and the poor, 
each of which generally supports certain national 
initiatives, their tendency to identify with state 
interests and the positions of state officials is 
reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the Courts: Agenda for 
the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism in the '80s 
97 (1981). 
See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and State 
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847 
(1979) (changes in political practices and the br~adth of 
national initiatives mean that the political branches "may 
no longer be as well suited as they once were to the task 
of safeguarding the role of the states in the federal 
system and protecting the fundamental value of 
federalism.") and ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, su~ra, at 
1- 24 (detai 1 ing the "dramatic shift" in kind of eder al 
regulation applicable to the States over the past two 
decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the numerous 
problems with the Court's position in terms of 
constitutional theory, there would remain serious 
questions as to its factual premises. 
10The Court believes that the significant 
financial assistance afforded the States and localities by 
the federal government is relevant to the 
constitutionality of extending Commerce Clause enactments 
to the States. See ante, at 23-24, 26. This Court has 
never held, however, that the mere disbursement of funds 
by the federal government establishes a right to control 
activities that benefit from such funds. See Pennhur st 
State School v. Halderman, 451 u.s. 1, 17-18 (1981). 
Regardless of the willingness of the federal government to 
provide federal aid, the constitutional question remains 
the same: whether the federal statute violates the 
sovereign powers reserved to the States by the Tenth 
Amendment. 
11Apparently in an effort to reassure the States, 
the Court identifies several major statutes that thus far 
have not been made applicable to State governments: the 
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. 824(f) ~ the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. §152 (2) ~ the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 u.s.c. §402(e) ~ the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 u.s.c. §652(5) ~ the 
Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§1002 (32), 1003 (b) (1} ~ and the Sherman Act, Parker v. 
Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943}. Ante, at 24. The Court does 
not suggest that this restra1nt will continue after its 
decision is understood. Indeed, it is unlikely that 
special interest groups will fail to accept the Court 1 s 
open invitation to urge Congress to extend these and other 
statutes to apply to the States and their local 
subdivisions. 
12This Court has never before abdicated 
responsibility for assessing the constitutionality of 
challenged action on the ground that affected parties 
theoretically are able to look out for their own interests 
through the electoral process. As the Court noted in 
National League of Cities, a much stronger argument as to 
inherent structural protections could have been made in 
e i the r Buck 1 e y v • V a 1 eo , 4 2 4 U . S • 1 ( 19 7 6 ) or My e r s v • 
United States, 272 u.s. 52 (1926), than can be made here. 
In these cases, the President signed legislation that 
limited his authority with respect to certain appointments 
and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 u.s., at 841-842 
n. 12. The Court nevertheless held the laws 
unconstitutional because they infringed on presidential 
authority, the President 1 s consent notwithstanding. The 




Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any 
authority for its contrary view. 
13The Court states that the decision in National 
League of Cities "invite[s] an unelected federal judiciary 
to make decisions about which state policies it favors and 
which ones its dislikes." Curiously, the Court then 
suggests that under the application of the "traditional" 
governmental function analysis, "the states cannot serve 
as laboratories for social and economic experiment". 
Ante, at 17, citing Justice Brandeis' famous observation 
in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Justice Brandeis, dissenting). Apparently the Court 
believes that when "an unelected federal judiciary" makes 
decisions as to whether a particular function is one for 
the federal or state governments, the States no longer may 
engage in "social and economic experiment". Ante, at 17. 
The Court's decision putting federal Commerce Clause 
enactments beyond judicial review, however, surely does 
not enhance the States' opportunities to serve as 
"laboratories." 
14opponents of the Constitution were particularly 
dubious of the Federalist claim that the States retained 
powers not delegated to the United States in the absence 
of an express provision so providing. For example, James 
Winthrop wrote that " [ i] t is a mere fallacy . • that 
what rights are not given are reserved." Letters of 
Agrippa, reprinted in Schwartz, The Bill of Rights, supra, 
at 510, 511. 
15 Indeed, the Virginia legislature came very 
close to withholding ratification of the Constitution 
until the adoption of a bill of rights that included, 
among other things, the substance of the Tenth Amendment. 
See Schwartz, ~he Bill of Rights, supra, at 762 - 766 and 
passim. 
16The Court's opinion mentions the Tenth 
Amendment only once, when it restates the question put to 
the parties for reargument in this case. See ante, at 8. 
17As the amici argue, "the ability of the [S]tates 
to fulfill their role in the constitutional scheme is 
dependent solely upon their effectiveness as instruments 
of self-government." Brief of Twenty-Four States as 
Amicus Curiae 50. See also Brief of the National League 
of Cities et al as Amicus Curiae (a brief on behalf of 
every major organizat1on representing the concerns of 
State and local governments). 
18The Framers recognized that the most effective 
democracy occurs at local levels of government, where 
people with first hand knowledge of local problems have 
more ready access to public officials responsible for 
dealing with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; 
No.45, at 316. This is as true today as it was when the 
Constitution was adopted. "Participation is likely to be 
more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a 
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional 
organizations, than at the state and federal levels. 
[Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved 
from the total population tends to be greater, the lower 
the level of government, and this, of course, better 
approximates the citizen participation ideal." ACIR, 
Citizen Participation in the American Federal System 95 
(1979). 
Moreover, we have witnessed in recent years the 
rise of numerous special interest groups that engage in 
sophisticated lobbying, and make substantial campaign 
contributions to some members of Congress. These groups 
are thought to have significant influence in the shaping 
and enactment of certain types of legislation. Contrary 
to the Court's view, a "political process" that functions 
in this way is unlikely to safeguard the sovereign rights 
of States and localities. 
19The opinion of the Court in National 
League of Cities makes clear that the very essence of a 
federal system of government is to impose "definite limits 
upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities 
of the States as States by means of the commerce power." 
See also the Court's opinion in~' supra, at 547 n. 7. 
20As Justice Douglas . observed in his dissent in 
Maryland v. Wirtz, supra, extention of the FLSA to the 
States could "disrupt the fiscal policy of the states and 
threaten their autonomy in the regulation of health and 
education." Id., at 302. 
.. 
21 In Long Island R. Co. the unanimous Court 
recognized that "[t]his Court's emphasis on traditional 
governmental functions and traditional aspects of state 
sovereignty was not meant to impose a static historical 
view of state functions generally immune from federal 
regulation." 455 U.S., at 686. 
.... ·.• 
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82-1913 and 82-1951 Garcia 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Court today, in its 5-4 decision, overrules 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 833 (1976), a 
.. 
case in which we held that Congress lacked authority to 
impose the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on 
local governments. Because I believe this 
Cam't, I 'Lespeetful-ly dissent. 
)a 
I 
There are, of course, numerous examples over the 
history of this Court in which prior decisions have been 
reconsidered and overruled. I can recall, however, no 
case in which the principle of stare decisis was ignored 
2. 
as flagrantly as we now witness. 1 The reasoning of the 
Cburt in National League of Cities, and the principle 
applied there, have been reiterated consistently over the 
past eight years. National League of Cities itself has 
been cited and quoted, since its decision in 1974, in 
opinions joined by every member of the present Court. 
H:>del v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Ass'n, 452 u.s. 
264, 287-293 (1981): United Transportation Union v. Long 
Island R. Co., 455 u.s. 678, 684-686 (1982): and Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 
764-767 (1982). Less than three years ago, in Long Island 
R. Co., supra, a unanimous Court reaffirmed the principles 
1National League 
changes in the composition 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 u.s. 
League of Cities, Wirtz had 
by our subsequent decisions. 
of Cities, following some 
of the Court, had overruled 
183 (1968). Unlike National 




of National League of Cities but found them inapplicable 
to the regulation of a railroad heavily engaged in 
interstate commerce. The Court stated: 
"The key prong of the National League of Cities 
test applicable to this case is the third one 
[repeated and reformulated in Hodel), which 
examines whether 'the states' compliance with 
the federal law would directly impair their 
ability to structure integral operations in 
areas of traditional governmental functions.'" 
Id., at 684. The Court in that case recognized that the 
test "may at times be a difficult one", id., but its 
application was considered in that unanimous decision as 
settled constitutional doctrine. 
Justice Blackmun, the author of today's reversal 
of National League of Cities, wrote the opinion of the 
Court in FERC v. Mississippi, supra, decided June 1, 1982. 
The four Justices who now join Justice Blackmun are the 
4. 
four who joined his opinion in its entirety in FERC v. 
Mississippi. In that case, the Court 
"In National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, 
for example, the Court made clear that the 
State's regulation of its relationship with its 
employees is an 'undoubted attribute of state 
sovereignty.' Id., at 845. Yet, by holding 
'unimpaired' California v. Taylor, 353 u.s. 553 
(1957), which upheld a federal labor regulation 
as applied to state railroad employees, 426 
u.s., at 854. n. 18, National League of Cities 
acknowledged that not all aspects of a State 1 s 
sovereign authority are immune from federal 
control." 
Id., n. 28, p. 764. 
lk__~ 
T~te went on to say that 
"\ 
even where the requirements of the National League of 
Cities standard are met, "there are situations in which 
the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such 
that it justifies state submission". Ibid. The joint 
federal/state system of regulation in FERC was such a 
"situation", but there was no hint in Justice Blackmun's 
q>inion that National League of Cities - or its basic 
.,, . 
5. 
standard that he reiterated was subject to the 
infirmities discovered today • 
. It is true that the doctrine of stare decisis 
does not apply with the same force in a constitutional 
case as it does where the meaning of the Constitution is 
mt at issue. City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983). Even in 
this case, however, "any departure from the doctrine of 
stare decisis demands special justification." Arizona v. 
Rumsey, u.s. (1984) • See also Oregon v. Kennedy, 
456 u.s. 667, 691 n. 34 (1982) (JUSTICE STEVENS 
concurring). In the present case, the five Justices who 
compose the majority today participated in National League 
of Cities and the cases reaffirming it. 2 The stability of 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages • 
I'~ 
6. 
judicial decision, and with it respect for the authority 
of this Court, are not served by the abrupt overruling of 
~~ts we witness in this case. 3 
A 
Whatever effect the Court's decision may have 
in weakening the application of stare decisis, this is 
likely to be less important than what the Court has done 
to the Constitution itself. A unique feature of the 
united States is its federal system guaranteed by the 
Constitution and implicit in the name of our country 
2Justice O'Connor succeeded Justice Stewart 1n 
September 1981, and participated in United Transportation 
Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 u.s. 678, 684-686 (1982), 
and FERC v~ Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 764-767 (1982)~ 
As we observed recently, "stare decisis is a 
doctrine that demands respect in a society governed by the 
rule of law." City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., ___ u.s. ___ (1983). See also, 
e. g., Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 
82 (1970); Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 
(1928). In this respect, stare decisis represents "a 
natural evolution from the very nature of our 
institutions." Lile, "Some Views on the Rule of Stare 




itself. Despite some genuflecting in Court's opinion to 
the concept of federalism, today's decision can be viewed 
, A 
~ ~ ·~~ 
as effectively rc:ea&i1tg._ the Tenth Amendment \.o tileft:Ref" 
~ k / "') 
~,e.g; !!i; iliJJii: ffE.t..- . 
CoRsti t nt ten. The Court holds that the Fair Labor ~ 
Standards Act ["FLSA") "contravened no affirmative limit 
on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause" to determine 
the wage rates and hours of employment of all state and 
local employees. at 27. In rejecting the 
traditional view of our federal system, the Court states: 
"Apart from the limitation on federal authority 
inherent in the delegated nature of Congress' 
Article I powers, the principal means chosen by 
the Framers to ensure the role of the states in 
~e federal system lies in the structure of the 
federal government 96'~~nt." 
Ante, at 21, 22 (emphasis added). 
~~ 6-L 
states 
1\ The "structure" relied upon is~the f-&et that bhe 
fk_ ~ fi:l~-i.L ~J 
have- "'& ~e-le in the selection of both the Executive 
A t 




-Olr . t;LJ~~ C..:~ ;:;o 1 
Ne-me-R-1:~~....-oi~,.s...-JIJQJ:::Le....-c;;;,~ A the Tenth Amendment~ 11'1!5- et~ 
~~~~\'~ 
if~;as "&R&I::tr[ing)" ehE 'tdl e= or the 
......... _.;..s..j~~''- 1-tu. ~k~ ~ ~ J-4 
states . is cited for the holding that the 
fl 
role of states in the federal systemA~ ~ 
rW.- ~rY(Aa.~~ ~
A Const1 tution itself. . -; he extent to which the 
states may exercise their authority now is to be 
determined from time to time by political decisions of the 
~ 
Congress and the President, decisions the CourtAsays will 
not be subject to judicial review. 
/ 
Id. Indeed, not the 
- ) 
least remarkable aspect of the Court] s opinion is its 
criticism of National League of Cities because it 
( 
? 
"inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make 
d~~ions about which state policies it favors and which 
ooes it dislikes". Ante, at 17. It does not seem to 
occur to the Court that it - an "unelected" majority of 
lfp/ss 12/07/84 Rider A, p. 7-8' (Garcia) 
RIDERB7 SALLY-POW 
The "structure" said to "ensure the role of the 
states in the federal system is their function in "the 
selection of both the Executive and Legislative Branches 
of the federal government". Id., at 27. To leave no 
doubt about its intention, the Court renounces its 
decision in National League of Cities because it 
"inevitably invites an unyelected federal judiciafto make 
decisions about which state policies its favors and which 
ones it dislikes". Ante, at 17. In other words, the 
extent to which the states may exercise their authority, 
where Congress purports to act under the Commerce Clause, 
now is to be determined from time to time by political 







will not be subject to judicial review. !d. I note in 
passing, it does not seem to have occurred to the Court 
that it - and unp elected majority of five Justices - today 
rejects almost 200 years of the understanding of the 
constitutional status of federalism. In doing so, there 
is only the barest mention of the Tenth Amendment. Nor is 
so much as a dictum ~any court~ted in support of the 
view that the role and authority of the states in the 
~ 
federal system depend upon the grace of elected federal 
~ 
officials rather than the 




1ve Justices - today rejects almost 200 years of he 
the canst· tutional status of fed~l~---- ' 
~~ 
Court •·s t£eatment of will return later to the 
federalism. First, I will address 
<.4a .u?s Jt£ · ;wzi2c(:., ) 
i ts~r i tic ism of the 
_/ 
,{\ general standard of National League o f-Cities. 
II 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity 
~n National League of Cities and its progeny is 
.... 
unworkable and unsound in principle. Ifl my '+'iew, the~ 
eeRolYBiGA5--do ~ -wiUu1taae sc..r,.l-ti-fty. In finding the 
~st to be unworkable, the Cou~~~rizes National 
"\ 5'~. 
~ 
League of Cities and subsequent cases. Ifr-eencluaing t~t ~~ 
~ 
/ ~ 
) ; Court ~adically departs from long settled principles 
lfp/ss 12/07/84 Rider A, p. 9 (Garcia) 
GAR9 SALLY-POW 
nu_~_s 
in Part II~-'\ J1f In the opinion that follows, I will address 
criticism of the rationale of National League of Cities 
and the standard it applied. Part III will review briefly 
the understandin1at=e~~ti~f the 
" 
Constitution and the extent to which this Court, until 
today, has recognized that we have a federal system in 
which the states retain a signficant measure of 
sovereignty. Part IV will consider the applicability of 
~,L.e..--~ 
the FLSA to the indisputabld local~service provided by an 
urban transit system. 
10. 
of constitutionalism and of the role of judicial review in 
our system of government. 
A 
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to arguing 
that it is difficult to define a priori "traditional 
governmental functions." National League of Cities 
neither engaged in, nor required, such a task. 4 The Court 
~ ~ 
y(~  .• 
4 In Natio ue of Cities, referred to 
the sphere of state overeig as including "traditional 
governmental function ," a realm ich f course, 
difficult to define ~ the C t's a tempt to / 
demonstrate i~ ... _,;'*'lila i!llpossibili t is s.elftewhat. ;;::> 
A number of . ~· the cases it cites do not 
nvol ve, the problem of ef ining governmental functions. 
E.g., Williams v. Eastsi e Mental Health Center Inc., 669 
F.2d 671 (CAll), cer • denied 459 u.s. 976 (1982): 
Friends of the Earth • Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (CA2), cert. 
denied, 434 u.s. 90 (1977). A number of others are not 
roperly an·alyzed der the principles of National League 
o Cities notwithstanding some of the language of 
the lower > cour E.g., in United States v. Best, 573 
F.2d 1095 (CA 1978) and Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of 
Akron, 654 • 2d 1187 (CA6 1981). Moreover, rather than 
carefully nalyzing the case law, the Court simply lists 
various unctions thought to be protected or unprotected 
by co ts interpreting National League of Cities. Ante, 
at -10. In the cited cases, however, the courts 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
teaay discusses "traditional governmental functions," 
"purely historical" functions, "'uniquely' governmental 
functions," and "'necessary' governmental services." 
fh_(-
Ante, at 10;-11, 15, 16 • ..)( ...-NOwhere does it mention that 
National League of Cities aft~ i~s -PFQ9eftY adopted a 
~ht)LL~ / 
balancing - test for determining whether Commerce Clause 
-1 
enactments transgres~ constitutional limitations imposed 
by the federal nature of our system of government. This 
01 ~$ 
omission BLACKMON, 
wno oest tbe of Cities, 
~ A. concurred separately to note that the Court's opinion in 
wf'~) 
consi ered the issue of state immunity on the specific 
facts · GQ£~ ~t; they did not make blanket pronouncements 
that particular things inherently qualified as traditional 
governmental functions or did not. Having thus considered 
the cases out of context, it is not surprising that 
could find no "organizing principle" 
ante, at 10. 
• 4[':·, .... 
12. 
that case ~dopt[sl a balancing approach [that] does 
not ou~w federal power in areas • • • where the federal 
11, 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state • • • 
compliance with imposed federal standards would be 
essential." 426 u.s., at 856 (JUSTICE BLACKMON 
concurring) • 
National League of Cities to embrace a 
balancing approach, JUSTICE BLACKMON quite correctly cited 
that part of the er opinion that reaffirmed .Ell. v. 
United States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975). The Court's analysis 
reaffirming ~ explicitly weighed the seriousness of the 
problem addressed by the federal legislation at issue in 
that case, against the effects of compliance on State 
sovereignty. 426 u.s., at 852-853. Our subsequent 
~al~t~~:;;·~·::::: 
(  ~ rl..L-~ ~ f-''0_:<>: .R. . A S, 
------~==~~ ~~~~ 






v. Wyoming, 46-~ u.s. 226 (1983), for example, the Court 
stated that "(t]he principle of immunity articulated in 
tational League of Cities is a functional doctrine • • • 
whose ultimate purpose is not to create a sacred province 
of state autonomy, but to ensure that the unique benefits 
undert king such balancing, we have 
considered, on the o e hand, the federal interest in the 
challenged legislatio and the impact of exempting the 
States from its Central to our inquiry into the 
federal interest is ow closely the challenged action 
implicates the ~ concerns of the Commerce Clause, 
viz., the promotion of a national economy and free trade 
among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 s. Ct. 1054, 
1065 (1983) (JUSTICE STEVENS concurring). E. g. United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail Road co., 455 
u.s. 678, 688 ( 1982) ("Congress long ago concluded that 
federal regulation of railroad labor services is necessary 
to prevent disruptions in vital rail service essential to 
the national economy.")~ FERC v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 
742, 757 (1982), ("it is difficult to conceive of a more 
basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy 
• ."). Similarly, we have considered whether 
exempting States from federal regulation would undermine 
the goals of the federal program. See Fry v. United 
States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975). See also Hodel, 452 u.s. at 
282 (national surface mining standards necessary to insure 
competition among States does not undermine States' 
efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards) • On 
the other hand, we have assessed the injury done to the 
States if forced to comply with federal Commerce Clause 
enactments. See National League of Cities, 426 u.s., at 
846-8~1. 
14. 
of a federal system not be lost through undue 
federal interference in certain core state functions." 
Id., at 236. See also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass'n., 452 u.s. 264 (1981). In i~ baste t~ 
~verrul~ ~N~a~t~i~o~n~a~l~~L~e~a~g,u~e~--~o~f~~C~l~·t~l~·e~s~, 
Fj;sjf? fitnd c 
the Court 
Ar::tizes the mode of analysis established therein 
and developed in subsequent cases. 6 
-/..e~~ 
Moreover, it is netewer~y that the statute at issue 
1 
in this case, the FLSA, is the 6tHfte statute that was at 
1\ 
issue in National League of Cities. Although JUSTICE 
~~~ 
6In addition, the ~~ eliance on the 
Court's difficulties in the tax irnrn nity field is 
/~ ~. Although the Court has abandoned the 
~ "governmental/proprietary" distinction in his field, see 
I New York v. United States, 326 u.s. 572 (194 ) , it has not 
' taken the drastic approach of defining the States' 
immunity from federal taxation solely in proc dural terms. 
See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 u.s. 444 (1978). 
Thus, faced with an equally difficult problem f defining 
constitutional boundaries of federal action the 








concurrence noted that he was "not untroubled 
by certain possible implications of the Court's opinion" 
in National League of Cities, it also stated that "the 
result with respect to the statute under challenge here is 
(~~4.). 
necessarily correct." 426 u.s., at 856. 
~~~~~~~~~ ~~~does not 
discuss the statute, IlltiCh less oUer ally basi& ferzi 
B 
The Court holds that the 
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause 
to protect the 'States as States' is one of process rather 
8nk-J 
than one of result." ~at 25. The Court expressly 
rejected this position in National League of Cities, 426 
(. u.s., at 841-842 n. 12. I be r i-ev-e t:-aat j t should do so 
;;-: ., 
lfp/ss 12/05/84 Comment as to pp. 15 and 16 (Garcia) 
COMMENT SALLY-POW 
Note to Annmarie: 
Subpart B (p. 16) commences with the statement 
that the Court holds that the "fundamental limitation that 
the constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause 
to protect the states as states is one of process rather 
than on of result". 
flAB's opinion does say this. But is this a 
different protection of the states from HAB's reliance on 
the "structure" of the Constitution that vests the 
electoral power in the states Y It seems to me that 
without some el~g~a\e explanation of why the two 
"protections" are consistent, it may be better simply to 
,,' 
2. 
omit from the beginning of the paragraph on p. 15 to the 
point marked end near the bottom of page 16. 
In others words, Subpart B could begin with the 
sentence that commences: "Today's opinion does not 







again, for this view is both illogical and inconsistent 
with our most fundamental constitutional principles. 
Jl-tA-~~ 
TR.e Gol::l-f't is ....gurel.y correct that the Framers intended 
"\ 
the structure of the federal government to protect the 
interests of the states. See, ~9..!....t The Federalist Nos. 
46 (Madison} & 31 (Hamil ton} (Cooke ed. 1961} • It is 
nevertheless a long step from that proposition to the 
conclusion that the fundamental protection of State 
sovereignty under the constitution is one of process and I 
I 
not of substance. The history of the Tenth Amendment is I 
t 
squarely at odds with the Court's view. See infra, at 
Moreover, like JUSTICE BRENNA~ dissent ) 
in National League of Ci tie%~ opinion does not 
.. ~, i ~ J 
s;>~ 
explain how , the oeRo4!itutieRal proui sion-. fe£ StateAi~ 
in the electoral process 
.s 
guarante~ that particular 
. ' 
17. 
exercises of the Commerce Clause power do not infringe on 
residual State . t 7 sovere1gn y. Although the States 
participate in the Electoral College, this is hardly a 
reason to view the President as a representative of the 
States' interest against federal encroachment. 
M embers of Congress are elected from the various States, 
~ 
I\ once in office they are members of the federal 
~~~ 
7Given its willi~ness to rely on the political 
process to protect t States' interests, it is 
interesting that the Co rt provides no ~~andards for 
judging when this process h&~ h eeq effective~ Late in its 
opinion, the Court suggests that there Amay be some 
naffirmative limits the constitutional structure might 
impose on federal action affectings the States under the 
Cl:>mmerce Clause.n Ante, at 27. Asserting that n[i]n the 7 
~ctual setting of these cases the internal safeguards of 
fue political process have performed as intended,n ibid., 
the Court does not explain by what test it is able to 
reach th~ fiOnclusion. Nor does the Court provide 
guidance  the circumstances in which it may intervene 
to enforce such affirmative limits. These failures make 
the Court's recognition of the States' nspecial and 
specific position in our constitutional systemL' ibid., 
sound hollow indeed. The Court's reluctance to specifyJ 
its view of the /affirmative limitS"'-. on federal power 
undoubtedly stems from the fact that any such attempt 
would be subject to precisely the same objections it 
raises against National League of Cities • 
lfp/ss 12/07/84 Rider A, p. 17 (Garcia) 
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Annmarie: Note 7 is excellent. In an effort to make it 
somewhat stronger, I have reframed it along the following 
lines. Feel free to edit, or I could go back to your 
draft. 
* * * 
Late in its opinion, the Court suggests that 
after all there may be some "affirmative limits the 
constitutional structure might impose on federal action 
affecting the ~tates under the Commerce Clause". Ante, at 
27. The opinion then ~ates that "in the factual setting 
~ 
of [some Aidentified] cases the internal safeguards of the 
political process have performed as intended." Id. But 
the Court identifies no standards as to when and under 
2. 
what circumstances the "political process" may have failed 
and "affirmative limits" are to be imposed. Presumably, 
such limits are to be determined by the Judicial Branch 
even if it is "unelected". But today's opinion has 
~rvY"-
rejected the balancing standard appr~ iR ~e •e~r~-
'\ ) 
~ ca•ee i~ ~as ~rr~€d, and suggests no other standard 
that would enable a court to determine when there has been 
a malfunction of the "political process". The Court's 
unwillingness or inability to specify the "affirmative 
limits" on federal power that it vaguely mentions, or when 
and how these limits are to be determined, may well be 
explained by the transparent fact that 
would be subject to precisely the same 
any such attempt~ 
objection~ ~ 
1\ 





government. 8 We noted recently "the hydraulic pressure 
inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer 1 imi ts of its power • • " Immigration and 
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2765, 2784 
(1983} • The Court offers no reason to think that this 
pressure will not operate when Congress seeks to invoke 
its powers under the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding the 
electoral role of the States. 9 
l4J~~. 
8one can hardly imagi this Court saying that 
because Congress is composed individuals, individual 
rights are amply protected by the legislative process. 
Yet, the fosition adopted today • 
At one time in our h1story, the view that the 
structure of the federal government sufficed to protect 
~e States might have had somewhat more practical, 
although not more logical, basis. ~ Professor Wechsler, 
whose seminal article in 1954 proposed the view adopted by 
the Court today, predicated his argument on assumptions 
~at simply no longer accord with historical , reality. 
Professor Wechsler wrote: "National action h s 
always been regarded as exceptional in our p 1 i ty, an 
instrusion to be justified by some necessity, e special 
rather than the ordinary case." Wechsler, Th Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the ates in the 
Cornposi tion and Selection of the National overnment, 54 
Footnote continued on next page. 
19. 
The Court apparently thinks that the States' 
Colum. L. Rev. 543, 544 ( 1954) • Not only is the premise 
of this view clearly at odds with the proliferation of 
national legislation over the past 25 years, but "a good 
rgument can be made that a variety of structural and 
·tical changes in this century have combined to make 
ngress particularly insensitve to state and local 
values." Advisory Comm' n on Intergovernmental Relations 
[ACIR], Regulatory Federalism: Policy, Process, Impact and 
Reform 50 (1984). The adoption of the Seventeenth 
Amendment (providing for direct~~lection o~enators), the 
weakening of political parties ~ the locaf level, and the 
rise of national media, among "other things, have led the '0 Congress to be increasingly less representative of state 
and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to 
the demands of various national constituencies. ~ at 
50-Sl. As one observer explained, "As Senators and 
members of the House develop independent constituencies 
among groups such as farmers, businessmen, laborers, 
u 
1
-).,.. /" tl' environmentalists, and the poor, each of which generally 
~d V ' rft1 • supports certain national initiatives, their tendency to 
' identify with state interests and the positions of state 
officials is reduced." Kaden, "Federalism in the Courts: 
Agenda for the 1980s," in ACIR, The Future of Federalism 
in the '80s (1981). See also Kaden, Politics, Money, and 
~ 
State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 
r;• 847 (1979) (changes in political practices and the breadth of national initiatives mean that the political branches "may no longer be as well suited as they once were to the task of safeguarding the role of the states in the federal 
Y A~ system and protecting the fundamental value of 
1/~ ~ federalism."). See also ACIR, Regulatory Federalism, 
. supra, at 1- 24 (detailing the "dramatic shift" in kind of 
,
11
y two decades). Thus, even if one were to ignore the 
~ yv- numerous problems with the Court's position in terms of 
r k constitutional theory, there would remain serious ;\ y /; question:s;~actu~ e:ses. 
~A;;~~ · 
( -t V;0 
-
lfp/ss 12/07/84 Rider A, p. 18, 19 (Garcia) 
GAR18 SALLY-POW 
Note to Annmarie: Again, I admire your note ~ with the --
excellent cites to secondary authority. Your quote from 
Kaden is on target. What would you think of adding, 
following that quote or perhaps at some other place, a 
more specific reference to the innumerable special groups 
with powerful lobbies that also make generous campaign 
contributions to selected members of Congress. These 
groups now have a far greater influence on the voting of 
many members of Congress than unorganized individual 
opinions in their districts or states. Indeed, the 
average individual often feels incompetent to understand 
the complex legislation that may, when it is applied, 
'' 
2. 
diminish the opportunity for democracy to work at the 
local level. 
20. 
success at obtaining federal funds for various projects 
and exemptions from the obligations of some federal 
statutes is indicative of the "effectiveness of the 
federal political process in preserving the States' 
~ 
interests. • • " Ante, at 23-24. Bu~ political successes 
are not relevant to the question whether the political 
processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional 
limitations. The fact that Congress generally does not 
transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach 
State activities does not make judicial review any less 
necessary to rectify the infrequent cases in which it does 
do so. The States' role in our system of government is a 
matter of constitutional law, not of legislative grace. 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
21. 
reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." 
u.s. Const., Amend. 10. 
More troubling 
federal political officials are the judges of the limits 
of their own power. This result is inconsistent with the 
~~· 
fundamental principles of our constitutional SGA&me. See, 
"' 
e .g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At least since 
Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the 
federal judiciary "to say what the law is" with respect to 
;h.v~~ 
the constitutionality of acts of Congress. ~~dieial;-
.e:;(:>~~Hu_~~~~~~ 
r~idw Im'eds~'ito d4::erem: j~ficetie"* in tl:lQ con~xt- Q,f. 
-?"''2't..?MHq_.5~~ ~$ ~ ?-
tb<o C""""<U<*-..c;l.aJise-..f rOIII t.ftat ;,high -i t always ha; ) 
This Court has never before abdicated re~ponsibili ty 
- .... _!_<~ 
for assessing the constitutionality action 
22. 
~ on the ground that affected parties theoretically 
their own inter~ As the are able to look out for 
-
Court noted in National League of Cities, a much stronger 
~~ \\ 
argument about inherent 1'structural protections could have 
1\ 1\ 
been made in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1 (1976} and Myers 
v. United States, 272 u.s. 52 (1926}, than can be made 
with respect to 1 imitations on the Commerce Clause. In 
~ 
these cases, the President signed legislation ~h 
limited his authority with respect to certain appointments 
and thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that 
the law violated the Constitution." 426 u.s. at 841-842 
n. 12. The Court nevertheless held the laws 
Q .. 
unconstitutional because they entrenched on presidential 
authority, the President's consent notwithstanding. The 
23. 
Court does not address this point; nor does it cite any 
authority for its contrary view. 
--- Ill 
refers to the 
federal and state which Z7"' 
C::U * • 6~;.u..-,!'t~l!'!-6b-?.2:i"h"!::G~'a:~~~"Z?2-n::t.~~2;d 
l'llicessarill! ....recogRizaa tb•t e 




...___ --i:.n.w-tfte--de~ e.£ this Coar L. 
Federalist No. 39, for example, Madison delineated 
~.' the elements of federalism by drawing a series of 
~~contrasts between the attributes of a national government 
~ tvtr 
~ those of a federal form of government. While a ;:f ~~~ .JI-. A 
-·-~~-~~tv ~ ~~~~-/ 
.~ ~~A/0 ~ v-; .b1 
~:::~ ? . 
24. 
national form of government would possess an "indefinite 
supremacy over all persons and things," the federal form 
contemplated by the Constitution il"lettad 5 
consisted of "local or municipal authorities [which] form 
distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no 
more subject within their respective spheres to the 
general authority than the general authority is subject to 
them, within its own sphere." Id., at 256. Under the 
Constitution, the sphere of the proposed government 
extended to jurisdiction of "certain enumerated objects, 
only, • leav [ ing] to the several States a residuary 
and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Id. 
~.),_AA_A~~ ~ 
~· Th~~detalist No. 45, Madison elaborated on 
1'\ 















"The powers delegated by the proposed 
<bnsti tution to the Federal Government are few 
and defined. Those which are to remain in the 
State Governments are numerous and indefinite. 
The former will be exercised principally on 
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, 
and foreign commerce; The powers 
reserved to the several States will extend to 
all the objects, which, in the ordinary course 
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and 
properties of the people; and the internal 
order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State." 
25. 
Id., at 313. Madison considered that the operations of 
the federal government would be "most extensive and 
important in times of war and danger; those of the State 
Governments in times of peace and security." Ibid. As a 
result of this division of powers, the State governments 
would have a distinct advantage in power and importance 
over the federal government. Ibid. 
-·--
Federalists and Antifederalists alike were concerned 
with the potential dangers of power concentrated in the 




The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History (2 vols. 1971); 
The Federalist, supra; Elliot, Debates in the State 
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 
(1854). The Framers believed, however, that the separate 
sphere of sovereignty reserved to the States would ensure 
that the States would serve as an effective "counterpoise" 
to the federal government. They believed that the States 
would serve this essential role because they would attract 
and maintain the loyalty of their citizens. The roots of 
such loyalty, the Founders thought, were found in the 
objects peculiar to State government. For example, 
Hamilton argued that the States "regulat[e) all those 
personal interests and familiar concerns to which the 
sensibility of individuals is more immediately aware." 
Thus, he maintained that the people would perceive the 
' " . 









'states as "the immediate and most visible guardian of life 
~ 
and property," a fact w~h "contributes more than any 
other circumstance to impressing upon the minds of the 
people affection, esteem and reverence towards the 
government." The Federalist No. 17, at 107. Madison took 
the same position, explaining that "the people will be 
7((~)~ 
more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the business 
of State governments, and "[w] i th the members of these, 
will a greater proportion of the people have the . ties of 
personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and 
party attachments • • • " The Federalist No. 46 at 316. 
Like Hamilton, Madison saw the States' involvement in the 
everyday concerns of the people as the source of their 
Id. See also Nagel, Federalism as a 
N~a=t..:::.i..:::::o:.=..:n~a:..::l:.,____.:L::..::e::..::a~g:L:u::.:e=--- of Cities in 
28. 
Perspective, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 (19~ In the 
--- y ,, " 
ramers' view, the States' ability to., w1 n the loyality o 
citizens was essential to their ability to functioJ 
....... 
~~ly~n their federal syste . Only State 
-~ 
~
governments which enjoyed strong citizen support could 
serve as a bulwark against overbearing federal power. 
The opinion for the Court in Nationa~~~!t 
~r~jt-LrJ.c~~~~. ~~ 
Cities \r~te GR tbQ sam& QGRCeptiQA of federalism as t~t 
i-J /\ , 
' ")... 
0
- etttl-inEd -abave. Observing that nour federal system of 
government imposes definite limits upon the authority of 
Congress to regulate the activities of States as States by 
means of the commerce power,n the Court invoked the Tenth 
Amendment to make clear that n 'Congress may not exercise 
\ power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or 
their ability to function effectiVely in a federal 
----
31. 
matter of dollars and cents. National League of Cities, 
426 u.s., at 846-851. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or 
folly of certain policy choices. Cf. ante, at 17J As we 
~f~l 
recognized in N~al League of cjties, what is at issue 
is whether the foundation on which the Framers staked the 






Courtjt• ;fz:Z:tt;r.; ;nized 
---
This that 
state sovereignty ~emai>Rs a fundamental component of our 
1\ 
~~~~~V; 
system of government. Cn Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 
tJ 
A ~ a :J .,._ 
(7 Wall.) 71 (1868), for exampl,_ the Court 1"-ei te ; aie i ~he 
~ ~:e ...e aa~e~t.wkQd.-~t>C~•''~4 ' %s§£ ~ 
~ that the Constitution recognized "the nee sary 
/\ 
existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, 
32. 
the independent authority of the States." 1 t concluded, 
as Madison did, that this authority extended to "nearly 
the whole charge of interior regulation 
States] and to the people all powers not expressly 
delegated to the national government are reserved." !d., 
at 76. M&H! ~cently, 
in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 
~~~--~~ 
u.s. 40, 49 (1982), r  the state action exemption 
"\ 
~ 
from the antitrust laws ~based on state sovereignty: United 
Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 u.S. 
678, 683 (1982) , applying the Railway Labor Act to a 
state-owned railroad while recognizing that the States 
possess constitutionally preserved sovereign powers: and 
Federal Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 
33. 
742, 752 (1982) , considering whether the Public Utility 
. (TV(- ~ 
~1d ~._ $ue) l:f »~ 
Policies Act d ~state sovereignt y in Regulatory 
violation of the Tenth Amendment. These represent only a 
"baAdilltl ~the ~cases 
1\ 
in which the Court has 
~~-~ H...£. ~ ~~-
recognized~ the importance of state sovereignty. See also, 
e. g., United States v. ~ supra; Metcalf & Eddy v. 
Mitchell, 269 u.s. 514 (1926); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 u.s. 
559 (1911). As Justice Frankfurter noted, the States are 
not merely a factor in the "shifting economic 
arrangements" of our country, Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 u.s. 
77, 95 (1949) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring), but 
constitute a "coordinate element in the system established 
by the Framers for governing our Federal Union." National 
League of Cities, supra, at 849. 
35. 
w.~L~~ 1 /1._.~~~~14 
of that Amendment , b¥- s-t a-tjng ..-=="'At that "[t]he 
1\ ~ .b 
powers not delegated to the United States are 
reserved to the States," u.s. Const. Amend. 
,S~ 
~ ~ 
q.me J;.e:i.gR pow~ s "only the States 
.k.li 3 
retain that& to the 
extent that the Constitution has not divested them of 
their original powers and transferred those powers to the 
Federal Government," ante, at 20. This rephrasing is not 
a distinction without a difference, but reflects the 
~~ ~.H4..-~iJ&£-
m"'--4'"'~ unprecedented view that Congress is free l to "\ 
~-- 1 ~ 
-· t-;w4~~C; lJ6IieP a State's traditional sovereign powe cl 
~ ~ ~ . 
~~Aearr~~ ~b:J 
. 
federalism Gffe r&a hi!: \l.le 
~ demotes the States to precisely the t-ri u ij l role 
~ 
that opponents of the Constitution feared they would 
occupy. Samuel Adams, for example, believed that if the 
36. 
several States were to be joined in "one entire Nation, 
under one Legislature, the Powers of which shall extend to 
every Subject of Legislation, and its Laws be supreme & 
controul the whole, the Idea of Sovereignty in these 
States must be lost." Letter from Samuel Adams to Richard 
~ 
Henry Lee (Dec. 3, 1787), A ~ Anti-Federalists versus 
Federalists 159 (J. Lewis ed. 1967). b~wise, George 
Mason feared that "the general government being paramount 
to, and in every respect more powerful than the state 
governments, the latter must give way to the former." 
Address in the Ratifying Convention of Virginia (June 4-12 
1788), Anti-Federalists versus Federalists, supra, at 208-
' ------ -AltnoUgn the Framers replied that the --1-egislati 
---------of the ~-tgOV;;nment would permit 
oppressive Congress, 
34. 
In contrast, the Court today propounds a view of 
federalism that pays only lip service to the role of the 
States and fails to acknowledge the potential impact of 
imposing the FLSA on the States. Although it ~Bes 
that the States "unquestionably do 'retai[n) a significant 
measure of sovereign authority,'" ante, at 20 (quoting 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 u.s. 226, 269 (POWELL, J., 
dissenting)), it fails to ~road, yet specific 
" 
areas of sovereignty that MadisoR and -.. the ~ Framers 
11The Court's opinion mention the Tenth 
Amendment only once, when it restates question put to 
the parties for reargument in this cas • , See ante, at 8. 
' ' 
29. 
system.'" 426 u.s., at 842-843 (quoting Fry v. United ...___. 
States , 4 21 U • S • 54 2 , 54 7 n • 7 ( 19 7 5) ) • 
~~ 
In National League of Cities, w. spoke of fire 
/1 
prevention, police protection, sanitation, and public 
~] 
health as "typical of ehe!le performed by state and local 
" 
governments in discharging their dual functions of 
administering the public law and furnishing public 
services." 426 u.s. at 851. Not only are these activities 
~~~~~~ 
far from ~h€ c~e of interstate commerce, see supra n. 5, 
they are activities wftieh epitomize the concerns of " '\ .Su. ,('(., 
local, democratic self-government. See fnfxa n. , . ~ 
~ - ~~.Jo /IP / 
w ecti.oo!t traditional governmental functions, I 
J ..,),~ ~LL 11_; ...4.~· f'~.d ~ ~ 
we l'fad:~;; ::~~l;;a.:£l.&.--~1Atttri~hek'i~s of acti vi ties.A that Ji-riRg " State ~ 
~w~~~ f.~ ~ 0 5~ ~ .,fh ; th~l-f~d ~~h' h~ government) 1n.to li G&rreacc \J le e peop e ) an - w 1ch ~ -1 
~~~t:.-u~~~~-
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as these which governments are created to provide ••• ," 
and that the States' ability to perform such functions is 
the key to their "separate and independent exist~nce. J 
Thus, the~ the States that results from federal 
overreaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a 
10The Framers recognized that the most effective 
democracy occurs at local levels of government, where 
people have first hand knowledge of local problems and 
more ready access to public officials responsible for 
dealing with them. E. g., The Federalist No. 17, at 107; 
N:>.45, at 316. This is as true today as it was when the 
Constitution was adopted. "Participation is likely to be 
more frequent, and exercised at more different stages of a 
governmental activity at the local level, or in regional 
organizations, than at the state and federal levels. 
[Additionally,] the proportion of people actually involved 
from the total population tends to be greater, the lower 
the level of government, and this, of course, better 
approximates the citizen participation ideal." ACIR, 
Citizen Participation in the American Federal System 95 
(1979). L.t i~ esP.{'cially ironj c that t che Court casts 
its argument against judicial enforcement of the Tenth 
Amendment in terms of the "principles of democratic self-
ante, at 18L. wh-H:e= appare-ntly tJ:ncwmu!rned.,. 
~~~~~~et~~~~~~~eg~'slat~v~~ewer. 
/ 
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In emphasizing the need to protect traditional 
governmental functions, we identified the kinds of 
activities engaged in by state and local governments that 
affect the daily lives of people. These are services that 
people have the ability to understand and evaluate as well 
as the right, in a democracy, to 
oversee. 10 We recognized that "it is functions such as 
these which governments are created to provide .,"and 
that the states and local governments are better able to 
perform than the national government. 
37. 
Convention that such structural protection was 
Observing that the proposed Constitutio required that 
three-fourths of the States ree to amend the 
Constitution, he rightly oncluded that the logical 
corollary was that a trifling minority may reject the 
nost salutary am dments." Id., at 215. Henry regarded 
it as a "most fearful situation, when the most 
cont 
nost 
ptible minority can prevent the alteration of the I 
oppressive government." Id., at 215-216. -~ 
' - -----~ 
Opponents of the Constitution were particularly 
dubious of the Federalist claim that the States retained 
powers not delegated to the United States in the absence 
of an express provision so providing. For example, the 




powers were reserved to the States "more specious than 
solid." Letters of Brutus, reprinted in Schwartz, The 
Bill of Rights, supra, at 505, 507. Similarly, James 
Winthrop ~ that "[i]t is a mere fallacy, invented by 
the deceptive powers of Mr. Wilson, that what rights are 
not given are reserved." Letters of Agrippa, reprinted in 
Schwartz, supra, at 510, 511. Antifederalists raised 
these concerns in the ratifying conventions of almost 
every State. See Elliot, Debates in the Several State 
Conven.tions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 
(1854). Eight States voted for the Constitution only 
after proposing amendments to be adopted after 
ratification. All eight of these included among their 
recommendations some version of what later became the 
~nth Amendment. Ibid. So strong was the concern that the 
39. 
r 
proposed Constitution was seriously defective without a 
specific bill of rights, including a provision reserving 
powers to the States, that the Federalists eventually 
conceded that such provisions were needed in order to 
secure the votes for ratification. See Schwartz, A 
Documentary History of the Bill of Rights, supra, at 505 
and passim. l.~ =•· ~ 
J ~""Y r' ~ ~-~--~ 
hist~~the integral role of This 
~ the Tenth Amendment in our constitutional theory. ·It 
~well, I believe,J~~~~;i. 
'\ 
~~~ 
of the Court's decisioR today ~. Far from being "unsound 
in principle," ante, at 18, judicial enforcement of the 
Tenth Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal 
system adopted by the Constitution. 
IV. Applicability of the FLSA to SAMTA 
aml 10/18/84 
~ gz._-111~ 
,~ ~arcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 
~ FIRST DRAFT 
~/ 
Justice POWELL, dissenting. 
~- ~t-
~f~~~ The major~ agrees that National League of Cities v. Usery, 
~yaf 426 u.s. 833 (1976), correctly held that Congress' power under 
~ 
the Commerce Clause is limited by the role of the States in the 
federal system. It finds, however, that the standard which has 
evolved for determining these limits, i.e., whether the exercise 
of federal power reaches "traditional governmental functions," is 
both unworkable and inconsistent with the principles of federal-
ism on which National League of Cities rests. Rather than at-
. f' h' d d h ~ f- 1 d h h tempt1ng to re 1ne t 1s stan ar , t e maJorlty cone u es t at t e 
jL~L 
States are protected amply by the legislative process as long as 
1 
federal legislation treats States and private parties in the same 
~ ~~ ~ ~ 'JL .. ~ ~ie'+<.. ~c::;__4 
way. I agree with tHe majority that the test thus far ~veloped~ 
~f'J ~eaLAA-/~A:-J~~ ~ 
for determining whether considerations of federalism bar particu-
dtJ ~~ 
lar exercises of the Commerce Clause power is not entirely satis-
. ' . 
factory. I cannot agree, however, that except in cases where 
legislation discriminates against the States, the legislative 
process provides the only constitutional protection against fed-
eral overreaching under the Commerce Clause. 
I. 
The Court finds that the test of State immunity developed in 
National League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable and un-
sound in principle. In my view, these conclusions are erroneous. 
In finding the test to be unworkable, the majority misperceives 
the case law. In concluding that efforts to define state immuni-
ty are unsound in principle, the Court radically departs from 
long settled principles of constitutionalism and of the role of 
judicial review in our system of government. 
A. The Test of Traditional Governmental Functions 
In claiming that the test which has developed from National 
League of Cities and its progeny is unworkable, the Court focuses 
on the the third factor identified in Hodel v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 u.s. 264 (1981), that state com-
. '
pliance with the federal obligation must 11 directly impair [the 
State's] ability 'to structure integral operations in areas of 
traditional governmental functions.' .. 452 u.s. at 287-288 (quot-
ing National League of Cities) • To make this argument, JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN cites a long list of cases involving the question of 
state immunity under National League of Cities. In his view 
there is no 11 0rganizing principle .. distinguishing the cases that 
~k. 
have found state immunity from those which have not. Draft at ---
It is, of course, difficult to define traditional govern-
mental functions. But the majority's attempt to demonstrate its 
virtual impossibility is somewhat disingenuous. A number of the 
cases it cites do not involve the problem of defining governmen-
tal functions. 1 A number of others are not properly analyzed 
1~, Williams v. Eastside Mental Health Center, Inc., 669 
F.2d 671 (CAll), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 976 (1982), turned on 
whether the application of the Fair Labor Standards to employees 
of a halfway house would reach the State as a State. The court 
held that it did not, because the halfway house was not a state 
institution with state employees. In Friends of the Earth v. 
Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 u.s. 902 (1977), New 
York City claimed that requiring it to enforce a plan under the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
.,. 
. 
L ' ) 
., 
under the principles of National League of Cities at all, not-
withstanding some of the language of the lower courts. 2 More-
over, rather than carefully analyzing the case law, the Court 
simply lists various functions thought to be protected or unpro-
tected by courts interpreting National League of Cities. Draft 
at 9-10. In the cited cases, however, the courts considered the 
issue of state immunity on the specific facts before it; they did 
not make blanket pronouncements that particular things inherently 
Clean Air Act violated National League of Cities. The Second 
Circuit rejected this argument on the ground that the plan in 
question was developed by the State and City, not the federal 
government. 
2E.g., in United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (CA9 1978} and 
Hybud Equipment Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (CA6 1981}, 
the courts discussed whether particular activities were integral 
governmental functions. Hybud Equipment, however, did not 
involve the authority of Congress to legislate against a claim of 
state immunity, but rather the opposite question, whether a state 
law interferred with interstate commerce. The issue in Best was 
the authority of a federal court to order a state agency to 
suspend the state-created privilege of a driver's license, in a 
case where the federal court convicted an individual of drunk 
driving on a federal enclave. Similarly, Gold Cross Ambulance 
Service v. City of Kansas City, 537 F. Supp. 956 (W.D. Mo. 1982} 
held in the alternative that federal antitrust laws could not 
prevent the city and state from regulating ambulance services, 
citing National League of Cities. On appeal, however, the 
decision was affirmed not on the ground that National League of 
Cities compelled this result, but under the state action 
exemption to the antitrust laws. 705 F.2d 1005 (CA8 1983}, cert 
pending, No. 83-183. 
·. 
.E:Jage :::>. 
qualified as traditional governmental functions or did not. Hav-
ing thus considered the cases out of context, it is not surpris-
ing that JUSTICE BLACKMUN could find no "organizing principle" 
among them. 
In addition, the majority's reliance on the Court's difficul-
ties in the tax immunity field is misplaced. Although the Court 
has abandoned the "governmental/proprietary" distinction ~ 
~, see New York v. United States, 326 u.s. 572 (1946), it has 
not taken the drastic approach of defining the States' immunity 
from federal taxation solely in procedural terms. For example, 
in Massachusetts v. United States, 435 u.s. 444 (1978), JUSTICE 
BRENNAN wrote for the Court that the states could have no consti-
tutional objection to federal taxes that satisfied a three prong 
.L &-<:) 
test: '}- ) that the tax not discriminate against the states; ( ~) 
~-
that the tax be based on a fair approximation of use; (J'} that 
the tax be structured to produce revenues not in excess of the 
total cost to the federal government of providing the relevant 
benefits. Id. at 466-467. Thus, faced with an equally difficult 
page o. 
problem of defining constitutional boundaries of federal action 
~4-u.~uV 
~ewaro the States, we did not leave the States protected only by 
1\ 
J1 \\ 
the inherent structure of the our federal system. 
B. Federalism and Traditional Governmental Functions 
~d-e 
The majorit:¥ assert1'" h~ that any attempt to define 
the scope of state immunity in terms of traditional or integral 
governmental functions is "unsound in principle." 
j;.. 
~. TRQ Cou~t argues that no distinction "that purports to sepa-
rate important governmental functions from other ones can be 
faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society.,." be--
A ld- lsa@ 
~cauB€ lckly such distinction "inevitably invites an unelected fed-
eral judiciary to makes decisions about which state policies it 
a-.k. -
favors and which ones it dislikes." ~at ..lrl. I fully agree 
that judicial attempts to judge the wisdom of State policies are 
unsound in principle. I cannot agree, however, that our efforts 
to enforce constitutional limitations on the commerce power "in-
evitably" require us to do so. As I show in Part III infra, as 
difficult as the task of defining these limitations is, we are 
guided by the core concerns of the Commerce Clause, and the prin-
ciples of self-government on which rest the essential role of the 
States in our constitutional system. 
II. 
A. Procedural Protection for States as States 
The holds that the "fundamental limitation that the 
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect 
the 'States as States' is one of process rather than one of re-
sult." Id. at 25. The Court expressly rejected this argument in 
National League of Cities, 426 u.s. at 841-842 n. 12, and thus 
the doctrine of stare decisis provides an adequate ground for 
doing so again. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742 (1982) ~ 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 u.s. 
264 (1981). More importantly, however, I eelieve t Aat the posi-
tion adopted today is both illogical and inconsistent with our 
most fundamental constitutional principles. 
The Court is 7 Y correct that the Framers intended the 
structure of the federal government to protect the interests of 
'•· 
•• 
pa~e o • 
the states. See, e • .9...!_, The Federalist Nos. 46 (Madison) & 31 
.-r.. 
(Hamilton) (Cooke ed. 1961). It is nevertheless a long step from 
that proposition to the conclusion that the fundamental protec-
tion of State sovereignty under the constitution is one of proc-
~~~~ 
ess and not of substance. ~ JUSTICE BRENNAN 1 s e-a_:t i-er dissent 
j gap § /7 
in National League of Cities, JUSTICE BLACKMUN 1 s opinion for the 
Court does not explain how the constitutional provisions for 
State input 
~ . 
in the electoral process gJ.laraRt&e that part1cular 
exercises of the Commerce Clause power do not infri~
~ 
~ State sovereignty. 
"'\ 
Although the States participate in the 
Electoral College, this is hardly a reason to view the President 
as a representative of the States 1 interest against federal en-
croachment. While members of Congress are elected from the vari-
ous States, once in office they are members of the federal gov-
ernment. 3 As we have noted recently, there is "the hydraulic 
3one can hardly imagine this Court saying that because Congress 
is composed of individuals, individual rights are amply protected 
by the legislative process. Yet, the position adopted today 
makes no more sense. 
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pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power •• II Immigration and Natural-
ization Service v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2765, 2784 (1983). The 
~ 
majori-ty offers no reason to think that this pressure will not 
operate when Congress seeks to invoke its powers under the Com-
merce Clause, notwithstanding the electoral role of the States. 4 
More troubling than the logical gaps in the Court's position~ 
~ is its result, i. e., that federal officials are the 
judges of the limits of their own power. This result is incon-
sis tent with the fundamental principles of our constitutional 
scheme. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 78 (Hamilton). At least 
since Marbury v. Madison it has been the settled province of the 
federal judiciary 11 to say what the law is 11 with respect to the 
4The maj~apparently thinks that the States' success at 
obtaining federal funds for various projects and exemptions from 
the obligations of some federal statutes is indicative of the 
11 effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the 
States' interests ...... Draft at 23-24. But political 
successes are not relevant to the question whether the political 
processes are the proper means of enforcing constitutional 
limitations. Additionally, the fact that Congress generally does 
not transgress constitutional limits on its power to reach State 
activities does not make judicial review any less necessary to 




constitutionality of acts of Congress. Judicial review needs no 
different justification in the context of the Commerce Clause 
·~ArW~ 
from that which it always has. r ~ . 
'\ 
This Court has never before abdicated responsibility for as-
sessing the constitutionality of challenged action solely on the 
ground that affected parties theoretically are able to look out 
~ 
for their own interests. As 5e£~1GE National 
.Skf ./1 
I ~ .,.__/-- ~ J 
League of Cities, a much stronger argument about inherent struc-
1\ 
tural protections could have been made in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
u.s. 1 (1976) and Myers v. United States, 272 u.s. 52 (1926), 
than can be made with respect to limitations on the Commerce 
Clause. In these cases, the President signed legislation which 
limited his authority with respect to certain appointments and 
thus arguably "it was no concern of this Court that the law vio-
lated the Constitution." 426 u.s. at 841-842 n.l2. Never the-
t?-~~ 
less, the Court held the laws unconstitutional because they en-
" 
trenched on presidential authority, the President's consent not-
withstanding. 
it cite any authority for its contrary view. 
B. Nondiscrimination as a Substantive Standard 
The 
~~~ ~ 





straint on the exercise of the Commerce Clause power, that is 
"that Congress not attempt to single out the States for special 
burdens or otherwise discriminate against them." The opinion 
argues that this restraint finds its justification "in the proce-
dural nature of th[e] basic limitation" and is "tailored to com-
pensate for failings in the national political process rather 
than to dictate a 1 sacred province of state autonomy. In 
a...._J.<..., <-
~t at ~ This argument flatly contradicts other premises of 
th ~t * .. e ffiaJ0£1 ¥ s op1n1on. 
~I 
In~e, the nondiscrimination standard is incon-
"" 
sistent with the basic premise of State sovereignty as a limita-
tion on the commerce power. The Court recognizes: "The central 
principle of National League of Cities is that the States occupy 
~ 





-l:-8. But th~ nondiscrimination standard P£Opose9 by th8 majorit¥ ~ 
requires only that Congress treat the states exactly as it treats 
private parties. Far from reflecting the States' special role in 
~ 
the federal system, this standard .seem• to ~e to ~/\ incompatible 
with its existence. Cf. National League of Cities, 425 u.s. at 
854 (States as States stand on "quite different footing" than 
private parties with respect to Commerce Clause); New York v. 
United States, 326 u.s. 572, 577-578 (1946) (plurality opinion; 
specifically rejecting nondiscrimination as sufficient basis for 
applying federal tax to States) • 
s~, ~~~· 
In - th8 s8cona pla.ce, adoption of tH::J~TIC& RI.ACJ:CMUN ~ nondis-
crimination standard does not mean that the federal courts will 
be free from having to define integral governmental functions or 
some equivalent realm of protected state functions. The opinion 
notes in a footnote that not "every statute that does single out 
the States for special obligations is unconstitutional ipso fac-
to." Draft at 27 n.20. The Court does not provide a standard, · 
however, for determining which discriminatory statutes are con-




stitutional and which are not. Given that the Court's purpose in 
~~ 
any such inquiry would be exactly the same as it is new under 
National League of Cities and its progeny (~ ~, whether enact-
ments under the 
ties), the Court inevitably will be forced to engage in precise-




~f!'r PI;:::;:.. A. A Balancing Approach to State Immunity 
Although I think the majority is wrong in its view that w 
hould abandon our efforts to define the scope of state immunity 
from Commerce Clause enactments, the concerns expressed by the 
da,-zh. 
Court lead me to conclude that it would be useful to refine the 
test thus far developed. Our cases implicitly have balanced a 
number of factors in determining whether federal action intrudes 
on fundamental attributes of state sovereignty. On the one hand, 
we have considered the federal interest in the challenged legis-




the other, we have assessed the injury done to the States if 
forced to comply. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN recognized, National 
League of Cities itself .. adopt [ed] a balancing approach [which] 
does not outlaw federal power in areas . • where the federal 
interest is demonstrably greater and where state • • . compliance 
with imposed federal standards would be essential ... 426 u.s. at 
856 (JUSTICE BLACKMUN concurring). See also Hodel, 452 u.s. at 
288 n. 29. More explicit articulation of these factors would be 
helpful in making clearer the principles of National League of 
Cities. 
Central to consideration of the federal interest is how 
closely the challenged action implicates the core concerns of the 
Commerce Clause, viz., the promotion of a national economy and 
free trade among the states. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 
1054, 1065 (1983) (JUSTICE STEVENS concurring). For example, in 
upholding the application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-
owned railroad, we recognized that .. Congress long ago concluded 
that federal regulation of railroad labor services is necessary 
·. 
paye .L:>. 
to prevent disruptions in vi tal rail service essential to the 
national economy." United Transportation Union v. Long Island 
Rail Road Co., 455 u.s. 678, 688 (1982). Likewise, in FERC v. 
Mississippi, 456 u.s. 742, 757 (1982), we noted that "it is dif-
ficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce 
than electric energy .. II 
Thus, in determining whether particular state activities are 
beyond federal reach, we have been concerned with how closely the 
affected activities involve the basic concerns of the Commerce 
Clause. 5 It is helpful to consider the problem of defining the 
scope of State immunity in this light. When the objects of fed-
eral regulation directly involve interstate commerce, ~ it is 
~f 
unlikely they~the kind of activities ~ch we have de-
fined as "traditional governmental functions" or "indisputable 
5similarly, we have considered whether exemptinj~ates from 
federal regulation would undermine the goals ofA~ federal 
program. See Fry v. United States, 421 u.s. 542 (1975). See also 
Hodel, 452 u.s. at 282 (national surface mining standards 
necessary to insure competition among States does not undermine 
States' efforts to maintain adequate intrastate standards). 
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attributes of State sovereignty." 
I also think that we can articulate better the other factor 
balanced in our cases, i. e., the impact on the States of forcing 
them to follow particular federal policies. Although we have 
? 
referred frequently to "traditional governmental functions," this D 
language may be somewhat misleading. We have not limited the 
1-"t-.c;._f 
realm of the States' immunity to the particular activities which 
they have performed in the past. United Transportation Union v. 
Long Island Rail Road Co., 455 u.s. 678, 686 {1982). ~--As the ma-
~ correctly points out, such a limitation on the States' 
freedom to experiment would undermine a vital part of their role 
in our federal system. Nevertheless, it is possible to define 
the limits to State immunity from the reach of the Commerce 
Clause power in a manner ~e~ ~& consistent with the constitu-
,L 
tionally sanctioned role of the States. 
The Framers believed that the ctates would serve as an effec-
tive "counterpoise" to the federal government because they would 
attract and maintain the loyalty of their citizens. The roots of 
~· ... 
.~:-~a~::~e .L 1. 
such loyalty, the Founders thought, were found in the objects 
peculiar to State government. For example, Hamilton argued that 
the States "regulat[e] all those personal interests and familiar 
concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immedi-
ately aware." Thus, he maintained that the people would perceive 
the States as "the immediate and most visible guardian of life 
~~-
and property," a fact wllieb "contributes more than any other cir-
cumstance to impressing upon the minds of the people affection, 
esteem and reverence towards the government." The Federalist No. 
17 at 107. Madison took the same position, explaining that "the 
people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant" with the 
business of State governments, and "[w]ith the members of these, 
wr../1<-
will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal 
acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments 
" The Federalist No. 46 at 316. Like Hamilton, Madison 
saw the States' involvement in the everyday concerns of the peo-
~1-~~ ~~ J4J ft~~ ~ 




. ' . 
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Nagel, "Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of 
Cities in Perspective," 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81 (1981). 
In the Framers' view, the States' ability to win the loyality ~ _ 
I 
11'1-t.~ .· 
of their citizens was essential to their ability to function ef-
fectively in their federal system. Only State governments 
enjoyed the strong citizen support could serve as a bulwar 
against overbearing federal power. 
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, 
police protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of 
those performed by state and local governments in discharging 
their dual functions of administering the public law and furnish-
ing public services." 426 u.s. at 851. Not only are these activ-
ities far from the core of interstate commerce, but they are ac-~ 
tivities which epitomize the concerns of local, democratic self-
government. When we spoke of protecting traditional governmental 
functions, we had in mind the kinds of activities that bring 
State government into close contact with the people and in which 




pate. We recognized that "it is functions such as these which 
governments are created to provide ••• ," and that the States' 
ability to perform such functions is the key to their "separate 
and independent existence." Id. 
Thus, the harm to the States as a result of federal over-
reaching under the Commerce Clause is not simply a matter of dol- ~~~4. 
lars and cents. Nor is it a matter of the wisdom or folly of 
certain policy choices. Instead, we are concerned with whether 
the foundation on which the Framers staked the States' continued 
vitality will be eroded by the "nationalization" of those func-
tions which epitomize local self-government. 
B. Applicability of the FLSA to SAMTA 
The ~;~ question we~is case is the applica-
""" 
bility of the Fair Labor Standards Act to the wages and hours of 
employees of a city-owned bus system. It ioe= e~a.t -rhese 
~~~M •tdu 
affect interstate commer~aAa bb~ ~n 
~~~ ~ :k1oyer~ C:z=:C:::~~ .. 
conditions of employment 






the employees of a system are not w~tbia eh& co~ con- ~ 
cerns of the Commerc 
~~~~­
Notwithstanding the infusion of  
~
federal funds, local mass 
al functio:t. one c.ao .b~l-Jl imag..i,.ne ~e 
;1..-~ ~ 
In contrast, the '\. interest of ...e.e.e loca~ government in main-
~JP-/od.L~ 
taining the" pom!r to -s-et the wages and hours of ~ employees of 
~~~~-4.-~ 
its b~ is strong indeed. In ~oday's world, the operation ,. 
of an intracity mass transit system is a paradigmatic example of 
local self-government. There are few institutions of modern ur-
ban life with which citizens are more "familiar[] and minutely 
conversant." The Federalist No. 46 at 316. As a result, local 
~~ 
elected officials are subject to oare~ul scrutiny by voters and 
the press with respect to the operation of such systems. It is 
just this kind of local accountability that the Framers believed 
-· w fl!i L4J . .L---. ~ J 
~~1~~~t---
engender ~g~Hppo£t foF tAe State and local governments > 
ensure their vitality in the federal system. 
~. 
IV. ~::=~ '::s I o'-z-/ 
~ 
page L.l. • 
.. 
The application of the FLSA to employees of a city bus sys-
~ 
tern ~~ is not within the e concerns of the Commerce Clause. In 
contrast, the operation of such a system is precisely the kind of 
activity that the Framers thought to be essential to the inde-
pendence and vitality of local government. Thus, I conclude that 
the balance in this case weighs heavily in favor of the City, and 
accordingly, I would affirm. 
SUITE 500 
1800 M STREET, N . W. 
WASHINGTON , 0 . C . 20036 
February 21, 1985 
j L.J 2 5 1985 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: ~ ~ ~-~ 
I have been following your recuperation at a 
distance. Having read that you do not intend to sit for 
argument in February, I was delighted to see your partici-
pation in Garcia v. San Antonio. 
As you know, my partner Bill Coleman and others 
here labored mightily on that case. Even making allowance 
for the prejudices I probably entertain because of their 
efforts, I was very impressed with your dissent, which 
certainly showed no signs of the handicaps you were working 
under. 
I'll look forward to seeing you this spring. 
STJ)y, 
Carl R. Schenker, Jr. 
CRS: j lc 
CHAMBERS OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 





FEB 2 8 1985 February 27, 1985 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Justice Powell: 
I have been meaning to write you for some time to tell you how delighted 
I was to hear that you are up and about after your operation. I must say your 
recent dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio MTA is an outstanding piece of work. 
I had hoped that the interference of Congress would be stopped by the 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Back in 1967, I 
dissented in the Three Judge Court in Maryland, et al. v. Wertz, 269 F.Supp. 
826 (D.Md. 1967) and Justice Douglas used part of that dissent in his dissent 
in the same case in 392 U.S. 183, 88 S.Ct. 2017 (1968). 
Prior to the time I came to the Bench, I had been Majority Leader of 
the Senate of Maryland, and during that period I was Chairman of the Finance 
Committee and before that had chaired a study of taxation and fiscal matters. 
I therefore intimately know the relationship of the state to the central 
government, and particularly the Legislature to the Congress, etc. I can 
tell you without fear of contradiction that the individual Congressmen and 
Senators have very little concern whatsoever for various acts that effect 
intimately the financial situations of the states. There are, of course, 
numerous ways in which the State is subject to Congressional power but 
Congress certainly should not be able to reach into the budget making process 
and to effect the most careful and continuous consideration that the states 
give to fiscal matters and the budgetary process. 
This is a particularly bad time for this decision to have been rendered, 
when the federal government is seeking to denude itself from the responsibilities 
it has undertaken in the last 50 years. Garcia v. San Antonio has a 
potentiality of crippling the states as they undertake this tremendous task of 
again establishing a viable federalism. 
I just wanted to let you know how important your dissent is and hope 
it becomes the majority real soon. With all best wishes for your continued 
good health and with kindest regards, I am, 
rop 
ESN:ce 
~ c~ ~b c~. lvr-ld- ..; St1C _ J/f"/Fs-
,. 
March 5, 1985 
Dear Ed: 
Your letter of February 27 is particularly appre-
ciated. What has been written in the eastern press - per-
haps predictably - generally has approved the Court's deci-
sion in Garcia. Your warm approval of the dissent therefore 
is particularly gratifying. 
You knm•t from actual experience in your. major 
roles in state government that the Court's basic assumption 
is fallacious. The "structure" of our federal system, with-
out iudicial review, affords minimal protection to state and 
local interests as such. 
Although my experience was minimal compared to 
yours, t did serve for eight year$ on the Virginia State 
Board of F.ducation And was Chairman of it. I also ~erved on 
other state bo~ies (e.g., the State Library Board, the Com-
mission on the Virginia Economy), and was on the Richmond 
City School Board for 11 years. !t ~r.~as clear from my expe-
rience that democracy works best when it is closest to the 
peopl~. 
My thanks also for your concern about my opera-
tion. Complications developed that hospitalized me .for five 
weeks, and I still have quite a way to go before regaining 
my strength and vitality. I ho?e to return to the Court by 
the April arguments, and my physicians say that the long 
term prognosis is good. 
I hope to see you at the Fourth Circuit JurHcial 
Conference in late June. 
Sincerely, 
Hon. Edward S. Northrop 
United States District Court 
nistrict of Maryland 





JUSTICE SAND R A DAY O'CON N OR 
Dear Lewis, 
.ju.vrtmt a}111trf cf t4t 'Jnittb .jtalt.&' 
J ht,gltittgton. ~. a} . 2llgt~~ 
April 17, 1985 
Enclosed is a copy of part of Gerry Gunther's book 
on constitutional law. I thought you would like to read his 




!>1ay 1, 1985 
Dear Gerry: 
Sandra O'Connor was good enough to share with me a 
copy of your "Election Year Reflections" that you sent her. 
She and I both uere particularly interested in 
your comments on G~rcia. I confe5s that the majority deci -
sion shocked me - both because of it~ lack of respect for 
star~ decisis an0 its virtu~] rejection of ju~icial review 
of legislation affecting the stP.t~s ~coptea un0er the Com-
merce Clause. It is heartening for a scholQr of your quali-
ty ann distinction to agree with our concerns. r understand 
that your "Reflections" will be included in the forthcoming 
supplement to your ca~e~o~k. 
I agree generally with vour assess~ent of the Bur-
ger Court. It is fa!r to Eay that we h~ve not hP~n as "ljb-
eral" as the Warren Court in decisionF effecting t he rights 
of defendants in criminal cases. nut the basic rights have 
been preserved. Despite Bill Brennan's concern, repeate~ in 
a nu~ber of decisions , that a majority is determine~ to 
overrule Miranda , in my view no such sentiment exists. Even 
apart from precedent, I think Mirandu was correct. E<'h:arc~s 
v. Arizona arguably extends Miranda. 
The Burger Court - as you noted - has hardly been 
ultra conservativ~. You mentioned our decisions on abor-
tions; the First A~endment: and t~e rights of minorities, 
women, and illegitimates. 
We do have too many fractured courts, with concur-
ring as well as dissenting opinions. This is caused in part 
by t he changing nature of our cas~load. I believe we have a 
larger percentage of close and difficult cases than the 
Court did during the Warren an~ earlier years. This is par-
ticularly true with reso~ct to the social legislation, en-
acted in the sixties and seventies, that we must construe • 
. ~uch of this, with accompanying regulations, is both complex 
and unclear. 
I hope to see you when you are in \'iashington. 
Prof. Gerald Gunther 
School of Law 
Sincerely, 
Stanford University 
Stanford, California 94305 
lfp/ss 
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THE BURGER COURT: SOME ELECTION YEAR REFLECTIONS ·"'-~-:r. ,. S"-
Nineteen eighty-four seems to particularly apt vantage point for ~~Jl~ 
look to the past as well as the ure of the u.s. Supreme Court. My ~/ 
backward and forward glances e prompted essentially because it is now 15 tiL-
years since Warren Earl Bu er succeeded Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the 
United States; and becau this~ a presidential election year, an election 
whose recent outcome well have significant impact on the makeup and 
direction of the Co 
Let me begin with a look backward. Richard Nixon named Warren Burger 
to the Court in 1969. Within the next three years, Nixon put three 
additional Justices on the Court: Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist, and 
Lewis Powell (but not Clement Haynsworth, and, happily, not Harrold 
Carswell, nor Hershel Friday, nor Mildred Lillie). Since Nixon, we have 
had three Presidents: Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, and the present incumbent. 
Carter had no appointments to the Court. Each of the Republicans has chosen 
one Justice: Ford named John Paul Stevens; Reagan has so far named Sandra 
Day O'Connor. That makes six Justices selected by recent Republican 
presidents; plus one Eisenhower appointee, William J. Brennan. Only Byron 
White and Thurgood Marshall were the nominees of Democratic Presidents, 
Kennedy and Johnson respectively; seven-ninths of the present composition of 
the Court, in short, are Republican selections. And all of the recent 
Republican Presidents, all those starting with Nixon,-were strong critics of 
Warren Court directions; only Kennedy and Johnson were clear supporters of 
the Warren Court. 
To the pundits in and out of the media in the early 70s, the political 
orientation of the nominators gave rise to widespread expectations of a 
dramatic turnaround from Warren Court jurisprudence. In the early 70s, The 
New York Times, Time Magazine and other periodicals were filled with 
headlines and think-pieces and editorials with such titles as "Conservative 
Profile of a Nixon Court Discernible, .. ''Supreme Court Begins Swing To The 
Right That Was Sought By Nixon," "The Nixon Way," "The Nixon Radicals," and 
so forth. 
Twelve years ago, in 1972, in the midst of statistical analyses and 
editorial comments elaborating such conclusions, I argued that those 
assessments were vastly overstated. In an Op-Ed piece in the New York Tin~s 
and in a couple of law review articles, I ventured to guess that the Nixon 
appointees were not peas out of the same pod, would not be a solid bloc, 
were quite distinguishable individuals, were mostly diSinclined to engage in 
a radical discarding of Warren Court achievements. "There was no drastic 
rush to the right," I argued at the time. "The changes were marginal, not 
cataclysmic. [So-called] 'retreats' were more typically refusals to extend 
Warren Court tendencies and narrow readings of Warren Court precedents. Not 
firm strides to the rear but side-steps and refusals to step forward were 
characteristic. And in a considerable number of cases, Warren Court 
principles ~ embraced and applied." I concluded that "portrayals of a 
dramatic turnabout do not ring true. Rather, I see a Court divided, 
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uncertain and adrift.• 
I have never written anything that produced so much hooting from 
colleagues around the country and from some of my friends in journalism. I 
was whistling in the dark or currying favor or had leapt from the ivory 
tower into the wild blue yonder, the charges went. Some people even bet me 
that, if I gave the Nixon appointees another two or three years, I would 
surely concede that there had indeed been a radical turnabout. 
Well, here it is, 12 years after that, 15 years after Warren Burger 
took his seat, and I still have not had to pay up. Indeed, if you will 
forgive my egomaniacal self-congratulation, I think that assessment can 
still serve as the centerpiece of a retrospective evaluation. And indeed, 
some of my sharpest critics in '72 are now on record as agreeing with me. I 
recently read a book published not long ago by the Yale University Press, a 
book for which a number of constitutional scholars submitted essays 
evaluating the work of the Burger Court. All of the scholars are members of 
a quite liberal organization called the Society of American Law Teachers, 
and SALT sponsored the collection. Well, the title of the book is •The 
Burger Court." But for my purposes, its significant theme is reflected in 
its subtitle: the full title goes "The Burger Court: The Counter-
Revolution That Wasn't." 
Quite so. The most controversial, innovative decisions of the Warren 
Court still stand: Brown v. Board of Education, the school segregation 
case; Reynolds~ Sims, the:feapportionment decision; even Miranda~ 
Arizona, requiring detailed warnings when criminal suspects are arrested. 
Continuity, not counter-revolution, has been, to many people's surprise, the 
dominant theme. And, quite apart from the leading cases, the major trends 
of the Warren Court persist. Judicial activism was the hallmark of the 
Warren Court; greater judicial self-restraint was one of the refrains of 
Richard Nixon in his campaigns and, allegedly, in his selection process. 
Yet, if anything can be said of the Burger Court, it is that activism is 
still very much a dominant strand in the Court's institutional performance. 
It is a more "rootless" activism -- a more centrist, ad hoc activism -- than 
that of the Warren Court. But it is activism nonetheless. 
After all; a Court -- the Burger Court -- that hands down Roe ~ Wade 
and the later cases removing most legal barriers to abortions can hardly be 
called a shrinking violet. {My colleague and Dean John Ely, for example, 
has called Roe an even worse, more unjustified judicial performance than 
Lochner v. New York, the 1905 case striking down a state limit on the hours 
bakery employees may work, a case widely conde~ned as instituting three 
decades of unjustified economic policy-making by the Supreme Court.) 
Moreover, in a rough sketch such as this, it is fair to say that the Burger 
Court by and large has not retreated drastically from Warren Court First 
Amendment decisions; indeed, much of First Amendment law was put on nore 
solid footing in the 70s than it had been in the 60s -- though that footing 
has gotten more slippery in the 80s. In the school segregation area, the 
Burger Court has not only repudiated Administration efforts to curb busing 
remedies but has indeed been remarkably willing to develop new ways of 
curbing intradistrict segregation. And, despite increasingly strident 
opposition by the Reagan Administration, almost all affirmative action 
remedies that have reached the Court have in effect been sustained, from 
Bakke, involving preferential admissions in higher education, to Weber, 
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involving preferences by private employers, and Fullilove~ upholding 
congressional "set-asides" for minority businesses. And, despite some 
nibbling away at the edges of Warren Court doctrine, the Court so far 
continues to reject the major Administration pleas to change direction, as 
with the most recent group of abortion cases and the denial of tax 
exemptions to racially discriminatory private schools. 
What has happened, then, to confound so many expectations about the 
Republican appointees of the last decade and a half? First of all, most of 
the new Justices have obviously taken their robes, their judicial 
independence, quite seriously. They have gone their own way, often to the 
disappointment of those who named them to the bench -- and one does not have 
to stop with the Nixon appointees' rejection of the President's claims in 
the Watergate Tapes Case a decade ago to repudiate the excessively 
deterministic analyses of those who expect direct quid pro quos by political 
nominees, and who exaggerate the impact of politics on the Court. In 1972, 
a lot of commentators expected Harry Blackmun to be simply Warren Burger's 
Minnesota Twin. I thought that prediction was wrong in 1972; but it was 
simply a guess then, unsupported by data. Now, the outcome is quite clear: 
Blackmun has proved to be quite independent, lining up on the liberal side 
with Brennan and Marshall a surprising and indeed growing number of times. 
Lewis Powell, I argued in 1972, seemed to me independent and impressive from 
the start; and he has continued to be that in many areas. John Paul Stevens 
-- selected by Ford, the least ideological of recent Republican Presidents; 
more accurately, perhaps, selected by the best Attorney General in many 
years, Edward Levi -- has been quite independent from the beginning. Even 
Sandra O'Connor -- expected by some to be merely Rehnquist's Arizona and 
Stanford Law School twin -- not long ago spoke for the Court in rejecting 
Rehnquist's efforts to undermine the semi-suspect, intermediate scrutiny 
level for gender classifications that the Court developed during the mid-
70s. Of the six sitting appointees of recent Republican Presidents, only 
William Rehnquist has shown real eagerness to re-examine and repudiate some 
of the major formulations of the Warren Court. 
What went wrong? Why haven't the recent Republican Presidents been 
more successful in their efforts to change the direction of the Court? I do 
not mean to say that they have had no impact, of course: most of the 
appointees are more conservative, with respect to states' rights and social 
justice and criminal procedure, for example; they lack the overarching value 
commitment to equality of the Warren majority, and they are more receptive 
to competing claims of individuality and autonomy; and these values have 
from time to time had impacts on statutory interpretation and constitutional 
law. But I deliberately emphasize the really quite remarkable continuity, 
the institutional unwillingness to engage in any radical turning back of the 
clock, the phenomenon, in short, of the ··counter-revolution that wasn't." 
And that continuity has taken place not because most of the recent 
Republican Presidents, like most Presidents in our history, have been 
uninterested in and inattentive to the Court. It is precisely because at 
least Nixon and Reagan made the Court a campaign issue and because both had 
strong ideological disagreements with the Court that expectations of 
dramatic changes in constitutional law arose. In the face of that, what 
explains the continuity? Let me suggest several factors. 
First of all, there is the inherent shortsightedness, the inherent 
limited attention span, of most Presidents. By and large, even those 
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Presidents who have reason to pay very serious attention to the Court tend 
to worry about the Court only with respect to a narrow cluster of issues. 
Recall the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example. The major changes in 
the economy that the Roosevelt Administration enacted in its first term ran 
into repeated vetoes from the Court. FDR was frustrated because the Nine 
Old Men stood in his way; and he did not have an opportunity to replace even 
one of them during his first term. Shortly after, his Court-Packing plan of 
1937 failed in the Senate. But the dam soon broke, and before FDR left 
office, he had nine opportunities to send Supreme Court nominations up to 
the Hill. All of his appointees proved to be loyal New Dealers in the sense 
-- in the only sense -- he hoped: all joined in dramatically changing the 
constitutional groundrules by eliminating many of the barriers to 
governmental regulation of the economy. But Roosevelt had no special 
interest in the ideological direction of the Court beyond that. His 
nominees, unanimous about regulatory power, soon spread all over the lot on 
issues of individual rights. Again and again, for example, one found Felix 
Frankfurter and Robert Jackson on one side, Hugo Black and William 0. 
Douglas on the other. 
So it really proved to be for Richard Nixon. To Nixon, the critical 
issue, virtually the only Court-related one he expressed interest in, was 
law and order. Even there, he proved only marginally successful: As I have 
said, despite some significant whittling away, there has been no overturning 
of major Warren Court criminal procedure landmarks -- at least not yet. As 
to most constitutional issues, the Nixon appointees have gone their own 
different ways. 
For Ronald Reagan, the social issues -- abortion, school prayer, busing 
have been central. Sandra O'Connor was with the dissenters in the most 
recent abortion cases, to be sure; but she has shown some independence, and 
she did repudiate Rehnquist on the sex discrimination issue, as I have 
noted. 
Another source of explanation for the relatively limited impact of the 
Republican Presidents lies in the nature of conservatives and conservatism. 
To some conservatives -- for some of those who are conservative rather than 
radical reactionary in outlook -- precedent and continuity rank high in the 
scale of values. And for those conservatives -- Justice Lewis Powell is 
probably the best contemporary example -- well established law is not to be 
readily overturned, even if the Justice would not have supported its 
creation had he sat on the Warren Court. 
The commitment of some conservatives such as Justice Powell to 
precedent and continuity and stare decisis has had a great deal to do with 
the preservation of so much of the Warren Court and early Burger Court 
legacy in recent years. I will remind you simply of the Akron cases just a 
couple of years ago -- the major onslaught in the Supreme Court so far on 
the principles of Roe v. Wade, the abortion decision. Despite the legal and 
political arguments since Roe in 1973, the majority in the Akron cases held 
firm to the basic principles of Roe; and the majority opinion by Jus t ice 
Powell, contained an eloq~e~ n e i ortance of stare decisis 
even in constitutiona~I cannot help 1nterpolat1ng here my oubts that 
the force of stare decisis and precedent will be quite as strong in the 
coming few years, quite apart from new judicial appointments, to which I 
will turn in a moment. My interpolation is especially prompted by the most 
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important decision from the Court so far this Term. The decision came down 
just a bit more than a month ago, on February 19, in~ v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority. The case, you may recall, produced a rare 
outright overruling of a prior Supreme Court decision. The 5 to 4 decision 
in Garcia flatly overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, a case that 
had been decided less than a decade earlier, in 1976. There isn't enough 
time today to belabor the aspects of the Garcia ruling that troubled me 
substantially (quite apart from the immediate issue at stake, the 
applicability of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act to the employees of a 
municipal transit authority). But there are aspects of the case that seem 
to me worth mentioning briefly, for the bearing they may have on the binding 
effect of past constitutional norms on future Supreme Court Justices. 
The first aspect, and the one most germane to my topic today, is the 
source of the overruling that took place in Garcia. The source of the 
overruling was the Justices usually viewed as being on the liberal side of 
the Court spectrum (though I would note that the principle they overturned 
was one that had long been endorsed by the late Justice William o. Douglas, 
hardly an arch reactionary). Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion in 
Garcia; it was Justice Blackmun who was the key switch in voting, for he had 
been with the majority, albeit in considerable doubt, in supporting the 
result in National League of Cities. Joining Justice Blackmun were Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, White and Stevens. The dissenters were Chief Justice 
Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. The first point I want 
to note about the case is emphasized in Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia. 
He suggested that the ruling may "weaken the application of stare decisis," 
and he commented: "The stability of judicial decision, and with it respect 
for the authority of this Court, are not served by the precipitous 
overruling of multiple precedents that we witness in this case." As I have 
l noted, it has been so-called conservatives such as Pm-1ell who have been at the forefront in adhering to a good deal of the Warren Court and early Burger Court precedents so far. In short, stare decisis and precedent, in a 
conservative age, has been largely of aid in results to the liberals. Yet 
in Garcia it is the liberals that perform one of the more dramatic 
overturnings of precedent in Court history. Can one really believe that, in 
future onslaughts on Warren Court precedents, responsible conservatives will 
be quite as ready to support decisions with which they disagree and which 
were rendered when they were not yet on the Court as readily as has been the 
case to a remarkable degree in the history of the Burger Court so far? In 
short, I wonder, as a matter of sheer strategy and tactics, whether the 
liberals have not inflicted on themselves a fairly substantial wound by 
their handling of the National League of Cities line of cases in the recent 
Garcia decision. 
I said I do not want to turn this into an elaborate discussion of 
Garcia. But a couple of additional aspects of Garcia are worth noting 
fairly briefly. First of all, the alleged limit on Congress involved in 
Garcia is states rights -- the state autonomy concern derivable from the 
structure of the Constitution and reflected in the lOth Amendment. Many 
people who would wail if a First Amendment or equal protection or due 
process precedent were overturned would probably say that there is no reason 
to cry over a repudiation of the states rights defense. Certainly that 
would seem to express the attitude of Justice William J. Brennan: Justice 
Brennan had written a vehement (and in my view rather misleading and 
exaggerated) dissent in National League of Cities, and the Garcia decision 
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may be seen as a triumph for the Brennan view, albeit I believe at 
considerable cost. Yet federalism is not quite as reprehensible or 
worthless a defense as some of you may think. True, it comes down to us as 
a defense long invoked by vested economic interests to subvert national 
regulations of the private sector. Indeed, it is the Nine Old Men's resort 
to rigid Tenth Amendment notions in the pre-1937 years that produced the 
widespread modern notion that states rights concerns, at least so far as 
judicial concerns are involved, have long been properly buried. Yet may I 
remind you that the issue raised in cases such as National League of Cities 
or Garcia, or, especially, FERC v. Mississippi (on the power of the federal 
goverment to mandate the agenda of state agencies) are importantly different 
from those that were at the forefront in the days when states rights notions 
were in disrepute. The new issues were largely unheard of in the New Deal 
and subsequent days. The regulatory techniques we are dealing with now have 
been resorted to by the federal government only in very recent years --
that is the imposition of regulations directly on the states, not on the 
private sector; and, even more troublingly, imposing coercive regulations 
that require state agencies to act as enforcers and implementers of detailed 
federal programs. Justice Brennan's dissent in National League of Cities, 
which argued eloquently albeit unpersuasively that the majority decision was 
a repudiation of most of our constitutional history, of the spirit of John 
Marshall, of Gibbons v. Ogden, of the Darby case, of Wickard v. Filburn, was 
in my view alternately wrong or beside the point. Neither the Framers nor 
John Marshall nor Gibbons nor Darby nor Wickard ever had to deal with the 
issue of direct regulations imposed on states. Whatever may be said of the 
merits of the majority's resolution in National League of Cities -- and I 
have had my doubts about that -- surely the dissenters argument that this 
was a long settled issue was absurd. And the basic thing to be said about a 
legitimate judicial concern with states rights concerns, particularly in the 
novel late Twentieth Century context, is that a federalism concern permeates 
the United States Constitution -- in its text, in its history, and in its 
structure. Surely it behooves the Court to take so clearly established 
limiting principles seriously, whether or not you agree with its intrinsic 
merits as a promoter of local self-government and whether or not you condemn 
some of those who have invoked it in the past. 
A final, to me most basic point about Garcia, before I return to my 
main theme. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Garcia comes awfully 
close to, if he does not fully endorse, the notion that states rights 
retraints on national authority should be viewed as essentially 
nonjusticiable issues -- issues to be left to the political processes rather 
than to Court implementation. He argues, akin : to Herbert Wechsler's famous 
1954 argument about the political safeguards of federalism, that the 
structural provisions for assuring representation of state interests in 
national decisionmaking are adequate to guarantee sufficient safeguarding of 
state autonomy concerns in the political process, and that therefore 
judicial review is well nigh unnecessary and inappropriate. I find that a 
truly troubling notion. I remind you that when Herbert Wechsler put forward 
that argument, in a somewhat different national environment in 1954, he did 
not argue that judicial review was therefore wholly inappropriate -- quite 
the contrary. The only academic I know of who has made that argument is 
Dean Jesse Choper of the law school at U.C. Berkeley. Jesse Choper said in 
a 1980 book, ··Judicial Review and the National Political Process,· that all 
federalism concerns, like all separation of powers concerns, should be 
viewed as nonjusticiable and left to the political process, so that the 
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Court could devote itself exclusively to the safeguarding ·of individual and 
minority rights. Now, I don't disagree with Jesse about the special 
importance of judicial review for individual and minority rights. But I 
think it is a significant step beyond, and in my eyes a wholly unjustifiable 
step, to consider as nonjusticiable, as new varieties of "political 
questions" as it were, a set of major questions clearly arising "under the 
Constitution" of the United States. 
In my view, that aspect of Garcia casts into question the entire 
legitimacy of the Court's authority, at least its legitimacy to the extent 
it rests on the rationale traditionally advanced ever since Marbury v. 
Madison and, indeed, Hamilton's No. 78 of the Federalist before that. I 
think the Court very seriously undermines its own legal underpinnings -- the 
underpinnings it resorts to when it does do all the good things it does and 
has done for individual rights and minority interests -- when it purports to 
pick and choose what it will consider a constitutional issue on the merely 
prudential ground that some types of issues ·warrant not merely less 
attention from the Court but no attention at all. And yet that comes pretty 
close to describing the ultimate thrust oflthe Garcia case. Again, I 
tremble some for the future -- especially a future in which judicial power 
is likely to be more and more in the hands of Justices who, unlike me, are 
not liberal Democrats (although, like me, they may hold some fairly narrow 
views of the proper judicial role) --when the liberal majority of 1985 
leaves as its legacy to those Justices the message that they are free to 
pick and choose among constitutional norms in selecting those that a new 
majority chooses to take seriously -- and, in exercising that selection 
authority, is free to give very little weight to the force of precedent and 
stare decisis to boot. 
Enough of my excursion on Garcia. Let me return to my main theme. On 
that one, you will recall, I have tried to sketch and to some extent explain 
the relatively small amount of impact of the Burger Court on the fabric of 
constitutional law, at least so far. But I urge you not to misunderstand 
me: I am not trying to paint an admiring portrait of the Burger Court. I 
can -- and often do -- go on at great length criticizing particular opinions 
and trends. And I have repeatedly criticized the institutional processes of 
the present Court. When I said in 1972 that this was a Court diviaed and 
adrift, I expected the Justices to get their footing and develop greater 
coherence before long. I by and large still await that. It is often a 
terribly fragmented Court, with too many separate opinions, too many casual 
dicta (for which one can blame the explosion in the number of law clerks 
only in part). But none of that seems to me to undercut my basic theme, 
that the Burger Court and its Republican appointees have left a remarkable 
part of the Warren Court legacy quite intact. 
Enough of patting myself on the back about my vision of 1972. Let me 
turn to the future. As to that, I am certainly not willing to make any bets 
or predictions that there will be as few dramatic changes from the Supreme 
Court in the next few years as there have been for the last fifteen. You 
hardly need reminding that we have recently had a Presidential election; 
Ronald Reagan has been reelected. And today, the majority of the Justices 
are 75 or older. In his second term, Ronald Reagan, like Frankli.n 
Roosevelt, may well have several opportunities to leave his imprint on the 
Court. And President Reagan continued to harp on the social agenda in his 
campaign, as you know. 
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The kind of impact future Reagan appointments will have will in my view 
turn on the nature of those appointments. Will he name people of the ilk of 
Ed Meese -- a trusted political ally but not a person with a long-developed, 
well-formed constitutional philosophy? Or will he name predominantly people 
such as Bob Bork, the former law professor at Chicago and Yale and Solicitor 
General in the Nixon Administration, who now sits on the federal Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia? 
I suspect that those who fear or desire dramatic long-term change in 
Court direction had better look to the Bork rather than the Meese type of 
appointee. The Reagan administration has been quite sophisticated, in my 
view, in naming some of the nation's outstanding conservative scholars to 
Court of Appeals vacancies - - not only Bob Bork but also Nino Scalia of 
Chicago, who now sits with Bork on the D.C. Circuit, and Ralph Winter of 
Yale, who now sits on the Second Circuit in New York, and Dick Posner and 
Frank Easterbrook of Chicago, who now sit on the Seventh Circuit there. A 
Bork type of Supreme Court Justice might well be more of an intellectual 
force and leader, even more ready to re-examine precedent, than William 
Rehnquist has been. A Meese-type appointee can probably be counted on more 
reliably in terms of short-term results. But I suspect that the prospects 
-- or horrors -- of more basic and more lasting constitutional change are 
more likely to be realized from strong-minded academics than from more run-
of-the-mill political appointees. For better or for worse, academics such 
as Bork have thought about constitutional law and the role of the Court for 
years, broadly and deeply. They have a considered, coherent (some would say 
unduly rigid) philosophy. I doubt that anyone would say that of the Meese 
type of nominee. Even now the exclusionary rule is undergoing re-
examination. Soon, with the strong prospect of changed personnel, a good 
many more well-established parts of Warren Court doctrine may be up for 
reconsideration. 
Even a Reagan Court of the future will not necessarily be a 
catastrophe, though the risks are greater than proved to be the case with 
the shrill prophecies of the early 70s about the Nixon-Burger Court. But I 
ought not to stop without saying a word about a fear I have about 1984 and 
1985 that Dtay more closely resemble an Orwellian nightmare. My fear goes 
less to what the Court may do than to what the country may do. 
My fear concerns the ongoing campaign to resort to a hitherto unused 
method of amending the U.S. Constitution. The 26 amendments to our 
Constitution have all been added by one of the : two amendment routes 
delineated in Article V: two-thirds of Congress has proposed amendments; 
three-fourths of the states have then ratified. The untried alternative 
route is to have amendments proposed not by Congress but by a constitutional 
convention, a constitutional convention which Congress Must call if two-
thirds of the states' demand one. Two-thirds of the states today means 34 
states. Today, 32 of the necessary 34 state legislatures have applied to 
Congress to demand a convention to consider a balanced budget amendment to 
the Constitution. If two more states act in the same way, and if Congress 
hasn't in the meanwhile proposed an amendment of its own, Congress will have 
to call a convention. And no one really knows how .that convention will ~ 
organized, and, most important, how broad its scope will be. In~ view, 
convention delegates may consider any issue perceived by those who elected 
them as important to the country; in my view a convention would ~ be 
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limited to the single, balanced budget issue. We simply ·have had no 
experience with that convention route -- unless you consider the arguably 
relevant one of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which was called for 
narrow purposes and itself became a "runaway•• one. 
Convention applications are now pending in a number of states. 
Recently, California very nearly became the critical state. \ve \\•ere _about 
to confront an initiative on the November ballot to press our legislature to 
apply for a balanced budget convention -- or else lose all salaries and 
other benefits. A California Supreme Court decision removed that issue from 
the ballot. But the issue continues very live indeed in other states. 
And at the same time, not only fiscal conservatives call for 
constitutional change. A scattered number of moderate and liberal leaders 
-- with Lloyd Cutler, President Carter's White House Counsel, in the lead 
are also holding meetings to consider allegedly necessary constitutional 
changes, such as moving toward a parliamentary system or increasing 
executive power or what have you. And, though this campaign has not yet hit 
the headlines, there is a growing undercurrent of noise claiming, as Lloyd 
Cutler does, that the Framers would be shocked if they only knew that there 
had been only 26 amendments to the document wrought nearly two centuries 
ago. 
Why does a constitutional convention give me Orwellian nightmares? I 
am not denying the legitimacy of the convention route. Nor do I have 
terribly strong feelings about the merits of the balanced budget amendment 
(although I think it mighty ironical that some of its strongest supporters 
are also among the strongest critics of the Court -- and yet tell us that 
the uncertainties in the budget amendment's language would be resolved by, 
who else, the Supreme Court, which would thus gain a major role about fiscal 
policies, not only the present range of political and social ones.} No, my 
concern comes from the process by which we have come so very close to 
reaching the necessary number of states to trigger a convention -- a process 
which in most state legislatures, I assure you, has been one of perfunctory 
debate simply on the pros and cons of fiscal responsibility, with virtually 
total inattention to the risks of the convention route -- at least no 
discussion beyond unfounded reassurances about the risk-free nature of 
calling a limited convention. I think that is an extraordinarily 
irresponsible invocation of constitutional processes. And, given the 
political dynamics, given one way of sketching the possible scenario if that 
convention route is taken, the convention that .confronts us in the wake of 
1984 may well produce as much substantial constitutional change than 




May 7, 1985 
PERSON~L 
Dear John: 
I enclose a typewritten draft of "Reflections" by 
Gerald Gunther that he sent to Justice O'Connor. 
This will be of interest to you, as it was to me. 
I was particularly pleased by his substantial agreement with 
my dissent in Garcia. 
Although I understan1 that Gerry intends to in-
clude these "Reflections" in the supplement to his casebook, 
since it has not been published I would not think any public 
reference to it would be appropriate. It is an interesting 
view of the Burger Court that, in general, is about right. 
I recall that you admire Professor Gunther~ 
Dan Ortiz will be in CharlottesvillP. this weekend 
(Saturday and perhaps a part of Sunday) . house hunting. Sev-
eral realtors have been in touch with Dan. I suppose he 
will be with them primarily, but possibly you may have an 
opportunity to see him. 
Sincerely, 
Professor John C. Jeffries, Jr. 
School of Law 
University of Virginia 
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Mr. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Lewis: 
July 3, 1985 
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Ever since the Court's Garcia opinion carne down, I have been 
mulling the intrinsic defects of that decision. It seems to me 
objectionable on many levels -- of history, of principle, of an 
understanding of the processes of government. I suppose a 
professor of constitutional law may be expected to read opinions 
critically, but I can think of few opinions in recent years 
which I think more disappointing, whether tested by the precepts 
of constitutional law or by more general notions of good political 
theory. 
I have had several occasions to talk about Garcia and its 
implications before various groups, such as the National Conference 
of State Legislators and the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference. 
At the request of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, I have also written a short article on Garcia. The 
article will appear in a forthcoming issue of ACIR's magazine, 
Intergovernmental Perspectives. It occurs to me that the article 
might be of interest to you. I enclose a copy. 
I am sure that you must be glad to have the current Term come 
to an end. The work does not, of course, end, but at least you 
have a bit more flexibility with your schedule. I was more than 
a little interested, as you may suppose, in reading the Grand 
Rapids opinions. As one who teaches and writes about the Court 
and constitutional law, I welcomed the chance to do the oral 
argument in that case. I think it important that a teacher of 
the subject, if given the chance, sharpen his skills by the 
argument of a challenging case like Grand Rapids. I know that I 
found the experience immensely stimulating and rewarding. 
While at the Judicial Conference, I had the chance to chat 
briefly with your son. He is making a palpable mark for himself 
in the practice, and I am sure you are proud of him. It was also 
good to see Jay, who seems to take nicely to the judge's life. 
I hope that I run into you this summer, either in Richmond 
or elsewhere. In the meantime, my warm regards, 
Enclosure 
Sit!~ 
A. E. Dick Howard 
White Burkett Miller Professor 
of Law and Public Affairs 
Two centuries ago, the framers who met at Philadelphia 
labored to produce a Constitution crafted to the needs of a free 
people living in a republic of extended territory. Drawing on 
the lessons of history, they sought to give the central 
government sufficient authority to deal with such national 
concerns ·as commerce among the states, while dispersing power in 
such a way as to protect individual liberty and local self-
government--two of the ends for which the war of independence had 
been waged. 
A linchpin of that constitutional order is federalism. One 
has but to read the text of the Constitution--which refers to the 
states at least fifty times--to realize how central the concept 
of federalism was to the founders' thinking. Indeed, it was a 
concern about the potential power of the new federal government 
that led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 
In the nineteenth century, that perceptive French traveler, 
Tocqueville, lavished praise on American federalism in his 
~mocracy in America. On the link between self-government and 
liberty, he commented, "A nation may establish a free government, 
but without municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of 
liberty." 
As Americans prepare to celebrate the Constitution's 
bicentennial, the Supreme Court appears to have forgotten both 
the framers' intent and the teachings of the nation's history. 
In February the Court decided Garcia y. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority. Five justices joined in a majority opinion 
concluding, in effect, that if the states "as states" want 
protection within the constitutional system they must look to 
'. 
Congress, not to the courts. The "principal means," Justice 
Blackmun wrote, by which the role of the states in the federal 
system is to be ensured "lies in the structure of the Federal 
Government itself." 
The states and localities, to be sure, will survive the 
impact of Garcia's immediate holding, which involves the 
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to a muncipally owned 
mass-transit system. The holding is bound to be both burdensome 
and expensive, but most local governments will find ways to 
adjust, as they have done to other fiscal and legal vicissitudes. 
But far more than labor laws and bus drivers' pay is at stake in 
Garcia. 
Garcia raises fundamental questions about the role of the 
Supreme Court as the balance wheel of the federal system. Garcia 
abdicates a function which history, principle, and an 
understanding of the political process argue strongly that the 
federal judiciary should undertake. For those who care about the 
health of American constitutionalism--including, but not limited 
to, federalism--Garcia should be an unsettling decision. 
Although the ultimate reach of Garcia is unclear, the 
decision adopts a variation on a theme asking the Court to hold 
its hand when a 1 i tigant claims that a federal action is beyond 
the authority of the Federal Government in that the action 
encroaches upon some protected right of the states. Final 
resolution of such claims, this thesis runs, should be left to 
the political branches of the government. 
Such a position reads an important part of the founders' 
assumptions out of the constitutional order. One may debate--
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though the point has long since been academic--whether the{ -hw.nJ~,.., 
intended the Supreme Court to have the power of judicial review. 
But assuming the legitimacy of that doctrine, it is hard to 
escape the conclusion that the founders assumed that limiting 
national power in order to protect the states would be as much a 
part of the judicial function as any other issue. 
James Madison, in Federalist No. 39, was explicit: there 
must be a tribunal empowered to decide "controversies relating to 
the boundaries between the two jurisdictions." The nature of the 
ratification contest--especially the Federalist' need to reply to 
anti-Federalist charges--supports the conclusion that the 
proponents of the Constitution saw the necessity that federalism 
be among the institutional arrangements to be protected in the 
constitutional system. 
The principle of the rule of law adds force to what this 
history teaches. A basic tenet of Anglo-American 
constitutionalism is that no branch of government should be the 
ultimate judge of its own powers. The principle that one cannot 
be a judge in one's own cause is of centuries' standing. This 
principle is stated by Sir Edward Coke in Dr. Bonham's Case 
(1610) and, in our own time, bas been reinforced by United states 
v. Nixon (1974). The principle is especially important in a 
system which, in addition to being federal, looks to checks and 
balances and the separation of powers to restrain arbitrary 
government. 
A further flaw in Garcia is its resting upon erroneous 
suppositions about the ways in which the nation's political 
3 
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process actually works. Essential to any argument that the Court 
. " should abstain from adjudicating limits on national power V1S-a-
vis the states is the notion that the states have ample 
protection in the processes of politics. 
This assumption has two dimensions. One is institutional--
that the ·states have a major part in structuring the national 
government. The other is political--that the ways in which the 
process actually works (such as in the political parties and in 
Congress) focus on the states. In fact, neither branch of the 
argument reflects current realities. 
There was a time when the states had considerable influence 
over the shape of federal politics. Under the original 
Constitution, u.s. senators were elected by the legislatures of 
their respective states. The Constitution did not set federal 
standards for congressional elections; the states controlled the 
franchise. And it was up to the state legislatures as to how to 
draw the boundaries of congressional districts. 
All this has changed. The Seventeenth Amendment (adopted in 
1913) brought direct election of senators. Judicial decisions 
(such as that striking down the poll tax) and acts of Congress 
(notably the Voting Rights Act of 1965) have federalized much of 
the law respecting the franchise. The 1965 statute, for example, 
requires preclearance (by the Attorney General or the District 
Court for the District of Columbia) of voting changes in areas 
covered by the act. State power to apportion congressional seats 
has been circumscribed by decisions such as the Supreme Court's 
1964 opinion in Wesberry v. sanders, requiring that congressional 
districts based on population. 
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Accompanying these significant shifts in institutional 
arrangements has been a palpable decline in the "political" 
safeguards. Political parties, especially at the state level, no 
longer are the force they once were. Increased use of primaries 
and the impact of "reforms" have had the unintended consequence 
of encouraging the development of alternative institutions. Most 
striking has been the rise of PACs, which now number in the 
thousands. 
The "nationalization" of campaign finance has led to the 
weakening of the federal lawmakers' loyalties to constituents. 
Special interest politics has tended to replace consensus 
politics. Moreover, the explosive growth of the Federal 
Government in modern times has brought the emergence of the "iron 
triangle"--the convergence of bureaucrats, interested legislators 
(often powerful committee chairmen), and lobbyists to determine 
the shape of federal programs. 
In defense of having the Court abdicate Tenth Amendment 
questions, as it did in Garcia, one sometimes hears the argument 
that the Court cannot resolve empirical questions. Thus, it is 
argued, assessing the facts of a given case so as "balance" 
competing state and federal interests requires the Court to 
undertake a mode of enquiry that more properly belongs to 
legislators. Yet in other areas of constitutional litigation the 
Court resolves empirical questions as a matter of course. Every 
case involving claims that a state act burdens commerce requires 
the resolution of economic and other such data, but the Court 
does not shirk this task. 
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Another objection to the Court's having a role in Tenth 
Amendment cases is that the justices cannot draw workable 
distinctions, such as deciding (as precedents before Garcia had 
sought to do) what is and what is not a "traditional governmental 
function" (and hence entitled at least to some presumptive 
measure of protection against federal intrusion). such line-
drawing is, of course, difficult. But its being difficult does 
not mean that it should not be undertaken, any more than the 
conceptual difficulties of deciding what constitutes "speech" or 
"religion"--the thorniest of problems--are grounds for not 
deciding First Amendment cases. 
Whatever the tangles confronting the Court, there are even 
graver reasons to question Congress' competence or willingness to 
make considered judgments on constitutional questions--especially 
when the question is that of the limits of Congress' own power. 
The judicial process may have its flaws, but it aspires to a 
degree of rationality, including analytical reasoning, that one 
does not associate with the legislative process. The limits of 
time, the pressures of lobbyists, the temptations of expediency, 
undue reliance on staff, and other distractions often have more to 
do with the final shape of legislation than any thinking about 
constitutional issues. Martin Shapiro makes the point well: 
"The nature of the legislative process, combined with the nature 
of constitutional issues, makes it virtually impossible for 
Congress to make independent, unified, or responsible judgments 
on the constitutionality of its own statutes." 
Shl! 
~another argument for the Court's leaving the states and 
localities to the tender mercies of Congress is that the Court 
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needs to husband its scarce political capital. This argument 
raises the spectre of a return to "dual federalism"--the 
ancien regim~, before 1937, when the supreme Court often derailed 
federal social and economic legislation in the name of states' 
rights. 
such a risk is chimerical. For the Court to play a role in 
protecting the states as stat~s under the Tenth Amendment, as the 
majority set out to do in the Court's 1976 decision in National 
League of Cities v. Usery (overruled in Garcia), raises no 
question about Congress' power over the private sector. 
As to keeping the Court out of unnecessary controversies, 
most of the debate over "judicial activism" in recent decades has 
involved such issues as school prayer, criminal justice, and 
abortion. Federalism cases may provoke academic debate--and, of 
course, matter enormously to state and local officials--but they 
stir little outrage in the country at large. It is individual 
rights decisions that, by and large, stir passions. One doubts 
that the partisans of Garcia would be content to see individual 
rights matters, because they may be controversial, left likewise 
to the political process. 
Garcia betrays a glaring disregard of a basic truth about 
American constitutionalism: that institutional rights, under our 
Constitution, are a form of individual rights. Even such basic 
guarantees as those in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment do not secure absolute personal rights. The protection 
created is against governmental (that is, institutional) actions, 
not against infringements by private parties. Thus, for 
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individual rights to be secured requires assurances as to the 
stability of the institutional safeguards explicit or implicit in 
the Constitution. 
The individual American--as the heir to those who brought 
the Constitution into being and agreed to its adoption--has a 
fundamental entitlement to living under the form of government 
spelled out in the Constitution. The separation of powers is not 
to be abandoned simply because it may be inconvenient. Likewise, 
one of the predicates of the constitutional order is that the 
Supreme Court adhere to the values of federalism as manifestly 
implicit in the Constitution. 
Federalism may be an elusive idea, but it is no mere 
abstraction. And, while it was essential to the adoption of the 
original Constitution, it is more than simply a political 
compromise adopted to get the Constitution underway. Federalism 
is linked with individual liberty and with the health of the body 
politic. 
It is through participating in government at the local level 
that the citizen is educated in the value of civic participation. 
A robust federalism encourages state and local governments as 
schools for citizenship. Moreover, federalism both reflects and 
encourages pluralism, allowing individual idiosyncracies to 
flouish. One often hears Justice Brandeis quoted on the states' 
serving as "laboratories" for social and economic experiments. 
The states are more than mere laboratories; to the extent they 
encourage pluralism the states are handmaidens of the open 
society. 
Ultimately, the case for federalism rests on a concern to 
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preseve the right of choice--the essence of political freedom. 
States and local governments have, of course, often trampled this 
very right, for example, when they have denied the vote because 
of one's race. The remedies for such abuses lie in vigorous 
judicial enforcement of constitutional guarantees and in 
Congress' power to protect civil rights. But the need to guard 
against trespasses by states or localities on individual 
liberties does not undermine the conclusion that federalism as 
such can operate as part of the very matrix of protection fcc 
individual liberties. 
In refusing to enforce the Tenth Amendment--to play the role 
they regularly undertake in respect to other provisions of the 
Bill of Rights--the Garcia majority leaves an important 
constitutional sentry post unmanned. What recourse do those who 
care about the health of federalism have? 
There are other opportunities for courts to vindicate the 
underlying values. Federal statutes may be interpreted in light 
of their impact on state and local governments. For example, the 
Court's 1981 Pennhurst decision lays down the salutary rule that 
federal grant conditions, to be binding on state and local 
governments, must be clearly identified as such when grant funds 
are accepted. Notions of comity can come into play when 
reviewing lower courts' use of their equity powers to reform 
state institutions (such as prisons) or when deciding how far a 
federal court may go in intervening in state court proceedings 
(as in the Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris). 
Ultimately, one may hope for the undermining or demise of 
9 
Garcia. The majority decision stops short of saying that under 
no circumstances could the constitutional structure impose 
affirmative limits on federal actions affecting the states. A . 
more favorable fact situation than that ~Garcia, one entailing 
a more serious intrusion on the states and a more marginal 
~;,;,s. +~ 
federal interest, might ~occasion to begin the movement away 
from that unfortuate decision. 
Early and outright reversal of Garcia should not lightly be 
predicted, even assuming new justices are appointed to the Court. 
Reversals typically come only after a precedent has been robbed 
of vitality. The Court decided Gideon y. Wainwright (1963), 
requiring states to appoint counsel for felony defendants unable 
to afford a lawyer, only after twenty years of experience under 
Betts y. Brady proved that an ad hoc approach would not do. 
Likewise, it was easier for Justice Blackmun to rationalize the 
result in Garcia by pointing to the Court's difficulties in post-
National League of Cities decisions such as EEOC y. Wyoming and 
FERC y. Mississippi. 
Still, one can hope that eventually a majority of the 
justices will come to realize the mistake made in Garcia. 
Because federalism is an intrinsic component of the 
constitutional system--indeed, bolsters other constitutional 
values--safeguarding that process cannot be left to the 
unrestrained discretion of the political branches. It may be that 
the authority pronounced in National League of Cities (and 
renounced in Garcia) ought to be sparingly used. But it is 
salutary that the political branches know that the Court has 
power to step in when the facts point to intervention. 
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It is no less legitimate and proper for the supreme court to 
concern itself with assuring the health of federalism as it is 
for the Court to uphold individual liberties as such. In neither 
case is abdication of the Court's proper role consistent with the 
principles inhering in the Constitution. 
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UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA 
CHARLOTTESVILLE-VIRGINIA·22801 SEP 1 6 1985 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, DC 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
September 12, 1985 
I have arranged with the Boar's Head to have two bottles of 
German wine -- a 1983 Graacher JosephshOfer Riesling Sp!tlese and 
a 1982 Avelsbacher Altenberg Riesling Kabinnet -- provided to the 
Chief Justice and Mrs. Burger when they visit the law school this 
month. The Boar's Head will tell the Burgers when they arrive 
that the bottles are available and will deliver them to the 
Burgers' room upon request. I have asked that a note saying 
"From Jo and Lewis Powell with affection" accompany the gift. 
Because the Boar's Head had only one German wine on its list, I 
obtained the two bottles elsewhere in Charlottesville. They are 
both nice wines and are close to the ones you suggested. If you 
would like to change the arrangements at all, just let me know. 
The Boar's Head, I'm sure, will not mind a change in plans. 
Yours sincerely, 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
DEC 2 ~ 1985 
POSTA~ CODE Z7706 
December 12, 1985 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice 
United States Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Bu{lding 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Last term the Court abandoned any seriousness in federalism 
questions, in Garcia's overruling of the User~ case. Many of my 
colleagues in constitutional law think it is JUSt as well, but I 
believe they are mistaken. It is not clear to me on what legiti-
mate basis the Court may abdicate its obligation of judicial 
review piecemeal, or presume to apply less rigorous standards of 
constitutional compliance in some areas of its work than in other 
areas of more intense personal interest to some of its members. 
Your dissent in Garcia, like the conscientiousness of your 
work on related federalism issues (indeed, your work overall) is 
not subject to the reproach of selective enthusiasm. I was much 
moved by it and the written consequence is enclosed. I hope you 
may find it of some interest, especially as you are, in a manner 
of speaking, quite responsible for my having written it. 
Some years ago our mutual acquaintance, Gerald Gunther, 
wrote an appreciative article in which he compared your contribu-
tions and position within the Court to those of the late Justice 
Harlan. He was entirely right in doing so. The passing years 
have more than confirmed the compliment. Not the least important 
contribution you have made has been to those of us who regularly 
teach this subject and who thus cannot help but desire that the 
subject reflect an integrity of its own. Your opinions have been 
tremendously important in furnishing that assurance over the 
years. I would feel seriously remiss in allowing any more time 
to go by without having written to say how much your work has 
meant to me. 
I trust the current term goes well. 
Sincerely, 
?r~.//~~ 
William Van Alstyne 
January 7, 1986 
Dear Professor Van Alstyne: 
Since coming on the Court, I cannot recall having 
received a letter that pleased me as much as yours of Decem-
ber 12. I was deeply dlsturbed by the Court opinion in Gar-
cia. It can be read - and probably will be - as an abdica-
tion of the riqht to judici~l review of congressional action 
under the Commerce Clause. As your article so eloquently 
makes clear, the Court's reasoning and decision ~eem almost 
oblivious to the fact that the Constitution provided the 
structure for a federal nation. Otherwi<3e, the Constitution 
would never have been adopted. 
I would have benefited greatlv in writi.nq my dis-
sent, if I had had your brilliant article. I recall meeting 
you when we were on the proqram together at William and Mary 
in 1979. I admire both the substance of what you write even 
when I may not agree, and particularJ.y the grace with which 
you write. 
With appreciation and best wishes. 
Sincerely, 
Professor William Van Alstyne 
School of Law 
Duke University 
Durham, North Carolina 27706 
lfp/ss 
June 20, 1988 
M r • J a bl o ns k i : 
This is a belated thank you for your let-
ter, and the working master copies of the articles 
you have written on the 11th Amendment. I have 
hoped to find an opportunity to read at least one 
of them. I sat on the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals earlier this month, and now have three 
opinions to write that will keep me fairly busy. 
As you know fran my dissent in Garcia, I 
think it reasonably clear that the federal judi-
ciary has a responsibility to preserve the federal 
structure contemplated by the Constitution, the 
debates in Philadelphia, and the history of its 
ratification. 
I congratulate you on your fine education 
and record, and on the expected publication of 
your articles in the De Paul and Richmond Law Re-
views. I also recall meeting you in front of the 
statue of Chief Justice Marshall, and send best 
wishes. 
Sincerely, 
Joseph John Jablonski, Jr., Esquire 
1126 South Carolina Avenue, s. E. 




JOSEPH JOHN JABWNSKI, ... 
1126 South Carolina Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 543-3909 ..f2__ 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
q~ 
AtR 2 5 ,o,., 
April 20, 1988 
It was a great honor to meet you today in front of the 
statue of Chief Justice John Marshall in the ground floor of the 
Supreme Court. 
As promised, please find enclosed working masters of the two 
articles I have authored on the eleventh amendment. Undaunted by 
colleagues' remarks that the eleventh amendment was not "worthy 
of comment," I continued my efforts with encouragement from Judge 
Boggs, Dean Robert H. Mundheim, and Professor Clyde w. Summers, 
Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. 
The article entitled The Eleventh Amendment: An Affirmative 
Limitation on the Commerce Clause Power of the Congress - ~ 
Doctrinal Foundation is scheduled to be in print by the end of 
the summer in Volume 38 of the De Paul Law Review. Instead of 
distinguishing between the limits the eleventh amendment imposes 
on the federal courts, from the limits it imposes on the 
Congress, as Professor Tribe has clearly done (See L. TRIBE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 185 (1988)), I present a stronger more unified 
view of eleventh amendment doctrine cohering around the principle 
of the states' "constitutionally secured immunity" from 
unconsented federal jurisdiction over private suits against them 
- a principle even the Congress's clear will must respect, with 
the exception of enactments pursuant to section 5 of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
The article entitled Does Garcia Preclude an Eleventh 
Amendment Affirmative Limitation on the Commerce-clause Power of 
the Congress? is scheduled to be in print by November 1988 in 
Volume 23 of the University of Richmond Law Review. I suggest 
that the eleventh amendment may be one of those other 
"affirmative limits the constitutional structure might impose on 
federal action affecting the States under the Commerce Clause." 
Garcia ~· San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 
528, 556 (1985). Far from representing a form of "common law 
sovereign immunity," the eleventh amendment might be viewed as 
Page 2 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
addressing the problems of jurisdiction in a system of dual 
sovereignties in which the states have no representation in the 
federal judiciary. Thus, the eleventh amendment would bear its 
own structural justification, despite the Wechsler thesis. 
Further, the eleventh amendment might have broad implications for 
federalism law, as it may justify the Garcia dissenters' position 
that the Constitution does contemplate judicially enforceable 
affirmative protection for states from federal power. 
As indicated, I am currently with Judge Boggs in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Because Judge 
Boggs's Louisville chambers are not yet ready, we are temporarily 
situated in The James Forrestal Building, Room 6Bl04, 1000 
Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20585, (202) 586-
9440. Every five weeks we fly to Cincinnati, Ohio for the oral 
arguments, then back to Washington, D.C. to write our opinions. 
I might add that the mutual trust and respect we have in one 
another has been the greatest reward the clerkship has thus far 
given me. 
With best wishes. 
Jr. 
Law Clerk to the Honorable 
Danny J. Boggs, United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit 
JOSEPH JOHN JABLONSKI, JR. 
1126 South Carolina Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 543-3909 
EDUCATION 
UNIVERSI'IY OF PENNSYLVANIA, The Law School 
J.D., May 1987 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Editor 
Comment: The Eleventh Amendment: A Limit on the Commerce Clause Power of the Congress-
The Direction of the Supreme Court? 
UNIVERSI'IY OF PITrSBURGH, The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences 
M.A., Sociology, May 1983 
Teaching Scholar, 1981-82 
Cum. Ave.: 3.96 
HARVARD UNIVERSI'IY, The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences 
Visiting Graduate Student, 1982-83 
Unpublished paper: "Moral Logic of Virtu in the Thought of Machiavelli" 
UNIVERSI'IY OF PENNSYLVANIA, The College 
B.A., European History and Sociology, Double Major, May 1981 
Dean's List 
Honors Program in Sociology 
Honors Thesis: "Sociotemporality and the Behavioral System" 
Undergraduate teaching assistant for Emeritus Professor E. Digby Baltzell 
PUBLICATIONS 
Jablonski, The Eleventh Amendment: An Affinnative Limitation on the Commerce Clause Power of the Congress -
A Doctrinal Foundation, 38 DE PAUL L. REV._ (1988). 
Jablonski, Does Garcia Preclude an Eleventh Amendment Affinnative Limitation on the Commerce Clause Power of 
the Congress?, 23 U. RICH. L. REV._ (1988). 
EXPERIENCE 
Law Clerk 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1987-88 
The Honorable Danny J. Boggs 
Law Clerk 
Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, Summer 1986 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Massachusetts Bar Association 
Federalist Society 
Supreme Court Historical Society 
Phi Delta Theta Fraternity, University of Pennsylvania 
University Judicial System, University of Pennsylvania 
PERSONAL DATA 
b. January 17, 1960 Worcester, Massachusetts 
Saint John's, Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, diploma with highest honors, 1977 
Interests include American history and culture, ancient Greek and Latin, Shakespeare, and classical music. Other 
interests include ~olf, tennis and chess. Also collecting and restoring rare books, especially those works which 
influenced the thinking of the Framers. 
WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING 
2445 M STREET, N. W. 
WASHINGTON, o. C. 20037-1420 
EUROPEAN OFFICE 
4 CARLTON GARDENS 
PALL MALL 
CAROL F. LEE 
INTERNATIONAL TELEX: 440 239 WCPI Ul 
TELEX: 89-2402 WICRING WSH 
TELEPHONE 202 663 - 6000 LONDON, SWIY SAA , ENGLAND 
TELEPHONE 011-441-839-4466 
TELEX: 8813918 WCPLDN DIRECT LINE (202) 
663-6289 September 17, 1988 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
c/o Supreme Court of the United States 
One First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell, 
TELCPY : 839 -3537 
CABLE ADDRESS! WI C RING LONDON 
It was in the interplay between you and Justice Stevens, for 
whom I clerked during the 1982 Term, that I first became fascinated by 
questions of federalism. Both you and Justice Stevens wrote separately 
in EEOC v. Wyoming to express divergent views on the National League of 
Cities doctrine, and the two of you took leadership roles in the battle 
over Pennhurst II. 
Enclosed is a copy of my latest foray into the area of federalism. 
In a symposium issue of the Urban Lawyer arranged by the State and Local 
Legal Center, I explored the extent to which the "political safeguards of 
federalism" worked in four Congressional case studies. In each instance, 
Congress responded to the after-effects of Supreme Court decisions on state 
or local liability -- mitigating the effects of the antitrust laws and the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, and on the other hand attempting to impose liability 
on states under various civil rights statutes and the Superfund Act. On the 
whole, my article supports your conclusion in dissent in Garcia that there 
is little evidence of automatic, inherent respect for state and local interests 
in the Congressional process; on the other hand, state and local governments 
sometimes have a significant impact when they undertake active lobbying 
and pressure campaigns on issues of critical importance. I think that 
there are other, more persuasive grounds for the majority's conclusion in 
Garcia; but on "political safeguards" I think you have the better of the 
argument. 
I take the liberty of sending you a copy of the article because 
I know that federalism is one of the areas in which you took great personal 
interest. 
Sincerely, 
Carol F. Lee 
September 27, 1.988 
Dear Caro : 
Thank you f.or. your lnt.ere~t ng l~tter of September 
. 7, and for the copyr of your article on fede~al m. 
At +-h; s time, I have not had an ooportuni ty to read 
it. I note from your letter that you think I was right in 
suqqesting that rongress has 1E="ss resoect for st, te and 
local interests than state legis atures and local govern-
ments. 
Yet, I t•dll be interested i.n readinq your reasons 
for thinking that other grounds adequately support the m -
jor i ty' s conc1us i.on in Garc a. 'A though Justice StPVPns and 
I have "duel Pel" with enthusiasm over several issues, I hold 
him n high regard as a Justice an we share a warm friend-
ship. 
You r.e with a fine law firm, nd it is fortunate 
to have you. 
Sincerely, 
Ms. Carol F. Lee 
Wilmer, Cut er & P ckering 
2445 M Street, N.~. 
W~shington, n. C. '20037-1420 
lfp/ss 
